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Canadian brigade is rated "good," all other national contingents in LANDCENT are rated "fair" by SHAPE headquarters. This last stems from:

- (1) Inadequate trained manpower;
- (2) Inadequate firepower, tanks, and armored personnel carriers--although individual equipment items are good;
- (3) Serious shortages of support and service troops;
- (4) Inadequate logistics, either in stockage levels, or positioning, or both.

c. Moreover, the non-US-NATO nations have apparently permitted their once excellent mobilization bases to deteriorate almost to ineffectiveness. Not only are adequate reserves of modern equipment not in stock, but also the reserve training base is declining. Accurate data in this matter are quite difficult to obtain rapidly, but the net effect is a most serious inequality in force buildup as compared with quite conservative Warsaw Pact mobilization estimates.

d. NORTHAG is, by all yardsticks, less capable than CENTAG, although NORTHAG is astride the most vulnerable--hence probable--invasion route into the Ruhr, the heart of FRG.

12. The NORTHAG/CENTAG Imbalance. The fundamental reasons for the vast imbalance between NORTHAG and CENTAG capabilities are historical; the present NORTHAG area is largely what was the British Zone of Occupation after World War II. Britain could not afford to maintain a military posture that was even roughly comparable to that maintained by the US in its zone, further south. Also, national contingents that form NORTHAG include two corps from small countries, the Netherlands and Belgium. Specific NORTHAG deficiencies include:

a. The lack of adequate field communications between NORTHAG and its four corps headquarters. In contrast, CENTAG has the signal support from two field army headquarters to help direct its five corps.

b. The divisions that comprise NORTHAG have a much smaller portion of ready forces in kasernes in West Germany than does CENTAG. Thus, numerous units must march from Holland and Belgium to positions along the border, and UK must fly major elements from England.

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c. A most serious sign of the imbalance is in nuclear delivery capabilities. Figure 7 shows a distribution of field force delivery systems in all of ACE, as projected at the end of CY 64. In developing this representation it was necessary rather arbitrarily to distribute certain German weapons among the three German corps; I-Korps, with four divisions, was weighted over III Korps, and III Korps over II Korps; whether these distributions are those that will be made by the German command is not known at this writing. As the table at the bottom of Figure 7 shows, only 27% of the total LANDCENT nuclear delivery system capabilities is in NORTHAG.

13. Impediments to Equitable Nuclear Distribution. There are three reasons why the situation depicted in Figure 7 will be difficult to correct, at least until the exigencies of impending or existing war so require. These are US national policies, non-US national budgets, and the Atomic Energy Act.

a.. There is an implicit US national policy against providing much in the way of additional resources to strengthen non-US nuclear capabilities in Europe. Presidential approval is required in principle prior to the transfer of nuclear delivery vehicles or the dispersal of nuclear weapons. A modest program for dispersal through end-FY 66 is under review at this time.

b. The support of nuclear delivery systems is expensive. Although several nations had previously gone on record as desiring such, when the Mutual Assistance Program to NATO was severely reduced, they have found themselves unable to budget for the corresponding increase in expenditures. A particular case is that of Belgium, which refused a fourteen million dollar grant involving a Sergeant battalion because she would have had to purchase an additional eleven million dollars of backup missiles.

c. Application of the Atomic Energy Act puts severe strains on US manpower resources. Foreign military personnel not only cannot staff custodial detachments, but also, in certain cases such as ADMs, may not even be trained in weapon assembly, since even the training devices are classified SECRET--RESTRICTED DATA. Hence, every additional weapon dispersal requires USAREUR to provide additional personnel when, were the weapon allocated to the US unit, organic personnel of that unit would perform the weapon assembly and checkout.

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NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS END CY 64 TOTAL TUBES/LAUNCHERS

HJ-6(GE), 8in-4(GE), ADM(TEAMS) - 3(US)*		AFNORTH xxxxx			
	xxx	LANDCENT			
		HJ - 12	(2 Div)	8 in - 8	
		I NE			
	xxx	xxx			
SGT - 4 (GE)		HJ - 12	(4 Div)	8 in - 16	
		I GE			
CPL - 4 (UK)		I GE			
	xxx	xxx			
ADM(TEAMS) - 12 (US)*		HJ - 16	(3- Div)	8 in - 12	
		I UK			
	xxx	xxx			
	xxx	HJ - 12	(2 Div)	8 in - 8	
		I BE			
	xxx	xxx			
		NORTHAG xxxxxx			
	xxx	CENTAG			
3 Div		HJ - 12	(2 Div)	8 in - 8	
		III GE		- 12(US)	
PERSH - 8 (US)		xxx			
- 8 (GE)		HJ	(2 Div)	8 in	Moves on ORA
		V US		Div - 8	
SGT - 6 (US)		Div - 8		Corps - 48	
		Corps - 12		Corps - 12	
HJ - 4 (US)		V US			
8 in - 4 (US)		xxx			
ADM(TEAMS) - 56 (US)		HJ	(2 Div)	8 in	
		VII US		Div - 8	
		Div - 8		Corps - 36	
		Corps - 4		Corps - 24	Moves on ORA
	xxx	SEVENTH US			
		xxxx			
	xxx	FIRST FRENCH			
		HJ - 20	(2 Div)	8 in - 12(US)	
		II FR			
ADM(TEAMS) - 12 (US)* (on call)		xxx			
	xxx	II GE			
		HJ - 6	(2 Div)	8 in - 12(US)	
		LANDCENT			
	xxx	xxxxx			
HJ-8(GR), 8(TURK); 8in - 16(GR) ADM(TEAMS)-3(US)		AF SOUTH			* ATCH FROM SEVENTH US ARMY
<u>TOTALS</u>	<u>PERSH</u>	<u>SGT</u>	<u>HJ</u>	<u>8 in</u>	<u>ADM TEAMS</u>
GENTAG	16	6	74	148	71
NORTHAG	0	4	52	44	12

Figure 7

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14. Ground Weapons Dispersed.

a.

b. Two significant facts emerge from this look at overall dispersal. First, because of the maldistribution of delivery systems, there is a great imbalance in positioning between the two Army Group areas. This is not desirable from an operational viewpoint. Second,

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With warning, however, many* of the depot weapons would be moved to dispersal field positions to form mobile supply points and weapons supporting delivery units would deploy to the vicinity of battle positions. In the situation postulated in Part V, movement would start at Reinforced Alert on 6 January and would be complete by 10 January.

c. Full implementation of the ACE Plan for NATO Special Ammunition Storage would provide for adequate dispersal of weapons. The ACE Plan provides for Type "A" sites which support one or more delivery units and are completely mobile at Reinforced Alert, support sites which form mobile resupply points, and depots. Many factors have delayed the completion of this program. The greatest problem, however, has been the inability to acquire sufficient land, suitably located, in densely populated West Germany. The chart below shows programmed/operational sites.

* Figures not available; estimated 60% based on storage plan and completion status. Remaining in the 6 depots would be approximately 25% of the total ground weapons available, and 57% of the Nike warheads

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AIR DEFENSE

15. Air Defense Deficiencies. Analysis of AFCENT air defense deficiencies indicates that they do not adversely affect the end-CY 65 air defense system at the lower levels of gradual escalation, and that at these levels the AD system is a stabilizing influence. The AD effectiveness in a large scale conventional war could be seriously degraded if the enemy were to exploit its weaknesses. In a limited tactical nuclear engagement, restricted in area, the air defense system could contribute substantially to restrict inadvertent escalatory trends. In theater or general nuclear war elements of the air defense system can be destroyed as desired by nuclear missile attack.

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a. The most serious inadequacy in the air defense posture is the lack of systems to provide warning of and active defense against ballistic missile attack by tactical missiles, MRBMs, or IRBMs.

b. A second serious problem is the limited effectiveness of the AD system to counter low altitude aircraft attack, except in the HAWK belt, which will not be completed until end-CY 65.

c. The great majority of critical US and NATO targets such as airfields and key logistical installations are located west of the Rhine river. This area is provided an effective medium and high altitude defense against aircraft by interceptors and Nike Hercules. There are no low altitude HAWK systems deployed to defend this critical complex since all HAWK units are located in the belt, about 100 kms to the east. The HAWK belt can be overwhelmed to create a corridor if the enemy is willing to take high attrition. If such a corridor is established, enemy aircraft at low altitude are relatively free to attack airfields, key support and control installations, and Nike Hercules. Later, having neutralized Nike Hercules, they can overfly residual HAWK and thus strike deep in France, since such altitude extends range.

d. ACE forward ground units do not have unit air defense weapon systems which are effective against high performance aircraft, although the light AAA units, in some non-US divisions have a limited defense capability.

e. The identification of aircraft continues as a serious problem, precluding the most effective utilization of both tactical aircraft and air defenses.

f. The ground environment in AFCENT is a grouping of several national systems with varying degrees of automaticity, survivability, capacity, control capability and sophistication. This lack of integration reduces the ability of the system to efficiently control air defense operations.

g. The interceptors assigned to the air defense system have two deficiencies. None has the capability of interception below 2000 feet, except in clear weather with fortuitous vectoring. The other deficiency is in quantity of interceptors with truly effective all-weather capabilities.

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SUMMARY

16. Conclusion.

a. The deficiencies outlined above present formidable, but by no means insuperable, difficulties, both as to theater readiness for massive Soviet attack and as to the flexibility of posture, command and control arrangements, and nuclear release procedures necessary to cope with lesser contingencies. The Study Group wishes to emphasize, however, that in its view these difficulties should be susceptible to resolution. Indeed, the past few years have seen progress toward the resolution of many of the more serious deficiencies and useful work to this end continues.

b. To consider from our side this progress, the serious problems which certainly confront the Warsaw Pact powers, and the fundamental ties of mutual self-interest which bind NATO should engender more hope than frustration and despair. If the spirit of mutual trust, common purpose, and understanding among the principal NATO partners can be revitalized even the most difficult problems, such as achieving a consensus on the employment of nuclear weapons and the command control of theater forces, should be amenable to resolution.

c. Stated differently, the problem of solving the deficiencies described above may be more psychological than mechanical, is more political than military, and may even rest more on economic and social considerations than on the narrowly political.

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PART V

ANALYSIS OF CERTAIN CONTINGENCIES

Retain classification / Classify to _____
 With conditions of _____
 Declassify / In part and excise as shown
 EO 12356, Sec. 1.3 (a) _____
 FPC/HOR by _____

1. Purpose

The purpose of Part V is to analyze certain contingencies which might arise from implementation of the Berlin Contingency plans. Specific contingencies have been selected for their value in illuminating the problems of tactical nuclear war.

2. Scenario

Considering the overall balance of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces, it was difficult to devise a scenario leading to war in Central Europe. The US enjoys a preponderance in strategic nuclear capability, offset only in part by the 700-750 MRBM launchers in the Western USSR targeted against Western Europe, and NATO has a large tactical nuclear advantage which is counted upon to overmatch any Warsaw Pact attempt to capitalize on its larger ground force and greater mobilization capability. Nevertheless, in order to have a suitable situation for analysis, we have in this study, in effect, forced a scenario* which in very brief outline is as follows:

- 24 December 1964 Warsaw Pact powers sign peace treaty with GDR.
- (24 Dec - 1 Jan) Tripartite Powers consult on what to do if GDR cuts off Berlin (First decision period).
- 1 January 1965 GDR closes Berlin autobahn.
- 2 January 1965 Tripartite powers order platoon size probes at each end of the autobahn. Probe at Berlin end is stopped by GDR forces. Helmstedt probe delayed and does not cross frontier. Allied planes are shot down by SAM in corridor.
- 3 January 1965 US declares DEFCON 2 for its forces worldwide and prepares to reinforce Europe by 2 divisions whose equipment is prestocked in Europe.
- (3-6 Jan) Tripartite powers consult (Second decision period).
- 6 January 1965 NATO forces deploy on Order for Reinforced Alert. Tripartite powers order battalion DOMINICAN probe toward Berlin. Probe is stopped and trapped by strong forces 15 miles inside East Germany.

~~EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING~~

~~DDO ORN 0200.10 DOES NOT APPLY~~

*The full scenario used as a working paper by the 1d Study Group is appended to Part V of Volume II of this report.

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GROWTH OF TENSION AND INTENSITY OF CONFLICT IN SCENARIO




FIGURE 1

(7-10 Jan)

Tripartite powers continue consultations on next step. (Third decision period)

3. Decision Points

a. Within the scenario, three principal periods of decision have been indicated. These are of increasing risk of escalation of the conflict - first, the platoon probe; second, the battalion probe; and third, force as necessary to relieve Battalion DOMINICAN and demonstrate resolve to reopen access. In this interim report, we analyze in some detail the principal reasonable alternatives available at the third decision point.

b. The process of decision and escalation is shown (Figure 1) on a graph of "Intensity" versus "Time" - and in which time is measured in days and relative intensity is measured on a logarithmic scale, illustrative of the exponential rise in intensity at each step in escalation. At each step, the decision makers can choose from the full range of actions - from "back down completely" to "pre-emptive general nuclear war." (These extremes can be portrayed by vertical rays down and up from the points of decision). However, the practical alternatives worth examining fall within a smaller range. For example, in the first period of decision (24 Dec to 2 Jan) the decision makers consider actions of relatively low intensity and decide upon platoon size ground and similar air probes from each end of the autobahn and air corridors.

c. Failure of the small scale probes to reopen access leads to the second decision period (2-6 Jan). The range of alternatives remains theoretically the same - ranging from "back down" to general war. Practically, however, the range of alternatives is again much smaller. Although time has precluded detailed study, this second period of decision presents opportunities for interesting insights into various possibilities. For example, one alternative might be to expand the "air war" only, initially fighting transitory engagements rather than becoming entangled on the ground by sending the battalion probe forward. Such expansion of the air war would probably have to be limited to conventional weapons and local targets because of the great sensitivities that the Soviets would no doubt have toward nuclear capable fighter aircraft operating on combat missions near key targets in their areas, and the attendant pressures toward pre-emptive nuclear attack. Actually, this feature of air action pervades most alternatives at this and other decision periods, and indicates that in the interests of controlling escalation at this phase, it may be desirable to "de-fuse" somehow the threat of possible nuclear attack posed by seemingly conventional tactical air operating over enemy borders.

*yes - or all
"war of 50"*
*replaces
[unclear]*
[unclear]

d. At this second decision point there is also available a choice for the limited use of tactical nuclear weapons, either as a demonstration or in support of the battalion as it attacks on the autobahn axis. Since

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the platoon probe has not fully tested GDR determination to block access the political decision maker would probably not find use of nuclear weapons sufficiently attractive at this stage to justify examination of these alternatives in detail. Therefore, for the purposes of this particular scenario, it was assumed that the DOMINICAN battalion probe was decided upon and ordered by the Tripartite powers.

e. The battalion probe was permitted to pass the border check-point but then stopped by a GDR force in the vicinity of the overpass near Bornsted, fifteen miles inside East Germany, when the lead tank of the probing battalion was hit by tank fire. As the battalion started to deploy it found itself encircled by a superior, tank heavy force which fired only as the battalion vehicles tried to leave the autobahn. Casualties in the battalion were heavy as fire was exchanged. A temporary cease fire was arranged on GDR initiative during which GDR officers ordered the battalion to remain in place. Subsequently, intelligence indicated two Soviet tank divisions were moving to flank the battalion on the autobahn.

f. Thus the stage is set for the third decision period (7-10 Jan). (An overall summary of the opposing NATO and Warsaw Pact forces at this time is at Annex A.)

4. Selected Alternatives. At the third decision point the Allies are now seriously faced with considering whether or not to employ tactical nuclear weapons. NATO's Berlin contingency plans (BERCON) provide a range of options from which the NATO powers could select according to their assessment at the time of crisis. (While unilateral US plans also exist, it is prudent for NATO to undertake such critical operations involving vital NATO interests, in concert if at all possible.) Three of these BERCON plans, with some modification, have been selected for analysis in the attached annexes. Each analysis illustrates the principal military considerations involved in the contingency of restoring access to Berlin. One of these plans involves the use of a 4 Division conventional attack; the second envisages only the demonstrative use of tactical nuclear weapons in the hope that such manifestation of NATO resolve would cause the Soviets to reopen access; and the third involves a division attack. The third plan is modified to permit analysis of two alternatives. In the first alternative, during the division attack each use of nuclear weapons must be approved by higher authority than the division commander. With the second alternative, the division commander has authority to employ nuclear weapons from the outset of the attack. The analyses of these options are summarized briefly in the following four paragraphs and followed by a brief discussion of certain conventional air options which also warrant consideration. In all of these alternatives the Soviets have the capability, if they choose to exercise it, to overwhelm West Berlin by conventional force.

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