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This new battalion may have been formed by using the small reconnaissance battalion elements as a nucleus. The large number of reports stating that personnel from line units were selected for parachute training, or had departed for an unknown location after receiving an extensive physical examination, indicate that the EGA is preparing to activate a parachute unit of regimental size or larger. If such a unit is activated, the East Germans will have to rely on the Soviet Air Force for transport aircraft since the East German airlift capability is negligible.

4 Another EGA unit was activated in Pinnow in September 1959. The unit is of approximately regimental strength, and is either field or anti-aircraft artillery. The strict secrecy surrounding the installation housing the unit and the large number of reports indicating that the unit is associated with missiles and anti-aircraft troops lends credence to the assumption that Pinnow may be a SAM school and that a SAM unit is now in training there.

5 A ring of construction sites around Berlin, three of which have been confirmed to date as SAM sites, has been reported. While the ultimate user of the sites is unknown, many reports indicate that the EGA will move into them when they are completed. One SAM site located near Rauhen is guarded by EGA troops.

6 A passive Air Defense Command was activated in 1959 in East Germany. This command is subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior and will be responsible for damage control in major industrial areas during wartime. During peacetime it probably has the mission of assisting the Security Alert Police in controlling internal disturbances. While it is planned to activate at least one battalion-size unit in each major industrial area, only two battalions have been activated to date. These two battalions are located near Schneeberg and Potsdam.

7 Training in the Garrisoned Security Forces followed the pattern of 1959. Increased exercise activity involving the EGA and the Security Forces was observed this year. This increased coordination indicates the East German regime's desire to mold the Garrisoned Security Forces into effective combat units. Increased activity involving the Security Alert Police and the Kampfgruppen (Factory Militia) was also observed.

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(e) Hungarian Army

1 While it is probable that Hungarian Army units were issued additional equipment during 1960, the rebuilding of the army continued at a very slow pace. The Hungarian government budget for 1960 provided for a 30 percent increase in defense expenditures over 1959. This increase, together with reports during the summer of equipment being withdrawn from depots (where it had been stored since the Revolution) and issued to units, probably signify an effort to improve the equipment status of the Hungarian Army. However, its equipment still lags behind that of other Satellite armies.

2 Lieutenant General Lajos Czinege replaced Colonel General Geza Revesz as the Hungarian Minister of Defense on 18 May 1960. General Czinege, like his predecessor, has very little military experience, but has been a very active participant in Communist Party affairs for a number of years. He has held a series of important Party and government posts since World War II, and served in the Hungarian Army as a political officer from 1951 to 1954, attaining the rank of lieutenant colonel. The appointment of another Party functionary to the principal defense establishment post indicates the government's concern over Party control of the army, a concern which has been quite apparent during the rebuilding of the Hungarian Armed Forces.

3 Increased emphasis on the improvement of the Hungarian air defense system was noted during 1960. An air defense school, which was probably established in late 1959, is located in Budapest. A considerable amount of antiaircraft artillery training, mostly involving gun drill and tracking exercises, was observed at several locations during the year. The National Air Defense and Air Force Command (OLLEP) is believed to contain not more than two understrength antiaircraft divisions at present, and few elements of even these two are believed to be fully operational. The existence of an air defense school, and increased training activity by nondivisional antiaircraft artillery elements should help to alleviate this problem.

4 Civil defense training in Hungary continues to be emphasized, and very active programs to prepare individuals for duties in this field are under way throughout the country. As in 1959 some members of the 1912 through 1915 age groups were summoned for active duty training in civil defense matters during

1960. Although very little is known about the organization of the civil defense element of the Ministry of Interior, an estimated battalion-size unit is permanently located in Budapest. A civil defense training center is reportedly located near Petervasara, northwest of Eger.

5 The improvement of barriers continues along the Hungarian-Austrian frontier, with wooden mines being gradually replaced by plastic ones. The mine replacement program is being phased over a period of several years and indicates the Hungarian regime's continued concern with illegal border crossings, even though border security has been greatly improved since the 1956 Revolution.

(i) Polish Army

1 The program of modernization and mechanization was not as apparent in 1960 as it was in the two previous years. There were no new items of equipment reported in the Polish Army. However, 35mm antiaircraft guns were still being replaced by 100mm antiaircraft guns in home defense-type antiaircraft units.

2 Press reports mentioned an engineer brigade in the Warsaw Military District. This might indicate that there is an engineer brigade subordinate to each of the military districts rather than the three separate engineer regiments now held. However, this organization is not accepted as yet because of insufficient information.

3 The 3d Artillery Division in Orzysz is now accepted as the 8th Artillery Division. It is the only artillery division in the Polish Army.

4 Several personnel changes were noted during the year. They were apparently part of a program to strengthen the political reliability of high-level personnel.

5 Conscription was in accordance with the 1959 law, with draftees being inducted and released according to expected procedures.

6 Reservists throughout Poland were called up during the year. As in the past, they were integrated into active and special reserve units and remained on active duty for periods ranging from three weeks to three months.

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(g) Rumanian Army

1 An additional unidentified infantry division was accepted at Turnu-Severin in late November. During 1960 a report from a reliable Western observer and documentary confirmation make it clear that the First Military Region was not inactivated, as reported in 1959, but moved its headquarters to Bacau. As a result, the First Military Region is currently reaccepted in order of battle holdings with headquarters at Bacau.

2 Rumanian Army training and activities followed an unusual pattern in 1960. In January small units participated in recruit training which included basic drill, weapons familiarization and range firing. Artillery and tank firing exercises were conducted during February. Spring training activity appeared to be more intense than during the same period in previous years. The accelerated tempo of military activity was highlighted by a field exercise probably of reinforced division level during the first week in April. This was the first reliable observation in over two years indicating that training for any Rumanian Army unit had approached division level. However, summer field training was interrupted in July when nearly all Rumanian troops were engaged in harvesting, house-keeping, construction projects and garrison training. A summer induction of conscripts further reduced the high level of training attained in the spring. As a result training deteriorated to the low level of previous years and the Rumanian Army continued to lag behind other Satellites for the remainder of 1960.

3 An estimated 30 T-54 tanks were observed in tank sheds of the Tudor Vladimirescu (TV) Tank Division area during early 1960. This is the largest number of this type of tank so far observed in Rumania. During 1960 amphibious armored personnel carriers, probably the BTR-50p, were identified and accepted in Rumania. Other newly reported items were a possible PT-76 amphibious tank and some possible JSU-122 assault guns.

4 Decrees of the Rumanian Grand National Assembly directed that in addition to normally assigned missions, the Frontier Troops "will keep watch on air space and national territorial waters of the Rumanian People's Republic." Terms of service for air force, antiaircraft artillery and Frontier Troops conscripts were reduced from three to two years.

5 A reorganization of the Security Troops and

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Border Guards was reported. On 1 March 1960 an unidentified decree of the Rumanian National Assembly outlined a reorganization of the Border Guard and Security Troop Command (Comandamentul Trupelor de Granicieri si Securitatea (CTGS)) which was divided into two separate commands. The Troop Command of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Comandamentul Trupelor de Ministerul Afacerilor Interne (CTMAI)) remained subordinate to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Border Guards Troop Command (Comandamentul Trupelor de Granicieri (CTG)) became subordinate to the Ministry of Armed Forces (Ministerul Forta Armata (MFA)).

4. (S) Soviet Military Capabilities

In discussing Soviet military capabilities and courses of action in the USAREUR area of responsibility, it is considered most likely that any-military action in this area would be taken within the framework of a global war. The necessity for strategic deployment would limit the force which the Soviets could apply in central Europe.

a. General Considerations

Soviet national policies are designed to solidify the power of the Soviet government at home, to maximize this power within the Sino-Soviet Bloc countries, and to extend this power throughout the free world. The Soviet government considers a powerful military establishment essential to these policies.

Soviet leaders are presently following policies which create little risk of general war. Their policies during this cold war period, while not disregarding military aspects, are definitely oriented toward political and economic conquest as indicated by their current "coexistence" statements. They obviously realize that general war would entail a nuclear exchange from which neither side would emerge without unacceptable damage. Soviet leaders have been quick to disassociate themselves from statements made by other Bloc leaders concerning the inevitability of war and have endeavored to force modification of this "survival of the fittest" concept, even to the point of exerting economic and political pressures which have nearly caused serious breaches in Communist Bloc solidarity.

Current policies of the USSR are directed toward the consolidation of power within the Soviet Bloc and the extension

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of Communism among nations susceptible to infiltration and subversion. Soviet goals have expanded beyond the earlier phase of gaining control of states bordering the USSR and now include aggressive interjection of Soviet influence into world-wide targets of opportunity, such as the new nations in Africa and areas of unrest in the Western Hemisphere. Other fundamental aims are the dissolution or weakening of NATO and CENTO, the promotion of divisive tendencies among the nations of the free world, and the perpetuation of the division of Germany unless it can be reunited on Soviet terms.

Immediate Soviet objectives include a disarmament agreement and a settlement of the Berlin-East/West German situation. Such a disarmament agreement, however, can come about only on Soviet terms which essentially would permit the USSR to retain its large conventional capability while forcing the West to abandon its nuclear capability. Neutralization of the Western atomic capability would remove the major deterrent to Soviet military action. As for nuclear testing, the Soviets are probably satisfied with the de facto moratorium which presently exists. These objectives, namely disarmament and a Berlin settlement, both on Soviet terms, will undoubtedly be priority items on the agenda of any new summit conference. The Soviets desire such a conference by mid-1961 provided they believe that it will work to their benefit. Pending such negotiations the USSR will foster an atmosphere of detente in the West, supported by an impression of Soviet willingness to settle issues through negotiation.

Regardless of the outcome of any summit meeting, it is estimated that the Soviets may well sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany during 1961. Nonetheless, the USSR will make every effort to approach any possible summit conference appearing as a respectable, peace-loving country, while at the same time preserving the status quo in Eastern Europe.

b. Forces Available

(1) Soviet ground forces located in the European Satellites consist of 26 line divisions together with support units and control elements.

(a) The GSFG consists of 10 tank divisions, 10 motorized rifle divisions and support units. These are organized into six armies. The GSFG with its 20 divisions is a highly mobile,

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balanced striking force capable of immediate deployment for combat operations. The level of training in GSFG is high and is geared to both atomic and nonatomic warfare. Its weapons and weapons system are modern. This force poses the most immediate threat in the USAREUR area of responsibility.

(b) In addition to GSFG the Soviets have four divisions in Hungary. These four divisions, one motorized rifle and three tank, constitute the SGF. There are also two divisions stationed in Poland. These divisions, one tank and one motorized rifle, make up the NGF.

(2) Satellite ground forces as a group possess limited capabilities. These range from the capability of the Bulgarian Army to conduct a limited offensive against either Greece or Turkey to the negligible capability of the Albanian Army to withstand any significant attack. The armies of the other European Satellites have capabilities which lie between those of the Bulgarian and Albanian Armies. At best they would be able to take the field as divisions or armies under Soviet control in limited offensive operations, and at worst they could become liabilities. All of the Satellite armies are logistically dependent upon the USSR to some extent. On balance, it is estimated that the Satellite forces will be a military asset to the Soviets in case of war up to the time Soviet control over the military situation in their areas appeared to be weakening.

(3) Available to reinforce a Soviet offensive against Western Europe are an estimated 98 Soviet Army line divisions located in the 13 military districts of the USSR west of the Urals. With the present rail and highway capability, disregarding Allied interdiction, the Soviets could reinforce their forces in Western Europe at the rate of approximately 8.5 divisions daily (4.3 divisions by rail and 4.2 divisions by highway). However, only the rail reinforcement capability is considered a feasible initial capability. Highway movement across Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary would be slow and uneconomical, and would reduce the combat capabilities of the units involved.

c. Enumeration of Soviet Military Capabilities

(1) Withdraw all or a portion of Soviet forces stationed in the European Satellites.

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(2) Maintain forces in the European Satellites at present strength.

(3) Allow, or take, varying degrees of military action against West Berlin to include liquidation of the Western military position in Berlin.

(4) Attack Western Europe without previous build-up or warning.

(5) Attack Western Europe following a limited reinforcement in the forward areas.

(6) Attack Western Europe following a large-scale reinforcement in the forward areas.

(7) Support capabilities (3), (4), (5) or (6) with any or all of the following:

(a) 5,750 Soviet combat aircraft and 2,600 Satellite aircraft in support of forward ground and air units during the initial hours of hostilities, except to the extent they are committed to air defense of the homeland.

(b) 20,000 airborne troops in a single assault airlift.

(c) A wide range of rockets, guided missiles and nuclear weapons.

d. Discussion of Soviet Military Capabilities

(1) Withdraw All or a Portion of Soviet Forces Stationed in the European Satellites

A continuation of the present policy of stationing troops in Eastern Europe provides the USSR the best assurance of consolidating its power there and affords the best strategic positioning. The presence of Soviet forces in Poland and Hungary is important to the security of the USSR. The presence of at least elements of the GSFG in East Germany supports Soviet control of East Germany and assists in maintaining the East German regime. The geographic situation of East Germany affords the Soviets a valuable forward position from which operations can be mounted

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against Western Europe. Further, the attraction exerted by West Germany's prosperity, the avowed aims of West German leaders to bring about a termination of the partition of Germany, and the primacy of the problem imposed by West Berlin are sufficient reasons in themselves to maintain Soviet strength in East Germany essentially at its present level if the USSR is to preserve a strong bargaining position on the future of Germany and assure the stability of the East German government. Therefore, it is believed that a complete withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe is unlikely.

Conversely, there are reasons why the Soviets could and should withdraw troops from the Satellite areas. A substantial withdrawal would bring Moscow considerable propaganda benefit and a distinct psychological advantage. Some reduction also would appear logical to support the current Soviet disarmament propaganda offensive and would be in consonance with the announced shift in emphasis from reliance on masses of men to reliance on missiles and other modern weapons. In deciding on appropriate strength levels the Soviets will be governed by their estimate of minimum security requirements.

Minimum Soviet forces required to maintain the Soviet position in East Germany are estimated to be four divisions or one army. This figure is based on strengths necessary to control internal uprisings and assumes the continued reliability of the EGA. Any reduction of this magnitude would probably be dependent upon settlement of the Berlin problem to the satisfaction of the Soviets and would be given widespread advance notice.

Soviet forces in Poland (NGF) render the double service of securing general Soviet interests in that country and of providing lines of communication security for GSFG. In view of the unorthodox nature of Polish Communism and the restlessness of the Polish people, a requirement for at least two divisions exists. It is therefore deemed unlikely that any reduction will be made in the ground forces in NGF.

Soviet forces in Hungary (SGF) are probably in excess of those required to maintain the Soviet position in that country. Present security requirements probably are no greater than those before the 1956 revolt. At that time an estimated two Soviet divisions were in Hungary. Forces stationed in the USSR near Hungary could move rapidly into the country should a requirement for additional forces arise again. Accordingly, a reduction of up to two Soviet divisions in SGF is deemed possible.

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A total reduction of 18 Soviet divisions in the European Satellites is feasible from the Soviet viewpoint and is therefore considered possible. However, any decision on withdrawal and the extent thereof will probably hinge on the outcome of negotiations at a future summit or other high-level conference.

(2) Maintain Forces in the European Satellites at Current Strength

The adoption of this capability is almost certain through early 1961, at least until the Berlin problem is settled to the satisfaction of the Soviets or, in the absence of such a settlement, until after the Soviets sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany and determine Western reaction to it.

The Soviets will retain the option of undertaking or sponsoring harassing actions against Western powers. The exposed position of West Berlin furnishes the Soviets a useful lever with which to attempt to coerce the Allies. If the Soviets decide to maintain pressure on the West by this means, they will probably maintain the GSFG at its current strength unless actions requiring larger forces are contemplated.

The foregoing discussion has been based on the estimate that Soviet leaders do not intend to start a general war in Europe during 1961. The possibility remains that, for reasons not apparent at this time, the Soviet leaders might decide to begin hostilities during this period or that Soviet or East German miscalculation might lead to war. For that reason attack capabilities are analyzed below to include their relative probability of adoption. While the course of action against Berlin is in part a cold war capability, it is enumerated here in view of its potentially explosive nature.

(3) Allow or Take Varying Degrees of Military Action Against West Berlin to Include the Liquidation of the Western Military Position in Berlin

The range of Soviet capabilities against West Berlin and its communications with West Germany is extremely broad, proceeding from minor harassments of traffic to outright military attack and seizure of West Berlin. The Soviets could allow the East Germans to take these actions, with or without Soviet support, or the Soviets could take them unilaterally. The

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actions could be exercised selectively against German civilian traffic to and from Berlin, or against the Western Allies' military rights of access, or both; against certain types of traffic or communications, or against all types of traffic and communications from West Germany to West Berlin. Exercise of Soviet capabilities could take the form of imposition of new procedures, taxes or regulations, or the transfer of Allied access controls to the East German government, as well as creation of disturbances in West Berlin. These actions could be executed by individual Soviet soldiers, East German guards, "goon squads," groups of so-called "workers," or by Soviet and East German military forces.

Individual acts by Soviet or East German personnel necessitating protests of Western military commanders may occur at any time. However, as long as the West appears willing to consider a new summit conference, no major harassment of West Berlin and its lines of communication is likely. Should no progress be made on the Berlin issues in the next few months, or in the event no high-level conference is held, the USSR will probably renew its pressures on West Berlin and may sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany. The treaty would probably give control of Berlin access routes to the East Germans, subject to tacit Soviet supervision and veto.

If control of access routes is turned over to the East Germans, they may take any or all of the following actions:

(a) Air Traffic

1 Permit civil air traffic into and out of Berlin but demand that they be permitted to inspect passenger manifests.

2 Refuse to guarantee the safety of commercial flights, thus effectively limiting traffic to military aircraft.

3 Limit the number of military flights daily.

4 Take such military action as is necessary to prevent military flights.

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It is estimated that courses 3 and 4 will not be taken as a cold war action because of the grave risks involved.

(b) Rail Traffic

1 Deny services essential to military rail traffic, i. e., refuse use of locomotives or right-of-way, or refuse to furnish train crews.

2 Refuse to permit use of Allied equipment and personnel.

3 Attempt to force entry into cars to check passenger documentation.

4 Use force to stop trains.

It is estimated that courses 3 and 4 will not be taken as a cold war action because of the grave risks involved.

(c) Highway Traffic

1 Stop civilian traffic on the grounds of improper procedures or documentation.

2 Stop civilian shipments on the basis that they include war materiel.

3 Increase autobahn tolls to an exorbitant degree.

4 Stop Allied military traffic.

It is estimated that course 4 will not be taken as a cold war action because of the grave risks involved.

A Communist military assault on West Berlin is unlikely during 1961 unless the Soviets accept the risk of general war.

(4) Attack Western Europe Without Previous Build-up or Warning

The USSR is aware of the growing power in the

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USAREUR area. The continuing introduction of atomic weapons and the development in combat effectiveness of forces adjacent to the Satellites are certainly indications to the USSR that any attack must be made with forces adequate to obtain and exploit initial success in the face of defenses supported by atomics, and to maintain the momentum until reinforcements can be made available.

If the Soviets attack in central Europe without previous world-wide build-up, they will be confronted with the necessity of neutralizing the widely dispersed Allied retaliatory forces and of engaging in large-scale air, ground and naval warfare. Such an ambitious commitment, undertaken before adequate air, ground and naval forces had been deployed to exploit the initial attack, would require the ability to deliver a decisive initial attack. To do this the Soviets will need an exceptionally large nuclear stockpile and extensive, diversified and accurate means of delivery which they do not now possess to the extent necessary.

The Soviet Armed Forces in the forward area are capable of attaining an offensive posture rapidly and could be committed at their present strength. A coordinated initial strike involving ground, air and naval forces would require different starting times for each of the various components and different delivery means to assure that all significant targets are neutralized at approximately the same time. For example, it would be necessary for manned aircraft to start for their targets several hours before intercontinental ballistic missiles are fired. The coordination problem in a global attack is complex. In accomplishing such a plan, it is estimated that the deployment of manned aircraft would provide as much as five hours' warning. This warning would negate strategic surprise at least and would reduce the possibility of a really decisive initial attack to the point of unacceptability. Therefore, it is estimated that during 1961 the Soviets will not attack without some previous build-up.

(5) Attack Western Europe Following Reinforcement in the Forward Areas

If carried out covertly, this capability would not seriously compromise the Soviet intention of obtaining surprise, since limited ground and air reinforcement could be accomplished rapidly in locations adjacent to the major avenues of approach into

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Western Europe. Reinforcement in the forward areas (i. e., up to the Oder-Neisse line) before attacking would be in consonance with Soviet tactical doctrine.

It is estimated that the Soviets would favor a limited reinforcement to bring the attacking elements up to an initial balanced force of 45 to 60 line divisions in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, with planned additional reinforcements to bring the strength up to 100 divisions by D+30. The initial reinforcement to 45 line divisions could be accomplished in approximately four days. However, movement at this rate would saturate all lines of communication, would be difficult if not impossible to conceal, and would be dependent upon optimum combat conditions and unit readiness. It is more probable that a limited build-up would be phased over one or more weeks. For security reasons, reinforcement of the forward area would probably not involve movement of forces into East Germany until H-hour or immediately before.

Soviet objectives under a limited initial reinforcement would be to provide a preponderance of balanced forces having the capability of overrunning Western Europe within a short time, and to attain maximum possible surprise.

It is also possible that the Soviets might take advantage of a rapidly deteriorating international climate in order to conduct a large-scale reinforcement of the forward area. This would probably be done on the pretext of defending the Warsaw Pact area, or of strengthening the internal security of Satellite countries at the request of their governments. Such a large-scale reinforcement would sacrifice strategic surprise but would probably still permit tactical surprise. The Soviets probably believe, however, that the advantages of the preponderance of force provided by the large-scale reinforcement might well be lost since it might provoke a Western pre-emptive attack.

In view of the foregoing, it is believed that should the Soviets decide to start a general war during 1961 they would favor a rapid, covert reinforcement to provide a balanced striking force of 45 to 60 line divisions in the forward areas. A possible land campaign against central Europe is illustrated in Annex 1. It is estimated that at a later date the Soviets would also launch an attack against southern Europe. A possible land campaign against this area is illustrated in Annex 2.

(6) Support Capabilities

In the event of a Soviet decision to adopt capabilities (4), (5) or (6) it is highly probable they would support the course of action selected with rockets, missiles, CBR warfare, fighter and bomber aircraft, and airborne forces.

(a) Soviet ground forces possess varying numbers and a wide range of rockets, guided missiles and other nuclear weapons delivery systems. They vary from a 200mm rocket with a 20,000-yard range to a ballistic missile having a 1,100-nautical-mile range. In addition the Soviets are estimated to have a small number of intercontinental ballistic missiles of 5,500- to 6,500-nautical-mile range although these missiles would probably be used against the United States rather than Western Europe.

(b) The Soviets also have available chemical and biological agents. Their training procedures and public statements on the use of such weapons indicate that when the situation requires, the Soviets intend to exploit their capabilities.

(c) Soviet air forces available in the forward area are capable of mounting in excess of 1,800 jet fighter sorties and approximately 275 light bomber sorties during the first day of combat against Western Europe.

(d) Using the aircraft organic to the Aviation of Airborne Troops, the Soviets could employ an estimated 20,000 airborne troops within a radius of 500 nautical miles in a single airlift. In a five-day operation approximately 50,000 could be committed against Western Europe. The Soviets also have an estimated 220 light and medium helicopters available in the Aviation of Airborne Troops for troop movement and cargo transportation.

e. Warning of Soviet Attack

Soviet ground forces in the European Satellites consist of a large number of tank and motorized rifle divisions ready for commitment at any time. Soviet forces in East Germany could attack NATO forces without warning. The following estimate of warning times is based solely on the probability of detecting the movement of ground units to attack positions.

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(1) Warning times do not apply to capabilities (1) and (2).

(2) In connection with capability (3), direct military action or infiltration of Allied sectors of Berlin could occur with no warning, although it is considered improbable that such actions will occur. Political actions with regard to Berlin are very likely and can occur without warning.

(3) In the unlikely event that capability (4) (attack without previous build-up) were to be adopted, without a preceding increase in international tensions, it is estimated that from 4 to 12 hours' warning time would be available. This statement assumes the continued functioning of the Allied Military Liaison Missions in East Germany and that the G5FG would not attack unless all 20 of its divisions were to be committed in the first hours of hostilities.

(4) If capability (5) (attack with reinforcement) is adopted, it is estimated that up to four days' warning time would be available. This figure is based upon the minimum time required to move up to the Oder-Neisse line the additional forces necessary to make an initial attacking force of 45 divisions. In the event the Soviets attack after a deliberate, large-scale build-up, it is probable that up to 10 days' warning could be obtained.

(5) Hostilities would probably be preceded by an increase in international tensions, which could provide some degree of strategic warning. Such a warning might be on the order of several days or weeks but would not rule out the possibility of tactical surprise.

(6) It is also probable that any Soviet course of action initiating hostilities would be prefaced by certain unusual security and air defense measures in both the USSR and in Satellite countries.

(7) In summary, based on the premise that the Soviets will conduct a limited build-up before attack (the most likely course of Soviet action), it is estimated that up to four days' warning of impending attack can be obtained through detection of forward movement of ground forces. This time would be increased in proportion to the amount of information obtained on other Soviet activity.

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5. (S) Conclusions

a. The USSR still adheres to its goal of eventual world domination. Historically, the USSR has moved into every area adjacent to it when not opposed by military force. However, the Soviets realize the destructive potentialities of unrestricted nuclear warfare. The USSR, for the present, intends to achieve world domination by means other than general armed conflict, although it will not hesitate to use a lesser degree of force. In areas other than Europe, the Soviets prefer to exert this force by providing assistance to suitable countries, or by using a Satellite as a front (disavowing the action, if necessary).

b. It is estimated that for at least the next year the USSR will:

(1) Initially, cultivate the impression of "peaceful coexistence."

(2) Emphasize scientific progress.

(3) Strengthen its armed forces qualitatively.

(4) Strengthen its internal economic base.

(5) Continue its political consolidation and economic integration of the European Satellites.

(6) Continue the modernization and strengthening of the armed forces of the European Satellites on a selective basis.

(7) Carry on the world-wide struggle for Communist domination by overt economic penetration and both overt and covert political infiltration. The primary effort will be in the uncommitted or neutral areas of Asia and Africa, in border areas, and in susceptible areas in Latin America.

(8) Attempt to divide the Western nations, particularly the NATO powers.

c. The strength of Soviet forces in the European Satellites will be maintained at substantially current levels, at least until:

(1) Sufficient rockets and missiles have been deployed

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in forward areas to permit further reduction in conventional artillery and other support, or

(2) A summit or other high-level meeting results in agreements which grant the USSR adequate compensation for withdrawal of some forces from those Satellites.

d. The Soviets will not permit any major provocative incidents in East Germany and Berlin as long as they foresee prospects of a new summit meeting. Even if there is no summit meeting or if a summit meeting should fail, the Soviets will continue to restrain the East Germans in order to reduce the possibilities of general war. The USSR, however, may at any time permit or sponsor tensions in the Berlin area in order to emphasize the Soviet position that settlement of the Berlin question on its terms is essential to the maintenance of peace. It will continue to press for acceptance at least of the de facto recognition of the East German regime, the economic and political isolation of West Berlin from West Germany, and ultimately, the integration of West Berlin with East Berlin and with East Germany.

e. A large-scale Satellite revolt is not probable during 1961.

f. The USSR will not deliberately start a general or limited war in Europe during 1961.

g. Soviet or Satellite actions to harass or annoy the Western powers, accompanied by a miscalculation of Western capabilities and determination to resist, are the most likely circumstances that could lead to hostilities in Europe in 1961.

h. In the event hostilities do occur, it is estimated that the most probable course of action will be a rapid, limited reinforcement in the European Satellite areas before the attack. For security reasons, the USSR will probably refrain from moving reinforcements into East Germany before D-day. It is estimated that the initial force would consist of 45 to 60 line divisions supported by 20,000 airborne troops and approximately 5,750 combat aircraft. This would give approximately four days' warning time.

i. However, in the unlikely event that the USSR were to initiate a war without previous reinforcement of the forward areas, the period of warning gained through detection of forward movement

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of ground forces would probably vary from 4 to 12 hours. Interpretation of other imminence factors could extend this warning period to several days.

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- ANNEXES:
1. Possible Land Campaign vs Western Europe
 2. Possible Land Campaign vs Southern Europe
 3. Weather
 4. Terrain
 5. National Policies.
 6. War Production
 7. Resistance Potential and Internal Stability
 8. Compositions
 9. Strengths
 10. Dispositions
 11. Personnel/Organization/Equipment
 12. Training
 13. Combat Effectiveness/Reliability
 14. Soviet Airborne Forces
 15. Paramilitary Organizations

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- ANNEXES:
16. Reinforcement Capability
 17. Soviet-Satellite Weapons and Equipment
 18. Logistics
 19. Guided Missile Capability
 20. Atomic Energy Capabilities
 21. CBR Capabilities
 22. Electronics Capabilities
 23. The Counterintelligence Estimate

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