

~~SECRET~~

1 Permit civil air traffic into and out of Berlin, but demand that the East Germans be permitted increased control.

2 Refuse to guarantee the safety of commercial flights, thereby possibly limiting traffic to military aircraft.

3 Attempt to limit the number of military flights daily.

4 Take such military action as is necessary to prevent military flights.

It is estimated that courses of action 3 and 4 will not be taken as cold war actions because of the grave risks involved.

(b) Rail Traffic

Courses of action:

1 Deny services essential to military rail traffic, such as refusing to furnish locomotives or train crews.

2 Refuse to permit use of Allied equipment or personnel.

3 Repeatedly delay shipments on various pretexts.

4 Attempt to force entry into cars to check passenger documentation.

It is estimated that course of action 4 will not be taken as a cold war action because of the risks involved.

(c) Highway Traffic

Courses of action:

1 Stop civilian traffic on the grounds of improper procedures or documentation.

2 Stop civilian shipments on the basis that they include war materiel.

SECRET

3 Increase autobahn tolls.

4 Temporarily stop traffic on portions of the autobahn that will have been "closed for repair."

5 Stop Allied military traffic.

It is estimated that course of action 5 will not be taken as a cold war action because of the risks involved.

(d) East-West Berlin Sector Border

Courses of action:

1 Declare an international border and require civilians to have passports and visas for transit.

2 Refuse to allow uniformed Allied military personnel to cross without a check, and possibly require passports and visas.

(e) East-West German Zonal Border

Courses of action:

1 Declare an international border and require passports and visas for transit.

2 Harass, by delays and complicated procedures, but not deny, Allied military access to West Berlin.

(5) Attack Western Europe Without Previous Build-up or Warning

(a) The USSR is aware of the growing power in the Western European area. The continuing introduction of nuclear weapons and the increasing combat effectiveness of forces adjacent to the Satellites are certainly indications to the USSR that any attack must be made with forces adequate to obtain and exploit initial success in the face of defenses supported by atomics, and to maintain the momentum until reinforcements can be made available.

(b) If the Soviets attack in central Europe without previous world-wide build-up, they will be confronted with the necessity of neutralizing the widely dispersed Allied retaliatory forces

SECRET

and of engaging in large-scale air, ground, and naval warfare. Such an ambitious commitment, undertaken before the initial attack, would require the ability to deliver a decisive initial attack. To do this the Soviets would need an exceptionally large nuclear stockpile and more extensive, diversified, and accurate means of delivery than they now possess.

(c) The Soviet Armed Forces in the forward area are capable of attaining an offensive posture rapidly and could be committed at their present strength. A coordinated initial strike involving ground, air, and naval forces would require different starting times for each of the various components and different delivery means to assure that all significant targets were neutralized at approximately the same time. In accomplishing such a plan, it is estimated that the deployment of manned aircraft would provide as much as 5 hours' warning. This warning at least would negate strategic surprise and would reduce the possibility of a really decisive initial attack to the point of unacceptability. Therefore, it is estimated that during 1962 the Soviets will not attack without some previous build-up.

(6) Attack Western Europe Following Reinforcement in the Forward Areas

(a) If carried out covertly, this capability would not seriously compromise the Soviet intention of obtaining surprise, since limited ground and air reinforcement could be accomplished rapidly in locations adjacent to the major avenues of approach into Western Europe, as was demonstrated in October 1961. Reinforcement in the forward areas (up to the Oder-Neisse line) before attacking would be in consonance with Soviet tactical doctrine. (See paragraph (d) below.)

(b) It is believed that the Soviets would favor a limited reinforcement to bring the attacking elements to an initial balanced force of 45 to 60 line divisions in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and East Germany, with planned additional reinforcements to bring the strength up to 100 divisions by D+30. The initial reinforcement to 45 line divisions could be accomplished within approximately 7 days after start of movement. However, movement at this rate would saturate all lines of communication, would be impossible to conceal, and would be dependent upon optimum combat conditions and unit readiness. It is more probable that a limited build-up would be phased over a longer period. For security reasons, reinforcement of the forward area would probably not involve movement of forces into East Germany until H-hour or immediately before.

~~SECRET~~

(c) Soviet objectives under a limited initial reinforcement would be to provide a preponderance of balanced forces having the capability of overrunning Western Europe within a short time and to attain maximum possible surprise.

(d) It is also possible that the Soviets might take advantage of a rapidly deteriorating international climate in order to conduct a large-scale reinforcement of the forward area. This would probably be done on the pretext of defending the Warsaw Pact area, of conducting Warsaw Pact exercises, or of strengthening the internal security of Satellite countries at the request of their governments. Such a large-scale reinforcement would sacrifice strategic surprise but probably would still permit tactical surprise. The Soviets probably believe, however, that the advantages of the preponderance of force provided by the large-scale reinforcement might well be lost, since it might provoke a Western pre-emptive attack.

(e) In view of the foregoing, it is believed that if the Soviets should decide to start a general war during 1962 they would favor a rapid, covert reinforcement to provide a balanced striking force of 45 to 60 line divisions in the forward areas. A possible land campaign against central Europe is illustrated in Annex 1. It is estimated that at a later date the Soviets would also launch an attack against southern Europe. A possible land campaign against this area is illustrated in Annex 2.

(7) Support Capabilities

In the event of a Soviet decision to adopt capabilities (5) or (6), it is highly probable they would support the course of action selected with nuclear weapons, rockets and missiles, CBR warfare, fighter and bomber aircraft, and airborne forces, unless, in the hopes of avoiding CBR and nuclear warfare, they initially announced they would not use CBR or atomic weapons unless the West did. In this case they would probably not use CBR or nuclear weapons until the West did, or until they had overrun the major European-based NATO capability to retaliate in kind.

(a) Soviet ground forces possess a wide range of rockets, guided missiles, and other nuclear weapons delivery systems. These vary from a 200mm rocket with an 18,280-meter range to a ballistic missile having a 2,000-nautical-mile range.

~~SECRET~~

In addition, the Soviets are estimated to have 50 to 75 intercontinental ballistic missiles with a range of 5,500 to 6,500 nautical miles. However, these missiles would probably be used against the United States rather than Western Europe.

(b) The Soviets also have available chemical and biological agents. Soviet training procedures and public statements on the use of such weapons indicate that when the situation required, they intend to exploit their capabilities.

(c) Soviet air forces presently available in the forward area are capable of mounting in excess of 2,300 jet fighter sorties and approximately 150 light bomber sorties during the first day of combat against Western Europe.

(d) Using the transport aircraft assigned to the Aviation of Airborne Troops, the Soviets could, in a single airlift, transport 26,000 troops and their individual equipment to East Germany from bases in the western USSR. Alternately, they could commit the assault echelons of 2 airborne divisions, each consisting of approximately 6,000 troops, equipped with light regimental support weapons but generally without vehicles, for the infantry elements. An additional airlift of the same size would be required to move the remainder of the 2 divisions (3,000 men each, comprising artillery, reconnaissance, and other support elements). Considering the estimated present production rates of medium transport aircraft, it is considered possible that during 1962 the initial airborne assault capability will be increased to two complete airborne divisions.

e. Warning of Soviet Attack

Soviet ground forces in the European Satellites consist of 14 tank and 12 motorized rifle divisions ready for commitment at any time. The 10 tank and 10 motorized rifle divisions in the GSFG could attack NATO forces without warning. However, hostilities would probably be preceded by an increase in international tensions that could provide some degree of strategic warning. Such a warning might be on the order of several days or weeks, but would not rule out the possibility of tactical surprise. It is also probable that any Soviet course of action leading to hostilities would be prefaced by certain unusual security and other preparatory measures in both the USSR and the Satellite countries. The following estimate of warning times is based on the probability of detecting the movement of ground units to attack positions.

~~SECRET~~

(1) The Soviet capabilities to take direct military action against, or to infiltrate, Allied sectors of Berlin could be exercised without more than 30 minutes' local warning in Berlin. However, it is considered improbable that such action will occur. Political actions with regard to Berlin are very likely and can occur without warning.

(2) In the event the Soviets attack without a previous build-up, especially without a preceding increase in international tensions, it is estimated that from 4 to 12 hours' warning time would be available. This warning capability presupposes the continued functioning of the Allied Military Liaison Missions in East Germany and that the GSFSG would not attack unless all 20 of its divisions were to be committed in the first hours of hostilities. If the Allied Military Liaison Missions were not able to function, or if their movements were greatly restricted, this warning time could be reduced to zero.

(3) In the event the Soviets attack after reinforcement, it is estimated that up to 4 days' warning time would be available. This figure is based on the minimum time required to move to the Oder-Neisse area of East Germany the additional forces necessary for an initial attacking force of 45 divisions. In the event the Soviets attack after a deliberate, large-scale build-up, it is possible that up to 10 days' warning could be obtained.

(4) In summary, based on the premise that the Soviets will conduct a limited build-up before attack (the most likely course of Soviet action), it is estimated that up to 4 days' warning of impending attack can be obtained through detection of forward movement of ground forces. This time would be increased in proportion to the amount of information obtained on other Soviet activities.

5. (S) Conclusions

a. The USSR still adheres to its goal of eventual world domination, but the Soviets realize the destructive potentialities of unrestricted nuclear warfare. Therefore, the USSR, for the present, intends to achieve world domination by means other than general armed conflict, although it will not hesitate to use a lesser degree of force. In areas other than Europe the Soviets prefer to exert this force by providing assistance to countries favorably disposed toward them, or by using a Satellite as a front (disavowing the action, if necessary).

~~SECRET~~

b. For at least the next year the USSR will:

(1) Continue to press for a solution to the German and Berlin problems.

(2) Attempt to disrupt Western unity, particularly with regard to the military aspects of NATO and the association of the nations in the European Economic Community (Common Market).

(3) Strengthen its Armed Forces.

(4) Strengthen its internal economic base.

(5) Continue its political consolidation and economic integration of the European Satellites.

(6) Continue the modernization and strengthening of the Armed Forces of the European Satellites on a selective basis.

(7) Carry on the world-wide struggle for Communist domination by overt economic penetration and both overt and covert political infiltration. The primary effort will be in the uncommitted or neutral areas of Asia and Africa, in border areas, and in susceptible areas in Latin America.

(8) Basically, adhere to the policy of "peaceful coexistence."

c. The USSR will continue its strengthening of Soviet forces in the European Satellites at least until:

(1) Sufficient rockets and missiles have been deployed in forward areas to permit reduction in conventional artillery and other support.

(2) Any increase in NATO combat capability in the Western European area is more than met or,

(3) High-level negotiations result in a relaxation of tensions and a reduction in the NATO military build-up.

d. The Soviets will not permit any major incidents in East Germany and Berlin and will continue to restrain the East Germans in order to reduce the possibilities of general war. The USSR, however, may at any time permit, or sponsor, tensions in the Berlin

SECRET

area, or on its access routes, in order to emphasize the Soviet position that settlement of the Berlin question on its terms is essential to the maintenance of peace. As a minimum it will continue to press for de facto recognition of the East German regime, the economic and political isolation of West Berlin from West Germany, and ultimately, the integration of West Berlin into East Berlin and East Germany.

e. A large-scale Satellite revolt is not probable during 1962.

f. The USSR will not deliberately start a general or limited war in Europe during 1962.

g. Soviet or Satellite actions to harass or annoy the Western powers, accompanied by a miscalculation of Western capabilities and determination to resist, are the most likely circumstances that could lead to hostilities in Europe in 1962.

h. In the unlikely event of a deliberate Soviet attack, it is estimated that the most probable course of action would be a rapid, limited reinforcement in the European Satellite areas before the attack. For security reasons, the USSR will probably refrain from moving reinforcements into East Germany before D-day. It is estimated that the initial force would consist of 45 to 60 line divisions supported by 26,000 airborne troops and approximately 5,000 aircraft. Detection of this build-up could possibly give 4 days' warning time.

i. If the USSR should start a war without any previous reinforcement of the forward areas, the period of warning gained through detection of forward movement of ground forces could vary from 0 to 12 hours. Interpretation of other imminence factors could extend this warning period.

CLARKE
Gen

- ANNEXES:
1. Possible Land Campaign vs Western Europe
 2. Possible Land Campaign vs Southern Europe
 3. Weather
 4. Terrain


SECRET

SECRET

- ANNEXES:
5. National Policies
 6. Armament Production
 7. Resistance Potential and Internal Stability
 8. Compositions
 9. Strengths
 10. Dispositions
 11. Personnel/Organization/Equipment
 12. Training
 13. Combat Effectiveness/Reliability
 14. Soviet Airborne Forces
 15. Paramilitary Organizations
 16. Reinforcement Capability
 17. Soviet-Satellite Weapons and Equipment
 18. Logistics
 19. Guided Missile Capability
 20. Nuclear Weapons Capabilities
 21. CBR Capabilities
 22. Electronics Capabilities
 23. The Counterintelligence Estimate

DISTRIBUTION: See pages 381 and 382.

OFFICIAL:



WALTER
Maj Gen
DCSI