


~~TOP SECRET~~

CORPS CONVENTIONAL ATTACK OPTION



Approximate Scale
0 5 10 KM

~~TOP SECRET~~

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED NOT
RELEASABLE TO FOREIGNERS

NND 932015-732

~~TOP SECRET~~

5. Corps Conventional Attack Option

a. Concept. This option involves reinforced corps of 4 Divisions with mission of conventional attack along Autobahn to seize salient extending to ELBE River, and then to continue attack to restore Berlin access. The plan was based on BERCON CHARLIE THREE. The task organization includes V US Corps headquarters, 4 Divisions (2 US, 1 French, 1 UK), and 26 tactical air squadrons (22 US-CONUS augmentation, 2 UK, 2 French). Based on arrival and operational readiness of 2 US divisions and air augmentation of 22 squadrons, the date of attack is 18 January (M/15).

b. Scenario. Preceded by an intensive conventional preparation, the attack is executed with 3 axes of advance (see map opposite), crosses border on a wide frontage and initially makes a rapid advance to link up with the DOMINICAN battalion. (The corps attack at first encounters light resistance for possibly three reasons: (1) The best defensive position and obstacle closest to the border is the ELBE; (2) For politico-military reasons the Soviets may want to permit a link-up with the battalion, thus forcing NATO to assess the risks associated with a distinct decision to continue on toward Berlin; (3) The Soviets might foresee a "mouse-trap" advantage in permitting NATO to extend a salient into GDR.) Thus link-up occurs with the DOMINICAN battalion which has suffered only moderate casualties. However, after link-up, the corps attack meets heavy resistance some 15-20 km west of the ELBE, and slows to a stop near the ELBE. Intelligence confirms that 7 Soviet Divisions (4 armored, 3 mechanized) are containing the corps attack. Against this resistance the corps has no prospect for success if it remains limited to the use of its conventional resources only.

c. Principal Considerations (M/15)

(1) Soviet preponderance of conventional strength in Central Region (58 BLOC versus 30 NATO Divisions early on M/15) creates capability to stop attack by conventional means. This is most vexing Soviet capability since it could force on NATO decision to escalate or to withdraw.

(2) Combination of Soviet air recce which provides precise location intelligence, and relatively concentrated conventional attack heightens vulnerability of corps to possible Soviet nuclear attack.

(3) Salient into GDR territory creates air problem. Soviets can conduct air missions over entire salient without fear of infringing on sensitive NATO air space, but if NATO air forces penetrate GDR territory along periphery of salient, Soviets might become "touchy" with regard to their vulnerable nuclear delivery sites. Hence, unless NATO air works at a disadvantage, the risk of escalation is high.

(4) Were Soviets to launch general attack while NATO Corps in salient, the 4 Divisions could be lost so far as Central Region defense is concerned.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED NOT
RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

4

~~TOP SECRET~~

NND 932015-73

~~TOP SECRET~~

(5) Movement of low yield tactical nuclear delivery systems into salient risks capture, but not to do so invites delay in their use of forces resort to higher yield, longer range weapons if need arises.

(6) Air defense difficult to provide without some degradation of capabilities for defense of Central Region.

(7) Since disparity exists in nuclear delivery means and warhead dispersal among NATO divisions in force, a decision to use tactical nuclear weapons could escalate rapidly to use of larger yield, longer range weapons. Hence, prior to the attack it is necessary to make arrangements to equip the divisions with similar nuclear means.

d. The next step?

Using only conventional means the corps attack has been stopped near the ELBE by at least 7 Soviet divisions. The prospects for conventional continuation of the attack, even with commitment of the reserve division, are zero. Therefore, since the Soviets have elected to remain adamant on closure of access, the concept of BERCON CHARLIE THREE employing conventional means above has failed. At this juncture, then, if NATO remains firm on restoration of access to Berlin, the decision must be to escalate the level of intensity. Perhaps this would entail the use of tactical nuclear weapons in support of the corps.


SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED NOT
RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS 5

~~TOP SECRET~~

NND 932015-7

~~TOP SECRET~~

NUCLEAR DEMONSTRATION OPTION



~~TOP SECRET~~

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN DISSEM

NND 932015-75

~~TOP SECRET~~

d. The Next Step?

Soviet response could range all the way from withdrawal of forces blocking the DOMINICAN battalion, no action, destroy the DOMINICAN force with a conventional attack, or escalation to higher levels of conflict. Since the BERCON BRAVO demonstrations do not create militarily advantageous situations, the most vexing Soviet response would be to hold fast in deployed positions and continue diplomatic and propaganda attacks on "NATO Imperialism." This would deny recovery of DOMINICAN Battalion as well as access to Berlin and would leave the Allies confronted with the same difficult problem that they faced before initiating BERCON BRAVO.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED NOT
RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS


7

~~TOP SECRET~~

NND 932015-7


~~TOP SECRET~~

DIVISION SELECTIVE NUCLEAR ATTACK OPTION



Approximate Scale

0 5 10 KM



~~TOP SECRET~~

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

RELEASEABLE TO FOREIGN DISSEM NND 932015-7

~~TOP SECRET~~

7. Division Selective Nuclear Attack Option

a. Concept. This option is similar to the BERCON CHARLIE ONE Plan. A tripartite division force attacked 13 January to link up with the DOMINICAN battalion and move on to Berlin. A US Armored Division (-) was used as the basic organization. British and French forces in Germany each provided two battalions. The British contribution was kept small to minimize any weakening of the BOAR's General War posture. A tripartite air support force was also organized in which the French contribution was minimized because of the language problem. The division was to employ nuclear weapons on a controlled, selective basis if it became necessary, with the division commander obtaining specific permission, in each instance, before firing. (This concept was studied to test the feasibility of tight political control over the firing of each weapon, or small group of weapons, in such a situation.) Ten DAVY CROCKETTs, ten 155mm rounds, ten 8 inch rounds and five HONEST JOHN (10 KT) rockets accompanied the force even though this risked their capture. SARGEANT, PERSHING and tactical air weapons (10-50KT) were readied for possible support of the force from West Germany.

b. Scenario. Soviet forces opposed the immediate border crossing only lightly - either as a deliberate mouse trap play or because they were disposed against the possibility of a much larger attack. However, using defensive tactics, they soon reacted and eventually blocked the division's advance (and its linkup with the DOMINICAN Battalion). Permission was obtained to use one nuclear round (8-inch) against tanks preventing the linkup. (In this instance the decision was received four hours after the request. However, delays of many hours or even longer can be envisaged). Under orders to maintain contact but avoid presenting massed targets if nuclear weapons should be employed against them, the Soviet forces permitted the probe to continue while awaiting higher orders. The division linked up with remnants of the DOMINICAN battalion and continued against light resistance until its advanced elements reached the Elbe where the bridges had been blown and the east bank was held in force. At that time the Soviets attacked (conventionally) from the flanks and rear of the division with heavy tank and mechanized forces, forcing it off the high ground and against the river. The time involved in obtaining higher approval to engage the numerous transitory targets proved too long for effective nuclear fire. Division communications with West Germany were destroyed by Soviet artillery or air attacks and no more requests could be processed. There was no apparent way to save the division. By late 15 January it had been destroyed.

c. Principal Considerations.

(1) If the division is attacked in force time does not permit obtaining specific approval from higher authority for employing nuclear weapons in each instance requiring such employment.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

(2) To permit rapid application of nuclear fire accurate short range systems must accompany the force even though this risks their capture.

(3) Because the delays inherent in a selective release environment DAVY CROCKETTs are of limited value.

(4) The DOMINICAN battalion is placed at risk the moment any larger probe is undertaken.

d. The Next Step?

(1) Soviet conventional attack against the division force appears to be the most vexing enemy reaction. He could destroy the force, retain the propaganda advantage of not employing nuclear weapons and not seriously degrade his General War posture. His air movements would not risk being misunderstood as a general strike as much as ours might coming from West Germany to support the force. He could employ almost any amount of land power he desired against the surrounded force without thereby spreading the conflict.

(2) Assuming that the Soviets did not back down, this option would fail in recovering DOMINICAN battalion intact and in regaining access to Berlin. The Tripartite powers would then be faced with two unpleasant alternatives. First, they could back down, weakening the entire alliance, losing the respect of the world and, eventually, losing all control of Berlin. Second, they could take the next step up in escalation.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED NOT
RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

9

~~TOP SECRET~~

NND 932015-7

~~TOP SECRET~~

8. One Division Nuclear Attack Option

a. Concept. This option, derived from the NATO plan BERCON CHARLIE ONE, involves the commitment of a division size force along the Helmstedt-Berlin autobahn. Missions of the force are to link up with the DOMINICAN battalion and continue the attack to Berlin. In this option the National Command Authorities of NATO nations have authorized employment of nuclear weapons by the division force from the outset. Sixty-one tactical nuclear weapons are allocated for this operation.

b. Scenario

(1) The earliest time at which this alternative could be mounted and ready for execution is M+10 (13 January).

(2) The division force consists of one US Armored division (less one brigade), one French armored brigade and one British tank battalion and reconnaissance squadron. Except for initial preparatory fires nuclear delivery means are limited to those organic to the division force.

(3) The attack commences 13 Jan (M+10) with a nuclear preparation of four 40KT SERGEANT strikes and one 47KT Corporal strike. Each strike is against one of the five Soviet divisions. These strikes are designed to disrupt and disorganize command and control and inflict damage to one or more maneuver elements of each division.

(4) As a result of preparatory nuclear strikes, the impact of tactical nuclear weapons on forces which are engaged and initial Soviet reluctance to engage nuclear capable forces, the advance of the division force is rapid.

(5) Utilizing nuclear weapons from the outset the division is able to reach the site at which the DOMINICAN battalion had been surrounded and continue the attack to the Elbe river. Since the nuclear supported attack would most probably cause the Soviet Bloc forces to overwhelm the DOMINICAN battalion, it is doubtful that the DOMINICAN battalion could survive until the link-up occurs.

(6) The Soviet response to the Allied nuclear supported attack could vary from "back-down" to response in kind, or escalation to higher levels of conflict. If a response in kind with nuclear weapons on the division force is selected, the division force would be halted at the Elbe and become subject to annihilation. Since this Allied attack can be frustrated locally, the Soviets would not necessarily be provoked to employ nuclear means beyond the immediate battle area.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED NOT
RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

10

~~TOP SECRET~~

NND 932015-74

~~TOP SECRET~~

c. Principal Considerations

(1) The use of nuclear weapons will greatly increase the cost to the Soviets of subduing this attack.

(2) By having authority to employ its own nuclear weapons this division is relatively immune to enemy non-nuclear efforts to rapidly defeat or overrun it.

(3) Air support is an essential element of this attack. However, its use beyond the engaged battle risks enemy escalation.

d. The Next Step?

If the Soviets engage locally the division force with nuclear weapons, the Allied attack will fail in both its purposes, the DOMINICAN battalion will be lost and access to Berlin will be frustrated. Furthermore the Allies would face a serious diplomatic and psychological defeat. The burden of a "back-down or escalate" decision is thrust once again on the Alliance.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED NOT
RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

11

~~TOP SECRET~~

NND 932015-7