


CONVENTIONAL AIR OPTIONS



OPTION 1

"Air Probe" to Berlin, engaging attacking enemy interceptors to include hot pursuit and/or conventional attacks against one SAM site if fired upon with ground-to-air missiles

OPTION 2

Conventional Air Attacks against selected SAM sites and airfields in western portion of Germany

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9. Conventional Air Options

a. To preclude sustained confrontation of land forces and put pressure on the enemy, an alternative way to force reopening of Berlin might be to undertake independent conventional air operations. This would be subsequent to initiating planned "non-firing" courses of action such as denying entry of Soviet Bloc aircraft into NATO areas, ECM and overt reconnaissance operations.

b. An "air probe" to Berlin could be undertaken by flying military transport aircraft with heavy fighter escort to Berlin. Probable Soviet reaction to this course of action would be engagement of this force by interceptors and/or by ground-to-air missile fire. NATO response (option 1) to Soviet reaction could be limited to air-to-air engagement including hot pursuit, and/or the destruction of one SAM site adjacent to the corridor by a conventional air attack.

c. NATO response to engagement of the "air probe" could be immediate attacks against all SAM sites west of Berlin and a selected number of airfields in the western portion of East Germany (option 2). If enemy reaction to option 2 included attacks against airfields and missile sites in West Germany, the NATO counter air task could be expanded to extensive conventional air attack of airfields in East Germany. By these measures, the qualitative and quantitative superiority of NATO tactical air might be exploited to attain a degree of air superiority over the corridors to Berlin and over the political boundary of East and West Germany, although his capability of employing air forces from bases in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Western USSR would still permit him to attack in strength at the time and place of his choosing.

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10. Principal Points Derived from Analyses. These analyses suggest the following principal points:

a. Since in each alternative probe analyzed, the enemy had the military capability, if he chose, to overmatch (at the same level of escalation) the Allied forces involved conventionally and nuclearly, none of the alternatives can be considered to be viable in a strictly military sense. However, in the broad context of actions taken to avoid general nuclear war any or all of these alternatives might lead to restoration of access to Berlin and, in this sense, might prove to be viable.

b. As long as a military force relies heavily on aircraft to provide its nuclear delivery capabilities, it is very sensitive to enemy air actions, including ostensibly conventional actions, which appear to approach the air bases holding its nuclear capable aircraft. This consideration substantially inhibits Allied air reconnaissance and close air support for the alternative probes to Berlin.

c. NATO's posture for the defense of Western Europe is degraded to the extent that its forces are diverted to offensive probes to Berlin.

d. The narrow constricted nature of an Allied probe provides important military advantage to the enemy. The probe must advance into the teeth of the enemy; it is subject to counterattack from all sides and presents attractive targets for enemy artillery and air, tempting nuclear attack; it does not have the potential to break through and inflict heavy damage on the enemy rear. In addition, since only a few nuclear weapons can cover the entire probe, the Warsaw Pact enjoys tactical nuclear parity on the local level, even though its total number of nuclear weapons may be far less than NATO's.

e. The gradual development of the Berlin access crisis provided far more time for improving NATO's posture (to include working out necessary C³ arrangements for this localized contingency operation) than might be available to handle a massive Warsaw Pact attack into West Germany.

f. Any force likely to require the use of nuclear weapons in probing deep into enemy territory is seriously jeopardized if it must secure higher approval in all situations requiring use of nuclear weapons.

1 Incl
Annex A - Comparison of NATO and
Warsaw Pact Forces

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ANNEX A - PART W

Comparison of NATO and Warsaw Pact Forces

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AUTHORITY: NND 932005
BY: HR-MKD/MAR, Date: 10/17/94

1. General Situation 10 Jan 1964

The confrontation by fire of the allied probe by superior enemy forces demonstrates the intent of the enemy to apply the degree of conventional force required to deny access to Berlin. Two USSR Divisions have surrounded the Allied Probe forces. 20 other Soviet Divisions are in East Germany. Six East German Divisions are deployed. USSR reinforcements are headed West. (See Para 3). In order to analyze alternative courses of action, it is necessary to examine the relative balance of forces that exist, in this instance about one week after mobilization. This relative balance changes as national resources of each side are mobilized and/or destroyed after hostilities commence.

2. The Strategic Balance: Suffice this evaluation to state that the theater force comparison to follow must irrevocably be judged within the context of a clearly superior allied strategic capability which will inhibit the U. S. S. R. from taking risks that will inexorably lead to a strategic nuclear exchange.

3. NATO Ground Strength

(1). U. S. Ground Forces

The force posture of US Army Europe prior to augmentation would be a 5 Division force and 3 Cavalry Regiments. It is planned that this force will be augmented by over 100,000 personnel to bring it to wartime levels. These personnel and units reflect the shortages in the existing support base between peacetime operating requirements versus operational wartime capability. The in-theater level of supply would be at approximately 90 days. In-theater stockage includes less than 20% of the equipment required for the airlifted portion of the Post Mobilization Deployments List (PMDL). Assuming that a decision was made on 3 Jan 1965 to begin partial mobilization and to commence immediate reinforcement augmentation of USAREUR it would be realistic to deduce that by 10 Jan (M+7) less than 20% of the augmentation force would have arrived. Even if airlift and personnel were available in CONUS, the capability in the theater to receive and equip incoming augmentation units is initially limited. The two Divisions and 10 combat support units with prepositioned equipment could begin arriving as a show of force by about 7 Jan but would not be operationally ready until about 15-18 Jan. With the declaration of Reinforced Alert on 6 Jan, the Seventh US Army (5 Div Force only) would be tactically deployed under NATO control and ready to execute its initial wartime missions by 10 Jan. The covering force would be along the Iron Curtain,

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and Divisional forces along the assigned defensive position preparing barriers, and defensive obstacles. Tactical nuclear weapons and launchers would be dispersed and checked and war reserve stocks on hand. All Allied command headquarters would be in tactical field headquarters. Two Pershing battalions would be on QRA. (Communications capability, targeting etc for this program has not yet been finalized) The reconstitution of the Line of Communications would be underway but would require at least 60 more days to become operational across Western France. Dependent evacuation would have been completed.

(2) Allied Ground Forces

19 Allied (non-US) Divisions are in the M day force. All M day Divisions in CENTAG could have reached GAO positions except the first French Armored Division, which requires 5 days to complete movement from Trier to positions near Munich and thus would not be in position until 11 Jan. NORTHAG would not be operationally ready by 10 Jan. The 1st Netherland Division would be 48 hours short of closing; the 1st British Division would be less than 75% strength, the Belgium Divisions at about 85% strength. A forward movement of supply and logistics support East of the Weser would be underway but would require an additional 48 hours to reach a 10 day support level. The logistics support structure of non-US Allied forces is not capable of supporting sustained operations. Nonetheless within 48-72 hours or 13-14 Jan NORTHAG would be operationally deployed to GAO positions. Shortage of engineers, transportation, and communications would sharply curtail the preparation of barriers and defensive structures.

(3) Reinforcements

None of the first Echelon forces scheduled for NATO would be available by Jan 10th (M+7). However by M+15 (Jan 18th) 2 additional earmarked Belgium and 2 additional Netherlands Divisions would be operational. One (1) additional US Division is scheduled for arrival by sea by M+30. France has three to four additional divisions in metropolitan France which might be made available.

(4) A summary of the posture of Allied ground forces as of M+7 (10 Jan) follows:

CENIAG has 12 of its 13 Divisions at GAO positions while NORTHAG has 8 of its 11 divisions in an operational forward deployed status. The barrier plan is underway but will not be in a substantially effective condition for a week to 10 days. No mobilization reserve Divisions are yet available to counter attack Warsaw Pact break throughs and re-establish the forward defensive position or to re-establish alternate defense or blocking positions. Tactical reserves of Division size do exist to counter attack shallow penetrations. By M+15 (Jan 18th) the composition of NATO ground forces in the Central Region would be:

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24 M Day Div
2 US Prepositioned Div
2 Additional Netherlands Div
2 Additional Belgium Div
30 Divisions *

* 3 French Divisions (maybe)

4. Ground Delivered Nuclear Capability

(1) NATO forces now possess a substantial nuclear ground delivery capability. In the Central Region there are now about 50 non-US HONEST JOHN Batteries (2 launchers each) and 12 non-US batteries of 8" Howitzers for which US custodians and warheads have been positioned. In addition, there are 5 German HONEST JOHN, 4 German and 1 Belgium 8" Howitzer batteries that are trained and equipped but custodial warhead support has not yet been provided. There is, however, a disparity between the nuclear support available in NORTHAG and that which is available to CENTAG. NORTHAG has 30 batteries of surface-to-surface weapons vs 162 in CENTAG.

(2)

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1-3
A1

(3) Two significant facts emerge from this look at overall dispersal. First, there is a great imbalance in positioning between the two Army Group Areas. This is not desirable from an operational viewpoint.

1-3
A1

With warning, however, many of the depot weapons would be moved to dispersal field positions to form mobile supply points (NASP). In the situation postulated here, movement would start at Reinforced Alert and would be complete by 10 Jan.

5. Soviet and Satellite Ground Strength

(1) Soviet ground strength and disposition on 10 Jan 65 (M+7) in East Germany would consist of 12 Tank and 10 Motorized Rifle Divisions (2 USSR from Poland). Satellite Divisional strength capable of reaching a deployed status against NATO boundaries by 10 June consists of 6 East German Divisions, 2 Polish Divisions and 8 Czechoslovakian Divisions.

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This totals 22 USSR Divisions and 16 Satellite Divisions (38 Divisions). See Appendix 1. Only 1 or 2 of the 24 combat ready USSR Divisions (Category I) in Western USSR could have arrived in East Germany by M/7 (10 Jan).*

(2) Logistic Support Capabilities

Stocks of POL and ammo for approximately 45 days for the 38 Division force deployed are with GSFE in East Germany. Each unit carries seven days supply.

(3) Reinforcement Rates

The combined rail and highway reinforcement rate through East Germany is estimated to be about 3 division slices per day after 1 week of mobilization. Therefore by M/9 (12 Jan 1965), the USSR could have a force of 41-42 WP Divisions deployed; by M/12 (15 Jan 1965) the USSR could have a force of 50 WP Divisions deployed, by M/15 (18 Jan) the USSR could have deployed the 14 USSR Divisions from Western Russia to bring the total Soviet-Satellite force to 58 Divisions.

(4) Reinforcements

The 65 divisions (Category II & III) that were at reduced and cadre strength on M-day could have reached full strength by M/7, but not yet be deployable to the Western front.

(5) Nuclear Delivery Capabilities

Soviet nuclear delivery systems available to the Group of Soviet Forces are fighter-bomber aircraft, tactical missiles and free rockets. Also MRBM, IRBMs and Cruise Missiles are in the inventory. Tactical nuclear weapons available for support of theater forces vary in yields from 3 to 200 KT, with yields for the MRBM, ICBM and Cruise Missiles available up to the low megaton range. Surface delivered weapons are disposed as follows; Each Soviet Division contains a two-launcher Free Rocket FROG Battalion, with a maximum range of 26 nautical miles and believed to possess warheads from 5 to 35 KT; each combined Arms Army and Tank Army contains an organic missile brigade of six SCUD launchers with a maximum range of about 150 nautical miles and believed to possess warheads from 10 to 200 KT; one or two SS-2 Missile Battalions with two launchers each are allocated to a Soviet Front, with a range of about 350 nautical miles and believed to possess warheads from 30 to 200 KT; one or two regiments of SHADDOCK Cruise Missiles, with 8 launchers each, are assigned to the tactical Air Army supporting each front, with a range of up to 350 nautical miles and believed to possess warheads up to 1.5 MT. The Intelligence community is unable to determine the existence of nuclear warheads in East Germany, although some indications point to the presence of 2 nuclear storage depots.

*It is estimated that the USSR can send in reinforcing division at the rate of 3 a day commencing M/7.

6. Summary~~TOP SECRET~~

It is clear from examination of opposing forces that the USSR has a significant advantage in the early stages of mobilization. An additional factor not explicit in this analysis is the additional advantage accruing to the USSR if his mobilization could be initiated in secret. For NATO to mount conventional forces by M+15 to attempt to fight through to Berlin and secure access would denude the defensive posture of the Alliance and leave wide open the opportunity for Warsaw Pact forces to seize Western Europe without substantial conventional ground opposition. The USSR and their Satellites have the capability of denying access to Berlin and concurrently launching an offensive into Western Europe at a place and time of their own choosing. The absence of reserves in depth on the part of the Alliance makes a breakthrough offensive by W. P. forces a critical threat. The inability to block the advance or to restore the penetration would jeopardize the entire alliance. Conversely an offsetting offensive through a weak portion of W. P. forces by the Alliance could meet substantial W. P. reserves held in depth.

Thus, the advantage of an initial conventional ground offensive, if the danger of escalation is discounted, rests with the W. P. forces.

a. Opposing Air Forces - Central Europe

	<u>Allied Tactical Air</u>	<u>CONUS Augmentation</u>
	M-Day	M+15
Tactical Strike Aircraft	1709	396
Interceptors	692	
Recon	<u>492</u>	<u>36</u>
	2893	432
		2893
Total Tactical Aircraft, Allied Central Europe:		3325

b. The following tables reflect the W. P. Air Force capability:

Soviet Tactical Air in East
Germany, Poland and Hungary

Jet Fighters	1231
Strike/Recon	81
Jet Light Bombers	<u>212</u>
	1524

Satellite Assets (less Albania)

Jet Fighters	2127
Strike/Recon/Attack	402
Jet Light Bombers	<u>103</u>
	2632

* This analysis of opposing forces does not specifically address the relative combat effectiveness of Allied, U. S., and Warsaw Pact forces. The Army staff is conducting a major study responsive to this requirement. However, it is believed that even a wide disparity of effectiveness would not fundamentally alter the conclusions reached in this study.

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Western USSR Tactical Aircraft*

Jet Fighters	800
Strike/Recon	50
Jet Light Bombers	<u>185</u>
	1035
Total	5191

Although the above figures indicate a distinct Soviet numerical advantage, some qualifications should be noted. Soviet Bloc tactical aviation aircraft as compared with US aircraft are relatively short-ranged and capable of carrying less conventional ordnance. A majority of the aircraft are obsolescent by US standards.

The number of aircraft from the above total which the Soviets would employ against allied forces in Central Europe would be dependent upon their assessment of the overall military-political situation existing at the time. The strong possibilities that other areas along the Warsaw Pact-NATO boundaries would become extremely sensitive as a result of a US-Soviet confrontation in East Germany and the ensuing involvement of treaty obligations would probably place some limit on the amount of reinforcement to the Central Area the Soviets would consider prudent. To cover the possibilities of engagement in other areas, and to maintain a viable option to strike and/or defend in these areas (i.e. Southwest Europe, Middle East and Scandinavia) balanced forces would be retained. Thus, Satellite Air Forces would likely remain in the Air defense role, and the Soviet Air Force in Hungary would probably continue in support of the Soviet ground forces in that country.

Although the number of options available to the enemy is quite large, considerations of all factors involved result in the following assessment of the probable direct tactical air threat to Central Europe based on current estimates of likely Soviet campaigns. It should also be remembered that these aircraft would be called upon to carry out the four tactical air tasks simultaneously (air defense, maintain air superiority, conduct close air support, and interdiction). A portion of this force could also be assigned the Soviet equivalent role of NATO's QRA.

Soviet Tactical Air in East
Germany and Poland

Jet Fighters	1231
Strike/Recon	81
Jet Light Bombers	<u>212</u>
	1524

* Includes Baltic, Belorussian, Carpathian and Moscow Military Districts.

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Satellite (E. Germany, Poland
and Czechoslovakia)

Jet Fighters	1400
Strike/Recon/Attack	356
Jet Light Bombers	<u>90</u>
	1846

Western USSR*

Jet Fighters	800
Strike/Recon	50
Jet Light Bombers	<u>185</u>
	1035
Total	4405

Further reinforcement could be drawn from other portions of the USSR and/or Satellites, but at the expense of reducing capabilities in those areas from which drawn.

Summary

A comparison of these opposing air forces indicate that;

- 1) Neither side could sustain air superiority without striking enemy air fields.
- 2) Either side can effectively strike opposing ground forces.
- 3) NATO has nuclear strike aircraft on QRA. In this period of tension, it is possible that USSR has deployed nuclear strike aircraft to East German and Polish airfields.


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* Includes Baltic, Belorussian, Carpathian and Moscow Military Districts.

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Appendix 1

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