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combat ready. Of these 33 combat-ready divisions, 25 from the Western USSR (including 3 airborne divisions) are considered immediately available for reinforcement of Soviet and Satellite forces in central Europe. The 55 divisions considered not combat ready but at reduced or low strength could be brought to full strength in approximately 10 days after the start of mobilization; however, not all the divisions would have the same degree of combat readiness.

2 The daily reinforcement rate to support a Soviet limited buildup for an attack against central Europe has been computed to be 3.1 division slices⁵ by rail⁶ and 2.7 division slices by highway.⁷ At these rates, 18 division slices could be moved by rail from the USSR to a line extending along the Oder and Niesse Rivers to Kolin, Czechoslovakia, or to western portions of East Germany and Czechoslovakia within 9 days after the start of transloading at the USSR border. A similar move by highways to the Oder/Niesse-Kolin line could be accomplished within 21 days or to western portions of East Germany and Czechoslovakia, after the initial vehicle departs the western border of the USSR, within 26 days (See Annex 13, "Reinforcement").

3 The 2 remaining airborne divisions of the 25 combat-ready divisions have not been included in the surface movement because of the numerous options available for their use. However, the assigned aircraft of the Military Transport Aviation (MTA) are sufficient to commit and sustain only one airborne division operation to probable objectives in the vicinity of the Rhine River.

⁵ A division slice is estimated to have 20,000 personnel and 3,600 wheeled and tracked vehicles.

⁶ This rate would not become effective until one day after the departure of the initial train from the USSR border for movements to the Oder/Neisse-Kolin line. For movements to western portions of East Germany and Czechoslovakia, this rate would become effective 1.6 days after the departure of the train from the USSR border.

⁷ This rate would not become effective until 9.1 days after the departure of the initial vehicle from the western border of the USSR for movements to the Oder/Neisse-Kolin line. For movements to western portions of East Germany and Czechoslovakia, this rate would become effective 13.1 days after the departure of the initial vehicle from the western border of the USSR.

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(b) Satellites.

1 It is estimated that approximately 23 of the 63 Satellite divisions are sufficiently manned and equipped for commitment as part of an overall effort against central Europe (8 Polish, 6 East German, and 9 Czech).

2 It is estimated that these 23 Satellite divisions would be integrated directly into Soviet Fronts and are, therefore, considered committed forces in this estimate.

(6) (U) (S) Conventional Weapons and Equipment
(See Annex 14).

(a) USSR.

Soviet ground forces equipment developments continue to emphasize and improve stream-crossing and night-fighting techniques. The effort expended by the USSR in developing both armored and soft-skinned amphibious vehicles, in devising vehicle snorkeling techniques, and in improving bridging and ferrying capabilities gives the Soviets the ability to cross major water obstacles with increased ease and speed. The use of radar and infra-red devices at night is also especially significant. The Soviets now have the capability to conduct effectively many operations at night that were formerly impossible or extremely difficult. This night-fighting capability will probably increase. In addition, efforts are being made to improve various weapons systems. Examples of this are the introduction of the new T-62 medium tank armed with a 115mm smoothbore gun, a new 122mm gun-howitzer with 360-degree traverse, a new hand-held antitank grenade launcher with a 400-meter range, and the antitank guided missiles. These trends are expected to continue. At present, a major weakness in Soviet ground forces equipment is the inadequacy (both in quality and quantity) of armored personnel carriers.

(b) Satellites.

The Satellite ground forces have not reached the level of the Soviets in armament and equipment, although the East German and Polish ground forces are rapidly gaining in this respect. In addition, other countries, such as Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria are now receiving quantities of modern tanks and

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motor transport and engineer equipment. Although most of the Satellites must depend on Soviet design, or production, or both for most of their weapons, Czechoslovakia differs in that it designs and produces many of its own weapons. The development of Czech ground forces armament and equipment has reached an advanced state. Because of the unique position of Czechoslovakia among the European Satellites in matters of design and production, Czech ground forces materiel does not always follow the Soviet pattern found in the other countries.

(7) ^(u)~~(S)~~ Nuclear and CBR Weapons (See Annex 15).

(a) USSR.

1 Nuclear.

The Soviets can deliver nuclear warheads with yields extending into the megaton range against targets located anywhere in the USAREUR area of responsibility. The delivery systems, either manned aircraft or missiles, do not have to be based outside the periphery of the USSR. The Soviet Army is equipped with a variety of nuclear weapons, which range in yield from less than 5 kilotons to several hundred kilotons. According to Soviet doctrine, nuclear weapons will be used on a large scale in the event of general war. Present stocks of nuclear weapons available to the Soviet Army are sufficient for sustained large-scale employment. There is no firm evidence that the Soviets have moved nuclear warheads into the Satellites. The relative proximity of the USSR to East Germany could cause the Soviets to defer the movement of warheads until shortly before a Soviet-scheduled initiation of hostilities. The deployment of these weapons to the groups of Soviet forces could be accomplished without detection.

2 Chemical.

The Soviet forces have a large variety of weapons available for delivery of toxic chemical agents. Agents can be delivered by artillery, mortar, rockets, mines, aircraft spray, bombs, and possibly missile warheads. Soviet stocks of modern toxic munitions are sufficient to support Soviet forces in Europe for at least 6 months, and regardless of present positioning can be furnished to their forces without detection.

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3 Biological.

The Soviet forces probably do not have weapons specifically designed for biological agent delivery; however, many available weapons, particularly spray tanks, are suitable for delivery of biological agents. The Soviet Union is capable of producing and supplying sufficient quantities of biological agents or munitions to their forces without detection.

4 Radiological.

The Soviet forces do not possess weapons or agents specifically designed to product radiological contamination; however, surface bursts of their nuclear weapons could cause extensive contamination.

(b) Satellites.

1 Nuclear.

The Satellites are not producing nuclear weapons and do not have operational control over Soviet-produced nuclear warheads. There is the possibility that the Soviets may establish a Warsaw Pact-type nuclear pool. Weapons assigned to such a stockpile, although ostensibly for the use of all the Pact members, would remain under Soviet control.

2 Chemical.

Because of Soviet restrictions, quantities of toxic chemical munitions maintained by the Satellites are very small; however, weapons suitable for the delivery of Soviet toxic munitions are generally available in the Satellite forces.

3 Biological.

The Satellites do not have munitions specifically designed for biological agent delivery. Weapons suitable for biological agent delivery are available in the Satellite forces, and facilities suitable for the production of biological agents exist.

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4 Radiological

The Satellites do not possess weapons or agents specifically designed to produce radiological contamination.

(8) ~~(A)~~ ~~(S)~~ Guided Missiles and Rockets (See Annex 16).

(a) USSR.

1 The Soviets are continuing to emphasize the deployment not only of tactical and strategic surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) and rockets, but also of surface-to-air defensive systems. This wide deployment of many types of missiles and the sale of the SA-2 GUIDELINE surface-to-air missile (SAM) system to non-Bloc countries indicates a significant Soviet production capability in this field. While the Soviets have continued accelerated research and development programs in all phases of missile and rocket technology, they have not neglected the refinement and improvement of older weapons systems as evidenced by the new FAN SONG E Guidance Radar and newly configured missile for the SA-2 SAM GUIDELINE. It is believed that the Soviets will continue to give the highest priority to all phases of the missile and rocket field.

2 While all of the important targets in central Europe can be effectively covered by strategic medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles from sites in the Western military districts of the USSR, the need remains for the Soviets to deploy tactical (SSMs) to more forward areas. Such tactical (SSMs) and single-round rockets are present in the GSFG. The FROG-3/4 rockets and the SS-1 (SCUD B) missiles and their associated support equipment have been observed during displays, on maneuvers, in transit, and in installations in East Germany.

3 Another type of weapon in the GSFG is the antitank guided missile. Both the SNAPPER and SWATTER antiarmor missile systems have been observed with Soviet units in East Germany.

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4 There have been no indications of SS-2-associated equipment in East Germany over the past year, and available information indicates this system is probably obsolescent.

5 The GSFSG has a definite need for a delivery system capable of a maximum range of 480 to 560 kilometers. To fill the gap in this range capability, which resulted from the apparent obsolescence of the SS-2 system, it is estimated that the GSFSG has, or will introduce, a surface-to-surface cruise missile (SSCM) system, possibly the SSC-1 SHADDOCK.

6 It is estimated that the Soviets will continue the improvement and deployment of both defensive and offensive missile systems in all their areas of vital interest.

(b) Satellites.

1 Surface-to-Surface Missiles (SSM).
SS-1 SCUD A has been confirmed in the East German, Polish, and Rumanian Forces. FROG 3/4 is confirmed in the hands of the East Germans and Poles, and it is believed the Rumanians have the weapons system since this system is probably furnished to Satellite forces as soon as, if not sooner, than the SCUD A system. The Czechs and Bulgarians are both given the FROG and SCUD capability, although their presence in these forces remains to be confirmed. No information at this time indicates the presence of either FROG or SCUD in the Hungarian Forces, although SCUD has been confirmed in the SGF.

2 Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAM).
The only missile system known to be in the hands of all the Satellite forces is the SA-2 SAM system. SA-2 SAM Sites have been confirmed in all Satellite countries in varying numbers. The presence of the latest known SA-2 SAM equipment, to include FAN SONG E and the new configured GUIDELINE missile, has been confirmed in EGA, which is an indication that Satellite countries will receive this newer equipment to increase the air defense capabilities of the SAM system presently in their hands.

3 The above weapons systems, both SSM and SAM, would be equipped only with conventional warheads, the nuclear system remaining under strict Soviet control.

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(9) ^(U) ~~(S)~~ Electronics (See Annex 17).

(a) Soviet electronic equipment is of excellent construction and is available in large quantities. It is characterized by its ruggedness, mobility, and simplicity, and is well suited to field use. Most of this equipment has been introduced since 1955 and includes tracked vehicle-mounted artillery radars, missile guidance and control radars, early warning radars, proximity fuzes, infrared viewing equipment, and the R-series radios. The Soviets have excellent research and development resources, skilled manpower, and production capabilities to meet present and future military requirements.

(b) The preponderance of Soviet electronic equipment is standard throughout the Soviet Bloc, a situation that eliminates duplication, achieves economy of effort, and simplifies supply procedures.

(c) In the event of hostilities the Soviets have the capability to make extensive use of electronic countermeasures (ECM) and electronic counter countermeasures (ECCM). They have on hand active and passive electronic warfare equipment that can detect and interfere with NATO radar equipment, including that associated with guided missiles. The radar equipment used to control Allied flights to and from West Berlin is especially vulnerable because of the concentration of active and passive ECM equipment in and along the air corridors and the installation of additional Soviet/East German ECM equipment in the vicinity of the West Berlin airfields.

(10) ^(U) ~~(S)~~ Mobilization (See Annex 18).

(a) USSR.

The Soviets have sufficient personnel to mobilize a total force of approximately 350 divisions. However, based on the number of fully trained men available, the concepts of the present mobilization system, the stocks of equipment, and the current Soviet doctrine, it is estimated that the Soviets would elect to mobilize a force producing 250 line divisions by M+90 days. Such a force would be manageable and would provide sufficient combat-ready divisions to meet immediate operation requirements. Expansion to as many as 350 divisions could theoretically be attained during the first year with production of necessary additional equipment.

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The following figures show the mobilization capability. The figures in parentheses indicate the number of divisions that are considered to be combat ready at a particular phase of mobilization and the second line of figures indicate personnel strengths.

<u>M-Day</u>	<u>M+30</u>	<u>M+90</u>	<u>M+180</u>	<u>M+365</u>
138 (65)	225 (100)	250 (250)	275	350
1, 800, 000	6, 750, 000	7, 500, 000	8, 250, 000	10, 500, 000

(b) Satellites.

The following figures show the mobilization potential of the Satellite ground forces, assuming the availability of outside logistical support. The figures in parentheses indicate the number of divisions that are considered to be combat ready at a particular phase of mobilization, and the second line of figures indicate personnel strengths (excluding security forces).

	<u>M-Day</u>	<u>M+30</u>	<u>M+90</u>	<u>M+180</u>
East	6 (6)	11 (6)	12	16
Germany	85, 000	203, 000	225, 000	260, 000
Bulgaria	10 (5)	19 (10)	26	30
	140, 000	450, 000	600, 000	700, 000
Czech-	14 (9)	25 (14)	30	40
oslovakia	200, 000	550, 000	750, 000	1, 000, 000
Hungary	6 (0)	7 (6)	8	10
	100, 000	200, 000	250, 000	250, 000
Poland	15 (8)	28 (15)	37	50
	200, 000	650, 000	900, 000	1, 250, 000
Rumania	12 (5)	22 (12)	30	40
	220, 000	500, 000	700, 000	1, 000, 000
Albania	3 ⁸	5	6	7
	30, 000	80, 000	100, 000	120, 000

⁸ Represents three division equivalents.

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(11) (U) (S) Logistics (See Annex 19).

(a) Considering stocks presently available, the USSR's production capability, and the military supply system, it is estimated that the Soviets could adequately sustain their forces during a major conflict in central Europe. The USSR is the primary source of military equipment, ammunition, POL, and maintenance supplies in the Soviet Bloc. Although the production capabilities of the Satellite countries are continuously being improved, they would still depend on the Soviet Union for sustained wartime logistical support.

(b) The resupply capabilities of the Soviet Bloc transportation systems are adequate for providing logistical support to sustain the forces necessary to initiate hostilities against central Europe. However, the extent to which the Soviets will be able to maintain logistical support, considering Allied interdiction, is unknown.

(12) (U) (S) Special Warfare (See Annex 20).

(a) Unconventional Warfare.

1 USSR.

a Unconventional warfare is recognized by the Soviet leaders as a legitimate, permanent, and important mode of combat. According to Soviet doctrine, partisan activities are conducted by two basic types of organizations. The first of these is a small detachment composed of leaders and technical specialists in fields such as communications and demolitions. The second type of organization is the completely equipped and organized regular unit assigned missions in the enemy's rear.

b Soviet capability to control, conduct, or support special operations in the USAREUR area rests primarily with three major elements. These are the intelligence services, the Armed Forces, and the Communist elements in the USAREUR area of interest.

2 Satellites.

All of the Satellites have a capability to conduct special operations employing either military or paramilitary units alone or in conjunction with foreign partisan elements.

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It is probable that Satellite preparations for unconventional warfare do not necessarily involve or require extensive use of highly specialized forces or equipment. Current concepts are believed to call for the use of regular forces and equipment for special operations to as great an extent as practicable.

(b) Psychological.

1 USSR.

The overall guidance of foreign and domestic propaganda campaigns is a function of the Central Committee Secretariat. Internally, propaganda is intended to develop popular support of the government, the Party and the Communist system. Abroad, Communist propaganda is intended to further the economic, political, and military goals of the Soviet Union by furthering the idea that the Communist ideology and economic system are superior to the Western alternatives, by setting Western peoples against their governments through creation of disaffection, and by arousing mistrust among the Western governments, particularly those that are members of NATO.

2 Satellites.

The governments and Communist Parties of the Satellite nations have propaganda functions similar to those of the Soviet regime. Themes and techniques are basically the same as those employed by the Soviet Union, although the volume of activity is generally less. Among the Satellites, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland are the most active in the field of foreign propaganda.

(c) Counterinsurgency.

Possible areas of potential insurgency within the Soviet Bloc against which the Soviets and Satellites would have to utilize counterinsurgency techniques are discussed below.

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1 USSR.

The traditionally compliant attitude of the population in Greater Russia has been disturbed to some extent by anxiety over the possibility of war and concern over the effects of international tensions on the lagging rate of improvement in living standards. The de-Stalinization program has led to an openly expressed skepticism, occasional student riots, and some adverse comments from intellectual circles. Centers of active or passive resistance are most likely to occur in the outlying republics, particularly in the Ukraine, the Caucasus, and in Central Asia, where the nationality problem could be a factor in the disintegration of the Communist State. However, it is extremely doubtful that the discontent of the small nationalities and religious groups will be anything more than a minor irritation to the central government in 1965.

2 Satellites.

In all of the Satellite nations there continues to be some anti-regime groups. They come from all segments of the population, particularly the youth, the farm laborers, the factory workers, the intelligentsia, and members of religious groups. Presumably these groups, given any hope, would revert to resistance activities. Although a large portion of the population of each of the Satellite nations is largely anti-Russian and anti-Communist, they are presently submissive and inert because of the strict control exercised by the police and security forces.

(13) ~~(S)~~ Espionage, Subversion, and Sabotage

(See Annex 21).

(a) The Communist Bloc currently has a massive capability to conduct espionage and subversion (activities that are particularly appropriate to cold war conditions) and is capable of intensifying these activities, as well as initiating sabotage during periods of crisis or hostilities. At present, espionage is the primary threat to USAREUR. Subversive efforts directly affecting USAREUR have not been of major significance, and there has been no evidence of hostile-directed sabotage.⁹

⁹ The term "sabotage" is used in this estimate to mean efforts directed by an inimical element that are designed to impair military capabilities. It is not meant to include such activities as strikes under Communist sponsorship that are not specifically directed against USAREUR but could have an effect on USAREUR operations.

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(b) Hostile intelligence services active against USAREUR vary widely in level of activity and in overall capability. In addition to clandestine agent operations, the hostile intelligence services conduct "legal" collection operations from the various Embassies, consulates, military missions, trade agencies, and other overt bases in Western Europe. Some increase in such operations may occur in 1965, particularly if political tension increases.

(c) Utilizing a combination of collection assets, hostile intelligence services will maintain thorough coverage of USAREUR units, installations, and activities during 1964.

(d) Subversive elements in the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin have only a limited capability for independent activities that could seriously affect USAREUR. Activities of direct interest to USAREUR during 1965 will probably include distribution of propaganda to United States forces and efforts to impair United States-Federal Republic of Germany relations at the local level. The West Berlin element of the Communist Party could also be employed in acts of violence if required in support of Soviet-East German political moves.

(e) Sabotage will probably not be directed against USAREUR during 1965. Activities will continue to be directed toward recruitment and training of personnel in the Soviet Bloc, preparation of plans for wartime operations, and collection of information on sabotage targets.

(14) ^(U) ~~(S)~~ Significant Strengths and Weaknesses
(See Annex 22).

(a) USSR.

1 The significant power of the Soviet Armed Forces is in the overall size of the forces and the reserves of trained manpower. The individual soldier is physically rugged and capable of fighting in severe climatic conditions. The army is well equipped with modern weapons, vehicles, and materiel. A continuous equipment modernization program appreciably contributes to the improvement of Soviet firepower and mobility. Tactical air armies are under the operational control of the army, ensuring continued and close support to ground units.