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President had. Alternatively, since the decision to use nukes would be one of the most crucial ones any President could make and therefore would not in certain circumstances be likely to be made quickly or easily, planning on an early positive decision by the military commanders might lead to military inflexibility.

5. MREMs. Lem argued that European-based MREMs were essential both as an addition to the deterrent and for forward defense in the event deterrence failed. He said he had nothing to deal with the missile threat to Allied Command Europe. In response to our questions, he rejected external forces as meeting the need. He and McConnell argued that the US might well wish to have the capability for ^{fighting} a nuclear war limited to the European theater without requiring the engagement of US external forces. Despite my pressing him very hard as to the realism of a major European engagement of this sort which would exclude the US external forces, he held to his position. He argued, for example, that most people visualized several hundreds of MREMs being exchanged in one spasm, whereas he could visualize a very limited exchange of MREM's by both sides, an exchange which could not take place if the European Command did not have MREMs on hand.

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I asked whether the MLF did not fill both the deterrence and the fighting needs. Lem argued that it did not: it was insufficient in numbers and I gather in other respects, such as accuracy and survivability. He wants the MLF, but only as a part of a mix. He rejects the

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notion that the Europeans politically would not take land-based MRBMs. He says that the reason there has been reluctance so far is explained in large measure by the manner in which we have presented the case, i.e., an incomplete presentation combined with clear US reluctance to make the missile available. He said he thought that a full exposition of the need would lead to European acceptance of the requirement. For example, on the question of whether MRBMs wouldn't act as lightning rods, he says that they would be no more of a target than certain of his other capabilities, including the strike aircraft, which he points out are located frequently in or near cities (whereas the MRBMs would not). When we pointed up the problem of German manning, Lem denied that this need be a problem.

Comment: My general reaction is that the case militarily is probably somewhat better than OSD has heretofore argued and undoubtedly substantially less than CINCEUR believes. He is probably partially right about European receptivity to the MRBMs in the face of a full exposition as to its need, but he probably underestimates some of the concern which would exist re German manning. (For example, with regard to the Russian attitude, he argued, in effect, that we should not apologize to the Russians

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for equipping Europe to defend itself against 700 Soviet MRBMs.) The issue boils down to whether first, for reasons of deterrence, and second, for actually fighting a tactical nuclear war limited to Europe, MRBM's can be justified. On this I doubt that we had a meeting of the minds. However, on one point I do think Lem has a persuasive argument. He contends that much of our current problem with the Europeans is political and psychological in that they doubt our willingness to use nuclear weapons in their defense. They therefore need a physical evidence of a nuclear capability in Europe, which could strike the USSR and this MRBMs would supply.

6. Command and Control and PAL. I asked a number of questions concerning command, control and release of nuclear weapons. In general, Lem insisted that existing procedures were effective and provided him with full flexibility extending down to the use of one nuclear weapon at a time if necessary. (Though Lemnitzer said he could not himself conceive of the use of tactical nuclears as making sense on less than a corps basis.) Note: Some of our people in the Johnson NESC Study Group, who recently looked into this question, have doubts that such effective and flexible control actually exists. I asked whether the problem of forward deployment of such items as

Davy Crocketts on the battlefield didn't present a difficulty in the sense that an individual commander if surrounded might

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wish to use the weapon. McConnell argued that the Commander's orders under such circumstances would be to destroy the weapon. Both Lem and McConnell thought that he would, although Lem went on, significantly enough, to say that their plans would not be to have the Davy Crocketts in a forward position until after the decision had been made to use nuclear weapons. Lem seemed generally satisfied with the PAL device and in particular the latest models which are just now being installed. He feels that the existence of 27 separate headquarters for release of PAL codes is generally satisfactory as a protection against having these release authorities eliminated before our weapons could be activated. He did express some thought, however, about going down the chain of command in delegating release authority in PAL codes.

7. Intelligence. I received the usual intelligence briefing which emphasized the very great threat presented by Communist capabilities. I wasn't entirely persuaded that the intelligence estimates were as realistic as they might be. For example, when I inquired as to how reliable the satellite forces were and whether in fact the Soviets might not find that they had to divert some Soviet strength to keeping an eye on the

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satellites, I got an unsatisfactory response. It does seem clear, however, that the Communist force capability, especially satellite forces, is improving through being equipped with more modern items. Lem was rather pointedly critical of McNamara's Economic Club Speech concerning Soviet capabilities. He claimed that it was grossly optimistic and implied that it simply did not provide a full or candid description of the situation. He noted that there would shortly be another NATO Military Committee Meeting and he anticipated that there would be no substantial differences of opinion whatsoever regarding the size and character of the threat facing Europe, i.e., all of the NATO Military Committee representatives, presumably Lem included, will agree that the threat is grave.

Comment: In general, I felt that though Lem and McConnell both viewed the threat and enemy capabilities as being very serious (as one would expect of a military commander in the field), Lem was more balanced in his view than McConnell. The latter implied that NATO forces could be easily overrun and must rely quickly and heavily on use of nuclear weapons. Lem openly disagreed saying that the NATO force was substantial and would give the

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Russians pause, but that its deficiencies were serious enough so that it could not now fight a sustained conventional undertaking. It is clear, however, that if he sticks to his position on the military effect of further US force withdrawals, the adverse political impact, which is likely to be great in any event, will be magnified.

8. Nature of the Threat. In our discussions he emphasized the continued concentration of attention in most of the planning on a large Communist invasion. I said that prevailing opinion seemed to be that this was an increasingly diminishing probability. On the other hand an East European uprising, specifically an East German uprising, or trouble on the flanks, seemed quite possible. I said I was more concerned about our ability to handle such engagements in a way that would limit them from spreading geographically and into the use of nuclear weapons, than I was about the exact balance of MRBMs between East and West on the Central Front. Lem seemed in general to be sympathetic with the point, but we did not get into it very deeply. He expressed the need for improvement in UN capabilities to handle such problems as Cyprus.

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9. Wheelus. Lem made a very strong pitch on doing everything possible to retain the Wheelus base. He referred to General Adam's recent messages on the subject. Lem was not, it seemed to me, unappreciative of the somewhat limited range of pressures and inducements we can bring to bear on the Libyans, but wanted to underline the urgency of the need from his point of view and in support of Adam's pitch. Though he made a very strong case, he was more restrained than some of his subordinates (who, quite obviously without having thought the matter through, implied that we ought to stay in Wheelus, even if by use of force, if necessary). The general reaction was that loss of our Wheelus rights was a first step in eroding the situation which would end up in eventual Communist access to Libya. We discussed briefly the possibility of substituting an area in Spain (the requirement would be for a strip approximately 20 x 20 miles), which would meet the immediate military need of SACEUR.

10. Special Ammunitions. It turned out that Lem had just dispatched a response to Washington on this subject which corresponded exactly with the position which State had taken with DOD. In particular, Lem strongly agreed with the Department that we could not offer this special ammunition to certain of

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while the Allies/precluding others from having it. He did underline, however, the tremendous military significance and advantage which this ammunition had and the fact that it represents the one really secret weapon we have available. He did not feel, however, that we would greatly endanger security by making effects use available to our Allies. He agreed with me that the availability of this ammunition would substantially raise the nuclear threshold.

11. G-91 Problem and Pershings. Lem believes the G-91 aircraft should be permitted a nuclear capability and argued that it was the only aircraft which could be used in support of the ground operations. Lem indicated that Defense had stated that it, together with the JCS and AEC had agreed, but that State was resisting. We indicated we were not entirely familiar with the problem though we did say that one question which posed itself was whether, at a time when Defense was proposing that QRA aircraft and perhaps all strike aircraft should be phased out of their nuclear role because of their vulnerability, it made sense to go forward with the equipping of still additional aircraft for nuclear missions. Lem reacted very vigorously arguing that the "limited number of Pershings" would not

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adequately substitute for strike aircraft. We pressed him a little bit as to what his views would be assuming there was a sufficient number of Pershings substituted for the strike aircraft, but I did not feel that we got a fully satisfactory response. He seemed very much wedded to the notion that the strike aircraft must be retained in his inventory. One of the reasons he cited is that the Pershings do not have the range required to hit some of the targets that the strike aircraft, at least theoretically, cover.

12. NATO Aircraft Overflights of East Germany. Lem mentioned that we had had a number of additional incidents since the RB-66 wherein NATO aircraft had overflown East Germany. This, despite the establishment of a protective zone. Recently a West German had flown a Piper Cub into East Germany and landed there. The pilot was quickly released and permitted to return home.

13. European MAAGs. In response to my questions on the justification for maintaining MAAGs in Europe, McConnell argued that the need for continuing to exercise supervision over large amounts of material still coming out of the pipeline was a major consideration. (For example, \$112 million of MAP will be delivered to Italy this year.) But he also admitted that a good part of

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the rationale for retention of MAAGs was based on the very excellent access which the MAAGs have to the European MODs. McConnell argues that at some point our bilaterals under which the MAAGs operate will be reopened at which point we will lose important concessions which we obtained in the early years of the aid programs and which have stood us in good stead. He also notes that our personnel have been reduced from 4200 in 1954 to 700 by 1965.

14. French Attitudes and Motivations. We discussed this briefly. Lem implied that Page Smith might have made a tactical error in insisting on a written formal agreement with the French on their role in the Naval command. Lem felt that a good part of the explanation of French motivation was the general approach followed by DeGaulle of making French forces "truly French" once again. He seemed to imply that the Naval problem was not very serious, but he did say that if the French withdrawal were to extend to the Army and Air Force this would be much more serious.

Comment: CINCEUR is currently working on a response to a JCS request regarding this very issue. For additional details see Appendix I.