

37. After reading the paper, Minister von Hassel stated it was difficult to comment after a single reading. General Bertram said the U.S. paper was similar to MC100/1 with some variations. The FRG would especially wish to examine that portion of the document pertaining to the duration of time before the employment of nuclear weapons. General Trettner commented on Secretary McNamara's earlier remark concerning the need for NATO planning and that the present NATO R-hour plan was a quasi-strategic nuclear strategy. He, Trettner, found the same distinction problem in the current draft paper and felt that all future US/FRG discussions should distinguish between battlefield, tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. Secretary McNamara agreed that there might be a problem of semantics and perhaps the US/FRG staffs could develop an appropriate dictionary of terms. The Secretary thought that it might be necessary to create even further subdivisions, for example, battlefield, interdiction (close and distant), and so on.

38. In connection with Para. 4a of the JCS paper, to which General Trettner's point had been directed, Minister von Hassel noted that perhaps the correct wording would be, instead of "tactical nuclear weapons," "battlefield, and if necessary, tactical, nuclear weapons."

F. Tactical Air Employment:

39. Secretary McNamara stated he wished to make several additional points. He felt that there was a deficiency in planning for employment of NATO tactical air. He envisaged that the Soviets would attack the bases of nuclear armed aircraft in Europe. Therefore, NATO must have a plan for employment of strike aircraft under the battlefield nuclear strategy concept. Minister von Hassel agreed that there must be plans not only for tactical air but also for all components of the services.

40. Secretary McNamara continued asking if strike aircraft were employed with conventional weapons, what system would take over the strike mission? PERSHING? Also, NATO must face the problem of conventionally arming its F-104s. They currently cannot deliver conventional ordnance.

41. Minister von Hassel responded this was a difficult German problem. An earlier decision had been made that the F-104G, a very expensive weapon system, should be reserved for nuclear strike employment. Germany had provided the less expensive G-91 for delivery of conventional armament. Secretary McNamara responded by asking what von Hassel would do with the F-104s if only G-91s were used for conventional ordnance. How could the F-104s be protected? He added the U.S. once faced the same problem with

its F-4s and F-105s. However, the U.S. had made these aircraft dual-capable. He suggested that the US/FRG staffs during the next six months devote study to the employment of aircraft before and during the nuclear phase.

G. Retaliatory Offensive Operations:

42. Secretary McNamara also added that all NATO plans were essentially defensive and NATO should develop contingency offensive plans, particularly concerning the satellite nations, envisaging that our response would include seizing Bloc territory if possible.

43. Minister von Hassel agreed to the military necessity to plan for certain offensive operations. He pointed out, however, that this would be extremely difficult for the FRG since Germany is labeled the traditional aggressor, having inherited this reputation twice in a lifetime during World War I and World War II. He agreed to discuss this in the future, but reiterated that the FRG cannot be placed in the position of being branded the aggressor.

44. Secretary McNamara agreed with the Minister. Mr. Gilpatric added that these should be NATO contingency offensive plans, not German plans. Minister von Hassel again repeated the aggressor brand theme commenting that this would be politically disastrous for Germany, particularly in the satellites and also in the uncommitted nations. General Taylor emphasized these should be NATO contingency plans and Secretary McNamara added that the Soviets and the satellites must know that there is no sanctuary. Mr. Gilpatric stated that we already have offensive contingency plans pertaining to Berlin. Minister von Hassel agreed, emphasizing again that offensive plans could not be German plans. Secretary McNamara replied he would not expect Germany to take the initiative, and added that such plans might have to be made "covertly."

(Mr. Rowen joined the meeting at this time)

II. MULTILATERAL FORCE

45. Secretary McNamara opened the discussion of this topic by commenting on the progress being made by the MIF Working Groups in Paris and Washington. He anticipated the military subgroup draft report would be available about mid-February and the Paris report by March or April of 1964. The Secretary continued that he was encouraged by the discussions concerning the mixed manned test ship.

The U.S. had offered a DDG for trial with an international crew of which the mix would be about 50% U.S. personnel and 50% non-U.S. personnel, the latter subsequently increasable to 60% if and when deemed advisable. This project could proceed promptly and he hoped the FRG would participate. Under the foregoing percentages, the FRG crew complement would consist of about 3 officers and 62 enlisted ratings. Concerning formalizing MLF plans into a firm agreement, Secretary McNamara anticipated that signing of such an agreement could not be anticipated prior to mid-1964.

46. Minister von Hassel indicated that he agreed with Secretary McNamara's comments. He added that he had feared additional political problems might arise in the Paris working group, but he was not aware of such developments. Min. von Hassel welcomed the destroyer test vessel and stated that Germany was prepared to provide the 3 officers and 62 enlisted personnel to test the mixed manning principle. The Minister then inquired concerning British attitudes.

47. Secretary McNamara replied that he did not believe the current British government could make the decision to participate. Min. von Hassel added that he had discussed the MLF with Min. Thorneycroft. Min. Thorneycroft had raised the following points: First, he still questioned the survivability of surface vessels; and second, the British were concerned over the high cost involved. Von Hassel added that if the U.S. could prove the survivability of the surface mode, he thought the British might participate in the project. He inquired whether the U.S. had any current news on British views.

48. General Taylor replied that Admiral Ricketts had covered survivability with the British. In General Taylor's view, Lord Mountbatten was most concerned with the assets required to participate in the MLF.

49. Secretary McNamara commented he felt the British position was based on political and financial questions and not on military objections. He added the British had earlier decided to buy the very expensive Polaris; consequently, they would find it difficult to answer questions concerning why they should now switch to a cheaper system. The Secretary continued, the U.S. faces the same problem, as we have invested in 41 Polaris submarines; consequently, he anticipated the U.S. Congress would ask the same question. In the U.S. case, Secretary McNamara was prepared to show that the Polaris submarine was a "must" for the U.S. for operations outside of European waters. MLF surface vessels could operate in these European waters; but the U.S. could not operate surface missile ships off the coast of China.

50. Min. von Hassel repeated the Thorneycroft view that the British military had not been convinced of the survivability of the surface mode. General Taylor added he believed the current British government could not afford to be persuaded. Min. von Hassel repeated that the U.S. must keep trying to convince the British admirals of the survivability of the surface mode.

(General Strother joined the meeting at this time)

III. NATO FORCE PLANNING

51. Secretary McNamara invited Min. von Hassel to open the discussions on this topic. Min. von Hassel replied that during the NATO meetings in Ottawa last May, it had been agreed to proceed with NATO force planning which would include estimating the enemy threat and planning the forces required to meet this threat. He expressed concern over the French attitude toward MC100/1 and raised two points: First, what can be done to change the French attitude? And secondly, what can be done to proceed with NATO force planning? He was of the belief that the problem was primarily political and not military. Any effort to get a majority vote in NATO to overrule the French position would threaten the NATO structure. Insofar as Germany was concerned, the Germans were prepared to give Secretary General Stikker all the data he needed. However, von Hassel did not know what other assistance the Germans could give.

52. Secretary McNamara stated the French attitude was serious and, he believed, political rather than military in origin. He thought the problem must be dealt with as a political problem, and discussion of the subject should be avoided during the Paris NATO Ministerial meeting in December. In the event the subject appeared on the agenda, the French comments would elicit comments from other nations as well. Secretary McNamara continued, the U.S. was also willing to provide the Secretary General NATO with U.S. force plans and budget plans. He believed that the examination by the Stikker group should also especially include current and projected logistical and mobilization capabilities. He also agreed with Min. von Hassel that the U.S., at the political level, should also do what it could with the French.

53. Minister von Hassel then raised the question concerning alternative procedures. In his view, there were three: First, the French viewpoint could be integrated into the current draft MC100/1. This would be difficult because of the sharp differences between the U.S. and French viewpoints. Second, NATO could initiate a new study. The disadvantages to this would be that a new study would be time-consuming and in addition a new political directive

would be required. Lastly, there was the Lemnitzer proposal which envisaged a number of proposals, including the French, which would require a series of force goals, each based on an alternative concept. Von Hassel concluded by stating that the FRG hopes for a rapid solution, and he agreed with Secretary McNamara that the Stikker exercise should not be on the agenda for the December meeting. He wondered whether the Stikker exercise couldn't proceed without unanimous decisions on MC100/1, but rather based on the general consent of the other NATO nations.

54. Secretary McNamara stated that he could support the Lemnitzer proposals but he doubted whether the French would agree. In any event, General Lemnitzer should continue what he was now doing, i.e., proceeding with planning for force requirements. The Secretary noted that failure to arrive at a political solution, despite the probing that we might undertake, would not lead to any short-term delay since General Lemnitzer could go ahead with his assessments. However, there might be a substantial long-term problem if General Lemnitzer's study was submitted at a later date and we had not succeeded in arriving at a more unified view of strategy.

IV. FRG DEFENSE BUDGET

55. Minister von Hassel stated he felt he should elaborate on Chancellor Erhard's budget philosophy. Just prior to assuming the chancellorship, Prof. Erhard had had discussions concerning the German 1964 budget with his designee Finance Minister and with Minister von Hassel. Chancellor Erhard's primary consideration is to keep the German currency stable. He notes the inflationary trends in Italy, France and Holland. Germany could not again survive an inflation as occurred in 1923 or during the currency crisis of 1948. If such should occur, the only person who would rejoice would be Khrushchev. He did not wish to imply that there was any current danger of marked inflation in Germany; nevertheless, it was Erhard's view that the annual increase in the Federal budget should not exceed the 6% annual growth in GNP. Any greater budget increase would affect the stability of the currency.

56. Insofar as defense was concerned, the 1964 defense budget had been pegged at DM 19.28 billion. This was an actual increase of DM 1.3 billion over 1963. The German military staff was now studying the consequences of reduced defense spending, because von Hassel had wanted one to two billion DM more. The preliminary implications of the budgetary limit had resulted in his decision to give priority to the continued buildup of the FRG army. Consequently, the air force and navy buildup would be slowed. He particularly wanted the U.S.

to know his position and in using the term "army" he included buildup of the Territorial Defense Forces. He added that the German military staff would brief General Taylor when the full consequences of the budgetary limits were known. He wished Secretary McNamara to know, however, that Germany would meet its international commitments and this limitation would not affect the US/FRG offset arrangements. He predicted that during the Erhard visit to the U.S., Chancellor Erhard would emphasize German economic sacrifices for NATO and for national defense, and that the FRG defense budget had doubled in four years.

57. It was agreed that the topic might be pursued privately. *

V. INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF THE NATO MILITARY COMMITTEE AND STANDING GROUP

58. Secretary McNamara commented that Minister von Hassel had proposed this agenda topic and suggested that von Hassel initiate discussions on the subject. Von Hassel replied that he would prefer to discuss this topic during the working luncheon.

VI. VIEWS CONCERNING FRENCH STRATEGY

59. Secretary McNamara announced that the morning agenda had been concluded and asked whether anyone wished to raise additional topics. General Taylor replied he wished to exchange views briefly on French strategic concepts. He added that he read the French press, General Gallois' publications, and he was curious as to whether the German representatives thought Gallois, and the French press, accurately reflect French strategic views. He stated that he would summarize his own conclusions concerning French strategy.

60. General Taylor described the French strategy as the "trip wire" strategy similar to the U.S. strategy of ten years ago. He added the French did not deem it necessary to determine the depth of an aggressor's intentions by initially opposing him with conventional forces. A Soviet violation of the border would be prima facie evidence of aggressive intent and meant the immediate employment of strategic nuclear weapons. The strategy offered no option to verify the intent of the aggressor. He concluded by asking whether the Germans agreed with this summary of French strategic views and whether the French strategic views were satisfactory to Germany and to the NATO Alliance.

* It was not discussed further at other meetings or privately.

61. General Trettner replied that General Taylor's summary was by and large correct and he thought General Gallois' writings and public statements reflected French policy. He agreed that the French strategy appeared to be what the NATO strategy had been eight to ten years ago. He believed that the French strategy was based on two major assumptions. First, the Radford plan represented the strongest deterrent to war. Second, Europe cannot hope to provide adequate conventional forces to defeat Soviet aggression. General Trettner added he believed, however, that the French, in the event of local hostile enemy actions, would respond with non-nuclear forces. Nevertheless, a limited Soviet aggression would result in strategic retaliation.
62. Secretary McNamara then read a brief extract of recent Gallois statements, to the effect that nuclear arms were the only weapons of significance, and also noted de Gaulle's statement to a British representative that force goals had no real importance.
63. In response to Minister von Hassel's question whether the French doctrine appeared to mean that any incursion whatsoever constituted a major action, General Trettner replied that he thought this was not necessarily so.
64. Secretary McNamara added he did not wish to convey the impression that he was attempting to undercut the French. He pointed out that the French had solidly supported the U.S. in its confrontation with Russia over Cuba; and also in the recent Berlin autobahn incidents. However, the basic difference between the U.S. and French strategic views concerning defense of Europe was a matter of considerable concern.
65. In elaborating on General Taylor's analysis of French strategy, Secretary McNamara pointed out that there had been Russian incursions over Berlin, particularly in air corridor incidents. He expressed to Minister von Hassel the numerous precautionary measures the U.S. had taken during those grave periods. Therefore current NATO force goals were most important for the defense of Europe, unless NATO elected to adopt a "trip wire" strategy.
66. General Trettner commented he believed that French thinking was influenced by consideration of the destruction and population attrition which would result if efforts were made to resist Soviet aggression by conventional means, and at the same time there would be no damage to the enemy heartland. The French therefore believed there should be a quick transition to strategic nuclear warfare.

67. Secretary McNamara commented that the French appeared to misunderstand the U.S. position on the use of nuclear weapons. He said there should be no doubt that the U.S. would clearly use all necessary weapons before accepting any significant territorial loss, for example, Hamburg. He also thought that the French did not sufficiently appreciate that neither side could really win a strategic nuclear war in any meaningful sense. General Trettner agreed with the latter comment.

68. Secretary McNamara commented he believed the Soviets had given more thought to strategic nuclear warfare than the French. The Soviets feel they know how Western political leaders will respond. Experience in the past years has shown that a strategy based solely on strategic nuclear warfare does not deter the Russians from harassing action. There had been frequent examples in Berlin, such as the release of chaff in the Berlin air corridor. He could not understand French thinking that sole reliance on strategic warfare offered the best deterrent.

69. General Trettner commented he felt General Taylor's appraisal of the French strategy was correct. General Bertram added present French actions to fulfill NATO force goals also reflect a trip-wire strategy. At one time the French had a NATO force goal of 14 divisions. Today France has about one and two-thirds divisions in Germany and the equivalent of four to five divisions in France.

70. Secretary McNamara commented that he was extremely concerned that one member of the Alliance should adhere to such a differing strategy. He felt that the U.S. and German public would not continue to support the expenditures necessary to meet and maintain the existing NATO force goals, while France made only a token contribution.

71. Min. von Hassel commented that certain facets of the French position were not totally unrealistic. Any attack across the border would be an indication that the Soviets meant business. He excluded, however, incursions in Berlin.

72. Secondly, Min. von Hassel commented that part of the French motivation concerning force goals undoubtedly was their desire to build up the force de frappe which was costing much more than they wished. In this respect, he thought there might be a gradual change in the French position, and said that Messmer had shown some faint indications of changing over a period of time.

73. Thirdly, Min. von Hassel noted that there was one positive aspect to the French position, that the French were still clearly prepared to put all of their forces at the disposal of the Alliance

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in the event of an emergency and not withhold them for a "private French war."

74. Secretary McNamara replied he also thought the French would fight; however, he was concerned over the downward adjustment of their forces in accordance with their trip-wire strategy.

75. This concluded the morning discussions.

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