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Authority *MND 969000*
By *SP* NARA Date *8-29-01*



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TELEGRAM

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SECRET SECTION: 1 OF 2 USNATO: 0446

SUBJECT: NATO/PACT RELATIVE FORCE CAPABILITY STUDY

1. SUMMARY: IN WORK DONE THUS FAR ON NATO/PACT CAPABILITY STUDY, WE THINK WE HAVE REACHED POINT WHERE IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO CLEAR THE AIR ON WHAT WE SEE AS THE MAJOR PROBLEMS, LATEST OF WHICH MANIFESTED IN DISAPPOINTMENT EXPRESSED BY CONCERNED KEY INTERNATIONAL STAFF MEMBERS OVER VOIDS IN DATA INPUT FOR US AIR FORCES. DETAILS ON US INPUT WILL BE REPORTED SEPTEL. WE THINK STUDY WILL BE HELPFUL TO US INTERESTS, IF US SUPPORT OF STUDY IS MAINTAINED. END SUMMARY.

2. IT IS OUR VIEW HERE THAT THIS STUDY, WHICH IS NATO'S FIRST FULL-SCALE EFFORT TO EVALUATE ITS FORCES VIS-A-VIS THOSE OF THE PACT, IS AN OPPORTUNITY TO OBTAIN AN AGREED CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY COMPARISON AND THEREBY TO STRENGTHEN OUR FORCE PLANNING TECHNIQUES. WE THINK IT COULD BE MILESTONE IN GIVING US A MORE PRECISE BASIS FOR URGING NEEDED FORCE IMPROVEMENTS, AS WE ARE DOING NOW FROM INADEQUATE DATA BASE AND, CONSEQUENTLY, WITH ONLY MARGINAL SUCCESS.

3. UNFORTUNATELY, HOWEVER, IMPRESSION SEEMS TO BE GAINING GROUND IN INTERNATIONAL STAFF OF EFFECT THAT US IS UNINTERESTED IN COMPARISON STUDY. WE ARE FULLY AWARE OF DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED BY WASHINGTON STAFFERS IN PREPARING MATERIALS RELEASED TO DATE AND ARE MAKING STRONG EFFORTS TO ALLAY SUCH FEELINGS. WE WOULD HAVE MORE AMMUNITION FOR THIS IF WE

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COULD HOLD OUT HOPE FOR SOME HELP FROM US ON INTELLIGENCE PROBLEM.

4. AS A FINAL POINT IN SUPPORT OF NEED FOR VISIBLE U.S. INTEREST, THINK IT IMPORTANT WE KEEP IN MIND THAT SEED FROM WHICH IDEA FOR STUDY GREW WAS US FOOTNOTE TO MCM-17-68, NMA'S FORCE PROPOSALS, WHICH EVOLVED FROM DEPUTY SECRETARY NITZE'S STATEMENT AS CONSEQUENCE, I/S AND OTHER DELEGATIONS LOOK TO US TO LEAD WAY, IF NOT IN SUBSTANTIVE CONTRIBUTIONS OF METHODOLOGY AND TECHNIQUE, AT LEAST IN PROVISION OF GOOD DATA.

5. FOLLOWING ARE TWO SPECIFIC ILLUSTRATIONS OF CASES WHERE QUALITY OF US INPUTS CAN TIP BALANCE OF STUDY RESULTS IN EITHER DIRECTION OF FORCE SUPERIORITY:

1) THE ABSENCE OF DATA FOR US FORCES IN CRITICAL AIR PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT AREAS WILL LEAVE TO STUDY GROUP THE TASK OF MAKING SOME HIGHLY INEXACT ESTIMATES WHICH, IN OUR VIEW, WILL RESULT IN REFLECTING LESS, AND PERHAPS CONSIDERABLY LESS, THAN THE REAL OPERATIONS CAPABILITY OF USAF FORCES.

2) THE INTELLIGENCE PACKAGE CREDITS PACT FORCES GENERALLY WITH 100PC OF TO&E, AS REFLECTED IN THE OUTDATED SG 252/3, WHEREAS WE GATHER THAT THE US INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COULD SUBSTANTIALLY REFINER THIS JUDGMENT. ON THIS SECOND POINT, WE ARE WELL AWARE OF SENSITIVITIES INVOLVED IN THIS MATTER AND WOULD NOT EXPECT, NOR WOULD OUR NATO COLLEAGUES, THAT ALL BLANKS IN INTELLIGENCE FORMATS AND NECESSARY CORRECTIONS TO THE NATO DATA COULD BE IMMEDIATELY FURNISHED. HOWEVER, WE HOPE THAT DATA TO FILL SOME MISSING LINKS COULD BE PROVIDED SOON WITHOUT UNDUE COMPLICATIONS WITHIN THE WASHINGTON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. FOR MORE DETAILED EXPLANATION OF CRITICAL INTELLIGENCE GAPS WHICH ARE IMPEDING STUDY PROGRESS, YOU MIGHT WISH TO REFER TO USNATO 0340, 24 JANUARY 1969, AND NOTE FROM THE CHAIRMAN, WORKING GROUP ON RELATIVE FORCE CAPABILITIES, 15 JANUARY, POUCHED TO WASHINGTON, 22 JANUARY 1969.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE AIR FORCE DATA WILL BE CONTAINED IN SEPTTEL REFERRED TO IN PARA. 1, ABOVE. WE ARE NOT IN POSITION HERE, OF COURSE, TO SUGGEST SPECIFIC

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MEASURES TO BREAK APPARENT IMPASSE ON INTELLIGENCE DATA. HOWEVER, IT SEEMS TO US INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COULD BE ASKED TO TAKE HARD LOOK AT NATO PACKAGE (IF THEY ARE NOT ALREADY DOING SO) AND COME UP WITH EARLY SUBSTANTIVE INPUT, AND IN MEANTIME INDICATION OF ANTICIPATED INPUT WHICH WE CAN PASS TO WORKING GROUP AND OTHER INTERESTED AGENCIES.

7. TO ASSIST IN TACKLING FORMATS AND DOCUMENTS SENT TO WASHINGTON FOR REVIEW, FOLLOWING CHRONOLOGY IS FURNISHED:

A. USNATO 4648, 4 SEPTEMBER 1968, ADVISED FORMATS FOR US FORCES DATA INPUT BEING POUCHED, 5 SEPTEMBER. ARMY DATA CLEARED FOR RELEASE TO I/S BY JCS 07573, 12 DECEMBER 1968 AND AIR FORCE BY JCS 09330, 13 JANUARY 1969.

B. USNATO 5814, 18 OCTOBER 1968, ADVISED RFC(WG)(68)1, PACT LAND FORCES, POUCHED, 17 OCTOBER, REQUESTED WASHINGTON COMMENTS.

C. USNATO 5757, 13 NOVEMBER 1968, REQUESTED WASHINGTON COMMENTS ON RFC(WG)WP(68)2, PACT AIR FORCES, POUCHED, 12 NOVEMBER 1968.

D. USNATO 0308, 22 JANUARY 1969, REQUESTED WASHINGTON COMMENTS ON RFC(WG)WP(68)3, CHARACTERISTICS NATO AND PACT ARMY EQUIPMENT, POUCHED, 23 DECEMBER 1968.

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8. CURRENT INTENTION OF INTERNATIONAL STAFF, WHICH FURNISHES MOTIVE POWER FOR THE STUDY, IS TO SUGGEST EARLY MEETING OF WORKING GROUP TO REVIEW STATUS OF WORK IN PROGRESS. ALL REQUESTED DATA ON NATO FORCES HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM ALL OTHER COUNTRIES; ONLY THAT FROM US REQUIRES FURTHER PROCESSING TO CONFORM TO FORMATS USED IN STUDY. I/S HOPES TO HAVE ALL ESSENTIAL FIRST ROUND DATA TABLES PRINTED BY 15 FEBRUARY SO THAT MC WILL HAVE ADEQUATE PERIOD, ALONG WITH DELEGATIONS, FOR REVIEW OF DATA TABLES, BEFORE ANY EFFORTS ARE MADE TO DRAW EVEN TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS, WHETHER FOR WASHINGTON ANNIVERSARY MEETING OR FOR A LATE MAY/EARLY JUNE OPC MINISTERIAL MEETING.

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