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
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
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BY AUTHORITY OF:

1 JANUARY 1961



GRAHAM R. EVANS
Colonel GS
Chief, Production Branch
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UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, INTELLIGENCE

USAREUR INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE-1961

1 JANUARY 1961

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
1. Mission of the Commander in Chief, United States Army, Europe	5
2. Characteristics of the Area of Operations	6
a. Weather	6
b. Terrain	8
c. National Policies	10
d. War Production	12
e. Resistance Potential and Internal Stability	12
3. Enemy Situation	13
4. Soviet Military Capabilities	24
a. General Considerations	24
b. Forces Available	25
c. Enumeration of Soviet Military Capabilities	26
d. Discussion of Soviet Military Capabilities	27
e. Warning of Soviet Attack	34
5. Conclusions	36
ANNEX 1 - Possible Land Campaign vs Western Europe	41
ANNEX 2 - Possible Land Campaign vs Southern Europe	43
ANNEX 3 - Weather	45
ANNEX 4 - Terrain	63
ANNEX 5 - National Policies	75

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TABLE OF CONTENTS, CONTINUED

	<u>Page</u>
ANNEX 6 - War Production	83
ANNEX 7 - Resistance Potential and Internal Stability	89
ANNEX 8 - Compositions	99
ANNEX 9 - Strengths	105
ANNEX 10 - Dispositions	109
ANNEX 11 - Personnel/Organization/Equipment	127
ANNEX 12 - Training	141
ANNEX 13 - Combat Effectiveness/Reliability	155
ANNEX 14 - Soviet Airborne Forces	161
ANNEX 15 - Paramilitary Organizations	163
ANNEX 16 - Reinforcement Capability	167
ANNEX 17 - Soviet-Satellite Weapons and Equipment	171
ANNEX 18 - Logistics	175
ANNEX 19 - Guided Missile Capabilities	231
ANNEX 20 - Atomic Energy Capabilities	239
ANNEX 21 - CBR Capabilities	247
ANNEX 22 - Electronics Capabilities	261
ANNEX 23 - The Counterintelligence Estimate	271

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, INTELLIGENCE

1 JANUARY 1961

Maps: 1:250,000, AMS Series M501

1. (S) Mission of the Commander in Chief, United States Army, Europe

a. Command the United States Army, Europe, and assure the combat readiness of assigned United States Army forces. In the event of an emergency, defend assigned sector(s) with United States Army forces, and

(1) Support SACEUR's and USCINCEUR's tactical operations.

(2) Discharge United States responsibilities relating to all Germany, including Berlin.

(3) Coordinate and direct intelligence.

(4) Provide communications service.

(5) Coordinate and direct civil affairs activities.

b. As a component commander under the Commander in Chief, United States European Command, exercise assigned responsibilities pertaining to alert matters, noncombatant evacuation, and liaison with the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG).

c. As Commander of Central Army Group (CENTAG), an integrated NATO Headquarters subordinate to Allied Land Forces Central Europe (LANDCENT), supervise the peacetime preparation of assigned forces, and those earmarked for assignment, for their wartime tasks. In time of war, exercise operational command of forces assigned to CENTAG.

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d. By means of the Southern European Task Force (SETAF), be prepared to provide special weapons support for Allied forces in Italy in accordance with the plans of appropriate NATO commanders.

e. In conjunction with the Commander in Chief, United States European Command, insure the custody, security, maintenance and operational readiness of special weapons deployed in support of non-US NATO forces.

f. Plan for, train and prepare United States forces for employment outside Germany in support of USCINCEUR and CINCNELM contingency plans.

g. Provide instruction and training, particularly with respect to advanced weapons and techniques, for military personnel of Allied nations.

h. Operate and maintain a logistical support system which is capable of providing complete supply support for United States Army forces in peacetime and is immediately adaptable to wartime conditions.

i. Provide housing, medical services, dependents' education and other administrative support service, to insure health, welfare and morale of military and civilian personnel and their dependents assigned to United States Army, Europe, and of the personnel of other designated forces and agencies. *

(* The subsidiary tasks and responsibilities which contribute to the fulfillment of each mission are indicated in the inclosure to letter, AEAGC-PH, Headquarters, United States Army, Europe, 16 November 1960, subject: "USAREUR Mission Register (U).")

2. (S) Characteristics of the Area of Operations

a. (U) Weather

(1) Central Europe

The climate in the central European area is temperate despite its location in the northern latitude. The influence of the Gulf Stream insures mild winters even though the topography includes mountain chains, plateaus and low-lying plains.

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The range of temperature and rainfall is not great. Summer temperatures are not unpleasantly hot, averaging approximately 70 degrees Fahrenheit. Winter temperatures seldom fall below zero degrees Fahrenheit. The frost-free season is approximately 190 days. The annual rainfall, averaging 20 inches, is well distributed, with 9 to 13 inches falling from May to September. Slow rains and drizzles are common. Winter is the cloudiest season with December the cloudiest month. Winds are predominantly westerly the entire year. Good visibility exceeding six miles may be expected on more than half of the days in summer. Fog averages 30 to 40 days each year, increasing in the area of industrial towns. Fogs predominate during autumn, occurring most frequently in November.

(2) Southern Europe

Within the area consisting of northwestern Yugoslavia and northern Italy and Austria the best seasons for military operations are summer and early fall (June through September). September and early October are usually the months of minimum cloud coverage and moderate temperatures. Less rain falls during this period than in the summer or late fall months. The "highland and alpine" climate of northern Italy, northwestern Yugoslavia and Austria is characterized by variability and changeability. In this mountainous area the weather change within a 24-hour period is likely to be greater than in the adjacent lowlands. This mountain mass may experience sudden gusts of rain or snow, followed immediately by intense sunlight.

In the alpine areas the severe snowstorms of the winter months, together with the closing of minor passes and temporary blocking of major passes, restrict mobility and visibility. This factor, combined with the low temperatures and high winds of the area, lowers the efficiency of personnel and equipment and would generally limit, and temporarily block, enemy movement through the major avenues of approach. During the transitional periods of spring and autumn, mist, clouds and rain restrict visibility. Streams overflow, blocking mountain valleys and converting valley floors to bogs. Since the main routes of approach follow these river valleys, these conditions would adversely influence Soviet ability to move rapidly. However, the clear and warm summer months normally do not present climatic conditions which would interfere with a Soviet attack on Italy. (For influence of climate on specific military operations see Annex 3)

- b. (C) Terrain
 - (1) Central Europe
 - (a) General

From the Soviet point of view the outstanding critical terrain feature in Europe is the ground dominating the west bank of the Rhine River. The Rhine is the most formidable natural obstacle in the entire area. The west bank must be secured in order to ensure further westward advance along the axis toward Paris and the English Channel. If it is not seized, a potential threat to the flank of any Soviet advance across the North German Plain will exist.

In general there are three major favorable axes of movement for a force attacking toward and across the Rhine from the east. The first follows the dry southern edge of the North German Plain and crosses the Rhine between the Ruhr and Arnhem-Nijmegen. The polder regions of the Netherlands and the similar but less extensive areas in extreme northwestern Germany limit movement north of this axis.

The second axis follows the Wetterau and Fulda Corridors to reach the Rhine near Mainz.

The third follows the Bavarian Plateau and the Kraichgau Corridor to reach the Rhine at Karlsruhe. South of this third axis movement is greatly restricted and channelized by the Black Forest and Jura Mountains and even more directly by the Alps.

(b) Logistic Approach Routes

These major concentrations of transportation routes lead westward from the East German boundary. These on the whole coincide with the best tactical routes of advance.

1 Routes in the North German Plain. These routes form the densest and highest-capacity network of transportation lines on the European Continent. These lines, following the southern edge of the North German Plain near the base of the highlands, cross the Rhine between Cologne and Wesel.

2 The central German routes. These routes leading from Czechoslovakia and Thuringia pass through Hesse and Franconia and converge on the Upper Rhine Plain between Mainz and Karlsruhe. These routes are somewhat less concentrated and of somewhat lower capacity than those in the North German Plain;

nevertheless, they have a very high capacity. The routes leading to the key crossings of Mainz, through Frankfurt, have a capacity equal to or exceeding that of the routes leading to any other individual Rhine bridge area.

3 The south German routes. These routes lead northwestward out of Austria across Bavaria and the Kraichgau to the same crossings as the central German routes. In this case, however, the heaviest concentration of routes leads to Karlsruhe.

(c) Logistic exit routes

The concentrations of logistic exit routes in general correspond to the concentrations in the approaches. However, these factors should be noted:

1 In the north the exit routes generally have lower capacities than the approach routes.

2 Those in the Mainz-Karlsruhe sector are likewise of lower capacity than the approach routes but the disparity is not great.

3 Exit routes from the southern part of the Upper Rhine Plain via Strasbourg and Mulhouse have a higher capacity than the approach routes. These exit routes might be exploited by the Soviets through diversion of traffic from the northern part of the plain via the excellent lateral communications of the Rhine Valley itself.

From the logistical point of view, crossings from Wesel to Cologne and from Mainz to Karlsruhe would have the greatest value to the Soviets and would merit seizure by an airborne operation.

(2) Southern Europe

The mountainous terrain along the northern and northeastern boundaries of Italy is not favorable for a force attacking to the south. Approaches through this area are canalized into river valleys which are dominated by high terrain and could be easily defended. There is little room for dispersion, and approaching columns

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would be roadbound. The best approach is from the east through the Sava River Valley, the Ljubljana and Gorizia Gaps in Yugoslavia and Trieste, Italy. This approach is shorter than those to the north and has fewer mountains, offering more room for maneuver and dispersion, and less effective terrain for defense. The level terrain of the Po Valley and the Italian Friullian Plain are favorable to an invader. However, even there the canals, intense cultivation, numerous towns and stone boundary walls tend to restrict rapid cross-country movement.

The terrain in northern Italy along the Austro-Italian border is generally favorable for defense. The southern alpine belt running generally from east to west is suitable for defense in depth in at least two successive positions. The terrain along the Italian-Yugoslav border is not generally favorable for defense. The best defensive terrain is the Isonzo River line. Key defensive terrain in the area consists of the Mount Guadra-Mount Corada complex and the rivers which flow southward into the Adriatic from the Friullian Plain.

Numerous trails and one-lane all-weather roads exist throughout the Alps. These could be used by mountain troops. The plains area of northeast Italy is the most extensive region in this sector suitable for Soviet armored and airborne operations. (For a complete terrain appreciation see Annex 4.)

c. (S) National Policies

The year 1960 was characterized by a series of delays in the execution of several major Soviet national policies. Khrushchev saw fit to sabotage the May 1960 Paris Summit, probably largely because he believed he could gain nothing from such a meeting. As a result, the Berlin problem remained unresolved through another year. The East Germans, however, were allowed to undertake a series of limited actions against the Western position in Berlin during the autumn of 1960. These appeared intended chiefly to prove that West Berlin is not a part of West Germany and that the West Berliners are not West Germans. These moves apparently were intended to contribute to the Communist position in future negotiations on the Berlin problem. Khrushchev's program for the reduction of the Soviet Armed Forces was decelerated, if not revised. The Soviet space program apparently encountered difficulties, especially at the time of Khrushchev's visit to the United Nations. That visit itself provided the Soviets

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little in the way of practical or propaganda gain. Exploitation of the U-2 incident in May 1960 perhaps also proved counterproductive. However, in November 1960, the Soviets did finally attempt to come to grips with the problem of Communist China's ideological challenge. A compromise was apparently reached which outwardly gave the impression that Moscow's views had prevailed.

Khrushchev faces 1961 with at least a facade of international Communist unity behind him. However, he may feel the need to demonstrate that the policy of peaceful coexistence which he has championed can bring useful results for international Communism. As 1960 ended, Moscow was reassuring the West that despite the language of the statement agreed to by the leaders of world Communism at the conclusion of their November 1960 Moscow meeting, the Soviets were anxious to improve their relations with the West, especially the United States. Khrushchev has stated his desire for a new summit conference, and the new Soviet attitude obviously is intended to pave the way for it. However, if Khrushchev finds that the West cannot be brought to new negotiations by soft measures, he probably will use others. The most likely lever which he has available to force new negotiations is Berlin. In the new Soviet approach to unresolved problems, Berlin probably also holds the highest priority.

The coming year probably will see a general resumption of old policies where they were left as a result of the distractions of 1960. Since ideological unity was proclaimed in the November declaration, Moscow probably will take steps to make this meaningful, particularly in Albania, which sided with the Chinese Communists. Full attention probably will again be devoted to the completion of the building of Socialism in the Satellites. Attempts may be made to bring Poland into step with the rest of the Bloc with respect to agricultural collectivization. Whether or not this is done may depend largely upon the progress that is made in gaining Western recognition of the continued division of Germany.

One aspect of Soviet policy which was not disturbed during 1960 was penetration of underdeveloped areas. This will continue and be expanded by bolder moves, particularly in Africa and Latin America. Here, however, as in other matters directly dealing with the West, Moscow will continue to avoid risks of general war. Nevertheless the USSR will continue to support small-scale war such as that in Algeria, or possible civil war in the Congo and Laos. (For further analysis of national policies see Annex 5.)

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d. (C) War Production

Communist Bloc economic plans continue to stress heavily the development of capital goods industries. This development has at the same time facilitated Bloc war production effort. In spite of various difficulties, the Council for Economic Mutual Aid (CEMA) has continued to coordinate war production plans in order to arrive at a complete division of labor within the Communist Bloc and hence more efficient, specialized production. Food shortages, made serious by the wet summer of 1960 in Poland and East Germany and by agricultural collectivization in East Germany, have been reported. However, the standard of living of Satellite populations generally continues to rise. It is anticipated that Communist economic efforts will be intensified during the coming year and that limited successes will be achieved.

Continued, if not expanded, emphasis on the most-efficient-producer concept in the allocation of war production goals among the Satellites is expected. It is probable that Bloc military production will remain short of full wartime capacity, but nevertheless will continue to be more than adequate to support any type of attack which might be mounted against NATO forces in Europe. (For further discussion concerning war production see Annex 6)

e. (S) Resistance Potential and Internal Stability

The climate for open revolt and the acute instability which prevailed in Eastern Europe four years ago have all but disappeared. However, discontent and disaffection on the part of Soviet Bloc populations constitute, as in the past, a major Soviet vulnerability. The degree of disaffection differs greatly between the Russian populations of the Soviet Union, the minority peoples within the USSR, and the peoples of Eastern Europe on whom Communism has been imposed as a result of Soviet policy since World War II. The Soviet peoples' resentments are based largely on economic grounds and on their relative isolation from the rest of the world. However, they apparently have no quarrel with Moscow's foreign policies, or with the strength and influence in world affairs which their leaders have secured for the USSR. Although there may be grumbling over the cost of Soviet scientific and technical achievements, particularly in outer space, there is no reason to believe that the Soviet citizen is not proud of these achievements.

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Within the European Satellites, Moscow's problem and that of the local Communist regimes is more acute and less predictable, as the dynamic events of June 1953 in East Germany and of the fall of 1956 in Hungary and Poland made plain. The Soviets have sought to impress on the Satellite populations their willingness to resort to forceful repressions to preserve Communist hegemony within the Bloc, and this realization has been duly registered on Satellite minds. However, this still does not preclude completely the chance that the impossible or unlikely could happen again. This consideration probably has considerable bearing on all Soviet planning for the area. This is probably particularly true in matters which involve promotion of crises, or in which the risk of armed clashes may exist, such as East German interference with Allied ground communications with Berlin. Khrushchev apparently believes that his chief weapon to combat discontent and disaffection is improvement of Soviet Bloc living standards. As far as the European Satellites are concerned, the Soviets continue to press for Western official and public recognition of the Communist status quo in Eastern Europe, beginning with acceptance of the concept that Germany remain divided and its Eastern portions are a part of the Communist sphere. Moscow probably believes that such Western acceptance would do much to hasten Eastern European acquiescence and long-term accommodation to Communism and its permanence as a way of life in Eastern Europe.

The inherent tensions and weaknesses in the Bloc structure would be accentuated in time of war. There are many East Europeans who believe their only chance of eventual liberation lies in an East-West war. This being true, the Soviets undoubtedly would be faced with problems of control in case of war, but it is unlikely that the Satellite peoples would collectively act so as to seriously hinder the Soviet war effort until such time as Soviet forces suffered major reverses. (For further discussion of this topic see Annex 7)

3. (S) Enemy Situation

The Soviet and Satellite Armed Forces discussed in this estimate are those considered to be available for a Communist offensive against central and southern Europe. These forces include the Soviet Armed Forces in East Germany, Poland, Hungary and the western USSR, and the national forces of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Rumania.

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Recent and Significant Activities

(1) Soviet Forces

(a) Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG)

1 The most significant development during the past year was the attainment of an increased surface-to-air missile (SAM) capability and the probable attainment of a surface-to-surface missile (SSM) capability by the GSFG. Acceptance of this development is not based upon current order of battle holdings for GSFG missile units but upon a series of related incidents which logically leads to this conclusion.

2 The Soviets have consistently demonstrated a very conservative attitude toward replacement of old or obsolescent equipment with that of newer and more modern design until the newer equipment has been thoroughly proved and is available in sufficient numbers. For example, while the latest electronic tracking devices are available for anti-aircraft weapons, the lighter anti-aircraft weapons still retain a visual tracking capability. However, in June and July 1960 the Soviets transferred three anti-aircraft artillery brigades (Chemnitz, Glau and Rehagen) to the USSR. The 6th Artillery Division, one of two artillery divisions subordinate to the GSFG, also departed for the USSR during this period. It must be assumed that the loss of this conventional firepower has already been or is being replaced by more advanced and sophisticated weapons.

3 Reports of missile-like objects increased throughout 1960. These reports included sighting of both rail and road transport of these objects. The sightings of tractors and trailer-transporters suitable for carrying missiles also increased. During the 17-20 October maneuver, competent Western observers on two separate occasions reported convoys of missiles and related control and support vehicles. While information available will not positively support the use of these weapons in the scheme of maneuver, it is assumed that these weapons were integrated into the exercise.

4 By 1 November 14 temporary restrictions upon travel by Allied Military Liaison Missions had been imposed. While information supports the fact that each of these restricted areas was used for either a command post or field exercise by the East German Army or by the GSFG, these restrictions effectively

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reduced mission coverage. Some could have concealed the re-equipment of artillery units and subsequent redeployment of the newly equipped missile artillery units.

5 During the first six months of 1960 approximately 1,200 railroad cars loaded with unidentified military equipment arrived in East Germany. Most of these cars were carrying loads which exceeded standard measurement. It is possible that some of these unidentified shipments carried either missiles or missile-associated equipment.

6 The 1960 fall maneuver period did not follow patterns established during the last seven years in that division and division-opposed exercises did not take place in September and early October. Available information indicates that the two largest exercises occurring before the GSFG maneuver of 17-21 October were the large GSFG command post exercise in August and the smaller river-crossing demonstration in September. It is not yet known whether the extensive command post exercises for higher staffs with division (minus) participation, and the expanded use of local training areas for regimental and lower level training has in fact replaced the normal late summer division exercises. One explanation for the apparent lack of emphasis on mass troop participation in exercises this year may be that the overriding consideration was the need to familiarize all higher commands and staffs with the essentials of missile employment, using both surface and air delivery systems. Other possible explanations lie in the economic or political fields.

7 In 1960, as in 1959, there was extensive CBR training. The wearing of protective clothing, including poncho-like covers, and the carrying of gas masks were noted in troop convoys, tactical formations and training in local and casern training areas. Simulated atomic strikes were observed in several exercises. This training is indicative of continued Soviet concern about these types of warfare. While no reports confirm that the Soviets have given realistic play to the use of atomics in their exercises, it is assumed that the critical factors of casualties, contaminated areas and loss of equipment have been considered and employed in exercises. Higher commands and staffs have participated in command post exercises which undoubtedly included missile employment. Independent regimental and lower commands and staffs may have been similarly trained in local training areas. Artillery and air coordination training has been conducted in

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conjunction with troop exercises. The training pattern in 1961 may more nearly approximate previous patterns if missile systems are completely integrated into the GSFG by that time.

(b) Northern Group of Forces (Poland) (NGF)

Training in the NGF is estimated to have reached division level during 1960. As in previous years, the greater part of the training was conducted in the Swietoszow and Borne training areas. Some training was conducted in the Polish training areas of Drawsko and Sulecin in September. Despite a high-level Polish official's statement on 10 February 1960 that the Soviets would reduce their forces in Poland, there has been no indication of a reduction. On the contrary, several rumors and reports from low-level sources indicated that there was an increase in Soviet troop strength during the year. Neither a decrease nor an increase has been negated or confirmed.

(c) Southern Group of Forces (Hungary) (SGF)

1 In direct contrast to the events of 1959, no rumors or reports of a possible Soviet troop withdrawal from Hungary were received during 1960. Instead, rumors of an impending movement of two to four additional Soviet divisions into Hungary were reported in October. However, it was also reported that the Hungarian government informed the Soviets that there was no housing available for additional Soviet troops. Movement of more Soviet troops into Hungary would certainly increase popular discontent with the Communist regime. The purpose of such a move might be the application of psychological pressure against Yugoslavia and Austria. The continued presence of the four Soviet divisions currently in Hungary is sufficient to insure the stability of the Kadar regime, to remind Yugoslavia and Austria constantly of the ever-present might of the Red Army, and to maintain military forces in a strategic location. It is therefore considered unlikely that the Soviets have reinforced or will reinforce the SGF as long as current international conditions exist.

2 Three motorized rifle divisions of the SGF were converted to tank divisions during 1959 and 1960, apparently as part of the Soviet modernization program. The SGF, which was formerly an army of occupation, has thus become a modern fighting force with an excellent offensive and defensive capability.

3 The intensive field training programs which were in evidence during 1958 and 1959 were apparently paralleled in 1960 training activities. Battalion- and regimental-level activity was noted at the Hajmasker training area from June through late August. Division-level exercises may have taken place in that same general area in early October.

(d) USSR

The reduction of 1,200,000 in the armed forces, which the Soviets announced would be accomplished during 1960-61, appears to be proceeding very slowly. Available evidence indicates that less than 250,000 men have been demobilized. In contrast to Marshal Bagramyan's statement that the "bulk" of the reduction would take place in the spring and summer of 1960, only one line division, the 5th Heavy Tank Korsun Division, has been reported inactivated. Had other line divisions or major units been inactivated, the Soviets would probably have taken advantage of the propaganda derived from the public announcement of such unilateral reductions. The reason for the apparent lag in the demobilization program is not known. There has been fragmentary information that the goal of a reduction of 1,200,000 may be revised downward. In addition there have been numerous reports concerning difficulties and dissatisfaction in the "Virgin Lands" projects and in the government's ability to provide suitable employment for demobilized officers. Based on current indications, it now appears improbable that the full reduction of 1,200,000 will be achieved by the fall of 1961.

(2) Satellite Forces

(a) Albanian Army

1 The most significant activity in Albania during 1960 was the increased development of Albania as a strategic base for Soviet Bloc forces. This was evidenced by the construction of a SAM missile site near Durres, about 15 miles west of Tirane. Other evidence includes the extensive modernization of the port of Durres together with construction of an improved air facility near that city. The submarine pens at Vlone have been reliably reported as continuously active, and unidentified construction activities are probably being continued in this area. The total number of submarines known to be operating permanently from Albanian submarine pens increased from 8 to 12.

2 The development of a strategic base in Albania is probably accompanied by attempts to standardize and modernize Albanian ground forces. Although the extent of the re-equipment program is not clear, the replacement of bolt-action rifles by semi-automatic Soviet models is well under way. There are also reports that the ground forces have been furnished Soviet YA-14 and M-2 tracked prime movers and ZIL-164 tractor trucks.

(b) Bulgarian Army

1 Bulgarian Army training and activities followed the usual pattern in 1960 with unit field training starting in early February, progressing to regimental- or division-level exercises in the summer, and probably culminating in division-level training in October and November. For the second consecutive year training did not include large-scale army-level maneuvers.

2 The 5th Tank Brigade has been reorganized as a tank division. A tank regiment was formed in Levskigrad, in addition to the tank regiments at Kazanluk and at Chirpan. The 15th Rifle Division at Pleven, formerly considered in caretaker status, has been accepted at 25 percent strength. The 17th Rifle Division at Kurdzhali has been inactivated and its elements merged with the 2d Rifle and 5th Tank Divisions.

3 A number of reports of JS-type heavy tanks in Bulgaria were received during the year, but heavy tanks have not been confirmed in any unit. T-54 tanks, 100mm field guns and 130mm antiaircraft guns were observed in the hands of troops, and a possible PT-76 amphibious tank was observed in the vicinity of Kazanluk.

4 Three SAM sites of the SA-2 Guideline type were identified near Sofia during 1960. Bulgaria is the third Satellite to receive SAM defenses, the others being East Germany and Albania. There is no evidence to indicate that these sites are occupied.

(c) Czech Army

1 Czech Army training in 1960 exceeded that of recent years. Early in the year line division units in Bohemia and Slovakia conducted battalion- and regimental-size winter field training at major training areas. Large numbers of troops were committed to the Spartacus Games held in Prague during June and

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early July. Training time lost during this period was made up by the conduct of a division or higher level command post exercise and two high-level tactical field exercises during August and September.

2 There were indications that the Czech Army is accelerating its modernization program by the issue of more T-54 tanks as replacements for T-34's and by introducing several new items of equipment into army units.

3 During 1960 the Czech Army re-established six warrant officer grades which partially replace senior non-commissioned officer ranks. The new warrant officers will have the same legal status as commissioned officers. Individuals appointed will come from the noncommissioned officer ranks.

(d) East German Armed Forces

1 East German Army (EGA) training during 1960 was similar to that of previous years. However, command post exercises at military district level were more numerous, and offensive rather than defensive tactics were emphasized. The fall maneuvers in at least Military District V included complete line divisions rather than representative units as noted in 1959. The activation of a reserve training regiment for railroad engineers further improved the reserve training system. For the first time reserve officers attended refresher courses at service schools during 1960. This increased emphasis on reserve training shows East German concern with the establishment of a well-trained reserve.

2 Between late 1959 and mid-1960 the majority if not all of the former Wehrmacht officers in the EGA were discharged. While this action resulted in a considerable loss of experience among the higher commands and staffs, the replacement of these officers with more politically reliable officers has raised the over-all reliability of the EGA. The training of these new commanders and their staffs was probably one of the main reasons for the large number of high-level command post exercises during 1960.

3 The activation of a new battalion-size unit in Prora on Ruegen Island was confirmed in 1960. Reportedly this unit is a paratroop battalion and is to be trained as a helicopter-borne unit. It had previously been confirmed that a parachute element is assigned to each division reconnaissance battalion.