

c. (S) Estimated Soviet personnel strengths within the USSR in the 13 military districts west of the Caspian Sea-Ural Mountain line:

<u>Ground Forces</u>	<u>Air Forces</u>	<u>Security Forces</u>	<u>Total</u>
1,550,000 (5)	(5)	150,000	1,700,000 (5)

2. (S) Notes

- (1) Soviet missions in Bulgaria and Rumania have been dropped.
- (2) Increase of 3,250.
- (3) Does not include 1,500 river guards.
- (4) Represents 25,000 Internal Security Forces (KBW) and 20,000 Border Guards (WOP).
- (5) Decrease of 33,000 ground force troops and 17,000 security forces. Air force strength is still under study.
- (6) Represents equivalent of 2 divisions. Forces actually consist of 5 infantry brigades and 1 mechanized brigade.
- (7) 1 additional tank division accepted. 1 rifle division is at 25 percent strength.
- (8) 1 additional infantry division accepted.
- (9) Represents decrease of 5 rifle divisions, 9 motorized rifle/mechanized divisions and 1 airborne division for over-all decrease of 15 divisions from last strength estimate published in Monthly Intelligence Summary No. 5-60, this headquarters, dated 31 May 1960.
- (10) Decrease of 7,500 caused by reanalysis of NGF support troops and does not represent reduction in strength in 1960.
- (11) Decrease of 10,000 ground force troops caused by conversion of motorized rifle to tank divisions.
- (12) One motorized rifle division converted to tank division.
- (13) Elimination of security forces is based on re-evaluation of available information.

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3. (S) Line Division Strength

	Total	Tank/Armored	Infantry/Rifle	Mechanized/Motorized Rifle	Mountain	Airborne
a. Soviet line divisions in Satellites:						
GSFG (East Germany)	20	10		10		
NGF (Poland)	2	1		1		
SGF (Hungary)	4	3(12)		1(12)		
TOTALS	<u>26</u>	<u>14</u>		<u>12</u>		
b. Satellite line divisions:						
Albania	2(6)*					
Bulgaria	9(7)	2(7)	6(7)		1	
Czechoslovakia	14	2		12		
East Germany	6	2		4		
Hungary	5			5		
Poland	14	4	2	7		1
Rumania	13(8)	1	10(8)	1	1	
TOTALS	<u>63</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>
c. Soviet line divisions:						
13 western military districts	98(9)	8(9)	34(9)	46(9)	3(9)	7(9)
Others	60(9)	16(9)	18(9)	24(9)		2
TOTALS	<u>158</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>52</u>	<u>70</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>9</u>

* See notes, preceding page

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
DISPOSITIONS

- Figures No.
5. Home Stations Major Ground Units, Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG)
 6. Disposition of Soviet Forces in USSR West of Ural Mountains
 7. Disposition of Major Units Northern Group of Forces
 8. Disposition of Southern Group of Forces
 9. Disposition of Major Albanian Army Elements
 10. Bulgarian Army Dispositions
 11. Disposition of Czechoslovak Army
 12. Disposition of Czechoslovak Security Forces
 13. East German Army
 14. East German Border Security Police (BSP)
 15. East German Garrisoned Security Forces (Less BSP)
 16. Disposition of Hungarian Army
 17. Disposition of Hungarian Security Forces
 18. Disposition of Major Units Polish Ground Forces
 19. Disposition of Polish Security Forces
 20. Rumanian Army Dispositions
 21. Rumanian Border and Security Troop Dispositions

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EAST GERMANY
HOME STATIONS MAJOR
GROUND UNITS GSGF
1 JAN 61



NOTE: ARMY BOUNDARIES ARE USED TO SHOW GENERAL AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY ONLY. THESE ARE BASED ON UNIT DISPOSITION, TRAINING AREAS USED, AND GROUPING OF UNITS. NO TACTICAL BOUNDARIES ARE INFERRED.

LEGEND

XXXX
 TANK ARMY: THE TERM "ARMORED" IS NOT USED BY THE SOVIETS.

XXXX
 COMBINED ARMS ARMY: THERE IS NO STANDARD US SYMBOL FOR THIS UNIT. IT IS FELT THE SYMBOL OF INFANTRY AND ARMOR MOST NEARLY DESCRIBES THIS UNIT

Figure No. 5




Figure No. 6

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POLAND
DISPOSITION OF MAJOR UNITS
NORTHERN GROUP OF FORCES
1 JANUARY 1961




Figure No. 7

116




Figure No. 3

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ALBANIA
DISPOSITION OF MAJOR
ARMY ELEMENTS
1 JANUARY 1961




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BULGARIA
BULGARIAN ARMY DISPOSITIONS
1 JANUARY 1961





Figure No. 10

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
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
DISPOSITION OF CZECHOSLOVAK ARMY
1 JANUARY 1961



(C) Figure No. 11

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
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
DISPOSITION OF CZECHOSLOVAK
SECURITY FORCES
1 JANUARY 1961



(C) Figure No. 12

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EAST GERMANY
EAST GERMAN
ARMY
1 JAN 61




(C) Figure No. 13

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EAST GERMANY
EAST GERMAN BORDER
SECURITY POLICE (BSP)


1 JAN 61




(C) Figure No. 14

123

EAST GERMANY
EAST GERMAN GARRISONED
SECURITY FORCES
(LESS BSP)
1 JAN 61




(C) Figure No. 15



(C) Figure No. 16

1025


POLAND
DISPOSITION OF MAJOR UNITS
POLISH GROUND FORCES
1 JANUARY 1961



(C) Figure No. 18

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POLAND
DISPOSITION OF SECURITY FORCES
1 JANUARY 1961




(C) Figure No. 19

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RUMANIA
RUMANIAN ARMY DISPOSITIONS
1 JANUARY 1961

CONFIDENTIAL

U. S. S. R.



LEGEND: MR- MILITARY REGION
TV-- TUDOR VLADIMIR RESCU
--- MILITARY REGION
BOUNDARY -(APRX)

(C) Figure No. 20

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REINFORCEMENT CAPABILITY

1. (S) Major Soviet Forces, Western USSR

a. The present unit strength of Soviet Army ground forces is estimated at 158 line divisions plus supporting artillery divisions and anti-aircraft artillery brigades. In the 13 military districts in the USSR west of the Ural Mountains-Caspian Sea line there are an estimated 98 line divisions which could be made available for offensive action against Western Europe. Approximately 46 of these, including 7 airborne divisions, could be made available immediately because of their proximity to the Satellite countries.

b. The estimated personnel strengths of Soviet ground forces located in the 13 military districts west of the Ural-Caspian line are:

Army ground forces	1, 550, 000
Security forces	150, 000

2. (S) Mobilization Potential of the Soviet Ground Forces

a. Trained reserves: 9, 000, 000

b. Ground Mobilization Capability

With the exception of M-day and M+10, the number of divisions indicated in each time frame does not necessarily mean that all of those divisions would be combat-ready within the given time frame:

(1) M+day	158 line divisions	2, 450, 000 pers
(2) M+10 days	175 line divisions	4, 600, 000 pers
(3) M+30 days	185 line divisions	6, 000, 000 pers
(4) M+90 days	300 line divisions	3, 500, 000 pers
(5) M+365 days	*500 line divisions	15, 000, 000 pers

*It is estimated that 200 divisions will be used as replacement units to compensate for combat losses.

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3. (S) Logistic Capability

With stocks currently available, and with the USSR's production capability, it is estimated that the Soviets can maintain 300 line divisions in combat in Europe and Asia, together with air and naval forces.

4. (S) Transportation Capability (Before Interdiction)

a. Reinforcement by Rail from the USSR Frontier

The estimated rail movement capability will permit transport of approximately 4.3 Soviet armored-type (tank, motorized rifle and mechanized) divisions daily into the forward areas of East Germany, western Czechoslovakia and the Hungarian-Austrian frontier.

b. Reinforcement by Rail to the Yugoslav-Italian Border

The rail lines through Yugoslavia to the Italian border would support the daily delivery, on a sustained basis, of approximately .5 of a Soviet armored-type division.

c. Reinforcement by Highway (in Forward Areas)

Using the 19 major highway routes through East Germany, western Czechoslovakia and western Hungary, approximately 8.3 Soviet armored-type divisions could be moved on a daily sustained basis from a north-south line running through the Oder-Neisse River-Prague-Budapest areas to the combat area. Approximately .5 of a Soviet armored-type division could be moved daily across Yugoslavia from Hungary to the Italian border. It is impractical and militarily uneconomical to route either reinforcement or supply movements over highways from the USSR on a sustained basis. (See Annex 18).

d. Resupply by Inland Waterway

The inland waterway system could deliver to the forward area an estimated 75,000 short tons daily as follows: 25,000 short tons via the East German system, and 50,000 short tons daily from the Black Sea via the Danube River.

e. Resupply-reinforcement through the Baltic Ports

The five Baltic ports in East Germany and the two in Poland which are suitable for the discharge of Soviet divisions and unit equipment have a total discharge capacity of approximately 82,000 long tons daily. In terms of daily resupply this tonnage is capable of meeting the logistical requirements of about 150 divisions, or reinforcing at the rate of approximately 1.5 Soviet divisions daily.

f. Summary

Disregarding interdiction, the Soviets have the capability of delivering by rail and highway to the forward areas of East Germany, western Czechoslovakia and the Austrian-Hungarian frontier (from the vicinity of the Oder-Neisse River-Prague-Budapest line) approximately 12.6 Soviet armored-type divisions daily. In addition approximately 1.5 Soviet divisions could be discharged daily at the seven suitable Baltic ports. Approximately 1 Soviet division could be delivered daily, using rail and highway, to the Italian-Yugoslav border area.

5. (S) Airlift Capability

a. Employing only those transport aircraft assigned to the Aviation of Airborne Troops (AAT), the USSR could commit an estimated 20,000 fully equipped troops in a single airlift operation within a radius of 500 nautical miles from the staging area, and in a double airlift operation, approximately 30,000. If one-half of the civil air fleet (860 aircraft) was added to the airborne forces military transports, this augmented force could single-lift approximately 33,500 troops or 52,000 on a double lift. For each additional 340 light transports or 180 medium transports obtained from other military air components and the civil air fleet, the lift capability would be increased by approximately 7,000 men. Helicopters currently assigned to the airborne forces could single lift 3,800 troops or 5,700 on a double lift within a radius of 100 nautical miles. It is estimated that approximately 65 Camp and Cub aircraft, both rear ramp-loading assault aircraft with a heavy equipment airlift capability, are now in operational use by the AAT.

b. The quantities of military transport probably available in 1960 are:

Total transport aircraft	2, 235 (825 in AAT)
Medium	260 (235 in AAT)
Light	1, 620 (370 in AAT)
Helicopters	455 (220 in AAT)
Medium	30 (all in AAT)
Light	425 (190 in AAT)
Gliders (large)*	250 (all in AAT)

c. The normal cargo capacities of the foregoing transport aircraft are:

<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>TOTAL CAPACITY</u>	
	<u>Troops</u>	<u>or</u> <u>Supplies (In Pounds)</u>
Medium transport**	42-100	10, 000-40, 000
Light transport	18-25	3, 500-4, 500
Helicopter, medium	40	9, 000
Helicopter, light	16	4, 000
Glider, large	25	7, 000

d. The estimated single airlift capacity of military transport aircraft assigned to airborne forces is:

<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>TOTAL CAPACITY</u>		
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Troops</u>	<u>or</u> <u>Supplies (In Pounds)</u>
Medium transport	235	12, 675	3, 650, 000
Light transport	370	7, 950	1, 430, 000
Helicopter, medium	30	1, 200	270, 000
Helicopter, light	190	3, 050	760, 000
Glider, large	250	6, 250	1, 750, 000
TOTAL	1, 075	31, 125	7, 910, 000 pounds or 3, 950 short tons (approximate)

*Gliders are probably being replaced by assault aircraft and helicopters.
**The wide variation in troop and supply figures indicates the estimated differences in load capacities of the Bull, Camp and Cub aircraft.

SOVIET--SATELLITE WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT

1. (C) Developments in 1960

a. USSR

The trend toward greater sophistication in the field of conventional weapons and equipment continued during 1960. This sophistication has been achieved largely through modification of existing equipment. For example, the new *Frog-3 and Frog-4 which were displayed in Moscow on 1 May 1960 were carried on a modified version of the amphibious tank (PT) chassis. Modifications of the PT chassis included the addition of two track support rollers to the suspension system and the removal of the hydrojet water propulsion system. There is some evidence that this new chassis is also being used for self-propelled guns. It may be the standard Soviet light chassis in the armored tracked vehicle family.

Changes were noted also in the 400mm self-propelled mortar which appeared for the second time in the 1 May 1960 parade. The suspension of the chassis was greatly strengthened and otherwise modified, and the superstructure and weapon showed many changes. New characteristics have not been established, but it is believed that the tube is longer and possibly of smaller caliber.

Automotive development continued during the year although largely in the testing of prototypes. An exception was the beginning of serial production at Gorkiy in late 1959 of the GAZ-62, a new 4 x 4 military truck with a 1-metric-ton capacity. This vehicle is well suited for airborne units.

b. Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG)

River-crossing equipment continues to receive high priority within the GSFG. "Thick" snorkels now predominate in snorkel training. An interesting addition to the snorkel field is the new tank recovery vehicle on a T-54 chassis with an attached

*Free rocket over ground