

(2) Recent Significant Developments

(a) The majority of reported PIS operations against USAREUR was exclusively or partially of a counter-intelligence nature. From a standpoint of technique, few appeared to be carefully planned or refined.

(b) However, additional information received in 1960 indicates that the Guenther Kosch case was one of the more successful PIS operations uncovered in recent years. The case indicates that the PIS, despite apparent ineptness, are capable of mounting long-term clandestine operations with a reasonable degree of professionalism. At the time of his arrest in July 1959, Kosch was an employee in the Koblenz offices of the West German Defense Ministry. He originally had been recruited in 1953 by a Member of the PIS using the cover of the Trade Mission at Frankfurt/Main. By his own admission Kosch furnished the PIS copies or photographs of virtually every document at his place of work. Kosch made approximately 35 trips to Switzerland to meet his handler and deliver the material he had collected.

(3) Probable Courses of Action

In comparison with other non-German Satellites the PIS will continue to pose an important threat to USAREUR. Activity will be predominantly counterespionage, although recent information suggests an increase in positive collection efforts. Some increase may occur in the use of third countries for points of contact. Most agents will be drawn from Poles living in West Germany, legal travelers and repatriates.

e. The Rumanian Intelligence Services (RUMIS)

(1) Status and Capabilities

(a) The RUMIS have only a limited capability of operating against USAREUR because of Rumania's geographic remoteness, a scarcity of potential source assets and insufficient operational funds. RUMIS operational procedures also lack the degree of refinement which is often apparent in the operations of other Satellite services such as the CIS. The only RUMIS organization identified in operations against USAREUR is the General Directorate of State Security (Directia Generala a Sigurantii Statului (DGSS or Securitat)) of the Ministry for Internal Affairs (see Figure No. 48). The DGSS performs

RUMANIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

General Directorate of State Security
(Directia Generala a Securitatii Statului - DGSS or Securitate)
Ministry for Internal Affairs




Figure No. 48

both internal security functions in Rumania and foreign espionage operations abroad. Its foreign espionage component, Directorate I, has counterintelligence as well as positive intelligence responsibilities including the collection of military, political and economic information. A Military Intelligence Service exists in the Rumanian Armed Forces but has no known operational capacity against USAREUR.

(b) DGSS Directorate I has an estimated strength of 500 personnel. RUMIS officers receive only a moderate amount of training in Rumania, but since 1955 groups of from 20 to 30 have been attending one- and two-year espionage courses in the USSR. There reportedly has been a large turnover of RUMIS personnel during the past decade. Of 40 men who had attended one DGSS training course in 1952, 30 had been dismissed by 1959. RUMIS personnel are selected from among young members of candidate members of the Rumanian Communist Party, or well-educated individuals, who are subjected to careful investigation. For foreign military intelligence operations the DGSS also obtains officer personnel from the Rumanian Armed Forces.

(c) The main RUMIS home base is Bucharest, but operations may originate from any Rumanian town. Because of the distance between Rumania and West Germany, however, the RUMIS rely heavily on operational bases in West Germany and in third countries bordering West Germany. A known base is the Rumanian Trade Delegation with offices in Frankfurt/Main and Munich. In 1958, when two RUMIS officers operating under cover of the trade delegation in Frankfurt/Main were arrested, it was determined that the delegation staff consisted of 13 DGSS personnel. Little is known concerning RUMIS cooperation with other Satellite services. In one case, however, RUMIS obtained Hungarian Intelligence Services (HIS) assistance in escorting an agent to and across the Austrian border. The RUMIS also appear to enjoy the cooperation of the EGIS, possibly including indoctrination of RUMIS personnel for future legal or illegal residence operations in West Germany. RUMIS agents have been recruited both in Rumania or abroad with favorite recruiting targets being individuals who have relatives in Rumania. Most known agents, therefore, have been Rumanian refugees and ethnic Germans. The RUMIS have also made recruitment approaches to Allied personnel who have traveled to Rumania to visit relatives. Within recent years the RUMIS have made several attempts to recruit members of

Western Danube River ship complements. Ethnic Germans living in Rumania have also been recruited and trained and then either repatriated or permitted to "escape" to West Germany. Agents recruited abroad are usually given cursory training while those recruited in Rumania may be well trained. Training generally consists of briefings regarding targets, mission, the agent's mode of conduct, suggested operational methods, cover employment and communications. Communications involve secret writing, the use of ordinary mail and meetings with the agent handler. One-way coded radio messages also have been used.

(d) The 1958 apprehension of the two RUMIS officers from the Rumanian Trade Delegation in Frankfurt/Main resulted in the compromise of a number of RUMIS operations. Few of these represented significant neutralizations, but the operation led to the identification of more than 100 RUMIS officers, many of whom were serving in Western countries. The RUMIS do not appear to have recovered from this action and is probably not capable of currently fulfilling major requirements in West Germany.

(2) Recent Significant Activities

The RUMIS appear to have abandoned at least temporarily the legal residence operations they have conducted until 1958 in West Germany through the trade delegation in Frankfurt/Main, and have commenced third-country operations from Austria. RUMIS missions in West Germany have pertained primarily to the spotting and assessing of potential sources, including Allied personnel and West Germans, with emphasis on individuals who have relatives or other ties in Rumania. Other RUMIS interests were in general OB including USAREUR missile bases, atomic and conventional armaments, equipment, troop strength and installations. EEI were also directed against West German targets.

(3) Probable Courses of Action

No significant change is anticipated in either the level or targets of Rumanian espionage activity in West Germany. RUMIS operations will probably continue to be directed from third countries, and RUMIS personnel assigned to the Rumanian

Trade Delegation in Frankfurt/Main will continue to exercise caution because of the 1958 compromise of the delegation's role as a legal residency. New RUMIS operations against USAREUR will usually originate directly from Rumania.

f. The Bulgarian Intelligence Services (BIS)

(1) Status and Capabilities

The BIS are among the least active of the hostile intelligence services operating in the USAREUR area. Only one operation of any significance, involving personnel of the Bulgarian Trade Mission at Frankfurt/Main, has been uncovered in recent years. In this operation a net of agents which had operated from 1955 to 1958 among Bulgarian emigres and members of US Labor Services units in West Germany was neutralized. Targets included Bulgarian emigre groups in West Germany, information on Labor Service units and advanced weapons. Although this operation was a low-level effort, it does indicate that the BIS have the capability and assets to mount operations in the USAREUR area. The operation also served to emphasize that the BIS employ known and accepted Satellite procedure such as use of trade missions as operational bases for the conduct of operations.

(2) Recent Significant Developments

There were no significant BIS operations against USAREUR reported in 1960.

(3) Probable Courses of Action

Activity in the USAREUR area will continue to be relatively insignificant and will probably be limited to operations which can be controlled from a legal residency.

g. The Hungarian Intelligence Services (HIS)

(1) Status and Capabilities

(a) In common with most of the Satellite intelligence services, the HIS have access to a large group of

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Hungarian refugees who have resettled in the USAREUR area. An additional advantage to the HIS is the Danube River traffic which permits access to the USAREUR area by legal means. There is no evidence to indicate, however, that the HIS are at this time making extensive use of opportunities presented by Danube River traffic. In other respects, however, the HIS operate at a disadvantage since there is no mutual border with West Germany, and operations necessitate transiting a third country.

(b) The virtual lack of activity in the USAREUR area which has characterized the HIS since 1957 continued in 1960. In the instances in which HIS participation was noted, the primary targets were Hungarian emigré groups or Western intelligence agencies. The decline in activity coincided with the 1956 uprising, and it is not known whether this decline was by accident or design. There is evidence, however, that some agents dispatched before 1956 are still active in the USAREUR area. Contact and control is accomplished through HIS staff personnel placed in cover positions in the various legal Hungarian offices located in the West.

(2) Recent Significant Developments

There were no significant HIS operations against USAREUR reported in 1960.

(3) Probable Courses of Action

No appreciable change in extent or type of HIS activity is anticipated. The primary effort will be directed against Western intelligence agencies and Hungarian emigres in the USAREUR area. Hungarian diplomatic and trade missions in the West will be employed as operational bases by the HIS staff personnel using cover positions.

h. The Albanian Intelligence Services (ALBIS)

(1) Status and Capabilities

The ALBIS capability to operate against USAREUR is limited by Albania's remoteness, lack of operational bases and scarcity of potential agent assets in the West. The ALBIS

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Directorate of State Security
(Drejtorija e Sigurimit te Shtetit - Sigurimi)
Ministry of the Interior




Figure No. 49

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consist of the Directorate of State Security (Drejtoria e Sigurimit te Shtetit (Sigurimi)) of the Ministry of Interior, and the Directorate of Military Intelligence (Drejtoria e Inteligjences Ushtarske) of the Ministry of National Defense Armed Forces General Staff (see Figure No. 49). Both are based in Tirana. The Sigurimi, as the principal ALBIS organization, has internal security functions and also conducts positive and counterintelligence operations abroad. The Military Intelligence Directorate's responsibilities are apparently restricted to collection on non-Soviet Bloc countries bordering on Albania, particularly Greece and Yugoslavia. ALBIS strength is estimated at approximately 400. Both services have Soviet advisors, and ALBIS personnel are well trained. Many have attended courses in the USSR. The ALBIS have only two residence agencies in Western Europe located in the Albanian legations at Rome and Paris. Forty percent of the personnel assigned to these legations have been reported as engaging in intelligence work. However, their activities are hampered by very limited operational funds. The ALBIS further encounter difficulty in foreign operations because few nationals are located abroad who might be recruited as sources, and also because relatively few Albanian unofficial travelers visit Western European countries.

(2) Recent Significant Activities

There were no significant ALBIS operations against USAREUR reported in 1960.

(3) Probable Courses of Action

No appreciable increase in Albanian espionage activity in West Germany will occur during 1961.

i. Communist Subversion

(1) Status and Capabilities

(a) The illegal West German Communist Party (KPD), which functions as an underground subsidiary of the East German Communist Party (SED), and the numerous legal Communist-front organizations constitute the major subversive elements of interest in West Germany. Since its ban in August 1956, KPD

strength has declined steadily from 70,000, including 14,000 hard-core members, to less than 10,000 members. The KPD is organized according to a cellular system with the Central Committee and Politbuero in East Berlin directing the District Managements (Bezirksleitung) and County Organizations (Kreisleitung) in West Germany. The KPD districts do not coincide with the political state subdivisions (Laender) but in several areas overlap or further divide the large Laender into two districts. (See Figure No. 50) Regional advisers assist the district management in guiding Kreis activities. The KPD executives are triumvirates (Dreierkopf): the first and leading functionary is responsible for political and ideological direction; the second for organization, personnel and publications; and the third for labor union activities. The Kreisleitung supervises groups of five cells with a maximum of seven members. The basic cells are organized either in factories or residential areas (see Figure No. 51). For security reasons, the KPD observes strict "rules of conspiracy." Cell members are given access only to limited knowledge of KPD organization and are directed to observe all precautions in their meetings and communications. Recruitment therefore is particularly difficult and dangerous since underground KPD members hesitate to reveal their membership to potential new members. Indoctrination and schooling of the KPD cadre also present problems since it must take place in East Germany. Some 1,000 KPD members have attended one-week courses at the KPD school in Oderberg, East Germany, since 1958, and another 60 higher level functionaries completed in mid-1960 a more thorough one-year course. These are primarily indoctrination courses. No evidence is available that special training in sabotage or guerilla warfare is included. It is estimated that the illegal KPD expends two-thirds of its efforts in maintaining a secret organization and keeping up contacts with the undergroup membership. Fear of detection and prosecution by West German security agencies further prevents the illegal KPD members from engaging in significant overt activities. While the Communist Party possesses capabilities for clandestine activities that could pose a significant threat to USAREUR it is currently unable to realize this potential.

(b) The SED Central Committee has maintained over-all control of Communist activities in West Germany through its Department for All-German Affairs, frequently called Work Bureau (Arbeitsbuero). The Arbeitsbuero has complete ideological, organizational and financial control of the KPD. Max Reimann, First

ILLEGAL KPD DISTRICTS




Figure No. 50





Figure No. 51

Secretary of the KPD, actually lives in Berlin-Pankow near the SED Politbuero members. Every decision of the KPD must be approved by the SED which sends representatives to all important KPD meetings. Except for limited KPD membership contributions, the SED completely finances the illegal Party. The Arbeitsbuero also controls the major KPD-front organizations and guides the "West Work" of various East German Communist mass organizations. The most active of these is the Communist labor federation, the Free German Trade Union Federation (Freie Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund (FDGB)), whose members not only seek to subvert the West German labor unions but reportedly also assist in establishing and assisting clandestine organizations in West Germany. Other Communist mass organizations active in "West Work" are the Free German Youth (Freie Deutsche Jugend (FDJ)), the German Sport and Athletic League (Deutsche Turn und Sportbund) and the Democratic Women's League (Demokratische Frauenbund (DFB)). It is estimated that there are 16,000 Arbeitsbuero staff members assigned to "West Work", who work in East Berlin, throughout the mass organizations or as special organizers (Instrukteure) sent to West Germany. One such Arbeitsbuerc "Instrukteur," Rudolf Esterle, in October 1960 was sentenced to three and one-half years of imprisonment for his illegal Communist activities in West Germany. Two other agencies of the East German government are of particular interest because of their subversive propaganda activities against West Germany. The Independent Department of the Political Administration in the East German Ministry of Defense specifically produces propaganda material against the West German and NATO armed forces, while the Committee for German Unity, a central government agency, specializes in propaganda against government policies and leaders. (See Figure No. 52)

(c) The East and West German Communists expend considerable effort and money (some 4,000,000 West German Marks and 2,500,000 East German Marks monthly) on the production and distribution of propaganda designed to soften the West German attitude toward Communism and to weaken their faith in the Federal government and NATO defense structure. An estimated 10,000,000 newspapers, magazines, pamphlets and single leaflets are infiltrated each month from East Germany. Of particular interest are the publications directed against the West German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr), such as Barracks (Kaserne), Soldier's Friend (Soldatenfreund) and the troop information booklet True Information for the Forces (Wahre Inormationen fuer die Truppe) which appeared for the first time in



--SED Control of Subversion in West Germany




Figure No. 52

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mid-1960. It is believed that the Independent Department is responsible to a great extent for these antimilitary publications. The material published by the Committee for German Unity, designed to impress the West German population and foreign countries with the alleged "militaristic and fascist" character of the Bonn government, has been of high quality and sophistication. Another 2,000,000 items are published monthly by the illegal KPD and its front organizations in West Germany. The illegal KPD central organ Freies Volk (Free People) is published weekly with an estimated circulation of 16,000. Following the West German government action against the illegal KPD printing and distributing apparatus in December 1959 and early 1960, Freies Volk was temporarily produced in East Berlin. It is now again being printed in West Germany. The KPD district organizations also have their own papers (see Figure No.53), as do some of the more active county and city organizations and KPD cells in the labor unions. Their primary function appears to be political indoctrination and guidance of Party members. All the major KPD-front organizations have their papers, and some former KPD functionaries put out "information bulletins," bringing the number of overt pro-Communist publications to 135 with a monthly circulation of 1,250,000. Communist radio and TV also play a significant subversive role against West Germany. The KPD's own radio, German Freedom Station 904 (Deutsche Freiheitssender 904), has four hours of daily programs which carry information for the KPD, political reports and commentaries, and special programs for Bundeswehr listeners. Since October 1960 a "German Soldiers' Station 935" (Deutsche Soldatensender 935) has been sending special programs for the Bundeswehr during evening hours. The programs can be heard best in Berlin and reportedly interfere with US Armed Forces Network, Berlin. The East German government operates 25 shortwave and broadcast transmitters and 20 FM transmitters which beam propaganda programs toward West Germany. The state-controlled TV system reportedly can be seen by more people in West Germany and West Berlin than in East Germany. Another TV station oriented toward the West will begin operations in 1961.

(d) Since its ban the KPD has had to rely to a great extent on its auxiliary organizations to carry out Communist objectives in West Germany. The League of Germans (Bund der Deutschen (BdD)) is a legal political party which represents KPD interests. The BdD, however, has not been able to obtain anything approaching the 5 percent popular vote required for representation in federal and local governments.

Organ Papers of the KPD District Managements

<u>Name of Paper</u>	<u>KPD District</u>	<u>Publication Frequency</u>	<u>Number of Copies</u>
<u>Norddeutsches Echo</u> (North German Echo)	Schleswig-Holstein	Every 14 days	2,500
<u>Hamburger Volkszeitung</u> (Hamburg People's Paper)	Hamburg	Sporadic	1,000
<u>Neue Niedersachsische Volksstimme</u> (New People's Voice of Lower Saxony)	Lower Saxony	Every 14 days	-----
<u>Tribüne der Demokratie</u> (Tribune of Democracy)	Bremen/Weser/Emms	Every 14 days	-----
<u>Neue Volkszeitung</u> (New People's Paper)	Northrhine-Westphalia Ruhr area	Every 14 days and monthly	-----
<u>Freiheit (Freedom)</u>	Northrhine-Westphalia Lower Rhine area	Every 14 days and monthly	-----
<u>Sozialistische Volkszeitung</u> (Socialist People's Paper)	Hesse	-----	2,000 to 3,000
<u>Unser Tag (Our Day)</u>	Rhineland-Pfalz	Monthly	-----
<u>Badisches Volkssecho</u> (People's Echo of Baden)	Baden	Sporadic	-----
<u>Volksstimme (People's Voice)</u>	Wuerttemberg	Sporadic	1,000
<u>Nordbayerisches Volkssecho</u> (People's Echo of Northern Bavaria)	Northern Bavaria	Sporadic	1,000
<u>Suedbayerische Volkszeitung</u> (People's Paper of Southern Bavaria)	Southern Bavaria	Every 14 days in 1957	1,500
<u>Neue Zeit (New Times)</u>	Saar	Every 14 days and monthly	5,000
		Monthly	5,000

Figure No. 53

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In the local elections in Hesse and Rhineland-Pfalz in October 1960, the BdD secured only .1 to .2 percent of the popular vote. Among the most active Communist-front organizations are the many "peace" and antiatomic groups. The Peace Committee of the Federal Republic of Germany (Friedenskomitee der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (FKdBD)), whose federal secretariat was dissolved and Communist functionaries sentenced for their unconstitutional activities in April 1960, is being replaced by several local groups. The Land Peace Committee (Landesfriedenskomitee) of Baden-Wuerttemberg reportedly has assumed the functions of the federal organization; other active Peace Committees exist in Hesse, Bremen and Bavaria, and in the Saar where it is called "Peace Movement." The FKdBD reportedly receives a monthly subsidy of 100,000 West German Marks from the SED for "peace" activities in the Federal Republic. The German Peace Society (Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft), under the leadership of Hesse Protestant Church President Martin Niemoeller, is a KPD-infiltrated organization which parallels the Communist "peace" line in opposing nuclear armament for the Bundeswehr and missile bases on German soil. The Action Community Against Atomic Armament of the Federal Republic (Aktionsgemeinschaft gegen die atomare Aufruestung der Bundesrepublik), which was founded in 1958, also contributes to the Communist "peace" movement by agitating on the same themes outlined above. Linked with the Action Community are antiatomic groups designed for specific segments of the population: the Central Committee of the Rural Population Against Atomic Arming in the Federal Republic, Action Committee of Young Metal Workers and Miners Against Atomic Death, or Young Action Group Against Atomic Death. The pro-Communist, pacifist West German chapter of War Resisters International (Internationale der Kriegsdienstgegner (IdK)) is organized to appeal particularly to young men of military age. The IdK is reported to have 15,000 followers; the prominent fellow-traveler Professor Renate Riemeck is First Chairman in the Federal Republic. The established KPD-front Age Group 1922 (Jahrgang 1922) follows a more clearly recognized Communist line toward the military age group. The Association of the Persecutees of the Nazi Regime (Vereinigung der Verfolgten des Naziregimes (VVN)), affiliated with the Communist-front International Federation of Resistance Fighters (Federation Internationale des Resistants (FIR)), carries on a defamation campaign against the Federal Republic by alleging that Nazis and militarists are in the government. A federal suit has been brought

against the VVN for Communist anticonstitutional activities which is expected to result in a ban of the organization in 1961. In addition to these organizations which are of significance to the military community, there are Communist fronts established for every possible interest group or segment of the population: women, youth, students, athletes, lawyers, journalists, intelligentsia, farmers and labor union members.

(2) Recent Significant Developments

(a) As in previous years, the illegal KPD during 1960 was primarily concerned with preserving the underground Party structure and maintaining a disciplined and trained cadre. The KPD took several months in early 1960 to recover from the West German executive action against the illegal literature-distributing apparatus and the arrest of printers, couriers and other key members. Rather than subject the illegal Party membership to detection and arrest by West German security agencies, the KPD refrained from significant overt activities. This was particularly evident on two traditional Communist dates, May Day and 17 August, the fourth anniversary of the KPD ban. Despite considerable preparation and propaganda buildup, only minor activity was reported, such as the display of red banners and explosion of propaganda rockets which scattered red flags and leaflets.

(b) The dissemination of quantities of Communist propaganda material is the primary overt KPD activity in West Germany. The amount of Communist propaganda, particularly that of East German origin, increased significantly over the previous year. The Communists in early 1960 capitalized on the series of anti-Semitic incidents and painting of swastikas by claiming that Nazis and militarists abound in West Germany. In mid-July the East German propaganda machine launched a well-organized campaign against the West German government by publicizing statements of several alleged Bundeswehr defectors who "revealed" that Bonn was preparing a "Blitzkrieg" attack on East Germany. Despite the consistently virulent attacks on West German agencies and personalities, Communist propaganda was rarely specifically directed against US Forces, except to take advantage of unfavorable incidents involving US troops stationed in West Germany or such international incidents as the U-2 flight over the Soviet Union.

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(c) KPD-front groups displayed considerable activity in support of Communist aims. The meetings, demonstrations and signature-collection campaigns of the KPD fronts, like the Communist propaganda drives, frequently were linked to specific events: the Summit Conference in May, the August anniversary of the Hiroshima atomic bombing and the United Nations General Assembly meeting in September. In the second half of 1960 there was a noticeable increase in Communist "peace" and antiatomic activity which is considered to be part of the "world-wide campaign for disarmament and strengthening of peace" which the international Communist-front World Peace Council launched in Stockholm in July. Some specific agitation against US military bases and special weapons installations in West Germany was included in this "peace" campaign.

(d) Use of East German Communist auxiliary groups was evident during 1960 in numerous systematically organized East-West German contacts and meetings. The Communists, through the FDGB and the FDJ, were especially successful in sponsoring West German labor and youth attendance at the 3d Labor Youth Congress in Erfurt at Easter and at the two All-German Workers' Conferences staged concurrently with the Leipzig spring and autumn fairs. According to Communist claims, nearly 14,000 West Germans attended these three events. In addition to seeking labor union representation at these meetings, the Communists have emphasized infiltration of the West German Social-Democratic Party (SPD) and SPD attendance at East German conferences. Communist attempts to manipulate a segment of the SPD became increasingly evident as a pro-Communist group of Socialists who resigned or were expelled from the SPD formed a Union of Independent Socialists (Vereinigung Unabhaengiger Sozialisten (VUS)) in November. Ex-SPD members Viktor Agartz and Albert Berg are taking a major part in the organizational work of the VUS. The VUS is expected to become a new left-wing party as soon as the SED and KPD consider it a politically opportune moment, probably in time for the Federal elections in 1961.

(3) Probable Courses of Action

Faced with continuing restrictive measures by the West German security agencies, the illegal KPD will be primarily concerned with preserving the underground Party structure and retaining its hard-core membership. The KPD will not contribute

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significantly to the hostile intelligence effort, but some intelligence gathering by individual KPD members can be expected. As in the past, Communist activities in West Germany, however, will be most evident in the distribution of propaganda material and the program of the KPD-front organizations. Following the trend of recent years, the amount of Communist propaganda will increase. The primary target will continue to be the West German government and armed forces rather than the other Allies. Some increase in antiforeign base propaganda can be expected, however, especially as part of the international Communist "peace" campaign which will reach a climax during 1961. In its propaganda activities the KPD will take advantage of the 1961 federal political campaign and will attempt to gain at least some political representation by backing various political front organizations or a radical leftist Socialist party.

j. Hostile Sabotage

(1) Status and Capabilities

(a) Both the hostile intelligence services and the Communist-controlled subversive groups have sufficient personnel to direct, conduct or support sabotage operations in the USAREUR area. These elements as well as special sabotage groups or units trained and based in the Soviet Bloc may be employed at an appropriate time. The various subversive elements are not known to have received sabotage training or to be specifically committed to wartime sabotage operations. The primary capability among Communist groups is with those Party members or sympathizers working at or near critical installations who could use their knowledge of the area for sabotage activity not requiring extensive preparation. However, all countries of the Soviet Bloc except Hungary and Albania apparently have airborne components in their armed forces. One of the functions implicit in such organizations is the conduct of sabotage and disruptive activity behind enemy lines. However, only in the Soviet and East German intelligence services have sabotage elements been specifically identified. These groups could use either airborne elements or recruited native personnel in the target country for sabotage operation.

(b) There is increasing evidence that the hostile espionage effort is increasingly directed at the collection of sabotage

target information. Information obtained from neutralized agents indicates that the hostile intelligence services have thoroughly reconnoitered a large percentage of critical USAREUR installations. These include POL systems and communications installations as well as advanced weapon units, current installations and storage sites. It is likely that these targets will receive the majority of initial attention of all categories of sabotage sources upon an outbreak of hostilities.

(2) Recent Significant Developments

(a) There have been several recent indications that the EGIS and the EGA are preparing for future sabotage operations. In the EGA, 17-man reconnaissance units have reportedly been assigned to each division. These are parachute units which have, in addition to their normal tactical functions, missions against atomic storage sites, advanced weapon units and important communications or transportation networks. Thus far there has been no evidence of a command channel above division level for these units, and there is no apparent connection between the units and the EGIS. Such units may be increased, based on recent reports of a major personnel investigation program designed to find EGA unmarried personnel with excellent political background. Emphasis was placed on youth and reliability. A sabotage-demolition element within the MfS/HVA has been reported. Known as the Diversionary (Sabotage) Department or Department VIII, the unit is to recruit individuals in critical West German industries, communications centers and power installations. Within the V-12 a Department for Aggressive Reconnaissance has been established for the conduct of sabotage and other missions of a special forces nature. Information on both organizations is limited as a result of the secrecy with which they have been surrounded. There have also been reports that selected members of the MfS Guard Regiment in East Berlin are undergoing parachute training. The Regiment is responsible for East Berlin internal security (riot control) as well as the protection of government functionaries and installations in East Berlin. Although information is fragmentary, it is possible that the internal security functions of the regiment are being expanded to include all of East Germany and that an airborne capability is being added for increased mobility. There is no evidence that the reported changes in the regiment are connected with a sabotage or demolition function or that the regiment is to be connected with the sabotage-demolition element reported established in the MfS/HVA headquarters.

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In any event, the addition of an airborne capability to an MfS organization does increase the sabotage capability of the unit, whether by accident or design, and cannot be discounted.

(b) Recent information indicates that airborne units of the Soviet Armed Forces are being trained in attacks against enemy missile sites located 25 to 50 miles behind front lines. A recent intelligence report states that reinforced Soviet parachute companies will drop approximately two miles from objective and launch a shallow enveloping attack. Small arms and crew-served recoilless weapons are to be used. After the mission the company is evacuated by helicopter.

(3) Probable Courses of Action

Hostile-controlled sabotage activity on a scale that would materially influence USAREUR operations is not anticipated during 1961. Even significant test or training missions are not anticipated. The Communist elements will refrain from any sabotage activity which could be used as a basis for repressive government action. This, however, is based on the expectation of a continuing status quo in the political situation. An appreciable increase in tensions in particular areas such as Berlin could lead to the employment of sabotage for psychological or other political purposes. In the event of hostilities, disruptive sabotage attacks on critical military and civilian targets may be expected. Priority targets will include advanced weapon sites, and communications, transportation and power facilities. During a period of relative political calm, hostile attention will be directed primarily toward collection of additional information on USAREUR vulnerabilities to sabotage. An increase in hostile missions to establish USAREUR defenses against sabotage is expected. While such activity does not represent an immediate threat, increasing hostile knowledge of USAREUR will provide enemy forces with detailed information for wartime planning.

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