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(4) ~~(U)~~(C) Telecommunications (See Annex 4)

(a) The structure of Soviet Bloc telecommunications is based on centralized government control. This concept is evident in all Soviet Bloc operations and developments and generally applies to each country.

(b) A modernization program for the civil telecommunications system is under way, and the facilities are being increased by the addition of increased-channel-capacity radio-relay and carrier equipment, new carrier-frequency cable facilities, and modern teletype equipment. The program includes a number of improved cable systems, which furnish communications systems between defense ministries and major military headquarters of each country as well as a direct dual-cable system from Berlin to Moscow.

(c) Present Bloc civil telecommunications facilities are considered adequate to meet government, military, and industrial wartime requirements. The communications complex, moreover, is sufficiently diversified to offer alternate means and routing.

(5) ~~(U)~~(C) Political (See Annex 5).

(a) USSR.

1 The most significant political development in the USSR during 1964 was the removal of Nikita S. Khrushchev from leadership of the Soviet government on 14 October 1964. The main reason for his ouster appears to have been dissatisfaction with his methods rather than his policies, since many of the latter are being continued under the new leadership. The new leaders, Leonid I. Brezhnev, First Secretary of the Communist Party, and Alexei Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers (or Premier) have declared their regime to be a "collective leadership" as opposed to Khrushchev's "one man rule", but it is generally considered doubtful that the present collective team will last very long.

2 The control of the USSR over the European Satellites continues to be weakened by the polycentrism noted prior to the fall of Khrushchev, and no let-up has appeared in the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute. The major change in Sino-Soviet relations seems to be the absence of personal polemics which had been the rule under Khrushchev.

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3 No change in basic Soviet foreign policy is foreseen under the present Brezhnev-Kosygin regime. While East-West relations have been relatively relaxed, the main stumbling block standing between the East and West continues to be the German problem and, especially, Berlin. There has been no evidence that Soviet views and intentions on these matters have changed. They are demanding the transformation of West Berlin into a separate political entity as a long step toward their ultimate goal of complete Communist control over the city. Short of this, they can be expected to exert periodic pressure on the Allies, especially in the form of Soviet-instigated incidents along the access route to Berlin.

(b) Satellites.

1 East Germany.

The East German Communist dictatorship continues to be ruled by Walter Ulbricht. As in the Soviet Union, the Communist Party organization controls the entire governmental administrative, economic, and sociological systems of the country, from the highest down to the lowest level. It is this structure that makes organized resistance to the regime nearly impossible. Ulbricht, while paying lip service to the program of de-Stalinization, rules his captive population with typically Stalinist methods. The Soviet rulers have not let him fall, however, because he is a useful tool in controlling the population in East Germany. The death of Premier Otto Grotewohl on 21 September 1964 and his replacement by acting Premier, Willi Stoph, has not materially changed the leadership exercised by Ulbricht. Since there has been no indication that Stoph is wielding more actual power than his predecessor, the logical contender for Ulbricht's position remains Erich Honecker, a presidium member who has on several occasions acted for Ulbricht.

2 Bulgaria.

The Bulgarian Communist Party dominates the government apparatus and controls the country's life through a variety of means, including the use of mass organizations, internal security forces, and propaganda. Purges and changes in personnel in leading government and Party positions, which were designed to strengthen Party organization, also resulted in more extensive control over the population. However, considerable Party strife weakens the political power of Premier Zhivkov and may

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jeopardizing Zhivkov's position is his apparent inability to solve critical economic problems. Dependent upon the USSR for political and economic support, Zhivkov can be expected to adhere to Soviet decisions; nevertheless, national interests and the legacy of Stalinism will periodically cause Zhivkov some difficulties.

### 3 Czechoslovakia.

Czechoslovakia is dominated by the Czech Communist Party and currently ruled by President Novotny. A power struggle between Stalinist and anti-Stalinist elements and a deteriorating economic situation have jeopardized the political position of Novotny, a known Stalinist. It is presently a matter of conjecture whether or not Novotny has pacified discontented elements and succeeded in quelling serious intra-Party strife, thereby averting his own downfall. For the present, Novotny's removal does not appear imminent, as evidenced by his recent unanimous re-election as President. Moreover several recent events tend to suggest that the Czechoslovak leadership is attempting to bolster its domestic position by a show of independence from Moscow's control and influence.

### 4 Hungary.

The regime of Janos Kadar has ushered in a policy of de-Stalinization and has sought to regain a measure of international respect. Hungary today is one of the more liberal of the European Satellites. However, Soviet troops are still stationed in the country. Political life is being liberalized in an attempt to gain popular support. The regime has also relaxed the former repressive atmosphere through a number of measures, including a political amnesty releasing an estimated 3,000 to 4,000 persons from prison, and signing of an agreement with the Vatican as a step toward normalization of State-Church relations. In foreign affairs Kadar has followed the Moscow line, while achieving some degree of independence for the regime in its relationship with the Soviet Union. Desiring an improvement in relations with the West, Hungary is resuming efforts to open the way for normal diplomatic relations with the United States.

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5 Poland

Polish Communism differs from that practiced elsewhere in the Soviet Bloc, particularly in the small amount of collectivization in agriculture. However, the regime is one of the more stable Satellites. Poland is a bulwark for the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. In relations with the rest of the world the Soviet Union often seeks to depict Poland as a neutral. This is hardly the case, but the Poles probably do exercise a degree of independence in foreign affairs, although far less than in the case of Rumania. Several events indicate that Gomulka has been successful, temporarily at least, in maintaining a factional balance between hard-line Communists and those backing more liberal policies. For the time being, Gomulka apparently has achieved an appearance of Party unity.

6 Rumania.

The Rumanian People's Republic is ruled by one of the strongest Communist regimes in Eastern Europe. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej is the leader of the Rumanian Communist Party and has been in the forefront of Rumanian Communism since 1945. Recently the Rumanian regime has been taking advantage of the ideological and political differences arising from the Sino-Soviet rift and is asserting its national independence in several areas, particularly in the economic field. The country's independent stand has caused a strain in its relations with the USSR and weakened Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. It is the most critical crack in the Bloc since the Yugoslav defection in 1948.

(c) Albania.

Albania's Communist regime is one of the most stable of the European Communist countries, and Party leadership apparently is united in support of First Secretary Enver Hoxha. Although Albania's split with the Soviet Bloc has been termed an ideological rift, it probably can better be explained in the terms of purely a power relationship. The Albanian Communist leadership seemed to have sensed quite early the implications of the growing differences between Moscow and Peiping and the improvement in relations between Moscow and Belgrade. Although the Albanians now have to echo Peiping's invective on the dangers of Western imperialism, they probably are aware that this is really one of their lesser worries. They class the Yugoslavs as servants of Western imperialism, and they consider the Yugoslavs their primary threat.

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(6) (U) (S) Economics (See Annex 6).

(a) USSR.

The leaders of the Soviet Union have succeeded in changing their vast, basically agricultural country to an industrialized nation. At the expense of the living standard of the population, basic industries and raw material resources up to now have been given the highest priority, while consumer goods and light industry were neglected. Present plans of the new Soviet leaders indicate that a shift in favor of consumer goods and light industry is contemplated. Agricultural production goals for 1964 were not met and results from the point of view of food supplies, particularly meat and dairy products were most disappointing. While the new budget presented on 9 December 1964 contains a \$555 million cut in defense expenditures, it provides for expansion of chemical and light industries, improvement of public services, and methods of marketing and distributing consumer goods.

(b) Satellites.

In general, the Satellites have patterned their economic development on the Soviet model. The principal economic objective has been and continues to be a rapid overall economic growth, with primary stress on industrial expansion rather than agricultural development. Gains in industrial production have been made at the expense of consumer goods. Agricultural output has lagged seriously enough to cause price increases and, in some cases, rationing, which in turn has given rise to strong popular reaction and discontent. In terms of overall economic development, East Germany and Czechoslovakia rank first, followed by Poland, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria.

(c) Albania.

Albania is one of the poorest countries in Europe, and its economic status is inadequate. Before Albania's break with the Soviets, the Albanian economy was often the despair of Moscow, which was bearing the brunt of the bills for Albanian aid. Since then, Albania has turned to Communist China for financial and technical aid and to limited trade with the West. Albania's economic prospects are not bright in any case, particularly in view of its political isolation.

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(7) (U) (C) Sociology (See Annex 7)

(a) USSR.

1 The USSR (population 227 million) has within its territory some 174 ethnic groups, with many different religions, customs, and psychological characteristics. The wide gaps in income and social privileges, clearly evident in Soviet society, give rise to some resentment among the lower classes. However, this does not appear to be a critical problem for the regime, although there have been occasional reports of strikes and protest demonstrations.

2 The general attitude of the Soviet people toward their regime can be characterized as passive obedience, involving little, if any, enthusiasm or fondness. Nevertheless, in the absence of realizable alternatives, the Soviet regime and the social system that has evolved are considered stable.

(b) Satellites.

1 East Germany.

The East German population, estimated to be 17.0 million, is composed almost exclusively of ethnic Germans, the majority of whom are Protestants. Despite the complete suppression of personal freedom by the East German dictatorship, the East Germans have continued to maintain an independence of thought, and Communist attempts to win over youth, peasants, and workers have failed. With the chance for flight reduced to a minimum and involving the risk of life itself, the population appears to have settled down to a life of apathy and resignation. No popular uprising appears to be likely unless a military confrontation between the Soviets and the Western Allies should occur and be interpreted by the people of East Germany as the signal for their liberation. Soviet policy appears to avoid the development of such a situation with all its unpredictable consequences.

2 Bulgaria.

Bulgaria has an estimated population of 8.2 million, of which some 90 percent are Bulgars. Although the regime has succeeded in transforming an agricultural economy into

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a mixed industrial-agrarian one, the peasants still constitute the majority of the population. Consequently, the peasant's outlook on life, especially his belief in personal independence and private ownership, is a recent source of opposition to the regime. Some passive opposition is also found among the industrial working class. The intellectual classes, however, generally tend to support the regime, which is firmly in control of national life.

### 3 Czechoslovakia.

The Czechs and the Slovaks are the two major segments of Czechoslovakia's population, which is estimated to number 14 million. Accommodation to outside forces is in the Czechoslovak tradition, although in recent times it has been more characteristic of the Czech elements than of the Slovak. As a result, the regime commands less respect in Slovakia than it does in the Czech regions.

### 4 Hungary.

Hungary's population, an estimated 10.1 million, is 95 percent Magyar or Hungarian. Although gradually urbanizing, Hungarian society is still chiefly rural in character, and there are only a few towns with a population of more than 100,000. Nearly 70 percent of the Hungarians are Roman Catholic, and almost all of the remainder belong to one of the three major Protestant denominations. The regime has instituted a number of reforms in an attempt to gain wider popular support. Of the various population segments, the farm element is the largest source of dissidence and latent opposition.

### 5 Poland

Poland's population, an estimated 31 million, is almost entirely Polish. It is also almost completely Roman Catholic, and the church-state relationship is a major problem of the regime. Although Polish society still retains an essentially rural character, the postwar period has been one of increased urbanization. The population supports Gomulka despite its anti-Communist and anti-Russian attitudes, but this is largely because there are no alternatives. The Church is, of course, anti-Communist, but supports the regime's appeals for temperance and greater industry. Historically, the Poles have hated and feared both the Germans and the Russians, and this still remains the case.

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6 Rumania .

Rumania has an estimated population of 19.0 million, and although there are several minority groups, some 86 percent of the population is Rumanian. Rumania is slowly urbanizing but presently has few really large concentrations of people. Historically, the Rumanians are anti-Russian, and the events of the postwar years have not appreciably changed this popular feeling. This has made it difficult for the Rumanian regime to gain more than token support from the majority of the population. However, the regime's recent forceful assertion of Rumania's national interests should have a favorable effect on popular opinion.

(c) Albania .

Albania has an estimated population of 1,840,000, with some 96 percent being Albanians. Although once Christian, the Albanians are now almost 70 percent Islamic. In general, the harsh nature of Albania as a land has shaped not only its economic development and culture, but also its people. Isolation has fostered a strong spirit of independence and self-reliance, making the people bold, proud, and somewhat suspicious of foreigners.

(8) ~~(i)(S)~~ Science and Technology (See Annex 8).

(a) USSR .

In the USSR, support given to science and technology is emphasized primarily to strengthen the military establishment and the industrial base. The Soviet Government controls all scientific research activity through detailed planning, and although the value of basic research is recognized by the planning authorities, the general emphasis continues to remain on applied research. Soviet potential in the areas of electronics, geophysics, and physics is particularly strong, being well supported by a high capability in mathematics. It is in these areas that major scientific advances of possible military significance are most likely to occur. The overall Soviet potential in science and technology is being steadily increased through an intensive program of training for scientific and technical professions. The present rate at which engineers and scientists are being graduated from universities in the USSR will permit Soviet technical strength within a few years to challenge the West along a broad front of scientifically strategic areas.



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(b) Satellites.

In the last several years the Soviets have expanded their efforts to integrate Bloc research. Scientific work throughout the Bloc is organized as it is in the Soviet Union itself, which facilitates coordination of effort. East Germany has a well-developed scientific capability in the fields of chemistry and optics. Czechoslovakia is strong in pharmaceuticals. Hungary has a high capability in biochemistry, pharmacology, and veterinary medicine. Poland will continue to contribute significantly to research related to medical science. However, Bulgaria and Rumania, having a limited scientific capability, are not expected to make any significant contributions to science and technology in the course of the next year. The continuing integration of Soviet Bloc research will raise the scientific capability of the more advanced Satellites, which in turn will augment considerably the scientific potential of the USSR.

b. Enemy Situation.

(1) ~~(S)~~ Strength (See Annex 9).

(a) USSR.

The strength of Soviet ground forces is estimated to be 1.34 million personnel. Approximately 280,000 are located in East Germany, 25,000 in Poland, 50,000 in Hungary, 772,000 in the 11 military districts of the USSR west of the Ural Mountain-Caspian Sea line (including approximately 495,000 in the Western USSR USSR<sup>4</sup>), and 220,000 east of the Ural Mountain-Caspian Sea line.

(b) Satellites.

The Satellite ground forces (excluding security forces) are estimated to have a strength of approximately 920,000 personnel, of which East Germany has 85,000; Bulgaria, 140,000; Czechoslovakia, 200,000; Hungary, 100,000; Poland, 200,000; and Rumania 195,000.

(2) ~~(S)~~ Composition (See Annex 10).

(a) USSR.

The Soviet ground forces are estimated to consist of 43 tank, 88 motorized rifle, and 7 airborne divisions for a total of 138 line divisions. There are 8 corps and 19 armies in the Soviet ground forces.

<sup>4</sup> The Western USSR includes the Baltic, Belorussian, Carpathian, and Moscow Military Districts.

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(b) Satellites.

The Satellite ground forces are estimated to have 63 line divisions (East Germany, 6; Bulgaria, 10; Czechoslovakia, 14; Hungary, 6; Poland, 15; and Rumania, 12).

(3) (S) Locations and Dispositions (See Annex 11).

(a) USSR .

The Soviet ground forces are estimated to have 20 divisions located in East Germany, 2 in Poland, 4 in Hungary, 88 in the 11 military districts of the USSR west of the Ural Mountain-Caspian Sea line (including 42 divisions in the Western USSR), and 24 east of the Ural Mountain-Caspian Sea line.

(b) Satellites

The Satellite divisions are all deployed generally along the national boundaries of their respective countries.

(4) (S) Air (See Annex 12).

(a) Soviet .

1 The Soviets will continue to emphasize qualitative improvements in their air capability as evidenced by the continuing assignment to operational units of such high performance defensive and tactical fighters as the FISHBED-C and D, the FITTER, and the FISHPOT. The medium bomber, BLINDER-A, and the light bomber, BREWER, are now in the inventory in moderate numbers and a continuing pattern of conversion to the new generation weapon system is expected.

2 The Soviets have initiated a gradual reduction in overall totals of manned aircraft. At the same time, they have been improving the quality and striking power of their air elements. This trend is expected to continue. Reduction in aircraft numbers is being made possible through the employment of improved weapons systems and weapons systems components, and through the increasing capability of Soviet missile forces to assume strike missions. For at least the next several years the Soviet Union will find it necessary to maintain a mix of aircraft and missiles. This

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conclusion has been supported by public statements of leading Soviet authorities, confirmed information on the continued development of mixed forces and observed exercise activity. The current state of the missiles art makes it neither militarily feasible nor economical to employ missiles as a direct replacement for aircraft in all roles. The Soviets have extended the service life of certain aircraft through the development of air-to-air (AAM) and air-to-surface missiles (ASM). The continuing need for use of aircraft as an economical means for the delivery of non-nuclear weapons is clear. Current drives for the development of an increased NATO non-nuclear air delivery capability will cause the Soviets to consider retention of a greater portion of its non-nuclear strike capability. Thus for the period of this estimate, we see continuation of the trend toward reduction of aircraft numbers, but probably at a decreased rate, counterbalanced by the qualitative increase of manned weapon systems.

3 The mainstay of the long-range force continues to be the BADGER medium bomber. Two heavy bombers remain in use, the BISON and the BEAR. These heavy bombers will continue to be relied upon for long range strikes with the BEAR as an ASM carrier and the BISON as a nuclear bomb carrier. The introduction of the BLINDER, which may eventually replace the BADGER, is further evidence that the Soviets intend to rely on a mixed air and missile force in the years ahead (See Annex 12 for more data on the BLINDER).

4 Military Transport Aviation (MTA) has a significant capability to lift large numbers of troops or cargo to peripheral areas, and this capability is being increased by the probable additions of more transport aircraft.

5 Jet light bombers available to tactical air units in western USSR and the Forward Area remain a major potential strike threat to the NATO area. These forces are comprised predominantly of BEAGLE bombers; however, modernization of Soviet bomber units in East Germany continues with increasing numbers of the supersonic BREWER entering the light bomber inventory. In view of the number of BEAGLES still available to tactical air force elements in the western USSR and in the Forward Area, these jet light bombers are still regarded as a major potential strike threat to the NATO area. BEAGLE units of the Polish and Czechoslovakian Air Forces further augment this Soviet light bomber force.

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6 Fighters assigned to Soviet tactical air forces in the Forward Area are estimated to have multiple roles. Many aircraft specialize in an air defense function, particularly the FISHBED, while other units, predominantly FRESCO and FITTER equipped, concentrate on a ground support role. However, to some extent most regiments maintain a secondary capability in either role. Of more immediate concern is the probable configuration of some fighters as offensive nuclear weapons carriers. While no fighter regiment in the Forward Area is presently credited with having a primary nuclear delivery role, the FISHBED and FITTER are capable of carrying low yield nuclear weapons. It is estimated that either of these aircraft could be configured for nuclear weapons delivery, employing the LABS or tossbombing technique. Of these two, the FITTER probably offers the greatest potential. It is also believed that in their effort to extract maximum utilization from the assigned number of aircraft types by using them in multiple roles, the Soviets will inevitably degrade their capability in each of these roles.

7 In keeping with their overall doctrine calling for mobility, simplicity, and exploitation of the advantages of surprise, emphasis in tactical aviation is placed on flexibility, strike power, and those other factors which permit Soviet Tactical Air Armies (TAA) to deploy rapidly and operate from fields with marginal facilities.

8 The major role of the Tactical Air Armies (TAA) in the Forward Area will be an all-out effort to maintain air superiority over Western aerospace forces in the combat area. Strikes will range up to 200 NM from the main line of resistance for light bombers and 150 NM for fighter bombers. In effect, the role of the Soviet TAA during the first stage of hostilities will be that of assisting the LRA and Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) in their nuclear strike function. Initially, those units assigned a ground attack mission will strike missile positions and airfields equipped with nuclear weapon delivery capabilities. Following accomplishment of this mission, other priority tasks would be in line with the traditional role of tactical air: isolation of the battlefield, and immediate support of ground forces to include reconnaissance of enemy forward and rear areas. Distinguishing features of the TAA lie in their capability to perform multiple offensive/defensive, nuclear/non-nuclear functions. They are, however, largely limited to the European continent, and as previously mentioned, this multiplicity of functions probably tends to degrade their capability in each specific function.

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9 To achieve maximum effectiveness against targets in the USAFE area, nuclear strikes by BADGER elements of the Long Range Air Army will be initiated as rapidly as possible. These strikes, in coordination with Strategic Rocket Troop IRBM/MRBM strikes, will be directed at Allied European, Middle Eastern and North African based nuclear potential (missile sites, nuclear weapon storage and airfields possessing a nuclear weapon delivery capability), military and political command control centers and industrial centers which have a war supporting potential. To perform these tasks, it is estimated these medium bombers will carry only nuclear weapons. In view of the range capability of these bombers, a number of routes may be used for circumventing the Western air defense system in Europe. They are expected to make full use of low level penetration tactics, diversionary maneuvers, ECM (including chaff and active jamming), and, when possible, they are expected to take advantage of darkness and adverse weather.

(b) Satellites.

1 The overall inventory of fighter aircraft in the Satellites, including those of the Group of Soviet Forces, consists of clear air mass and all-weather aircraft with the latter estimated at approximately 44% of the Soviet inventory, and approximately 18% for the national forces. Although the major portion of this force will continue to be comprised of FRESCOs during the period of this estimate, the present trend to improve the quality of the Satellite air forces is expected to continue, with an increasing number of the new fighters replacing a portion of some of the more obsolescent aircraft.

2 The Satellite national air forces contain FAGOTs, FRESCOs, FARMERs, FISHBEDs, and some jet light bombers, BEAGLEs. These forces are similar in composition and organization to the Soviet Aviation of Air Defense (IAPVO). With the exception of the BEAGLEs in Poland and Czechoslovakia, their primary mission is air defense of their respective countries.

(5) ~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ Reinforcement (See Annex 13).

(a) USSR.

1 There are 88 divisions (including 5 airborne divisions) in the 17 military districts of the Soviet Union west of the Ural Mountain-Caspian Sea line (See Annex 10, "Composition"). Thirty-three of these divisions are estimated to be

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