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scale Soviet military aggression based primarily on the threat of general nuclear war is not credible against many lesser Soviet actions, political as well as military, none of which is grave enough, in itself, to warrant recourse to general nuclear war.

The United States considers that we must recognize the dangers of exclusive reliance on general nuclear war as an instrument of policy and make the effort required to build a strong non-nuclear capability as well. We believe that this alliance must, in the words of President Kennedy; "have a wider choice than humiliation or all-out nuclear action."

VII. Control of Nuclear Weapons - MRIM

Before I go on to a systematic recapitulation of NATO's future requirements. let me touch on two issues which I know are of concern to many of your.


First, there are the very complex problems involved in the control of nuclear weapons. The solution of these problems is very difficult. Our basic position, which is well known to you, and with which I think you agree, is that nuclear weapons must be subject at all times to responsible political control that meets the needs of all NATO countries. The use of nuclear weapons must also be subject to a clear line authority able to make a prompt and deliberate decision for coordinated action as circumstances require.

My Government recognizes the need for timely political decisions to support required military actions and the legitimate desire of all NATO nations for participation in starm determining the policy, the strategy and the circumstances of the use of nuclear weapons. We are studying intensively the ways in which your governments might effect such participation, and we have asked for your suggestions as to how your participation might be secured.

We conclude that our earlier suggestion concerning guidelines is, in the absence of any other solution on which we may be able to a serve, the most promising approach to a solution of this problem. Briefly, the basic tenet of the U.S. position on this issue, for both military and political reasons, is the necessity for both centralized command and a broadly and effectively shared determination of policy.

Pending an agreement by the Council regarding guidelines for the use of nuclear weapons, the Presidnt intends, as indicated by Ambassador Finletter, to direct or authorize, as appropriate, the use of nuclear weapons in the event that the illiance is subjected to a non-nuclear attack with which they cannot copo. Perhaps agreement could be reached on the suitability of these two conditions for use as guidelines; perhaps others could also be agreed.

Second, I should give you our current views on the MREM problem, which has also been the subject of considerable discussion in the Alliance.



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A significant portion of the U.S. strategic effort is now devoted to targets which threaten Europe and do not directly threaten the U.S. We will continue to provide this needed coverage. Illiance forces based outside of Europe have been responsible for semential this mission for many years and must continue to be responsible for some time to come. From a military point of view, the question boils down to the most effective use of our resources. We appreciate that there are also political questions involved. There appear, however, to be divided politiviews on this subject. We remain willing to discuss with you any new steps which the Alliance may wish to take in this direction.

In the event of general nuclear war, the Alliance forces based outside of Europe will be used against all major elements of Soviet military strength, includithose that threaten NATO Europe, from bases and areas that cannot be reached by the bulk of the Soviet nuclear force. The United States nuclear weapons program is an all-out effort to provide for the nuclear protection of the entire Alliance.

With changing technology and enemy capabilities, there will be a continuing need for new types of weapons. To meet possible demands of the mid-1960s, the United States has recently undertaken the design phase of a research and development program on an MREM which could, perhaps, be used in the European theater. This design project is without commitment as to future production, or to method of deployment. As Secretary Rusk will indicate, the U.S. would not be prepared to facilitate procurement of MREMs for a NATO force which was not "truly multilatoral in ownership and control" as described by President Kennedy in his Ottawa speech. The military situation that I have described makes possible deliberate and careful consideration of the control problems that are involved.

VIII. NATO Defense Requirements for the Future

Considered as parts of a whole, the threat we face, the range of possible alternative courses of action open to us in the pursuit of our objectives, and our present strengths and weaknesses, all point clearly to the requirements of NATO defense policy for the future. These can be summarized under four headings.

The requirement for Alliance nuclear forces based outside of Europe. The requirement for an effective nuclear capability in Europe. The requirements for non-nuclear forces.


The fundamental requirement that we maintain the courage, will and determination to recognize the danger, to prepare defenses adequate to the challenge, and, should it prove necessary, to apply in unity the forces needed to prevail.

First, the requirement for alliance nuclear forces based outside of Europe. As the foundation of its general par strength, and as the major deterrent to aggression, the allies must continue to have nuclear delivery forces capable of defeating Soviet forces and, if necessary, of destroying the Soviet Union. Geogrand military reasons digtate that the bulk of these forces be based outside of



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Europe. This situation exists today as it has for the almost twelve years of this alliance. The major portion of these alliance forces outside of Europe has been and will continue to be provided by the United States. These forces now have and will retain the capability required of them. We will continue to take whatever action is required to insure that these forces are kept modernized and available for the common defense.

Second, the requirement for an effective nuclear capability in Europe. We maintain a preponderance of tactical nuclear weapons for the intermediate levels of conflict. However, we cannot nor should we attempt to, assign a general war mission to forces based in Europe which does not take account of the role of forces based outside. The United States has committed itself to the maintenance of an effective tactical nuclear capability in NATO forces, and I maintain wish to reaffirm that commitment. However, tactical nuclear weapons supplement but cannot replace the strategic delivery forces based outside the theater.

The third requirement for the future is for non-nuclear forces adequate to deter or defeat Soviet non-nuclear aggression k at various levels of intensity. Our objective, in our own self-interest, should be to meet the enemy and at any level we consider most appropriate; only by so doing can we truly defend the peoples and territories of all the NATO nations.

In the air, we must be able to obtain non-nuclear superiority in critical areas and yet maintain our nuclear strike capability. We believe that this goal is within the capability of the Alliance. We need forces properly modernized and provided with improved non-nuclear ordnance such as the SIDEWINDER air-to-air missile, the EULL PUP air-to-ground missile, and the results of other new developments in this field. When we add to these forces the additional reinforcing strength which can be deployed to critical areas, the task does not appear so formidable. Our reinforcing capability is now being most forcefully demonstrated by the deployment of U.S. fighter aircraft and medium bombers to Europe in connection with the Berlin crisis.

On the ground, we first of all need the divisions which as long ago as 1957 this Council agreed to be the minimum number required. While there would be obvious advantages in having divisions additional to this number in place on M-Day, we believe the more practical course would be to have more first echelon forces, better manned, equipped and trained available as reinforcements within 10 to 15 days. The hard fact is that N-TO has still not achieved a real forward strategy.

The foregoing outlines in broad terms the overall quantitative aspects of the forces we believe to be needed to meet effectively the spectrum of roles and missions of NATO forces. Let me turn now to the qualitative aspects, which are fully as important, and with which we have xurrent experience and data as a guide to results our past efforts have achieved.

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Starting in early August, this Elliance agreed on the necessity to strengthen its military posture precedent to meeting the Soviet generated crisis over Berlin. The major NATO commanders surveyed the status of their forces from the standpoint of units, personnel, equipment and supplies, and recommended a two part program of action for each country. I must admit that I was shocked to see the grave weaknesses revealed by this survey.

For over eleven years the NATO nations have devoted enormous sums to defense, yet in the face of crisis we find that our overall ability to fight is jeopardized by many deficiencies which combine to degrade scriously the combat effectiveness of the NATO forces.

To support this statement, I draw your attention to SHAPE documents 167/61, SACEUR'S "Plan of Action: NATO Europe", and 188/61, the National responses thereto. If we examine these documents in detail, we will find that they reveal glaring weaknesses in manpower policies and practices, and deficiencies in support units, so extensive that both initial and sustained combat effectiveness are inadequate to meet NATO's needs.

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Furthermore, with respect to hardware, there are cited/purchal deficiencies in equipment, amountion and spare parts which could paralyze military action and yet which could have been avoided. The inclosures are studded with comments that there are on hand only 2 or 3 days of supply of items such as droppable fuel tanks, 20 mm amountion, 2.75 inch rockets, and SIDEMINDER missiles.

The estimate of my own logistics staff have indicated significant deficiencies for non-U.S forces. For example:

- 1. For ground forces, shortages of argunition are widespread. We believe the shortages in 90 mm tank ammunition may be as much as one and three quarters million rounds.
- 2. Ground units are short over 7000 armored personnel carriers, an item necessary for mobility. This is in addition to a shortage of 1400 light and 2000 medium tanks.
- 3. NATO is short about 152,000 2.75 inch rockets, a prime weapon for our aircraft on hand.
- 4. The navies likewise face shorteges including 2400 torpedoes and over 5000 mines.

These weeknesses have been further underlined in MC-39/13, "An Analysis of the Military Implications of the 1961 Interim Review", just submitted by the Military Authorities. Shortages have both short and long range implications. We are now engaged in attempting to overcome the short term deficiencies. We



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must continue urgently, and augment if necessary, our efforts to meet the progress outlined by the Major Commanders for the Berlin build-up.

Subsequently, we must use the higher level of readiness achieved by our current efforts as a plateau upon which to build for the future. In both the long and short term, the forces required must be manned, trained, equipped deployed and supported logistically to fight when and where they may be required. We cannot defend our peoples or our territories with divisions which exist only on paper or with supplies which should fill warehouses that are now empty.

Beyond the short term measures related to Berlin, a general area which requires primary consideration in building the strength of the Alliance is the field of logistic support. It makes little sense to commit our men to NATO and not p to provide them with a logistical system which will supply the equipment, material and weapons of war essential to their combat effectiveness.

Over the past several months, numerous studies have been made by SACEUR to determine the role which should be performed by the NATO Military Authorities in logistics control and management. These studies, now completed, have concluded that in peace SACEUR and his major subordinate commanders require the authority and staff capability continually to appraise the state of logistic readiness and to provide the nations with clear statements of the actions which are necessary to support NATO forces in the execution of approved ACE plans.


The second major conclusion of these studies is that operational control and logistical control are inscriming and this tenet implies that SACHUR should have authority in time of war to distribute and redistribute the logistic assets of forces committed to the alliance.

The results of the studies outlined above have been approved by the Military Committee in Document EC 36/5. The U.S. intends to support the adoption of these recommendations in the Morth Atlantic Council Mand urges all other member nations to do likewise. The U.S. does this with full recognition of the fact that standing NATO policy prescribes that logistics support is a national responsibility. None-theless, the U.S. believes, and it hopes its partners believe likewise, that adherence to national prerogatives must not be permitted to interfere with effective combat support of NATO forces.

Another element to which the Alliance must give increasing attention is the maximum possible standardization on every item of supply. Special emphasis must be placed on the adoption of common weapons systems and ammunition to increase the possibility of mutual & logistic support.

We can all agree, I am sure, that standardization is the primary and essential key to achievement of the most economical and effective NATO logistics system. Commonality of items in the inventories of our member countries is prerequisite





to a mutual or common logistic support system. Greater and more rapid progress will result if we give greater recognition and emphasis to this fact in the development and production phases of our activities.

With respect to the important matter of research and development, we, collectively, have in our countries prominent scientists whose talents are unsurpasse we should employ these talents to the utmost. There tend to be certain fields in which each country is more advanced than her allies. Therefore, careful coordination of scientific efforts, and in some instances selective choices of countries or groups of countries responsible for specific aspects of our programs, is essential to prevent duplication and accelerate progress. My government is currently studying these possibilities.

After an item has been developed and agreed upon for production, we should consider and decide on either NATO coordinated production or reciprocally agreed national production programs. depending upon our evaluation of such factors as specialized production capabilities, the balance of payments, and the vulnarability of production sources.


As a fundamental guiding principle throughout both our research and development and production efforts, we should continually give major attention to the need to have items standardized to the end that a coordinated and integrated logistic support system becomes increasingly practical.

In all frankness, the defense structure and needed improvements in quality of forces I have outlined will require considerable additional effort. As I have indicated, my government considers that NATO's nuclear strength must continue to grow, and action is being taken to insure that growth; in addition, Allied planning is already underway to provide adequate naval forces. What is more jurgently needed is an increase in improvement ground and air forces, primarily in the critical area of Central Europe.

There can be no question of our ability to provide the necessary resources.

Collectively, NaTO has much greater human, financial and industrial resources than the USSR and the European Satellites. The Western European economics are stronger than ever before, and are generally able to make an increasing contribution to the requirements for defense. The U.S. expects that those countries economical able to do so will assume responsibility for the defense needs of their own Assemble to their full share of multilateral requirements.

It is here that the fourth and final requirement - that NiTO display the courage, will and determination to accept its responsibilities - comes into play. We must recognize that exclusive reliance on deterrent nuclear power, wherever located, is no longer consistent with the military facts of life, - that these facts require that we not only maintain and continue to expand and improve the nuclear component of our defenses, but that we develop the non-nuclear components as well. We must have the will and determination to apply ourselves to the task,



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accepting the necessary burdens for the common defense.

My government recognizes that it has been able to afford to devote a larger share of its total productive effort to defense than can many of its allies. It will continue to act on this basis. However, both on the basis of equity and on grounds of practicality, we are equally convinced that this must be truly a common effort, with all member states providing their just share.

FINLETTER

