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3 The East Berlin District Alert Police were inactivated in June 1961. They were replaced by the newly activated I SAP Brigade. This brigade was formed from the former 2d SAP Regiment in Basdorf. Following the transfer of the BSP to the Ministry of Defense, the V BSP Brigade in Gross Glienicke was redesignated the II Border Guard Brigade (SAP). This action resulted in the stationing of two SAP brigades in positions so that they surround West Berlin. Both brigades were brought to full strength during the fall of 1961 by transfers from other SAP and BSP units.

4 Training in 1961 was the most intensive noted to date in the EGA. There were more division-level exercises than in previous years, and joint exercises at division or higher level, involving EGA and Soviet units, were observed for the first time since early 1959. It is evident that the training of EGA units has now progressed to the point at which joint exercises with the Soviets may be more frequent. Training will be even more intensive in 1962.

(d) Hungarian Army and Security Forces

1 The strength of the Armed Forces has recently been increased by the recall of selected reserves from several age classes and the retention of conscripts beyond their normal release dates. Recent observations indicate that some units may be approaching their authorized wartime personnel strength.

2 The equipment status of the army showed some improvement during 1961. The Hungarian Government apparently expects to increase the tempo of this equipment modernization program, since its newly published 5-year plan provides for a 200 percent increase in defense expenditures.

3 Emphasis on the improvement of air defense continued during 1961. The SA-2 Guideline missile was shown in the "Liberation Day" Parade in Budapest on 4 April 1961. This was the first public appearance of Soviet guided missiles outside the USSR. The construction of SAM sites in Hungary was first detected in March 1961. A total of 10 firing sites, 2 of which may be operational, presently ring the greater Budapest area.

4 The improvement of barriers along the Hungarian-Austrian border, which has been taking place for several years, continued during 1961 and indicates that the Hungarian regime is still

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vitaly concerned with the border-crosser problem. The major portion of the work this year appeared to be near Pusztasomorja, adjacent to the area at which the Austrians are building extensive fortifications.

(e) Polish Army

1 The most significant activity in Poland was the announced suspension of conscript releases until conclusion of a peace treaty with East Germany. This suspension, with a concurrent call-up of conscripts and an increased call-up of reserves, considerably improved the combat readiness of the army. However, in late December reports stated that conscript releases had begun in mid-December.

2 Analysis of information indicates participation by headquarters elements of the 15th and 2d Mechanized and the 6th Airborne Divisions in the Warsaw Pact exercises in East Germany during early October. At least 600 Polish administrative- and support-type vehicles were observed at the exercises.

(f) Rumanian Army

1 During 1961 reports from low-level sources indicated that the First Military Region headquarters is located at Iasi rather than Bacau. Pending confirmation, USAREUR will carry the First Military Region headquarters at Iasi. There is some evidence that the home defense antiaircraft artillery regiments may now be subordinate to the joint Air Defense Corps Headquarters and that the division echelon for such units has been abolished.

2 There have been indications of motorization of some infantry (rifle) divisions, particularly the 9th Infantry Division, of which two basic rifle regiments have been determined to be motorized. This organizational change is based primarily on sightings of tank elements located with infantry troops and the lack of sightings of the division antitank battalion. During 1961 evidence was received of a reorganization of the Rumanian Security and Border Troops. This was first reported in early 1960. This evidence indicates the resubordination of the Border Troops from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of Armed Forces. The Security Troops remain subordinate to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

3 In the annual "Liberation Day" Parade in Bucharest on 23 August 1961 seven Guideline missiles and six 130mm antiaircraft guns were observed for the first time. The prime movers

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and carriages for the missiles were real; however, the missiles appeared to be dummy or practice rounds. Although the PT-76 amphibious tank was seen in a parade rehearsal on 21 August, it did not make its debut in the actual parade. Less field artillery was observed than in previous years, and there were no antitank or self-propelled guns. The total military strength participating in the parade was 4,020, and participating troops were infantry, artillery, border guard, and paratroop. The paratroops were wearing air force shoulder boards. Security Troops served as escorts and lined the parade route. This was the first time that mountain troops did not participate. The military portion of the parade followed traditional patterns, but was on a much-reduced scale compared with previous years' participation.

4 The Rumanian Army appeared to make a determined effort in 1961 to progress above its previous low level of training. During the spring reinforced regimental- and possible division-level training was conducted, and it continued until May. Possible division-level exercises were conducted in mid-October by the Tudor Vladimerescu (TV) Tank Division. The type and level of training activity, which appeared to be more intense than during the same period in previous years, may indicate increased emphasis to improve the low standard and level of training prevalent in the Rumanian Army.

5 The Rumanian military response to the Berlin crisis has been more moderate and less publicized than that of the other Satellites. The fall call-up of conscripts started about 15 September and appeared to be at least 1 month ahead of schedule. A selective call-up of reserves was reported during September. USAREUR has accepted a temporary 40,000-man increase in army strength.

(3) Albanian Army

Albania has recently taken measures to improve the military forces' readiness. Emphasis apparently has been placed on internal security. Frontier Guard troops and army conscripts who were due for release in 1961 probably have been retained in service. Other measures taken to improve combat posture include a reorganization or redistribution of infantry brigades and an extensive recall of reserves for a short training period. Some recalled reserves are possibly being held to round out existing units or as cadre for newly formed brigade- and battalion-size elements. Specific details of the reorganization and shifting of units are lacking.

4. (S) Soviet Military Capabilities

Soviet military capabilities and courses of action in the USAREUR area of responsibility may be discussed as separate entities, although it is considered most likely that any military action in this area would be taken within the framework of a global war. The initiation of a global conflict could begin either with immediate world-wide military action or could expand from a local incident. In either case, the necessity for strategic deployment would limit the force that the Soviets could apply in central Europe.

a. General Considerations

(1) Soviet leaders, while following policies that appear to risk general war, actually seek to avoid war. Their policies during this cold war period, while often accompanied by shows of force and direct or implied threats of total destruction, are oriented toward political and economic, rather than military, conquest. One indication is their continued adherence to the "coexistence" theme. They realize that general war would entail a nuclear exchange that would inflict unacceptable damage on both sides. Soviet leaders have consistently disassociated themselves from statements by other Bloc leaders concerning the inevitability of war and have endeavored to force modification of the "survival of the fittest" concept, even to the point of exerting economic and political pressures that have caused serious breaches in Communist Bloc solidarity.

(2) Current policies of the USSR are directed toward the maintenance of political stability and Soviet leadership within the Soviet Bloc, and the extension of Communism among nations susceptible to infiltration and subversion. Soviet goals have expanded beyond the earlier phase of gaining control of countries bordering the USSR and now include the aggressive interjection of Soviet influence into world-wide targets of opportunity, such as the new nations in Africa and areas of unrest in the Western Hemisphere. Other fundamental Soviet aims are the dissolution or weakening of NATO, CENTO, and SEATO; the promotion of divisive tendencies among the nations of the free world; and the perpetuation of the division of Germany, unless it can be reunited on Soviet terms.

(3) Immediate Soviet objectives in central Europe are: an East-West agreement on Berlin that will ultimately permit the absorption of West Berlin by East Germany without war; a formal peace treaty embracing de jure Western recognition of the East German

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regime, or at least including provisions amounting to de facto recognition; and a disarmament agreement. The disarmament agreement, however, could be concluded only on terms that would in essence permit the USSR to retain its large conventional capability while forcing the West to abandon its nuclear capability.

(4) Although the Soviets were possibly forced by circumstances beyond their control to allow the East German regime to precipitate the dangerous Berlin wall crisis in August 1961, their overall technique of operation in the Berlin-East/West German situation has been to apply enough pressure to bring about negotiations, but not enough to solidify Allied cooperative opposition to the point of taking up arms.

(5) It is expected that the USSR will continue to push for a formal peace treaty with East Germany, including Allied participation. Failing in this, it is expected that the Warsaw Pact nations will sign a separate treaty with East Germany. Either agreement will probably grant nominal control of West Berlin access routes to the East Germans, but will protect those Western rights for which the West has indicated it will fight. These residual rights will then become the next intermediate objective for Communist erosion tactics. Throughout the negotiating period and into the next period of local pressure the Soviets will continue to foster the general impression that they are amenable to reasonable proposals, since they have found this attitude on their part to be the one most conducive to achievement of their aims in this area.

b. Forces Available

(1) Soviet ground forces located in the European Satellites consist of 26 line divisions, together with support units and control elements.

(2) The GSFG is a 6-army force composed of 10 tank divisions, 10 motorized rifle divisions, and appropriate combat and service support units. It is a highly mobile, balanced striking force capable of immediate deployment for combat operations. The level of training in the GSFG is high and is geared to both atomic and conventional warfare. Its weapons are modern. This force poses the most immediate threat in the USAREUR area of responsibility. An additional two line divisions are located in Poland and four in Hungary. These divisions are as well equipped and trained as their GSFG counterparts.

(3) Satellite ground forces generally possess limited capabilities. These range from the EGA's capability to conduct limited offensive operations to the Rumanian Army's inability to withstand a significant attack. The military capabilities of the other European Satellites lie between those of East Germany and Rumania. At best, they would be able to take the field as divisions or armies under Soviet control in limited offensive operations. All of the Satellite armies are logistically dependent upon the USSR to some extent. On balance, it is estimated that the Satellite forces will be a military asset to the Soviets in case of war only as long as the Soviets have the military initiative in their areas.

(4) An estimated 93 Soviet Army line divisions are located in the 11 military districts of the USSR west of the Ural Mountain-Caspian Sea line and are available to reinforce a Soviet offensive against Western Europe. With present rail and highway capabilities, and disregarding Allied interdiction, USAREUR estimates that the Soviets could reinforce their forces in Western Europe at the rate of approximately 7.32 divisions daily (3.72 divisions by rail and 3.6 divisions by highway). An additional 1.2 divisions could be moved by rail and highway across Hungary and Austria, and 1.5 divisions could be unloaded daily at the Baltic ports and moved by highway to the forward areas of East Germany. However, only the rail and Baltic port reinforcement capabilities are considered. Highway movement across Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Austria would be slow and uneconomical, and would reduce the combat capability of the units involved. Therefore, the maximum practicable reinforcement capacity is 5.22 divisions daily (3.72 by rail and 1.5 by Baltic ports).

c. Enumeration of Soviet Military Capabilities

(1) Withdraw all, or a portion, of Soviet forces stationed in the European Satellites.

(2) Maintain forces in the European Satellites at present strength.

(3) Reinforce troop strength in the European Satellites.

(4) Allow, or take, varying degrees of military action against West Berlin, to include liquidation of the Western military position there.

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(5) Attack Western Europe without previous build-up or warning.

(6) Attack Western Europe following either a limited or large-scale reinforcement in the forward areas.

(7) Support capabilities (4), (5), or (6) with any or all of the following:

(a) Approximately 1,000 Soviet combat aircraft in support of forward ground and air units during the initial hours of hostilities, except to the extent they are committed to air defense of the homeland.

(b) The assault echelons of 2 airborne divisions, each consisting of approximately 6,000 troops, equipped with light regimental support weapons but generally lacking in vehicles for infantry elements, in a single airlift; or 6 airborne divisions in a 5-day sustained airlift operation.

(c) A wide range of rockets, guided missiles, and nuclear weapons.

d. Discussion of Soviet Military Capabilities

(1) Withdraw All or a Portion of Soviet Forces Stationed in the European Satellites

(a) The present policy of stationing troops in Eastern Europe provides the USSR the best assurance of consolidating its power there and affords the best strategic positioning. The presence of Soviet forces in Poland and Hungary is important to the security of the USSR. The presence of the GSFG in East Germany supports Soviet control of East Germany and assists in maintaining the East German regime. The geographic situation of East Germany affords the Soviets a valuable forward position from which operations can be mounted against Western Europe. Further, the attraction exerted by West Germany's prosperity, the avowed aims of West German leaders to bring about a termination of the partition of Germany, the growing military strength of West Germany, and the problem imposed by West Berlin are sufficient reason to maintain Soviet strength in East Germany, at least at its present level, if the USSR is to preserve a strong bargaining position on the future of Germany and assure the stability of

the East German Government. Therefore, a major withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe is unlikely.

(b) Conversely, there are reasons why the Soviets might consider it to their advantage to withdraw at least a portion of their troops from western Europe following the achievement of an accord on Berlin and the signing of an East German peace treaty. A substantial withdrawal would bring Moscow considerable propaganda benefit and a distinct psychological advantage, should they choose to renew again their demand for withdrawal of foreign troops from the European area. In deciding on appropriate strength levels the Soviets will be governed by their estimate of minimum security requirements.

(c) The minimum Soviet force required to maintain the Soviet position in East Germany is estimated to be four divisions, or one army. This figure is based on strengths necessary to control internal uprisings and assumes the continued reliability of the EGA. Any reduction of this magnitude would probably be dependent upon settlement of the Berlin problem to the satisfaction of the Soviets and would be given widespread advance notice.

(d) Soviet forces in Poland (NGF) render the double service of securing general Soviet interests in that country and of providing lines of communication security for the GSFG. In view of the unorthodox nature of Polish Communism and the restlessness of the Polish people, a requirement for at least two divisions exists. It is therefore considered not likely that the Soviets would consider making any reduction in the ground forces in the NGF.

(e) Soviet forces in Hungary (SGF) are probably in excess of those required to maintain the Soviet position in that country. Present security requirements probably are no greater than those that existed before the 1956 revolt. At that time an estimated two Soviet divisions were in Hungary. Forces stationed in the USSR near Hungary could move rapidly into the country, should a requirement for additional forces arise again. Accordingly, a reduction of up to two Soviet divisions in the SGF is deemed possible.

(f) From the point of view of local security only, it would be possible for the Soviets to withdraw 18 of their divisions from the European Satellites, should they choose to do so. However, any decision on withdrawal, and the extent thereof, will hinge on the

political climate following East-West negotiations on the German problem. No withdrawal of such magnitude is considered likely in the coming year.

(2) Maintain Forces in the European Satellites at Current Strength

(a) Soviet armed strength in the European Satellites is presently great enough to permit assurance that they could defend against any conventional attack by NATO forces.

(b) Soviet capability to launch a successful conventional attack against NATO, using the forces stationed in the Satellites, was reduced by the build-up of the forces of the Western Allies during 1961.

(c) The Soviets sought to balance this reduction by retaining personnel in the GSFG beyond normal rotation dates and by limited reinforcement of the GSFG. If the NATO build-up continues into 1962 it is anticipated the Soviets will feel they cannot maintain their forces at their present level and still provide the USSR the capabilities it must have in Western Europe.

(3) Reinforce Troop Strength in The European Satellites

(a) The retention of most of the limited reinforcements received in 1961 is almost certain through early 1962, at least until the Berlin problem is settled to the satisfaction of the Soviets or, in the absence of such a settlement, until after the Soviets sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany and determine Western reaction thereto.

(b) The Soviets will retain the initiative to undertake or sponsor harassing actions against the Western powers. The exposed position of West Berlin furnishes the Soviets a useful lever with which to attempt to coerce the Allies. If the Soviets decide to continue pressure on the West by this means, they will probably attempt to maintain the GSFG in a position of strength relative to the NATO forces. If the NATO forces strengthen themselves, the USSR will feel compelled to increase the strength of the GSFG also.

(c) The foregoing discussion is based on the estimate that the Soviet leaders do not intend to start a general war in Europe in 1962. The possibility remains, however, that for some

reason not apparent at this time they might decide to begin hostilities during this period. Further, Soviet or East German miscalculation might lead to war. For that reason, attack capabilities, to include their relative probability of adoption, are analyzed in the following paragraphs. While the course of action against West Berlin is in part a cold war capability, it is discussed here in view of its potentially explosive nature.

(4) Allow or Take Varying Degrees of Military Action Against West Berlin, to Include Liquidation of the Western Military Position in Berlin

Soviet capabilities against West Berlin and its communications with West Germany are extremely varied and range from minor harassment of traffic to outright military attack and seizure of West Berlin. The Soviets could allow the East Germans to exercise these capabilities with or without Soviet support, or the Soviets could take them unilaterally. The actions could be exercised selectively against German civilian traffic to and from West Berlin, or against Western military access to East-West Berlin, or both. Action could also be taken against other traffic and communications from West Germany to Berlin. Exercise of these capabilities could take the form of imposition of new border-crossing regulations or procedures, limitations on types of traffic permitted, and harassment of traffic by police. It is not considered likely that the Soviets themselves will resort to the actions enumerated. It is considered more likely they will continue their present policy of allowing the East Germans to accomplish harassment in the name of the "sovereign nation" of East Germany. At the time the Soviets consider best suited for their purpose, all controls over "international" traffic may be turned over to the East German Government, whether or not a separate peace treaty has been signed. However, with or without a peace treaty, East German actions will be subject to tacit Soviet supervision and control. The harassment to which the Soviets will resort will be confined to that which plagues the West and serves to create a desire for a settlement of the German problem, but fails to give cause for war. Therefore, although a military takeover of West Berlin is within the capability of the Communists in 1962, it is believed they will confine their harassment to the following general areas:

(a) Air Traffic

Courses of action: