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2 The significant weaknesses of the Soviet Army are the vulnerability of its lines of communication and the effect of the inadequate road network within the USSR for its deployment. Logistical support required for troops in forward areas and for the Satellite forces must be supplied for the most part, by railroads that operate in Satellites of questionable political reliability. In spite of progress in augmenting their air defense capability with surface-to-air missiles, the Soviets lack a complete low-level air defense capability against high-performance aircraft. Target acquisition and aerial reconnaissance capabilities at army and division level are less than adequate. Finally, the inadequacy, both in quality and quantity, of their armored personnel carriers still continues.

(b) Satellites.

1 The principal strengths of the Satellite forces are their large manpower pool and the standardization achieved by using basic Soviet Army doctrine and tactics in the Armed Forces.

2 The principal weakness of the Satellites is their almost complete dependence on the USSR for logistical support. Their industrial capacity, with the exception of Czechoslovakia and East Germany, to produce heavy armaments and highly technical equipment is limited. A shortage of trained technicians necessary for the maintenance of weapons and equipment continues to exist. Reliability of the Armed Forces to fight effectively in furtherance of Soviet goals is questionable, particularly if severe military reverses were inflicted on the Soviet forces. With the exception of East Germany, inventories of arms and equipment, while improving, include a variety of models and some obsolescent World War II items.

3 The Warsaw Pact countries have not solved the many complex problems that are inherent in a multinational force, such as overcoming language barriers and subordinating divergent national aims for a common goal.

3. (u)(S) SOVIET CAPABILITIES

a. General Considerations.

(1) Soviet national policy is designed to solidify the power of the Soviet government at home, to maximize this power within the Communist Bloc, and to extend this power throughout the Free World. Soviet goals have expanded beyond the earlier phase of

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gaining control of countries bordering the USSR and now include the aggressive interjection of Soviet influence into world-wide targets of opportunity, such as southeast Asia, the new nations in Africa, and areas of unrest in the Western Hemisphere. Other fundamental Soviet aims are the dissolution or weakening of NATO, CENTO, SEATO, and the European Economic Council; the promotion of divisive tendencies among the nations of the free world; and the perpetuation of the division of Germany, unless it can be reunited on Soviet terms. The Soviet government considers a powerful military establishment essential to these policies.

(2) The Soviet leaders retain basic confidence in their ideologically motivated belief that the Communist system is destined to prevail worldwide. The aggressive nature of their policies derived from this belief will continue to be tempered by their appreciation of the inherent dangers of general nuclear war and their unwillingness to run serious risks of such a conflict. Their policies, while often accompanied by a show of force and direct or implied threats of total destruction, are oriented toward political and economic, rather than military, conquest. One indication is their continued adherence to the "peaceful coexistence" theme. Soviet leaders have consistently disassociated themselves from statements by other Communist leaders concerning the inevitability of war and have endeavored to force modification of the "survival of the fittest" concept, even to the point of exerting economic and political pressures that have caused serious breaches in Communist Bloc solidarity. Therefore, it is estimated that the USSR, for the present, intends to achieve world domination by means other than general armed conflict.

(3) For some years, Sino-Soviet relations have been beset by fundamental differences on a range of doctrinal and policy questions, including the inevitability of war and the tactics by which to extend Communism. The fall of Khrushchev has removed the aspect of bitter personal polemics from the conflict. But the basic rift remains. If a definite split should occur, the Soviets and the Chinese will compete for the allegiance of other parties, and each will use pressure and persuasion to isolate its rival. If no definitive split occurs, the Sino-Soviet relationship will continue to be marked by tension and instability, increasing and declining as events may occasion.

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(4) The nature of the Sino-Soviet situation is such that Moscow is unlikely to respond to Peiping's challenge with an exercise of greater militancy in the West. Rather, the Soviets are probably intent upon consolidating and holding their position in Europe, particularly in East Germany. While the Soviets will seek opportunities to work toward a German and Berlin settlement favorable to their interests, it is considered unlikely that they will exert serious pressures on the West in so doing.

(5) It is unlikely that the Soviets are resolved to bring the Berlin issue to a head in some fixed period of time. The USSR, by means of the Berlin Wall, has overcome the refugee problem in a way that has avoided a direct infringement on essential Allied rights. Nevertheless, the building of the wall has reduced only one of the urgencies in the Berlin problem and the Soviet basic objectives remain unsecured. In addition, Soviet prestige, has been deeply committed to demonstrable progress in this question. The Soviets must fear that continued failure to advance will not only hearten their Western opponents, but will also lend greater weight among Communists to Chinese criticisms that the "peaceful coexistence" strategy is a failure and in reality disguises the USSR's abandonment of the militant struggle against the West.

(6) It is expected that the USSR will continue to push for a formal German peace treaty, including Allied participation. Meanwhile, East German demands for a separate peace treaty were silenced by the Soviet-GDR friendship and mutual assistance pact. This pact not only protects East German interests; it also explicitly guarantees those Western rights for which the West has indicated it will fight. These residual rights will then become the next intermediate objective for Communist erosion tactics. The Soviets will continue to foster the impression that they are amenable to reasonable proposals, since they have found this to be the impression most conducive to achievement of their aims.

b. Enumeration of Soviet Military Capabilities.

(1) Withdraw all or a portion of Soviet forces stationed in the European Satellites.

(2) Maintain forces in the European Satellites at current strength.

(3) Allow, or take, varying degrees of military action against West Berlin, to include elimination of the Western military position in Berlin.

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- (4) Attack central Europe without previous buildup.
- (5) Attack central Europe following either a limited or large-scale reinforcement in the forward areas.
- (6) Support capabilities (3), (4), or (5) with any or all of the following:
  - (a) Nuclear weapons delivered by air-, land-, and sea-based systems.
  - (b) Chemical warfare.
  - (c) Strategic and tactical missiles.
  - (d) Approximately 1100 Soviet ground support aircraft.
  - (e) Support a divisional-size airborne operation from bases in Western USSR against Central Europe.
  - (f) Concerted espionage, subversive, and sabotage activity.
  - (g) Electronic warfare.

4. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIES

While it is estimated that the Soviet leaders do not intend to start a general war in Europe in 1965, the possibility remains that for some reason not apparent at this time they might decide to begin hostilities during this period. Further, Soviet or East German miscalculation might lead to war. For that reason, attack capabilities, to include their relative probability of adoption, are analyzed in the following paragraphs. While Soviet capabilities against West Berlin are in part cold war capabilities, they are discussed in view of their potentially explosive nature.

a. Withdraw all or a Portion of Soviet Forces Stationed in the European Satellites.

(1) The present policy of stationing troops in Eastern Europe provides the USSR the best assurance of consolidating its

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power there and affords the best strategic positioning. The presence of Soviet forces in Poland (two divisions) and Hungary (four divisions) is important to the security of the USSR. The presence of the GSFG in East Germany (20 divisions) supports Soviet control of East Germany and assists in maintaining the East German regime. The location of these forces in East Germany affords the Soviets a valuable forward position from which operations can be mounted against central Europe. Further, the attraction exerted by the prosperity of the Federal Republic of Germany, the avowed aims of the leaders of the Federal Republic of Germany to bring about a termination of the partition of Germany, the growing military strength of the Federal Republic of Germany, and the problem imposed by West Berlin are sufficient reasons to maintain Soviet strength in East Germany, at least at its present level, if the USSR is to preserve a strong bargaining position on the future of Germany and assure the stability of the East German regime. Therefore, a major withdrawal of Soviet forces from eastern Europe is unlikely.

(2) Conversely, there are reasons why the Soviets might consider it to their advantage to withdraw a portion of their troops from eastern Europe following the achievement of an accord on Berlin and the signing of an East German peace treaty. A substantial withdrawal would bring Moscow considerable propaganda benefit and a distinct psychological advantage, should they choose to renew again their demand for withdrawal of foreign troops from the European area. In deciding appropriate strength levels, the Soviets probably will be governed by their estimate of minimum security requirements.

(3) The minimum Soviet force required to maintain the Soviet position in East Germany is estimated to be four divisions, or one army. This figure is based on strengths necessary to control internal uprisings and assumes the continued reliability of the EGA. Any reduction of this magnitude would probably be dependent upon settlement of the Berlin problem to the satisfaction of the Soviets and would be given widespread advance notice.

(4) Soviet forces in Poland, the Northern Group of Forces (NGF), render the double service of securing general Soviet interests in that country and of providing lines of communication security for the GSFG. In view of the unorthodox nature of Polish Communism and the restlessness of the Polish people, a requirement for at least two divisions exists. It is therefore estimated that the Soviets will maintain the current strengths of the NGF.

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(5) The minimum Soviet force required to maintain the Soviet position in Hungary is estimated to be two divisions. Forces stationed in the USSR near Hungary could move rapidly into the country, should a requirement for additional forces arise. It is therefore estimated that a reduction of up to two Soviet divisions in the Soviet Southern Group of Forces, Hungary (SGF) is possible.

(6) From the point of view of local security only, it would be possible for the Soviets to withdraw approximately 18 of their 26 divisions from the European Satellites, should they choose to do so. However, any decision on withdrawal, and the extent thereof, would hinge on the East-West political climate. No withdrawal of such magnitude is considered likely in the coming year.

b. Maintain Forces in the European Satellites at Current Strength.

(1) Basically, the very reasons that argue against any withdrawal of Soviet forces from the European Satellites indicate adoption of this capability.

(2) Soviet strength in the European Satellites is adequate to permit assurance that the Satellites could defend against any conventional attack by NATO forces.

(3) Composition and strength of the Soviet forces in the European Satellites provide a balance of power to counteract the growing strength of NATO forces. Standardization of weapons and equipment, deployment of rockets and missiles, and improved logistical support capabilities indicate that the Soviets are attempting to maintain the balance of power status quo by improving the quality, rather than the quantity, of their forces.

(4) The Soviets will retain the option of undertaking or sponsoring harassing actions against the Western Powers. The exposed position of West Berlin furnishes the Soviets a useful lever with which to attempt to coerce the Allies. If the Soviets decide to maintain pressure on the West by this means, current strength is adequate.

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(5) It is estimated that the adoption of this capability is most probable through 1965, or at least until the Berlin problem is settled to the satisfaction of the Soviets, or, in the absence of such a settlement, until after the Soviets sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany and determine the Western reaction thereto.

c. Allow, or Take, Varying Degrees of Military Action Against West Berlin, to Include Elimination of the Western Military Position in Berlin.

(1) Soviet capabilities against West Berlin and its communications with the Federal Republic of Germany are varied and range from minor harassment of traffic to outright military attack and seizure of West Berlin. The Soviets could allow the East Germans to exercise these capabilities with or without official Soviet support, or the Soviets could adopt them unilaterally. The Soviet capabilities with respect to Berlin in order of increasing gravity can be outlined as follows:

(a) The Soviets Can Maintain the Status Quo in Western Allied Access to Berlin After Having, or Without Having, Concluded a Separate Treaty with East Germany. The Soviets may adopt this capability, if Moscow should foresee broader settlements holding some advantage to the Bloc as a result of improved contacts with the Western Allies.

(b) The Soviets Can Transfer Responsibility for the Controls They Currently Exercise on Western Allied Traffic to and from Berlin to the East Germans Completely, or on a Piecemeal Basis, Before, or as a Result of, the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty. Such a transfer could in effect constitute a form of selective interference with Western Allied access to Berlin. If the transfer were complete, the confrontation of the Western Allies with East Germans could prove dangerous, particularly at the autobahn checkpoints. Hence, the Soviets are more likely to absent themselves from the checkpoints or the Berlin Air Safety Center and attempt to send in East German substitutes on a spot basis, assessing subsequent Western Allied reactions for signs of gradual acquiescence.

(c) The Soviets and East Germans Can Engage in Selective Interference with Western Allied or Other Access to West Berlin. The Communists have a wide variety of measures open

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to them for harassment of traffic and from Berlin. These would range from the extreme of denying access--as in shooting or forcing down aircraft--to the replacement of Soviet personnel by East Germans at existing checkpoints on the Berlin-Helmstedt Autobahn and the parallel rail line. In between lie almost limitless possibilities for bureaucratic interference of one type or another, some of which are familiar from previous experiences, and are applicable to either goods or persons. The Soviets would apparently like civil air access to West Berlin to be under East German control before the conclusion of any further treaty arrangements with East Germany. However, pending further progress or failure toward high-level negotiations on the Berlin problem, the Soviets are unlikely to interfere seriously with air or other access. They will act, however, to limit strictly Western Allied prerogatives in matters of access to what they consider to be existing and accepted limits. The East Germans are still heavily dependent on interzonal trade, and this condition probably will continue in 1965. This will probably restrain them from creating serious difficulties for civilian ground access and commerce to West Berlin.

(d) The Soviets and East Germans Have the Capability to Impose a Total Blockade of West Berlin. The act of halting land and waterway access would be relatively simple, although later Western reaction might be severe. The interruption of air access would involve more serious risks, since actual interference by other aircraft or antiaircraft fire would probably be required. Control of Allied flights to and from West Berlin is especially vulnerable, because of the concentration of Soviet and East German active and passive electronic countermeasures equipment in and along the air corridors. However, while air access can be hindered, it cannot be stopped by electronic means. The Soviets and East Germans are unlikely to exercise either of these capabilities, not only because of the risks involved, but also because a total blockade would serve little useful purpose.

(e) The Soviets and East Germans Have the Capability to Seize West Berlin by Force. They could do this in concert or separately. Their capability to infiltrate the city surreptitiously has been seriously reduced by their construction of the wall and by physical severance of S-bahn connections between the two sectors. It is unlikely that the Soviets or the East Germans would attempt to exercise this capability unless they were ready for a general war, or as an early operation after initiating a general war.



(2) Although a military takeover of West Berlin is within the capability of the Communists in 1965, it is estimated that they will confine their action against the Western position in Berlin to capabilities in (a), (b), and (c) above.

d. Attack Central Europe Without Previous Buildup.

(1) Forces Available.

(a) The GSFG, NGF, and SGF provide a force of 26 Soviet divisions located in the forward area. However, it is believed that the Soviets would not employ the four divisions of the SGF against central Europe. These divisions would probably be reserved for use in a campaign against northern Italy to protect their southern flank, or they would be used in security roles in the rear area.

(b) It is estimated that approximately 23 of the 63 Satellite divisions (9 Czech, 6 East German, and 8 Polish) are sufficiently manned, equipped, and trained for commitment to combat as part of an attack against central Europe if Soviet logistical support is provided.

(c) It is estimated that the Soviets could employ a total of 45 divisions against central Europe if they attacked without previous buildup. However, they would have to make provisions for rear area and line of communications security, which may require additional Soviet divisions.

(2) If the Soviets adopt this capability, they will be confronted with the necessity of neutralizing the widely dispersed Allied retaliatory forces and of engaging in large-scale air, ground, and naval warfare. To ensure the success of such a commitment would require the ability to deliver a decisive initial attack. Adoption of this course of action involves a high degree of risk should the initial assault fail to achieve desired results.

(3) The continuing introduction of nuclear weapons and the increasing strength and combat effectiveness of NATO forces in the European area are almost certainly indications to the USSR that any attack must be made with forces adequate not only to obtain and exploit initial success, but also to maintain the momentum of the attack.

(4) The Soviets probably consider the Satellite forces to be a sizable but questionable asset. Reliability is still a critical consideration in Soviet planning for the employment of these forces. If the Soviets attack central Europe without prior buildup, they would probably utilize Satellite divisions in order to obtain desired numerical superiority.

(5) If surprise were the overriding factor, or if the Soviets concluded that they must quickly initiated preemptive operations, they could launch an attack against central Europe without prior buildup. However, Soviet adoption of this capability would require a coordinated initial strike involving joint ground, air, and naval forces to assure that all significant targets were neutralized at approximately the same time. In accomplishing such a plan, it is estimated that the detection of the deployment of ground forces could provide as much as 12 hours' warning, depending upon the time and place of detection and the rapid reporting and analysis of the initial reports. Collection of other imminence factors could extend this warning period. Warning of this degree would almost certainly negate complete surprise and would reduce the possibility of a really decisive attack to the point of unacceptability. Therefore, it is estimated that the Soviets will not attack without a previous buildup.

e. Attack Central Europe Following Either a Limited or Large-Scale Reinforcement in the Forward Areas.

(1) Forces Available.

(a) The GSFSG and NGF provide a force of 22 Soviet divisions located in the forward area. The Czech, East German, and Polish armies can provide up to 23 divisions under Soviet control if Soviet logistical support is provided.

(b) There are 88 divisions (including 5 airborne divisions) in the 11 military districts of the USSR west of the Ural Mountain-Caspian Sea Line (See Annex 10, "Composition," and Annex 11, "Locations and Dispositions"). Thirty-three of these divisions are estimated to be combat ready. Of these 33 combat-ready divisions, 25 from the Western USSR (including 2 airborne divisions) are considered immediately available for reinforcement in central Europe. The 55 divisions considered not combat ready, but at reduced or low strength, could be brought to full strength in approximately 10 days after the start of mobilization; however, not all the

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divisions would have the same degree of combat readiness.

(2) In central Europe, considering current Soviet doctrine for combat organization and echelonment as well as the geography of the area, it is estimated that the Soviets would favor a limited reinforcement to bring the attacking elements to an initial force of about 63 divisions. To assemble a 63-division force, the Soviets would be required to reinforce with 18 divisions from the Western USSR. These forces could be introduced into the forward area in 7 to 9 days (See Annex 13, "Reinforcement"). Movement at this rate would saturate all lines of communication, would be impossible to conceal, and would be dependent upon optimum movement conditions and unit readiness. It cannot be discounted, however, that the Soviets might decide to build up at a slower rate over a longer period.

(3) If carried out covertly, the reinforcing at a slower rate would minimize the compromise of the Soviet intention to obtain surprise, since limited ground and air reinforcement could be accomplished rapidly in locations adjacent to the major avenues of approach into central Europe. Reinforcement in the forward areas (up to the Oder/Neisse-Kolin line) before attacking would be in consonance with Soviet tactical doctrine.

(4) The Soviet purpose in employing a limited initial reinforcement would be to provide a preponderance of forces having the capability to overrun central Europe within a short time and to attain maximum possible surprise. Based solely on the detection of the forward movement of the reinforcing units, it is estimated that from approximately 3 to 9 days' warning could be obtained. This warning period could be extended by other imminence factors.

(5) In southern Europe the SGF (four divisions) is immediately available for employment against northern Italy. Additional Soviet forces would probably be limited to forces that could be introduced into Hungary in a 4- to 6-day period prior to the initiation of hostilities. Considering a reinforcement rate into Hungary from the Western USSR of approximately one division slice, per day, the total reinforcement would amount to four to six divisions. Because of the terrain in the area of operations these would probably be motorized rifle divisions. Thus the total Soviet force in Hungary and available for employment against southern Europe would probably be 10 divisions. These forces if utilized, would be used at the expense of divisions available for employment in central Europe and rear area and line of communications security.

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(6) It is also possible that the Soviets might take advantage of a rapidly deteriorating international climate in order to conduct a large-scale reinforcement of the forward area. This would probably be done on the pretext of defending the Warsaw Pact area, of conducting Warsaw Pact exercises, or of strengthening the internal security of Satellite countries at the request of their governments. Such a large-scale reinforcement would sacrifice strategic surprise, but could still permit tactical surprise. The Soviets probably believe, however, that the advantage of the preponderance of force provided by this type of large-scale reinforcement might well be lost, since it might provoke a Western preemptive attack.

(7) In view of the foregoing, it is estimated that if the Soviets should decide to start a general war during 1965 they would favor a rapid, limited reinforcement to provide a balanced striking force of about 63 divisions for a campaign against central Europe. A visualization of a possible land campaign against central Europe is discussed in Annex 25.

f. Support Capabilities c, d, or e With Any or All of the Following:

(1) In the event of a Soviet decision to attack either with or without reinforcement, they have the capability to support their attack with nuclear weapons, rockets, missiles, chemical warfare, fighter and bomber aircraft, airborne forces, concerted espionage, subversive and sabotage activity, and electronic warfare.

(2) Soviet ground forces possess a wide variety of rockets, guided missiles, and other nuclear weapons delivery systems. The Soviets also have available chemical agents. Soviet training procedures and public statements on the use of such weapons indicate that when required, they intend to exploit these capabilities.

(3) Soviet air forces that could be made available to support ground forces operations would be in three categories:

(a) Attack against US and Allied nuclear strike forces in Western Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa, would probably involve up to 200-300 jet medium bombers now based primarily in the Western USSR.

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(b) Initial combat air support for a Soviet Bloc thrust into Western Europe would be provided by approximately 1,000 jet fighters and 125 jet bombers assigned to Soviet air force units stationed in the Satellites. Reinforcement for these units could be drawn from approximately 850 fighters and 170 light bombers normally deployed along the peripheral areas of western southwestern USSR.

(c) Although Satellite countries are estimated to have approximately 2,400 fighter and 75 bomber aircraft, it is believed most of the fighter aircraft would be employed in an air defense role. In certain situations, however, some of the Satellite aircraft might be employed by the Soviets offensively.

(4) Using the available military transport aircraft, the Soviets, in a single lift can transport an estimated 31,000 troops with their individual equipment or 3,200 tons of supplies and materiel, to East Germany from bases in the Western USSR. This military airlift capability would allow the Soviets to support only a single airborne division from Western USSR to drop zones in Central Europe. Estimates are not available on the airlift capabilities of the civil air fleet of the Soviet Union; however, it is believed that it would not be used to support airborne operations except in extreme emergencies.

(5) The Soviets could conduct concerted espionage, subversive, and sabotage activity in rear areas and against lines of communication. The massive potential of in-place espionage agents would be fully exploited for military and political reporting. Subversive activities would range from harassment or inciting resistance to local authority, to interference with military operations. Sabotage and deep reconnaissance missions would be carried out by special warfare forces and special elements of Soviet Bloc intelligence services, either independently or with the assistance of resident agents or hard-core Communists.

(6) The Soviets have the capability to make extensive use of electronic warfare ECM and ECCM, to include strategic and tactical jamming of military and civil communications and interference with air navigational systems. They have on hand active and passive electronic warfare equipment that can detect and interfere with NATO radar equipment, including that associated with guided missiles.

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