


POSSIBLE LAND CAMPAIGN VS SOUTHERN EUROPE




Note: Soviet forces only are considered except for those movements in the southern Balkans which could include Bulgarian forces. Time phasing is not portrayed.

SCALE: 1:2,000,000

Figure No. 2

SECRET

POSSIBLE LAND CAMPAIGN VS WESTERN EUROPE



Notes: Soviet forces only are considered. Time phasing is not portrayed. It is estimated that the major movement through the North Corridor and the Central German Plain areas will precede these movements in the

NATIONAL POLICIES

(S) From the point of view of Soviet policy, the year 1960 was characterized by unresolved problems, some of them new, others persisting from previous years. Ideologically, the greatest problem was Communist China's repeated disputation of Moscow's line on a variety of international and internal policy issues. These differences required lengthy discussion at the meeting of Communist leaders in Moscow in November 1960. In the late summer the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute generated unusual ramifications in Moscow's relationships with Albania, the most remote of its European Satellites. Militarily, the extent to which Khrushchev would carry out his announced reduction of the USSR's armed forces appeared increasingly in doubt as 1960 ended. Economically, the USSR again was beset by difficulties in agriculture, particularly in the so-called "Virgin Lands," and by the chronic problem of satisfying the Soviet population's increasing demands for more consumer goods.

(S) Technologically, the Soviets failed to achieve an anticipated breakthrough--possibly a man in space--during Khrushchev's protracted stay in the UN in September and October. In the U-2 incident of May 1960, however, the Soviets had succeeded in bringing down a US reconnaissance plane over the central USSR. The incident served Khrushchev as an excuse, which he apparently had been seeking, to torpedo the Paris Summit Conference. However, it also raised many questions in the West, and possibly among Soviet citizens as well, concerning Khrushchev's claims of Soviet power and the inviolability of the USSR's defenses. Although the U-2 incident may have had little real bearing on the basic relationship between Soviet and Western military power, it nevertheless resulted in some diminution of the psychological image of overwhelming and irresistible Soviet power which Khrushchev had been seeking to create since the first Sputnik in October 1957. The remarks of Soviet military commentators in the fall of 1960 on the destructiveness of nuclear war, although directed at the Chinese Communists, probably also indicate reasonably sincere convictions on the part of the Soviet leadership. Although hardly constituting any confession of Soviet weakness, these statements contrast with the boastful self-confidence of Soviet pronouncements of 1958 and 1959.

(S) Nevertheless, 1960 also presented the Soviet Union new opportunities for the expansion of Soviet influence in Africa and Latin America. Although Soviet aggressive attempts to infiltrate the Congo suffered a severe tactical setback necessitating the withdrawal of Soviet personnel, the continued unsettled conditions in the Congo gave promise that Moscow might yet have a chance to play a part there. In addition, during 1960 Cuba became more closely tied to the Communist Bloc and greatly increased her military dependence on the USSR through the acceptance of extensive Soviet arms aid.

(S) In central Europe, however, where Soviet and United States military powers confront each other most directly, the issue of Berlin remained unresolved. Although more than two years have passed since Khrushchev's announcement in November 1953 that he would eliminate the Berlin problem within six months, the issue is little closer to solution than it was at the end of the inconclusive Four-Power Foreign Ministers' Conference in Geneva in August 1959. However, during the fall of 1960 Khrushchev stated his determination to solve the Berlin problem in 1961.

(S) In the course of 1960 the Soviets appear to have granted greater prerogatives to the East Germans, particularly in matters concerning the Western Powers. This extension of East German power was felt particularly by the Western Allied Military Liaison Missions to the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany, which suffered increasingly severe East German harassment in the performance of their duties. Moreover, beginning in early September 1960, the East Germans imposed a series of restrictions on West German travel to and from West Berlin and on access by West Germans to East Berlin. A primary purpose of these restrictions was to establish, through everyday usage, that West Berlin is not a part of West Germany and that West Berliners are not West Germans.

(S) In retaliation to these measures the West German government announced that the interzonal trade agreement providing for commerce between East and West Germany would be cancelled on 31 December 1960 and would not be renewed unless the restrictions were lifted. A face-saving formula was found during the last week of December and the trade agreements reinstated. The continuation

of trade during 1961 will depend in a large part on how the East Germans react in matters of access to West Berlin. Their reaction, in turn, will depend on economic considerations and on what Moscow decides is appropriate to the situation.

(S) In the matter of Berlin access, which is the most active focal point of East-West relationships, Communist attention during 1960 centered more on civilian access than on Western Allied military access, which proceeded with minimum interference during the year. In the course of their restrictive measures, during the fall of 1960 the East Germans again challenged the right of Western civilian air carriers to use the three air corridors to West Berlin. The Soviets indorsed the East German position, asserting that the air corridors could only be used in support of the Western Allied garrisons in Berlin. However, neither the Soviets nor the East Germans took any action to enforce their view. In December 1960 the East Germans unofficially threatened to disrupt all ground traffic to and from West Berlin on 1 January 1961 and to interrupt utilities and other vital services to West Berlin. This was done in an effort to pressure the West Germans into renewing the interzonal trade agreement. The East Germans apparently believe they have a legal basis for their threats since the provision of services, including the use of East German railway facilities and personnel for handling Allied military trains, is governed by annexes to the interzonal trade agreement.

(S) During 1960, Soviet policy toward the West was one which continued to avoid risks of war. In so doing it apparently came in conflict with more belligerent views held in Peiping. It is unlikely that this conflict was truly reconciled during the 10 November-1 December 1960 Moscow conference of world Communist leaders. Differences probably will continue through 1961, although they may not be aired as they have been in the past. Soviet policy probably will continue to avoid serious war risks, and Soviet puppets such as East Germany or newly found allies such as Cuba will be constrained or advised to act likewise. However, Khrushchev himself may feel it necessary to demonstrate that such a policy is capable of advancing Communist aims and achieving its goals. The policy faces a severe test in the problem of Berlin. As mentioned earlier Khrushchev has promised resolute since 1958, now, according to his reaffirmed intentions, the test will come in 1961.

~~SECRET~~

(S) By their very nature, the status of West Berlin and access to that city are matters with which the Soviets cannot seriously interfere without ultimate risk of war. Khrushchev will continue to seek through negotiation that which he cannot gain short of war. He demands a modification of Berlin's status and intends to achieve it at a summit conference in 1961. Should he encounter resistance to such a meeting, he probably would use pressure on Berlin as a lever to bring it about as he did in 1960. Although international free-city status for West Berlin continued to be the espoused Communist goal through 1961, there were indications that the Soviets were reconciling themselves to the continued presence of the Western Allies in Berlin for at least the next few years, and were looking back to the final positions at the 1959 Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conference as a point of departure for new negotiations.

(S) These positions were restated by the Soviets on 9 May 1960, on the eve of the ill-fated Paris summit meeting. Moscow again called for an interim Berlin agreement of specific duration which would provide for limitations on the strength of Western forces stationed in Berlin and a curbing of Western propaganda activities.

(S) Through 1960 the Soviets and the East Germans continued their efforts to gain international recognition of the East German regime. They probably will also press for an East German role in future East-West negotiations. Whether a summit meeting comes to any agreement or not, East German participation would contribute to their claims for recognition. Through 1960 the Communists also kept alive the threat of a separate Soviet-East German peace treaty. Such a treaty probably will be concluded in the event a summit meeting does not materialize or ends in no agreement. However, in practice, such a treaty probably would include devices to insure that direct contacts between the East Germans and the Western Allies would not involve serious risks of war.

(S) In any event, during 1961 the Communists probably will devote renewed attention to civilian air access to Berlin and attempt to gain a measure of control over it equivalent to that which they exercise over ground access. During 1960, as refugee figures continued to climb, there was speculation as to why the East Germans did not seal off East Berlin from East Germany. Aside from the

~~SECRET~~

85

practical difficulties involved, the need for a safety valve for the East German population was repeatedly cited by way of explanation. If evacuation of refugees from West Berlin to West Germany were halted, however, fewer East Germans might take the drastic step of defecting and it is even possible that West Berlin authorities themselves might have to take steps to prevent the city's economy from becoming overburdened by refugees.

(S) Ultimately the Communists will have to come to full grips with the refugee problem. The instability of the East German population probably is the most severe single threat to East Germany's future economic development. Until East Germany is fully integrated into the Soviet Bloc, its physical location and special condition are deterrents to the restoration of orthodox Communism in Poland. Moscow apparently has found itself capable of tolerating broad deviations in Poland, and that country is farther away from achieving Socialism today than it was before the disturbances of October 1956. However, there is no reason to believe that Moscow intends to allow the Polish anomaly to continue indefinitely.

(S) At the other extreme, Moscow can hardly afford to tolerate the Albanian leadership's preference for Chinese rather than Soviet ideological formulations. The Albanian deviation probably has little to do with ideology, but rather stems from its isolation which makes such impertinence possible, as well as from fears of Soviet long-term intentions toward Yugoslavia and what those intentions might mean to Albania. Although the Soviets and the Chinese may have reached a compromise on their ideological differences, the Albanians are now on record as rebelling against Soviet-inspired doctrine. From Moscow's point of view it is not so much a matter of what the Albanians said but that they dared to say it. It is quite possible that many of these problems, originating in 1960 or earlier, will remain unresolved through 1961.

(S) In summary, it is estimated that during 1961:

1. The Soviet Union will seek new negotiations to bring about a modification of Berlin's status. Moscow is primarily interested in convening a summit meeting for this purpose but may call first for a preliminary foreign minister's meeting. In the event of Western reluctance to come to the Summit, Moscow will probably use pressure on Berlin or its access routes to bring about the meeting.

2. The Soviets will press for acceptance of their international free-city proposals for West Berlin, although they probably are reconciled to the presence of the Western Allies in the city for some time to come. However, they will seek to limit the duration and strengths of any continued occupation forces, as well as seek to impose curbs on intelligence and propaganda activities in West Berlin. They may also demand formal guarantees that West Berlin is not and will not become part of West Germany.

3. The Soviets probably will conclude a separate peace treaty with East Germany in the event that there is no summit, or that such a summit fails to reach agreements satisfactory to Moscow. However, in this event safeguards to preclude or minimize risks of armed conflict between the East Germans and the Western Allies will probably be included.

4. The Soviet Union will continue to promote its plan for total disarmament, including immediate destruction of atomic weapons and a ban on nuclear testing. This will be done for its propaganda value and its appeal to certain neutralists.

5. The USSR will continue to strive for greater capabilities in the field of advanced weapons. It will also continue to improve its own general military preparedness and that of its Satellites.

6. The Soviet Union will not undertake any hostile military action against United States forces in Europe or against NATO countries.

7. The Soviet Union will seek every opportunity to promote rifts within the NATO alliance.

8. The Soviet Union will continue to press the expansion of its economy and the economies of its Satellites.

9. Communist China and Albania may suffer economic retribution for their ideological differences with Moscow, and Albania may undergo direct political pressure to change its outlook, despite the tone of compromise in the joint statement arrived at during the November 1960 Moscow meeting of Communist leaders.

10. The Soviet Union will continue its penetrations in the underdeveloped areas of the world, especially in Latin America and Africa, politically, economically and when appropriate militarily through arms aid.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL AND INTERNAL STABILITY

1. (S) General

The dramatic events in Eastern Europe during the fall of 1956 are slowly fading into history. There are undoubtedly vivid memories of these events among the Hungarians and to a lesser extent among the Poles, but on the whole, the climate for open revolt and acute instability in Eastern Europe has all but disappeared. The Soviet and Satellite regimes have tried to erase public recollection of these events or to recast them in the unrecognizable terms of Communist official history. However, from time to time there are grim reminders, some perhaps purposely intended to keep the concept of terror from being forgotten. Into this category may fall the repeated reports during early 1960 of the execution of young Hungarians who had participated in the revolt and had reached the age at which they could legally receive capital punishment for their "crimes." In October 1960 the Hungarian regime apparently also made a round of temporary arrests as a precautionary measure on the occasion of the anniversary of the 1956 uprising. The East German regime seemingly has also not forgotten its own difficulties in June 1953. In the fall of 1960, as the East German refugee flow continued at higher levels than in the two previous years, the need for a safety valve was repeatedly cited as the reason for not taking more drastic measures to seal the borders. Nevertheless, in spite of the basic discontent which clearly exists throughout Eastern Europe and under certain conditions could again grow to dangerous proportions, the outbreak of serious and widespread violence is unlikely during the coming year.

Of all the Bloc populations, the Poles continued to enjoy the relatively greatest degree of freedom. Except for the special case of the East Germans, the other Satellite populations appear to have settled into a state of resignation and lethargy. They might be aroused by a renewal of massive terror tactics by their governments or by drastically worsened economic conditions. However, the long-term trend is toward improvement of Bloc economic conditions.

Moreover, the various Communist regimes have consolidated their power to the point where force and terror are not necessarily required as coercive devices. Hence, it is estimated that during 1961 internal stability within the Soviet Union and its Satellites will be maintained at a high level, and virtually no open resistance to Communist authority will develop, with possible exceptions in Poland and East Germany, and in Albania where unique conditions prevailed as 1960 ended. Throughout the Eastern European area, however, there will continue to be numerous instances of passive resistance, expressed in such phenomena as low productivity and absenteeism.

In the event of war, inherent contradictions and weaknesses in the Bloc structure would be intensified. For large portions of the Satellite population, war would arouse hopes for liberation from Communist domination. It is unlikely, however, that such sentiments would exist to any significant degree within the Soviet Union itself, but there is little doubt that in Eastern Europe the Soviets would be faced with a difficult problem of control. In the event of an all-out Soviet attack on the West, with attendant initial successes, it is doubtful whether anti-Soviet opposition would constitute a significant force. In Poland and Czechoslovakia active opposition would be especially inhibited by Soviet-inspired propaganda concerning the possibilities of German aggression. Later on Soviet reverses would tend to reduce local inhibitions to action and could well result in large-scale rear-area disturbances. Possibilities of national revolt in the presence of Soviet troops, however, still seem slight. Thus, although the present and expected state of Satellite disaffection is a Soviet vulnerability, it is estimated that except in the event of major Soviet reverses this vulnerability would not seriously impede a Soviet war effort. It is estimated that the primary value to NATO of Satellite disaffection lies in providing a particularly suitable field of action for unconventional forces and for intelligence collection.

2. (S) Soviet Union

No active opposition to the Communist regime apparently exists in the Soviet Union. This situation is the result of a combination of factors, perhaps the most important of which is the domination of the country by Communism for 43 years, during 24 of which Joseph Stalin ruled dictatorially. Additional factors are the tradition

in the USSR of resignation to tyranny, and the fact that the population is aware that economic conditions are slowly improving, that Soviet power and influence are increasing internationally, and that the Soviets lead the world in many scientific and technical achievements. Nevertheless, the Soviet press during 1960 also revealed a type of grumbling among the population which reflected increased political and economic sophistication. One letter to a Soviet newspaper editor complained that less attention should be given to attempts to get to the moon and more to raising the citizens' standard of living. Khrushchev's adaptability and adroitness have served him well and his position appears reasonably secure, but his power is not of the absolute variety that Stalin wielded. Moreover, the reforms that he himself has made are hastening the day when Khrushchev's essentially old-fashioned type of personal leadership will be inadequate to guide the Soviet Union's destiny. Khrushchev himself probably will maintain his position as long as he desires, but his successor may be required to differ as much from Khrushchev as Khrushchev does from Stalin.

3. (S) Albania

Although it is impossible to gauge the extent of dissidence in Albania, considerable popular dissatisfaction probably exists because of the country's economic backwardness, and because of the regime's attempts to impose Communism on a society in which the concept of the clan is still important, if not dominant. It is possible that the regime's defiance of Moscow during 1960 may have gained it a measure of increased popular acceptance, although for the wrong reasons from the point of view of Communist ideology. Should Moscow's reprisal against the Albanian hierarchy extend to economic measures, or should Moscow-directed attempts to bring about realignment not be confined to the upper levels of the Albanian Party, the possibility of a period of acute instability in Albania would increase considerably.

4. (C) Bulgaria

There was no basic change in 1960 in the position of Bulgaria within the European Communist Bloc. Control over the population by Communist Party leadership is considered complete. In August there may have been intraparty strife in connection with Sino-Soviet

ideological differences, but the visits of Soviet leaders Kozlov and Ignatov gave strong support to the forces favoring Khrushchev's policy of "peaceful coexistence" and to the belief that the majority of Bulgarian leaders are behind that policy. In any event, political stability in Bulgaria apparently is not impaired in any way. However, internal political and economic measures remain unpopular, and the ambitious economic plan called the "great leap forward" was modified. The regime, nevertheless, tried to fulfill its present five-year plan ahead of schedule by completing it by the end of 1960. This was probably done through considerable adjustments to planning figures, with the major objective of starting a new five-year plan in 1961, thus synchronizing Bulgarian economic planning with the other Bloc nations.

There is no firm evidence of any active organized resistance against the Communist regime. It is estimated that during the forthcoming year the internal situation in Bulgaria will remain stable.

5. (C) Czechoslovakia

During 1960 Czechoslovakia maintained its position as the most stable and most loyal Soviet Satellite. The regime further consolidated its internal stability by adopting a new constitution in July. This constitution merely documents that which has been the law of the land since it became a Communist state in 1948. The regime has also stressed progress toward "socialism" by changing the country's official name to "Czechoslovak Socialist Republic." Economic conditions are good in comparison to those prevailing in other Communist countries. The standard of living has been rising slowly but steadily. The industrial base existing before 1948 has greatly facilitated further industrial development and expansion. Fulfillment of the agricultural plan has been deterred by poor weather and shortages of machines and fertilizers, and especially by shortages of farm workers and lack of enthusiasm of those remaining on the farms. However, agricultural collectivization, although opposed by farmers, probably reached 90 percent by the end of 1960.

There have been numerous instances this year of "economic crimes" such as black-marketing and hoarding or pilfering of state-owned property. These offenses have been punished severely, and they have never seriously threatened the stability of the regime. They do indicate, however, that even in Czechoslovakia the spirit of freedom and free enterprise is unbroken, although successfully suppressed by the regime.

No power struggle apparently exists within the Czech Party hierarchy. President and Party chief Novotny has the full support of Khrushchev, and his position may be considered secure. There is no known organized resistance which could successfully challenge the Czech Communist regime during 1961.

6. (C) East Germany

The vast majority of the East German population remains hostile to the Communist regime of Party Chairman Walter Ulbricht and there is little doubt that the regime would fall without the backing of Soviet forces. It is not anticipated, however, that the East Germans will again attempt an uprising as they did in June 1953, unless outside help is assured.

The Ulbricht regime, thus assured of its ability to control the population, has not hesitated to compound the people's discontent by a number of unpopular measures. The spring collectivization drive was carried out ruthlessly. It caused a great increase in the refugee flow from East Germany to the West. Approximately 200,000 East Germans had fled by the close of the year. The loss of manpower in all walks of life has had a serious impact on the East German economy. Nearly disastrous, however, has been the loss of intellectuals and professional people, especially teachers and physicians. Toward the close of the year the regime found it necessary to issue a special directive in order to dissuade qualified physicians from fleeing. The directive provides for the resumption of private practices, and physicians are no longer required to perform Party work.

The death of President Wilhelm Pieck on 7 September did not endanger regime stability. On the contrary, Ulbricht used the opportunity to increase his own power. Instead of replacing Pieck,

he created a "Council of State" under his own chairmanship. With the support of the Soviets and against the will of the people, Ulbricht has pursued his plan to consolidate the Communist regime, thus perpetuating the division of Germany. He seeks to destroy the last vestiges of the four-power status of Berlin and strives toward diplomatic, or at least de facto, recognition of his puppet state. Internal opposition is ruthlessly suppressed. The only positive aspect of the year as far as the populace is concerned was a slow but steady improvement in living conditions. Shortages of food and other consumer goods are nevertheless frequent. They are, however, usually caused by inefficiency in the distribution system.

There were several strikes and other instances of open opposition to the Communist regime during 1960. The youth riots which took place in Dresden and other cities during August and September were probably not instigated by any organized resistance group. Rather they were probably the work of discontented juveniles. In all cases order was quickly restored. None of these cases of resistance to Communist authority (the right to strike is not included in the newly proposed labor law) has in any way threatened regime stability.

It is estimated that during the coming year the East German Communist regime, with the backing of Soviet forces, will continue to remain in power and maintain full control over the hostile population.

7. (C) Hungary

During 1960 there was no substantial change in the hostile attitude of the Hungarian population toward the Communist regime which, as in East Germany, is dependent on the backing of Soviet divisions. This hostility remains undiminished despite a noteworthy rise in the Hungarian standard of living since the 1956 revolution. Communist functionaries, especially at collective farms, are hated and in many instances socially boycotted. The population is said to be distinctly divided into "Hungarians" and "Communists." Executions of participants in the 1956 revolt have been continuing, and amnesties of political prisoners have failed to reduce the people's hatred of their Communist rulers.

Church-state relations have continued to be marked by a "give and take" arrangement. The government gives financial support to the Church which, in turn, does not interfere with politics. In fact, Hungarian priests are required to swear allegiance to the state. In the meantime, Communists have begun to fight religion as such by promoting and supporting a strong atheist campaign. This activity ranges from the publication of a new atheist magazine to indoctrination at schools.

The winter of 1960-61 will witness a resumption and the possible completion of the collectivization of agriculture. Methods of coercion and force will probably be avoided. Incidents of local and possibly violent resistance to collectivization must be anticipated, but farmers will eventually be forced to submit to the will of the regime.

As long as Soviet troops are stationed in Hungary, the Hungarian population is not likely again to challenge seriously the authority of the Communist regime.

8. (C) Poland

The economic crisis which occurred in Poland in October 1959 failed to result in any far-reaching government or Party shake-up. Party Chief Gomulka succeeded in stabilizing Poland's economy through a program of austerity. Poland seems to have taken in its stride the economic dislocations which unavoidably accompany such a program. If there were any threats to the stability of the Polish Communist state, they occurred in the field of Church-state relations. Two major riots occurred at Nova Huta in April and at Zielona Gora in May. Both were caused by the population's violent opposition to local Party action to convert to other uses the construction site for a church, and to deny the Church the right to occupy a building used for religious purposes.

There were several similar but minor incidents during the year. All of them testify to the continued strained relations between the Polish government and the Catholic Church. For a time it appeared that Cardinal Wyszynski had embarked upon an all-out campaign against confiscatory taxation of Church property and, especially, for the purpose of upholding religious education in

schools. However, he never published a pastoral letter protesting these two points. Probably the Church did not wish to damage Gomulka's prestige at the time of his appearance at the 15th General Assembly of the United Nations. Perhaps, however, the Church did receive some assurances from the Party and in return withdrew the letter. In any event, Church-state tensions remain the greatest threat to Polish internal stability.

In the matter of foreign policy the Polish population appears to stand squarely behind the Communist theory that the Oder-Neisse line is the permanent border between Germany and Poland. The Polish Communists have used this popular sentiment to join in the Soviet and East German vituperative campaign against alleged West German "revanchism" and "aggressive militarism," although recently these attacks have almost subsided.

Despite low productivity in agriculture, Gomulka has been careful not to arouse the farm population, which, next to the Catholics, is the most sensitive and most independent social group in Poland. Farmers are not coerced into joining collectives, although collectivization is the explicit ultimate aim of any Communist state. So-called "agricultural circles" have become a more acceptable form of cooperation between farmers. Many farmers, however, oppose the "circles," because they recognize them as mere stepping stones toward eventual complete collectivization.

Gomulka has been slowly but steadily retreating from his original position of "liberalization," but he is not expected to take from the Polish people all of the limited freedom they have enjoyed since his return in 1956. He knows that such action could seriously endanger the internal stability in Poland.

9. (C) Rumania

During the past year, information concerning internal stability in Rumania has been almost completely lacking. The undoubtedly numerous opponents of the Communist regime are apparently fully controlled by the Party's police apparatus.

The Third Party Congress, held in late June 1960, was of secondary importance to Rumania itself. The prime purpose of the congress was to host Communist Bloc leaders and to hear a reiteration of Khrushchev's avowed policies of "peaceful co-existence" and of the "avoidability of war" as a means of advancing the final victory of Communism.

Rumania has used this relatively quiet year to resume its 1957 role as a proponent of a Balkan alliance and neutral zone. The country has also improved its diplomatic and economic relations with the West, especially with the United States.

There have been no indications in Rumania of open anti-regime activities and no evidence of any existing organized resistance against the present Communist regime.

It is anticipated that during the coming year, Rumania will retain its present state of internal stability.

COMPOSITIONS

1. (S) Soviet Armed Forces

a. Ground Forces

(1) Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG)

20 line divisions, 7 antiaircraft artillery brigades and 1 artillery division, organized into:

(a) 6 armies (2 tank and 4 combined arms),
comprising:

10 tank divisions
10 motorized rifle divisions
5 antiaircraft artillery brigades

(b) GSFG artillery, comprising:

1 artillery division
2 antiaircraft artillery brigades

(2) Northern Group of Forces (Poland) (NGF)

1 tank division
1 mechanized or motorized rifle division
1 antiaircraft artillery division or brigade
1 artillery brigade
2 signal brigades

(3) Southern Group of Forces (Hungary) (SGF)

3 tank divisions
1 motorized rifle division
1 antiaircraft artillery brigade
Nondivisional artillery units (probably totaling
1 brigade)

(4) USSR

(a) Soviet ground forces are now estimated to have 158 line divisions, of which 98 are located in the 13 western military districts of the USSR. The reduction in holdings from 173 to 158 line divisions is the result of the elimination of 14 understrength divisions because of lack of information to support their continued existence, and reduction of 1 division to a brigade. The 5th Heavy Tank "Korsun" Division is the only line division reported inactivated since the 1,200,000 reduction announcement in January 1960. The composition of the Soviet ground forces is now estimated to be:

Tank divisions	24
Motorized rifle/mechanized divisions	70
Rifle divisions	52
Mountain rifle divisions	3
Airborne divisions	9
TOTAL	<u>158</u>

(b) Within European USSR (13 western military districts), there are an estimated 98 line divisions, as follows:

Tank divisions	8
Motorized rifle/mechanized divisions	46
Rifle divisions	34
Mountain rifle divisions	3
Airborne divisions	7
TOTAL	<u>98</u>

b. Air Forces

(1) East Germany

Twenty-fourth Tactical Air Army (697 combat aircraft)

5 fighter divisions (15 regiments)
1 bomber division (3 regiments)

(2) Poland

Thirty-seventh Tactical Air Army (279 combat aircraft)

3 fighter divisions (9 regiments)

(3) Soviet Air Force units in Hungary (282 combat aircraft)

2 fighter divisions (6 regiments)

1 bomber division (3 regiments)

2. (5) Satellite Armed Forces

a. Ground Forces

(1) Albanian Army (equivalent to 2 divisions)

2 corps (?) and a coastal defense command,

comprising:

1 mechanized brigade
5 infantry brigades
1 infantry regiment
1 tank regiment

(2) Bulgarian Army (9 line divisions)

3 armies, comprising:

2 tank divisions
6 rifle divisions
1 mountain rifle division
2 brigades (1 tank and 1 mountain)

(3) Czech Army (14 line divisions)

(a) General Headquarters, including:

6 antiaircraft artillery divisions
1 airborne command or brigade consisting
of 4 battalions
1 engineer brigade
6 artillery regiments

(b) 2 military districts, comprising:

2 tank divisions
8 motorized rifle divisions
4 mechanized divisions

(4) East German Army (EGA) (6 line divisions)

2 military districts, comprising:

2 tank divisions
4 motorized rifle divisions
1 antiaircraft division

(5) Hungarian Army (5 line divisions)

5 motorized rifle divisions
1 artillery division
2 antiaircraft artillery divisions

(6) Polish Army (14 line divisions)

3 military districts, comprising:

4 armored divisions
1 motorized division
6 mechanized divisions
2 infantry divisions
1 artillery division
2 antiaircraft artillery divisions
1 airborne division

(7) Rumanian Army (13 line divisions)

3 military regions, comprising:

1 tank division
1 mechanized division
10 infantry divisions
1 mountain infantry division

b. Air Forces

- (1) Albanian Air Force (50 combat aircraft)
2 fighter regiments
- (2) Bulgarian Air Force (314 combat aircraft)
3 fighter divisions (9 regiments)
- (3) Czech Air Force (800 combat aircraft)
6 fighter divisions (19 regiments)
2 bomber regiments
- (4) East German Air Force (164 combat aircraft)
2 fighter divisions (6 regiments)
- (5) Hungarian Air Force (86 combat aircraft)
3 fighter regiments
- (6) Polish Air Force
 - (a) 3 fighter corps (979 combat aircraft), comprising:
6 fighter divisions (18 regiments)
1 bomber division (2 regiments)
2 attack divisions (4 regiments)
 - (b) Polish Naval Air Arm (66 combat aircraft)
2 fighter regiments
- (7) Rumanian Air Force (192 combat aircraft)
3 fighter divisions (9 regiments)

TABULAR SUMMARY OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT IN EAST EUROPEAN SATELLITES

		Jet Fighter	Piston Fighter	Attack	Light Piston Bomber	Light Jet Bomber	Total Combat Bomber
Twenty-fourth Tactical Air Army East Germany	Regts Est Acft TOE	15 575 555	0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0	3 122 96	18 697 651
Thirty-seventh Tactical Air Army Poland	Regts Est Acft TOE	9 261 333	0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0	0 18 0	9 279 333
Soviet Air Force Units in Hungary	Regts Est Acft TOE	6 188 222	0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0	3 94 96	9 282 318
Total SAF (Outside USSR)	Regts Est Acft TOE	30 1024 1110	0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0	6 234 192	36 1258 1302
Albanian Air Force	Regts Est Acft TOE	2 50 74	0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0	2 50 74
Bulgarian Air Force	Regts Est Acft TOE	9 304 333	0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0	0 10 0	9 314 333
Czech Air Force	Regts Est Acft TOE	19 734 836	0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0	2 66 66	21 800 902
East German Air Force	Regts Est Acft TOE	6 164 222	0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0	6 164 222
Hungarian Air Force	Regts Est Acft TOE	3 86 111	0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0	3 86 111
Polish Air Force	Regts Est Acft TOE	18 805 792	0 0 0	4 108 224	0 0 0	2 66 66	24 979 1082
Polish Naval Aviation	Regts Est Acft TOE	2 60 88	0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0	0 6 0	2 66 88
Rumanian Air Force	Regts Est Acft TOE	9 190 333	0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0	0 2 0	9 192 333
Total Satellites	Regts Est Acft TOE	68 2393 2789	0 0 0	4 108 224	0 0 0	4 150 132	76 2651 3145
Grand Total	Regts Est Acft TOE	98 3417 3899	0 0 0	4 108 224	0 0 0	10 384 324	112 3909 4447

STRENGTHS

1. (5) Strengths

a. (C) Estimated Soviet personnel strengths outside the USSR:

	<u>Ground Forces</u>	<u>Air Forces</u>	<u>Security Forces</u>	<u>Total</u>
GSEFG (East Germany)	322,000	28,500	5,500	356,000
NGF (Poland)	35,000(10)	10,500	(13)	45,500
SGF (Hungary)	55,000(11)	10,000	(11)	65,000
Soviet Mission in Albania				300 (1)*
TOTALS	<u>412,000</u>	<u>49,000</u>	<u>5,500</u>	<u>466,800</u>

b. (5) Estimated Satellite personnel strengths:

	<u>Ground Forces</u>	<u>Air Forces</u>	<u>Security Forces</u>	<u>Total</u>
Albania	20,000	2,000	10,000	32,000
Bulgaria	110,000	10,200	35,000	155,200
Czechoslovakia	136,000	25,000	44,000	205,000
East Germany	70,000	3,000	59,950 (2)	137,950
Hungary	75,000	4,000	35,000	114,000 (3)
Poland	135,000	27,000	45,000 (4)	257,000
Rumania	<u>200,000</u>	<u>13,000</u>	<u>60,000</u>	<u>273,000</u>
TOTALS	796,000	39,200	238,950	1,174,150

*See notes (1) - (13)