

He acknowledged that this low damage factor was partially due to the limited range of SACEUR's aircraft and that SACEUR depends greatly on external forces with the longer range and greater weight of attack capability. In conclusion, the Secretary suggested that discussion of this subject be resumed in about six months after the US/FRG had an opportunity to study the problem. He added that he would make the US study, from which he had quoted damage estimates, available to the FRG.

Gen. Wheeler commented that SACEUR's aircraft had political as well as military utility and that we must differentiate between the two. However, in the coming years, missiles employed in the QRA role would play an increasingly greater part. As the missile ratio increases, aircraft would have lesser political importance. The Secretary agreed, stating it would be politically impossible now to tell the Turks, for example, that tactical aircraft were no good in a general nuclear war.

#### 16. Use of Obstacles

Gen. von Freytag continued the briefing explaining that use of natural and prepared obstacles would lend support to the battle in front of and within the defensive area. His principal points were: Fortified positions are useful only when they can be exploited in connection with a mobile defense; obstacles should be controlled by covering forces; militia-type formations will be only conditionally qualified to man obstacles. He cited the Bohemian Forest and the Harz Mountains as useful natural obstacles.

Although the FRG has prepared plans for the organization of obstacles, overriding political considerations preclude the construction of defensive positions along the Iron Curtain because this would lead to a politically untenable manifestation of the present border.

General Wheeler commented that he agreed with the FRG concept that heavy fortifications along the Iron Curtain had little value either military or political. Minister von Hassel noted that this concept had come from RAND. He values RAND contributions highly but not in this case. This particular study was "leaked" and caused considerable political discussion. Such a concept is politically unthinkable in Europe. Minister von Hassel noted also that a militia system was involved, another aspect which the FRG cannot contemplate.

#### 17. Intelligence Study

The Secretary then proposed a joint US/FRG study of the Soviet and Satellite capability of deploying additional troops for the ground battle. He suggested that the FRG provide two or three people to work with Gen. Carroll, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. The Defense Minister replied that he would be agreeable; however, the FRG intelligence sources were being depleted.

Gen. Wheeler commented that the areas which deserve attention involve more technical aspects rather than intelligence collection. He felt it would be desirable to study how rapidly the Soviet and satellite forces could assemble and deploy along the Iron Curtain, considering rail, road and airlift capabilities. The Secretary added that US and FRG staff estimates differ and it would be useful to compare the differences.

Gen. Trettner added there was little overall difference in estimates, the US estimating 140 divisions and the FRG 145. The real differences lay in the rapidity with which these divisions could be deployed for the battle. There was also a difference as the FRG felt there was a capability to move in 20 divisions covertly.

Gen. Wheeler stated he believed that the West would have ten days to two weeks of strategic warning of any major buildup. He cautioned that the West could not be too dull to detect this or too timid to do anything about it. Min. von Hassel repeated that the FRG human collection capability was far less than it was ten years ago.

#### 18. US Reinforcement Capability

Gen. Wheeler stated this point was very important to the US because by 1970 the US would have improved airlift and sealift to provide rapid reinforcement from the US. The Secretary added that if the Soviets cannot covertly reinforce the Iron Curtain with 20 divisions, the increased US strategic lift capability was extremely important. If, on the other hand, the West did not receive adequate strategic warning, there would be no need to maintain the large ground and tactical air reserves which the US has in the continental US. He referred, as examples, to the callup of reserves in September 1961 and October 1962. The Secretary said he would like to see the world become accustomed to large-scale US troop training moves. Conducting these training exercises would ease the political decision problem and political alarm.

#### 19. Solution to NATO Strategy Problem

In concluding his presentation, Gen. von Freytag stated that the military authorities of NATO cannot solve the problem presented by the disparity of views on NATO strategy. The North Atlantic Council must issue a new political directive and a new strategy can then be developed.

General Wheeler then indicated that, although there was need for review of the political directive, the time was not now expedient in view of SACEUR's action to clarify his directives and the force planning exercise in progress. The Standing Group was working on these problems now. However, there were certain things which could be studied: the exact timing of a decision to use nuclear weapons; how long a conventional defense could be sustained, and how such a defense might be improved; our different estimates of Soviet capabilities.

## 20. Results of Tactical Nuclear Exchange

Commenting then on his earlier discussions with Gen. Trettner, Gen. Wheeler stated that he tends to agree with the German view that a full-scale tactical nuclear exchange would have the same effect in Europe as a strategic exchange. With respect to the question of whether SACEUR should have interdiction weapons and whether these weapons would cause escalation, he tended to think that employment of interdiction weapons would cause such escalation.

The Secretary commented some people felt that current war plans tended to establish the US and the Soviet Union as sanctuaries. A tactical nuclear war in Europe could result in US-Soviet Union sanctuaries, with Eastern and Western Europe destroyed. He added that he could not accept a strategy which would permit this. He added that holding out some NATO tactical aircraft for the nuclear strike role would tend to support such a strategy.

Gen. Trettner replied that aircraft employing tactical nuclear weapons enjoyed some advantages, particularly in the small yields which could be delivered. The Secretary said a 20-kiloton weapon was a small yield; nevertheless, a weapon of that size had destroyed Hiroshima. If NATO employed tactical nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe, the Soviets would respond by employing them in Western Europe. Consequently, destruction in Europe would be the same as in general war.

The Minister stated that if employment of ADMs and denial weapons in Phase I and selective use of battlefield weapons did not stop the aggressor, world nuclear war would result.

Secretary McNamara said he could not support a concept to limit nuclear war to Western and Eastern Europe. This was why he did not favor holding out tactical aircraft for a nuclear response. These aircraft, if employed with conventional weapons in Phase I, would be a major contribution toward stopping the war in its first phase. However, today SACEUR's tactical aircraft are not dual capable and they are nuclear-oriented.

## 21. General Trettner's Points

Gen. Wheeler, reporting again on the earlier discussions with Gen. Trettner, stated that Trettner had made two significant points: First, the FRG favors both the MLF and land-based MRBMs if other countries in addition to the FRG agree to the requirement and to stationing them on their soil. Second, SACEUR's position must be maintained and not down-graded. Europe considers Gen. Norstad and Gen. Lemnitzer to be European generals. Europeans prefer to have SACEUR talk to the President on release of nuclear weapons rather than to someone in Omaha.

## 22. December NATO Meetings

Gen. Wheeler reported that the question had arisen concerning the FRG making a presentation of their concept of the forward defense to the Military Committee in December. He favors the idea. The Secretary replied that he would favor such a presentation although he cannot endorse the German concept in its entirety. He added that the Military Committee should be planning in anticipation of a change to the political directive. The Minister stated he would propose that the German presentation be made and that it be concluded with a recommendation of how the political directive to SACEUR might be changed. Perhaps a single sentence was all that was necessary. The Secretary asked that von Hassel cable him after his next talks with the French Defense Minister Messmer and Gen. Trettner's talks with Gen. Ailleret. Min. von Hassel commented that Min. Messmer might be persuaded but not his boss. He would inform Secretary McNamara of the results of his discussions with the French. Secretary McNamara replied he would be delighted to see a change in the political directive but not at a cost that would split the Alliance.

Gen. Wheeler added that the last Military Committee meeting had revealed interesting, progressive actions. He felt that NATO was moving toward a de facto change, even if the words of SACEUR's directive remain the same. The Secretary added that if the political and military directives cannot be changed, we should engage in studies to offer progress in plans and deployments.

## 23. Troop Base for FRG Concept

The Secretary said he had several questions concerning the German concept: First, how would the German concept affect troop strength objectives? Would 29 divisions employed in Central Europe do the job? Gen. Trettner stated it was his judgment that 29 divisions were not enough. However, Europe would not be willing to raise more troops. Therefore the solution lay in improving mobility, improving conventional artillery and improving reserves and backup forces.

The Minister added that he does not envisage any German troop reductions. The Germans still plan on an ultimate peacetime strength of 520,000 in the Armed Forces. They are now at 430,000 and 500,000 is the objective for end 1969.

The Secretary's second question pertained to the role of reserves in the German concept. Gen. Trettner said the concept envisaged the buildup within the FRG of the Territorial Defense Command to provide greater freedom of movement for all NATO forces. There were no plans for FRG reserve divisions.

The Secretary inquired about the FRG reserve program. Gen. Trettner stated they presently had 400,000 reserves but lacked sufficient NCOs and officers. At the present time they could muster only 40 to 50 battalions for the Territorial Forces.

The Minister explained that the 500,000 active-strength figure for end '69 did not envisage the 12 divisions to be the 100% war strength. The divisions would be filled to war strength from the reserves. He envisaged that the total war strength of the German Armed Forces would be 900,000. At the present time the approximate strengths of the active armed forces were 264,000 Army; 94,600 Air Force; 29,000 Navy; and 24,000 Territorials. His planning envisaged the Territorial Defense Forces being augmented over current total strength in CY 64 by 10,000; in CY 65 by 25,000; in CY 66, 50,000. He had hoped to obtain these forces on a voluntary basis. However, thus far he had obtained only 8,000 in CY 64. In explanation he pointed out that volunteers get in trouble with their employers, but he nevertheless hoped to stick with the volunteer system. Unfortunately the Territorial Defense was "paying the mortgage" for the poorly equipped Volksturm of World War II.

The Secretary said his next question pertained to logistics. What level of logistical support did the Germans envisage for this concept? Minister von Hassel stated that he would prefer to discuss this in Friday's sessions, as there were differences between the US and FRG views on logistical support levels.

#### 24. Ground Combat for 1970-80 Time Period

The Secretary commented that this topic appeared on the agenda at FRG initiative, Gen. von Freytag and his group had received briefings as requested and perhaps Min. von Hassel would take the lead in discussing this subject.

The Minister replied that Generals Wheeler and Trettner had already discussed this in their meetings. Von Hassel felt that developments beyond the Iron Curtain would influence FRG developments in that time frame. He expressed his appreciation for the briefings given the German delegation. He said the Germans had a continuing interest in the trend of development of small types of nuclear weapons. They were also interested in protection against nuclear weapons, for example, the radiation protection to be afforded for the main battle tank. However, this would be raised on Friday when the main battle tank was an agenda item.

The Minister continued, stating he believed there was some disagreement concerning the 1970-80 time period concepts for mechanized equipment. He understood that US concepts for the Armored Infantry fighting vehicle for that time period still envisaged that the US Infantry would fight on foot, utilizing personnel carriers only as transport. He proposed that there be an operations research study conducted on a mechanized division employed

in Central Europe during the 1970-80 time period. He concluded by stating that joint research, development and co-production could be achieved only if joint doctrinal concepts for combat for that period were agreed upon.

General Wheeler asked Gen. Haines to respond to the question. Gen. Haines pointed out that the US Army had been working closely with the FRG Army. There had been frequent exchange visits both in the US and in Germany. In his judgment the doctrine that was evolving was compatible, although not identical. He added that the US has worldwide requirements and commitments. Consequently its doctrine must be applicable in areas other than Central Europe. He had personally accompanied Lt. Gen. Zerbel on his visit to the US last spring which included a visit to two armored divisions at Ft. Hood. He felt that there was no real basic difference between US and German armored infantry doctrine. He added that the US and the Germans had plans to exchange prototypes of armored infantry fighting vehicles.

## 25. Ground Doctrine Study

General Wheeler commented that the US/FRG Army talks and studies should continue. The Secretary agreed and stated that prior to the next US/FRG Defense discussions he would like to see the results on paper so that he and Minister von Hassel would be aware of the areas of agreement and disagreement in ground combat doctrine in 1970-80 time period.

General Wheeler added that the ABC concept which had been presented to the German delegation had not been reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Gen. Haines said the German Army has been provided copies of the ABC concept. This concept deals with tactics and does not address strategy.

The Minister asked about the British and Canadian reaction to the concept, pointing out that the British main battle tank concepts differ greatly from the US/FRG concepts. Gen. Haines explained that although there was a US/UK Standardization Group, no great degree of standardization had been achieved with the British on armored vehicles.

Gen. Wheeler added he thought the British concept was based largely on their World War II experience fighting in North Africa, that the US experiences differed and the US felt a requirement for a faster tank and a better gun.

The Minister asked whether the US and the British agreed on the armored infantry fighting vehicle concept. Gen. Haines responded that the US views fell almost precisely between the FRG views and the British views, that is, the British envisaged even more dismounted fighting than the US.

## 26. Employment of PERSHING in QRA Role

The Secretary said he understood that the FRG was interested in reorganizing its PERSHING battalions in accordance with the Phase I concept

recently adopted by the US Army. Gen. Trettner replied there was interest in the concept. The Secretary added that the US concept did not involve increasing the number of PERSHING missiles and he was agreeable to providing the FRG with additional PERSHING launchers if they wished to procure them.

Gen. Wheeler commented that during his discussions with Gen. Trettner the proposed PERSHING operational testing had been explained. Gen. Trettner had asked whether the FRG could observe CINCEUR's test. Gen. Wheeler had suggested that Gen. Trettner ask Gen. Lemnitzer if the FRG could observe. Gen. Wheeler had alerted Gen. Lemnitzer that Gen. Trettner would be asking to send observers to the tests.

Secretary McNamara ended the discussion of this topic by stating that the US would be willing to sell the FRG additional launchers necessary to provide 8 launchers per FRG battalion.

27. NATO Force Planning Exercise

The Secretary said the discussions of strategy-forward defense of NATO had included this topic. He had nothing additional to bring up. Did the German side wish to discuss this topic? Minister von Hassel replied in the negative.

The meeting concluded with an announcement by Secretary McNamara that special briefings would be presented at 1345.

Note: The doctrine-strategy portion of the agenda was resumed at 0900 Friday, 13 November in Secretary McNamara's dining room.

28. Establishment of an Operations Research Capability  
in the FRG Defense Ministry

The Secretary asked Mr. Hitch to lead the US discussion. Mr. Hitch explained that there had been a series of exchange visits and briefings on the US Defense financial management system, beginning in 1963. The FRG Defense Ministry was in the process of setting up a 5-year program similar to the US program and it was anxious to establish an operations research capability.

The German request originated in a letter from Mr. Schiffers which sought US assistance in establishing an OR capability. The plan provided the establishment of a mixed US/FRG team with a nucleus of ten US professionals. The professionals would be provided by a US non-profit organization. The group was to be prepared to undertake the study of selected current German defense problems and concurrently provide on-the-job training to German members of the team. US team members would phase out of the program after about three years.

The Minister stated he had nothing to add. However, he was hopeful that the team would be operative by 1 January 1965. The purpose of the team was not to compete with the US but to learn US methods.

The Secretary commented that the US would probably also discover worthwhile German ideas in this process.

The Secretary and the Minister agreed that the Memorandum of Understanding would be signed at a later meeting.

Memorandum of Conversation

Prepared by:  
Colonel Kurt G. Radtke  
European Region, ISA  
x 54812  
13 November 1964

Concurrences: General Wheeler,  
Chairman, JCS  
(informed)

Mr. Rowen, DASD  
(Pol Pl & NAA)

Approved by:

Cyrus Vance



Distribution:

Sec Def  
Dep Sec Def  
OSD (Mr. Roche) (3)  
Sec Army (5)  
Sec Navy (5)  
Sec Air Force (5)  
Chairman JCS (2)  
Joint Staff (5)  
DDR&E (2)  
ASD (Comptroller) (?)  
ASD (I&L) (2)  
ASD (ISA)  
DASD (ISA)  
DASD (ISA) Regional Affairs  
DASD (ISA) Planning & NAA  
DASD (ISA)/ILN (2)  
DASD (ISA)/OF&F (2)  
Maj. Gen. Dolvin (2)  
European Region, ISA  
R&C, ISA File  
DEFREPNAME (2)  
USCINCEUR (5)  
USRO  
Chief MAAG FRG (2)  
Embassy Bonn  
MOD Bonn (10)  
CIA  
DIA  
State - GER  
          EUR/RPM  
          G/PM  
Treasury (2)