PROJECT 1d

FIRST INTERIM REPORT, 18 MAY 1964

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GENERAL

PART I

1. This interim report covers the Project 1d Study Group's initial evaluations of the major problem areas, which, at the meeting with the Secretary of Defense on 6 May 1964, we were directed to examine with as much precision as possible by 20 May. These problem areas are: (a) What are the current deficiencies in SACEUR's Emergency Defense Plan (EDP) and NATO's posture for the defense of NATO Europe, in the context of the "flexible" response; and (b) What are the British, FRG and French concepts for the defense of Western Europe and how do we evaluate them?

2. This report also covers interim progress on the two additional tasks directed on 6 May, to wit: (a) Devise contingencies arising from the Berlin situation which might lead to resort to the use of tactical nuclear weapons; and (b) Examine, in this context, likely forms of escalation, weapons available to Soviets, what they would do, alternative roles played by the opposing air forces, etc., and conclude whether tactical nuclear warfare represents a viable concept.

3. This progress report is in two volumes, Volume I being a summary report and Volume II more detailed backup discussion and information. Volume I is in five parts covering the following subject areas:

Part I, General

Part II, Warsaw Pact Capabilities and Deficiencies

Part III, Allied Concepts for the Defense of Europe

Part IV, Analysis of Current SACEUR Emergency Defense Plans

Part V, Analysis of Certain Contingencies

- 4. In compiling data and making analyses to date, we have tried to become familiar with and to use appropriately all currently applicable studies and work by other agencies which bear on our problem areas.
- 5. Warsaw Pact Capabilities and Deficiencies. We have pulled together in Part II, which follows, some initial facts and observations on Soviet and Warsaw Pact posture, capabilities and deficiencies. Among the more interesting of the initial broad indications we get from analysing this subject to date are the following:

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- a. It appears to the ld Study group that, from the Soviet standpoint, Moscow is still confronted with and will be for some years the basic strategic dilemma of facing a serious risk that any Warsaw Pact military adventures in Western Europe could and would lead to the strategic exchange of thermonuclear weapons. This dilemma should make them very chary of initiating major military action in Europe.
- b.. There are serious gaps in the intelligence available on Soviet nuclear weapons, particularly in regard to specific types, yields and numbers of tactical nuclear weapons, on Soviet command, control and communications (C^3) , release procedures, storage sites of weapons, and their speed and flexibility of response. The question of whether or not nuclear weapons are stored in East Germany could prove important.
- c. From what information is available, we suspect that Soviet procedures for release, and the speed and flexibility of their response with tactical nuclears to unplanned situations are far more imperfect, ponderous, and inflexible than are the current US and NATO procedures which are in themselves very far from the theoretically desirable. The Soviet system seems highly dependent on pre-planning.
- d. Soviet ground and tactical air forces are currently organized, trained and equipped to depend to a high degree on the exploitation of large scale, pre-planned (and hence directly controllable) nuclear strikes on military targets throughout Europe. Subsequent use of tactical nuclear weapons may be far less flexible and less directly responsive than NATO's use of them.
- e. Even given considerable downgrading of the current estimates of the numbers, readiness and effectiveness of Soviet reserve divisions and tactical air forces, it is possible for the Soviets to mass, against any specific area of the Central Region front that they choose, considerably greater relative conventional strength than NATO can hold at that point.
- f. If this capability for local mass is associated with a surprise Soviet initiation of a widespread tactical nuclear strike, and if the NATO response with our tactical nuclear weapons is delayed, the Soviet-Warsaw Pact forces would have a high probability of breaking through the NATO defensive band and could exploit a "tactical nuclear blitzkrieg".
- g. While it is likely that Soviet strategic thinkers are now discussing more widely the possible utibity to the USSR of being able to fight some types of limited conventional or even limited tactical nuclear conflicts with the Western Powers, their current force structure, C³ and selective release procedures are not currently optimized for or efficiently organized to implement such new strategic concepts. Furthermore, it will likely require some years before they could be reoriented to do so with maximum effectiveness.

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- 6. Allies Concepts for the Defense of Europe. In Part III of this progress report will be found a more precise and specific discussion and analysis of the NATO defense concepts of the UK, FRG and France.
- 7. The pertinent, broad indications we derive to date from this part of our study are as follows:
- a. Despite important specific divergencies in these concepts, they have a similar fundamental basis and this basis is widely divergent from current US thinking. It is this basic divergency of view which is imposing serious strains on the NATO alliance.
- b. The fundamentally similar basis of the British, German and French concepts rest on the common donvictions of the three countries that:
 - (1) However imperfect may be NATO's plans and posture for the defense of Western Europe, they have -- in the face of Soviet plans and posture -- been highly successful to date in maintaining peace in Europe, in providing the sense of security needed for the economic rehabilitation of Western Europe and the defeat of internal Communist subversion, and in maintaining the position of Free Berlin.
 - (2) Because the Soviets have in being quantities of nuclear weapons, varying in yield from "tactical" to "strategic", and delivery means varying from short range to intercontinental, it is essential that NATO also have a full spectrum of these weapons.
 - (3) The threat of a planned application of Soviet military power to take objectives in Europe is now and will remain remote so long as the prospect of nuclear engagement by NATO, both tactical and, if necessary, strategic, is ever present.
 - (4) It is not feasible and, in fact, there is no need to contemplate conducting major conventional operations for any extended period in defense of Western Europe.
 - (5) From the standpoint of the survival of Western Europe, there is no difference between "theater-wide tactical nuclear war" (in which the US and USSR remain as sanctuaries) and "total war" (in which the US and USSR exchange nuclear blows).
 - (6) Tactical nuclear weapons are indispensible to the defense of Western Europe, both as deterrents to conventional and tactical nuclear war and to force the Soviets, in the event they ever attack, to consider the choice between falling back or going on to probable strategic nuclear war.

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- (7) Tactical nuclear weapons must be employed as early as it can be determined that a planned major attack is being conducted against Western Europe. Tactical nuclear war cannot be continued for very many days without very high probability that it will escalate to total war. (The official French view seems to reject any concept of limiting war in Central Europe once it starts. However, this may stem from French pre-occupation with the importance of the threat of an immediate triggering of strategic retaliation as the real deterrent to any kind of aggression.)
- (8) The impact of different uses of tactical air forces in a limited conflict in Europe upon escalation is agreed to be very difficult to assess. Increasing the number of reconnaissance sorties and depth of their penetrations may have the direct effect of increasing the chances of escalation.
- (9) The economic and political realities of Western Europe make it impracticable to expect Western Europe to put any appreciably greater numbers of men into full time, active military forces.
- (10) Political realities require acceptance of the "Forward Defense". This fact, when related to (9) above, increases the dilemma of a defense of Western Europe without early use of tactical nuclear weapons.
- c. Despite these basic divergencies between these European concepts and US views, there may be some potential areas for overall agreement. Among these are:
 - (1) There seems to be recognition that there is need for Central Region active ground forces on the order of at least 20-25 Divisions. Hence, there is broad agreement, even implicitly by de Gaulle, on the need for some NATO options between the bare "trip wire" plus strategic nuclear exchange option and the surrender option.
 - (2) There may be a possibility that agreement could be reached to utilize more local ready reserve forces in lieu of sizeable augmentations of active forces to give greater depth and flexibility to the defense posture.
 - (3) Overall agreement semms possible on the feasibility of separating the initial use of nuclear weapons from the strategic nuclear exchange. Opinions vary, however, on how long this separation can be sustained.

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8. Each of the concepts of the British, Germans and French have considerable military and political validity when viewed from the European standpoint. Except for the problems caused by de Gaulle's current intransigence, there appear to be no insuperable reasons why an effective commonly acceptable, modernized concept for the defense of Europe cannot be worked out on an evolutionary basis between the US and the principal European NATO powers. Militarily the problem is manageable although it will require compromises among all four of the major nations involved. The basic difficulties remain political and economic.

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9. Analysis of Current SACEUR Emergency Defense Plans. Part IV of this report deals with the Study Group's analysis of the deficiencies in SACEUR's current EDP and the NATO capabilities to implement this plan. There are numerous recognized deficiencies in the NATO capabilities to respond flexibly to the full conceivable spectrum of contingencies which might arise.

10. In respect to command, control and release procedures, these were designed originally to permit the release by the highest authorities of all tactical nuclear weapons on an all or nothing basis in close coordination with the strategic nuclear strikes. Currently they are tied directly with strategic strike targeting and procedures, but, in theory, the targets in the USSR could be deleted if it were decided to separate them. In recent years, additional selective release procedures have been devised but they are very imperfect, as is detailed in Part IV, in terms of speed, selectivity and flexibility of response under contingencies requiring urgent partial releases. The fundamental problem in C3 springs from the wide diversity of mental attitudes regarding the use of tactical nuclear weapons and the likelihood of escalation following their first use. Because of those divergencies there are lacking throughout NATO, to include within the US Government, a concensus, a concept, doctrine, and planning guidance on what is really required of C3 to achieve deliberate-selective-controlled response to aggressions less than general war. Given such guidance the devising and effecting of a workable selective release procedure is not mechanically very difficult, although it could be fairly costly. Even lacking a concensus and planning guidance on C3 many substantial improvements are under way or being devised.

11. From our hasty analysis of contingency situations (see Part V), wherein decision points were created in our scenario to require evaluation of the need, desirability and capability to use tactical nuclear weapons, we have developed one interesting initial conclusion. It is that NATO's current military posture, including its command and control mechanisms and procedures, is most probably considerably better fitted to deal with the time phased intensification of events than it is to deal with a Soviet initiated, quickly mounted, major conventional attack. In the latter case, current selective release procedures are too slow and cumbersome. developing crisis situation, NATO retains a measure of the initiative and offensive which permits more time for pre-planning, evaluation and even some decisions in advance of our taking actions which escalate the level of conflic or which might provoke risk of escalation by the opponents. While Tripartite or NATO forces in Europe may not have the capability to reopen access to Berlin by force against determined Soviet resistance, they would (given the necessary political decisions) be able to force the Soviets to meet our successive steps of escalation until the Soviets must either back down or recognize that strategic nuclear war was inevitable. In the final analysis, this is better than our having no real option for major military action lying between the option of strategic nuclear war or the option of giving up Berlin.

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- In evaluating the ground force components of SACEUR's EDP and posture, our analysis confirms that one of the serious deficiencies lies in the imbalance in strength, both conventional and nuclear, as between NORTHAG and CENTAG; NORTHAG being considerably weaker even though it is a more likely area for an enemy main effort.* Another serious deficiency is the lack of readily mobilizable reserves in depth on the NATO side. deficiency contributes to European reluctance to conceive of a lengthy These deficiencies are compounded by the failure tactical nuclear war, of most European countries to fulfill NATO quantitative force goals and qualitative standards and to establish an adequate logistic system including forward stockage; and by the maldeployment in peacetime of the forces which are available, particularly in the NORTHAG area. The general problem of cumbersome selective release procedures makes a flexible response with tactical nuclear weapons currently almost impossible under conditions requiring the urgent use of these weapons.
- In the tactical air aspects of the problem, the following points The effectiveness of the air forces is highly sensitive to the timeliness and speed of the decision-making process, particularly if a decision to convert from the planned nuclear posture to a primarily conventional posture is delayed for some hours after the initiation of combat. Their capabilities to conduct either nuclear or conventional missions is not so much the issue, as is the fact that no individual strike/attack aircraft or small units can do both types of mission at once and must take time on the ground to convert from one to the other. Upon declaration of Reinforced Alert, a significant number of NATO aircraft not scheduled for strikes in SACEUR's Scheduled Program, can be quickly loaded for conventional operations. Given a moderate degree of strategic warning, US reinforcements from outside Europe can be moved in to lessen the problem of keeping aircraft on QRA while increased numbers fight conventionally. This problem can be defined by saying that the NATO air forces have considerable strategic flexibility, but need some hours to make ready for changed tactical missions requiring changes from or to nuclear loading.
- Another air problem arises from the fact that fixed site missile units and the tactical air forces, when on the ground and particularly before dispersal, on both the NATO and Soviet sides are, in a conventional war phase as in peacetime, highly vulnerable to and unprotected from a surprise nuclear strike by the other side. Hence, each side is very "touchy" to a real or even a supposed threat of surprise nuclear strikes by the other side. also vulnerable, but to a lesser extent, to surprise, low-level conventional attack.

*This imbalance is due in part to reluctance on the part of European nations to buy and man nuclear delivery equipment which could be available to them, and partly to our US political policies regarding "proliferation" and to certain inhibitions arising from the Atomic Energy Act.

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15. There have been severe shortages in conventional and low-yield nuclear munitions for aircraft. The conventional munitions shortage is being substantially rectified so far as the USAF is concerned. Increased numbers of low-yield weapons should become available during CY 1965.

- 16. Part IV also looks into NATO's air defense deficiencies. The "airground-air defense" triangle is of great importance in both conventional and tactical nuclear wars and is particularly vulnerable during the transition phase from one to the other. Because NATO's air defense system has little or no missile defense capabilities, its role and effectiveness in conventional war may be substantially different from its role in nuclear war. Current deficiencies include lack of ballistic missile early warning; lack of full coverage warning against very low level air penetrations; no fully effective, universal IFF equipment for all types of friendly aircraft; still no agreement on a NATO plan on how to integrate the varying air defense ground environment systems; lack of air defense weapons for forward ground units; and a shortage of fully effective all weather interceptors.
- Analysis of Certain Contingencies. This subject is covered in Part V of this report. The 1d Study Group derived for its internal use an outline scenario of possible contingency developments arising from the hypothesized signing of a USSR-GDR treaty on 24 December 1964. As a result of this the GDR, acting in part as a front for the USSR, cut off Allied access to Berlin. A time phased series of developments was worked leading to "decision points" for Allied-NATO leaders and Warsaw Pact leaders. To date the Study Group has been able fully and precisely to evaluate and analyse only one such decision point -- when a battalion-sized force which followed up an unsuccessful initial LIVE OAK probe was trapped 15 miles in East Germany and a much larger force was needed to free the battalion and to show our continuing determination to reopen access to Berlin. This analysis is set forth in Part V and evaluates SACEUR's capabilities in pursuing several alternative possible courses of action at this "decision point", with a comparable analysis of Soviet capabilities and reactions. After discussion with the Secretary of Defense on the results of the analysis, it will be possible for the Study Group to analyze later and more expanded contingencies.
- 18. Progress by the Study Group to date indicates that it should be able progressively to isolate a number of specific problem areas and throw some light on possible approaches towards their solutions.

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PART II

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1. General Purpose Forces

a. The trend in Soviet requirements for general purpose forces has been downward, with the personnel strength estimated between 1.6 to 1.8 million men in theater ground forces. It is estimated that there are about 139 divisions in the Soviet Army; about 105 are located west of the Urals and, of these, some 65 are believed to be at combat strength.

b. The following chart shows Warsaw Pact divisions which could be available for use against NATO forces in Central Europe at three time periods.

Location	M-Day	<u>M+15</u>	<u>M+30</u>
Soviet Forces in:			
Western USSR East Germany Poland	20 2	14 20 2	20-24 20 2
Satellite Forces in:			
East Germany Poland Czechoslovakia		6 8 <u>8</u>	6 8 8
TOTALS	22	58	64-68

c. It is estimated that the Warsaw Pact could employ initially against the Central Region, without prior buildup, the 22 Soviet combat strength divisions currently in East Germany and Poland. However, it is believed that the attack would probably follow a limited buildup and comprise three fronts employing 50 to 60 ground divisions, supported by about 2,000 tactical aircraft. By careful selection of courses of action and missions, the USSR could make effective use of satellite forces, but could not count upon them for the full range of operations against NATO.

2. Tactical Aviation

The following chart shows Warsaw Pact tactical air which could be available to support an attack against the Central Region in three time periods. (Satellite aircraft are not listed as available for commitment on M-Day due to their primary role as air defense. Additionally, the Warsaw Pact would probably avoid forward deployment of these aircraft prior to M-Day to minimize indications of offensive preparation.)

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Location	M-Day	<u>M+15</u>	<u>M+30</u>	
Soviet Aircraft in:				
Western USSR East Germany Poland	0 912 <u>310</u>	500 912 310	1035 912 <u>310</u>	
TOTAL Soviet	1222	1722	2257	
Satellite Aircraft in:				
East Germany Poland Czechoslovakia	0 0 <u>0</u>	75 125 125	360 720 620	
TOTAL Satellite	0	325	1700	
GRAND TOTAL	1222	2047	3957	

By M+30 it is estimated that the Soviets could have about 130 Strike/Recon, 1785 fighters and about 335 light bomber aircraft available for use with Warsaw Pact forces. The Satellites would have an additional 1580 fighters and 120 light bombers. Many of the Satellite aircraft are obsolescent and would probably be employed primarily in the air defense role within national boundaries. Although about 140 principal airfields are located in East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, there are additional alternate airfields, some with pre-stocked POL, which could be used to reduce concentrations of aircraft. It is estimated that Warsaw Pact airforces would encounter command and control and logistic support problems in employing tactical aviation from these dispersal bases.

3. Nuclear

a. It is estimated that Soviet nuclear warhead yields vary from approximately 3 KT to 100+ MT. An estimate of the Soviet nuclear stockpile for mid-1964, by system and yield, is shown on this chart.

System	<u>Yield</u>		Number
Long Range Aviation Rocket Forces Theater Forces Air Defense Forces Naval Operations	90 KT - 25 MT 500 KT - 25 MT 3 KT - 200 KT 3 KT - 25 KT 5 KT - 500 KT		1,200 1,650 2,900 1,000 <u>750</u>
		TOTAL	7,500

b. Although intelligence documents have not addressed a further breakout of theater force weapons, an analysis shown by chart below

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discloses that of the 2,900 nuclear weapons estimated to be allocated to theater forces, a total of 1,500 could be available initially to support the Soviet ground forces in the Central Region front. This does not include approximately 650 nuclear weapons that could be delivered against ACE targets by MR/IRBM launchers of the Strategic Rocket force.

Estimated Breakout of the 2,900 Theater Forces Weapons Allocation:

580	Allocation to other Soviet fronts.
820	Theater reserve.
820 1400	SUBTOTAL
1500	Possible allocation to Theater Forces against Central
	Region front.
2900	TOTAL

- c. Nuclear weapons appear not to be physically located with field forces in peacetime, and are probably stored in Ministry of Defense depots located within the USSR. Special units of the KGB have been created to maintain custody of nuclear weapons in storage and during transportation to firing units.
- d. Characteristics of tactical missiles, artillery and airdelivered systems available for support of theater forces are shown below:

Tactical Missiles*

	Range	<u>Yield</u>	Basic Orgn	Allocation	Remarks
FROG	26 n m	5-35 KT	Bn	Bn per Cat I Div.	Two to four launchers per bn.
SCUD SS-1	150 nm	100-200 KT	Bde	SCUD support provided Army and higher echelons.	Estimated that 35-40 six launcher brigades exist.
SHADDOCK	300 rm	1.5 MT		Possibly assigned to tactical air armies and front arty formations.	Direct evidence of deployment not available. Estimated that 50-60 launchers exist - with bulk in western USSR.
SIBLING SS-2	350 rm	10~30 KT			May have been replaced by SHADDOCK as a front weapons system
SS-16 SS-N-3	90 nm 300-450nm	10-30 KT 10-30 KT			•

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