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Authority NND 59307

By h377 NARA Date 6/9/86

HL

G/PM

May 27, 1964

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(With Attachments)

TO: G - Mr. Johnson
FROM: G/PM - Seymour Weiss
SUBJECT: Attached Summary Memorandum

The attached is a proposed summary memorandum to the Secretary covering your Paris discussions. To it are attached a more detailed memorandum covering this subject, plus an appendix which covers the subject of CINCEUR's views on a further French withdrawal from NATO. This latter I picked up in side discussions with General Lemnitzer's staff.

Attachments
As Stated

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

THRU: S/S

FROM: G - U. Alexis Johnson

SUBJECT: Meetings in Paris with Bohlen, Finletter
Lemnitzer and McConnell

1. General. The meetings went very well. They provided a useful orientation for me to the European scene, but in addition provided an insight into some of the specific problems our key civilian and military representatives are attempting to cope with. There follows a brief summary of key points of interest. Attached is a more complete report which you may wish to read if time permits. (Attachment A)

2. Embassy-USRO. Discussions with Chip and Tom Finletter were too short. Tom is concerned about the MLF and about the NATO Force Planning exercise.

3. CINCEUR/SACEUR. Six hours with Lemnitzer and McConnell covered a wide range of subjects:

a. Force Withdrawals. Lemnitzer is absolutely adamant on the point that any further withdrawals (i.e., the 10,000 LOC or the 10 tac air squadrons) will have a "devastating effect" on his military capabilities. He says he will so state when and if SACEUR's military appraisal is requested by the NAC. He expressed deep appreciation and praise for your stand in September resisting withdrawals which he feels would have been and still would be politically and militarily damaging.

b. Tactical Nuclear Weapons. CINCEUR has completed a study on this question which will soon be released. Lemnitzer argues that the weapons are needed for the defense of Europe (though he was somewhat more moderate in his views than McConnell). In response to my pressing him he argued that a tactical nuclear war limited to Europe was feasible. I argued that we had doubts that the Europeans would find such a prospect appealing and that their current position was based on maximum deterrence with

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little regard to what would really happen when the chips were down. I also said that we were insistent that there be sufficient flexibility in the hands of the political decision-making authorities as to when and if we go to the use of nukes and that it would be in the interest of our military planners that military planning not be premised on unrealistic assumptions. I had a little bit of the feeling that we might have started him thinking anew about these issues.

c. MRBMs. Lem argues that these are necessary both for deterrence and fighting purposes. He does not buy the notion that external forces can fill the bill. He feels that the State assessment of a lack of European political willingness to accept MRBMs is distorted by virtue of our having failed to lay out the full case for European consideration. I pressed him on all points and may have raised some doubts in his mind. In general, however, he is firmly committed on this one and though he supports the MLF he does not agree that it adequately meets his MRBM needs.

d. Command and Control. Lemnitzer argued that it was quite adequate and permitted discreet use down to a single weapon if necessary. He is satisfied with the PAL system.

e. Intelligence and Nature of the Threat. As might be expected, CINCEUR intelligence estimates paint a pretty serious picture of the threat. I pressed Lemnitzer on the question of the realism of assuming that a large scale Communist attack in Europe was likely. I referred to our concerns about East German uprisings and trouble on the flanks. He seemed not unsympathetic to the point.

f. Wheelus. Lem made a strong pitch for us to do everything possible to retain Wheelus. Militarily, his need could probably be met by a facility in Spain, but it was obvious that the European Command felt strongly about the broader implications for our Middle East position of being pushed out of Wheelus.

g. G-91 Problem and Pershings. Lemnitzer wants the G-91 (a light weight ground support aircraft) equipped with nuclear capability. We asked how this was consistent with the DOD pressure for substituting Pershings for existing strike aircraft.

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Lemnitzer is resistant to the idea of the Pershing substitution. How well this has been thought through I could not fully ascertain.

h. NATO Aircraft Overflights of East Germany. I was surprised to learn from Lemnitzer that since the RB-66 incident there have been a number of additional overflights of East Germany.

i. European MAAGs. CINCEUR defends the continuation of a MAAG presence as needed to oversee deliveries of MAP still in the pipeline (\$112 million this year to Italy) and because of excellent contacts which MAAGs have with MODs. McConnell claimed that they were reducing size of MAAGs as fast as is prudent.

j. French Problem. Lemnitzer was not much concerned about the French pull-out from the Naval commands. He indicated, however, that if this shifted to Army and Air Force the problem would be critical. CINCEUR is now in process of responding to a detailed JCS inquiry on this subject. (Appendix I, attached).

Attachments
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cc: U - Mr. Ball
M - Mr. Harriman
EUR - Mr. Tyler

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MEMORANDUM

1. Embassy-USRO. Time available for discussions was much too short. A working breakfast with Chip and Tom Finletter was devoted mainly to discussion of the MLF. (.... To be supplemented by Mr. Johnson as appropriate.) We then moved to USRO where Tom, Durby and I discussed the NATO Force Planning exercise. In a word, Finletter is concerned that the exercise has bogged down and seemed to be of the opinion that a June Defense Ministers Meeting would give Bob McNamara the opportunity to put some life into the undertaking. One concern which I have is that Tom continues to assume, quite understandably, that McNamara will be able to spell out the US views on NATO strategy and force capabilities in a detailed way which will be convincing to our European Allies. I am by no means satisfied that we are in any better position to do this today than we have been at any other time over the past three years. One further point I might note was Tom's indication that the arrangements whereby Burt Klein (formerly of RAND, but now on the DOD payroll) reports to him as the US Representative on the Defense Planning Work Group (the Group which is running the NFP exercise) was less than fully satisfactory. I gather that Klein is entirely cooperative but that somehow the lines of communication from

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Klein back to DOD leave Finletter with a feeling that he does not control the undertaking.

In subsequent discussions at USRO, expanded to include Cecil Lyon and Jack McGuire from the Embassy, Alan James, John Burns and Phil Farley, I spent sometime discussing the French problem. In general, I gather that there was a fairly unanimous opinion that the French views on NATO strategy, with their heavy dependency on the use of nuclear weapons for defense of Europe, are reflective of a wider European feeling. (Incidentally, I was told that the French have just recently announced that they are undertaking the full reequipping of five of their divisions to make them nuclear capable. I am not clear on the details.) Cecil Lyon says that the French clearly look upon NATO as the creature of US invention. It is not that they object to NATO as much as it is their desire to have the dominant role. When I asked whether it might not be useful to begin thinking about heavy US force withdrawals I received a somewhat mixed reaction. Lyons tossed out the notion that perhaps the time had arrived when we should begin to turn the defense problem back to the Europeans. Farley felt that the beginning of such a movement would start in motion political forces which we might not be

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able to control. He felt that lessened US force presence would result in decreased US influence over European affairs. Others echoed his view.

2. CINCEUR/SACEUR. I met for six hours with Generals Lemnitzer and McConnell. The discussions were quite free and easy and the rapport I thought quite good. Lemnitzer began with a pointed reference to the fact that he felt that the Department had been extremely helpful and appreciative of his Command's point of view on a number of issues in the past, more so than DOD. He particularly referred in this connection to the force withdrawal issue (see below). He said he felt that the State analysis on this subject (your memorandum of last September) was the best paper he had seen in his many years in Washington. He made it clear that he felt State had saved the day at the time and had saved us from making a serious mistake. In this sort of atmosphere the range of topics discussed went smoothly even where it was clear we had areas of difference of view. At the end of the meeting he and McConnell called me aside and Lem was particularly complimentary in his remarks about our POLADs John Burns and Alan James.

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3. Force Withdrawals. We spent a good period of time on this subject. On the logistics side Lem claims that he is now so strapped that any significant further withdrawals (i.e., the 10,000 contemplated) would leave his force with a seriously impaired fighting ability. He has gone on record as preferring a withdrawal of a division to any more LOC personnel. Similarly, on the 10 squadrons of aircraft, his military evaluation is that withdrawal would be a serious blow to his carrying out his responsibilities. He points out that the aircraft are required to support the ground operations as well as for control of the air. In response to my direct question, he said he does not believe that the US can meet the spirit (indeed, even if it meets the letter) of its NATO commitment and still "dual base" the 10 squadrons. He said that the withdrawal would have a "devastating effect" and that when SACEUR's military judgment is solicited by NATO he will feel bound to so state. I pressed Lem very hard as to which he would prefer if he had to choose between the logistics force reductions and the 10 squadrons. He flatly refused to choose between these undesirables, finally concluding that from a military point of view a proportional reduction in both air forces and ground forces would make the

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most sense.

Finally, Lem said he could not see how the US could politically square itself arguing for increased conventional capabilities for NATO on the one hand and sponsoring a force reduction on the other. He says the Germans and our other Allies are not fooled and know full well that our conventional capabilities have already suffered from previous reductions. For example, the CINCEUR conclusion is that OSD's estimate of thirty days to reestablish the contracted French LOC is highly optimistic. McConnell thinks it would take 90 to 100 days. Because of the LOC reductions CINCEUR now estimates his capability for fighting conventionally as being limited to 14 days. He said the Europeans know full well that the US has lost its sustained combat capability as a result of the LOC squeeze. He said that US forces would require 120,000 non-combat reinforcements to fight an extended conventional combat. In this connection, Lem spoke fairly scathingly about operation BIG LIFT and its significance. He made it clear that it had far more limited military utility than DOD press agency implied and that it did not by any means prove itself as a feasible means for reinforcing Europe in time of stress or hostilities.

4. Tactical Nuclear Weapons. CINCEUR is quite clear as

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to the need for these weapons for defense of Europe. He has just finished a detailed study on this matter which, we learned from others in the CINCEUR staff, should be ready for transmittal to the JCS within the next ten days. While we did not get into the details of that study, Lem seems convinced that a tactical nuclear defense of Europe is possible. We pressed him rather hard as to whether the Europeans would really be willing to fight a tactical nuclear war limited to Europe; one which would not engage the US or USSR homelands. While he and McConnell argued that such a war was possible, they were not entirely persuasive and might have been a little bit shaken by our arguments that the Europeans seemed more devoted to the notion of deterrence than fighting and that they could hardly hope to profit from a nuclear war limited to Europe.

Lem pressed me hard on the reasons for the State refusal to agree to the DOD proposal for agreement in principle to deployment of Anti-Demolition Munitions for our Allies. I explained that we had not received a rational explanation of how the ADMs fitted into his planning or why they were so urgently required. CINCEUR argued that they were highly important to an effective forward defense and would provide important delaying

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action. However, I got a little of the feeling that, though in strictly technical military terms a case might be made, the broader political significance of a reliance on nuclear weaponry, in some cases where conventional explosives might even do the job, had not really been comprehended. For example, one of Lem's staff made the point that nuclear demolitions required only a fraction of the LOC back up as compared to that required to provide an equivalent explosive force through the use of conventional demolitions.

We tried to get at the question of whether conceptually, use of ADMs would require early employment. We never received very precise answers to this one, though the implication generally seems to be that early use would be required since the weapons would be emplaced far forward.

I noted to Lem, partly in connection with the ADM problem, but in a more general sense as applying across the board to the assumption of the use of tactical nuclear weapons early in hostilities, that heavy reliance on such an assumption could lead to inflexibilities. On the one hand to the extent that early use required the President to make an affirmative decision, this tended to limit the flexibility which the

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