


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FOREWORD

THIS ESTIMATE INCLUDES INFORMATION OBTAINED THROUGH 31 DECEMBER 1961. CHANGES TO THE ESTIMATE WILL APPEAR IN THE USAREUR MONTHLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY AND THE USAREUR QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW. USERS OF THE ESTIMATE SHOULD INSURE THAT THESE CHANGES ARE POSTED TO THE ESTIMATE.

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BY AUTHORITY OF:

1 JANUARY 1962



S. M. PATTEN
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UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, INTELLIGENCE

USAREUR INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE-1962

1 JANUARY 1962

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, INTELLIGENCE

1 JANUARY 1962

Maps: 1:250,000, AMS Series M501

1. (S) Mission of the Commander in Chief, United States Army, Europe

a. Command the United States Army, Europe, and plan for the combat readiness of assigned United States Army forces. In the event of an emergency, exercise operational command of forces assigned to USAREUR, unless otherwise directed.

(1) Support SACEUR's and USCINCEUR's tactical operations.

(2) Discharge United States responsibilities relating to all Germany, including Berlin.

(3) Coordinate and direct intelligence.

(4) Provide communications service.

(5) Coordinate and conduct civil affairs activities.

b. As a component commander under the Commander in Chief, United States European Command, exercise assigned responsibilities pertaining to alert matters, noncombatant evacuation, and liaison with the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG).

c. As Commander of Central Army Group (CENTAG), an integrated NATO headquarters subordinate to the NATO Headquarters, Allied Land Forces, Central Europe (LANDCENT), supervise the peacetime preparation of forces, assigned and earmarked for assignment, for their wartime tasks and, in time of war, exercise operational command of forces assigned to CENTAG.

d. By use of the Southern European Task Force (SETAF), be prepared to provide special weapons support for Allied forces in Italy in accordance with the plans of appropriate NATO commanders.

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e. In conjunction with the Commander in Chief, United States European Command, insure the custody, security, maintenance, and operational readiness of special weapons deployed in support of non-United States NATO forces.

f. Plan for, train, and prepare United States forces for employment in support of contingency plans.

g. Provide instruction and training, particularly with respect to special weapons and techniques, for officers and men of Allied nations.

h. Operate and maintain a logistical support system capable of providing complete supply support for United States Army forces in peacetime and immediately adaptable for transition to wartime conditions.

i. Provide housing, medical services, dependents' education, and other administrative support service, to insure health, welfare, and morale of military and civilian personnel and their dependents assigned to United States Army, Europe, and of the personnel of other designated forces and agencies.¹

2. (S) Characteristics of the Areas of Operation

a. (U) Weather

(1) Central Europe

The climate in the central European area is temperate, despite its location in the northern latitude. The influence of the Gulf Stream insures mild winters, even though the topography includes mountain chains, plateaus, and low-lying plains. The range of temperature and rainfall is not great. Summer temperatures are not unpleasantly hot, averaging approximately 70° Fahrenheit. Winter temperatures seldom fall below 0° Fahrenheit. The frost-free season is approximately 190 days. The annual rainfall, averaging 20 inches, is well distributed, with 9 to 13 inches falling from May to

¹ The subsidiary responsibilities that contribute to the fulfillment of each mission are indicated in the inclosure to letter, AEAGC-PH, Headquarters, United States Army, Europe, 19 October 1961, subject: "USAREUR Mission Register (U)."

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September. Slow rains and drizzles are common. Winter is the cloudiest season, with December the cloudiest month. Winds are predominantly westerly the entire year. Good visibility exceeding 6 miles may be expected on more than half of the days in summer. Fog averages 30 to 40 days each year, increasing in the area of industrial towns. Fogs predominate during autumn, occurring most frequently in November.

(2) Southern Europe

(a) Within the area consisting of northwestern Yugoslavia, northern Italy, and Austria the best seasons for military operations are summer and early fall (June through September). September and early October are usually the months of minimum cloud coverage and moderate temperatures. Less rain falls during this period than in the summer or late fall months. The "highland and alpine" climate of northern Italy, northwestern Yugoslavia, and Austria is characterized by variability and changeability. In this mountainous area the weather change within a 24-hour period is likely to be greater than in the adjacent lowlands. This mountain mass may experience sudden gusts of rain or snow, followed immediately by intense sunlight.

(b) In the alpine areas the severe snowstorms of the winter months, together with the closing of minor passes and temporary blocking of major passes, restrict mobility and visibility. This factor, combined with the low temperatures and high winds of the area, lowers the efficiency of personnel and equipment and would generally limit, and temporarily block, enemy movement through the major avenues of approach. During the transitional periods of spring and autumn, mist, clouds, and rain restrict visibility. Streams overflow, blocking mountain valleys and converting valley floors to bogs. Since the main routes of approach follow these river valleys, these conditions would adversely influence Soviet ability to move rapidly. However, the clear and warm summer months normally do not present climatic conditions that would interfere with a Soviet attack on Italy. (For influence of climate on specific military operations see Annex 3.)

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b. (C) Terrain

(1) Central Europe

(a) General

1 From the Soviet point of view the outstanding critical terrain feature in Europe is the ground dominating the west bank of the Rhine River. The Rhine is the most formidable natural obstacle in the entire area. The west bank must be secured in order to ensure further westward advance along the axis toward Paris and the English Channel.

2 In general, there are three major favorable axes of movement for a force attacking toward and across the Rhine from the east. The first follows the dry southern edge of the North German Plain and crosses the Rhine between the Ruhr and Arnhem-Nijmegen. The polder regions of the Netherlands and the similar, but less extensive, areas in extreme northwestern Germany limit movement north of this axis. The second axis follows the Wetterau and Fulda Corridors to reach the Rhine near Mainz. The third follows the Bavarian Plateau and the Kraichgau Corridor to reach the Rhine at Karlsruhe. South of this third axis, movement is greatly restricted and channelized by the Black Forest and Jura Mountains, and even more directly by the Alps.

(b) Logistic Approach Routes

Three major concentrations of transportation routes lead westward from the East German boundary. These, on the whole, coincide with the best tactical routes of advance.

1 Routes in the North German Plain. These routes form the most dense and highest capacity network of transportation lines on the European Continent. These lines, following the southern edge of the North German Plain near the base of the highlands, cross the Rhine between Cologne and Wesel.

2 The central German routes. Leading from Czechoslovakia and Thuringia, these routes pass through Hesse and Franconia, and converge on the Upper Rhine Plain between Mainz and Karlsruhe. These routes are somewhat less concentrated and of somewhat lower capacity than those in the North German Plain; nevertheless, they have a very high capacity. The routes leading to the key

crossings of Mainz, through Frankfurt, have a capacity equal to or exceeding that of the routes leading to any other individual Rhine bridge area.

3 The south German routes. These routes lead northwestward out of Austria, across Bavaria and the Kraichgau, to the same crossings as the central German routes. In this case, however, the heaviest concentration of routes leads to Karlsruhe.

(c) Logistic Exit Routes

1 In general, the concentrations of logistic exit routes correspond to the concentrations in the approaches. However, these factors should be noted:

a In the north the exit routes generally have lower capacities than the approach routes.

b Those in the Mainz-Karlsruhe sector are likewise of lower capacity than the approach routes, but the disparity is not great.

c Exit routes from the southern part of the Upper Rhine Plain via Strasbourg and Mulhouse have a higher capacity than the approach routes. These exit routes might be exploited by the Soviets through diversion of traffic from the northern part of the plain via the excellent lateral communications of the Rhine Valley itself.

2 From a logistical point of view, crossings from Wesel to Cologne and from Mainz to Karlsruhe would have the greatest value to the Soviets, and would merit seizure by an airborne operation.

(2) Southern Europe

(a) The mountainous terrain along the northern and northeastern boundaries of Italy is not favorable for a force attacking to the south. Approaches through this area are canalized into river valleys that are dominated by high terrain and could be easily defended. There is little room for dispersion, and approaching columns would be roadbound. The best approach is from the east through the Sava River Valley, the Ljubljana and Gorizia Gaps in Yugoslavia, and Trieste, Italy. This approach is shorter than those to the north and has fewer mountains, offering more room for maneuver