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g. Warning of Soviet Attack.

(1) The Soviets have the capability to take direct military action against Berlin. In view of the various options available to the Soviets under this course of action and the number, location, and disposition of the forces available to execute such an operation, it is estimated that the Soviets could take direct military action against Berlin without warning to the Allies; it is considered improbable, however, that the Soviets will adopt such a course of action. Other actions, including political actions, will almost certainly continue and could occur without warning.

(2) The Soviets have the capability to attack central Europe without previous buildup. If the Soviets adopt such a course of action, especially without a preceding increase in international tensions, it is estimated that up to 12 hours' warning could be available. This warning time is based on the detection of the movement of forces to forward positions; it presupposes the continued functioning of the Allied Military Liaison Missions in East Germany and is dependent upon the rapid reporting and analysis of available information. The Soviets could cover such movement under the guise of field exercises or maneuvers.

(3) The Soviets have the capability to attack central Europe after either a limited or a large-scale reinforcement in the forward areas. Although Soviet ground forces in the European Satellites could attack central Europe without warning, hostilities would probably be preceded by an increase in international tensions that could provide some degree of strategic warning. Such warning might be on the order of days or weeks, but does not preclude tactical surprise. It is probable that any Soviet attack would be prefaced by unusual security and other preparatory measures both in the USSR and Satellite countries. The collection and rapid reporting and analysis of the various military, political, and economic indicators of the imminence of hostilities are the basis for determining the overall warning time that would be available. The warning time provided would depend upon the particular context of events at the time, the international political situation, and the degree and rate of preparation that might have occurred in Soviet Bloc civil defense and in the land, sea, and air forces. Most of the indicators of the imminence of hostilities are highly unpredictable and must be analyzed in the context of other intangible factors.

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Indications of reinforcement offer a reasonable basis for determining warning time, since the reinforcement rate is based on the constants of travel distance and travel time. Warning time in this estimate is based on the probable detection of the forward movement of reinforcements from the USSR to East Germany and Czechoslovakia.

(4) Considering all the Soviet options for a limited buildup and the place where the possible detection of the reinforcement could occur, the warning time for a Soviet attack on central Europe could range from 3 to 9 days. Based on the estimate that the Soviets would conduct a limited buildup by reinforcing with an 18-division force to assembly areas in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, and that detection of the reinforcement would occur when the leading elements were at the USSR/Polish border, it is estimated that up to approximately 9 days' warning time could be available.

5. ~~(S)~~ CONCLUSIONS

a. The USSR, in spite of internal changes in leadership, will continue to adhere to its goal of eventual Communist world domination but the Soviets realize the destructive potential of unrestricted warfare. Therefore, the USSR, for the present and for the immediate future, will continue to strive for world domination by means other than general armed conflict.

b. It is estimated the USSR in 1965 will:

(1) Continue to strengthen its armed forces qualitatively while maintaining forces quantitatively.

(2) Increase emphasis on production of conventional armament, especially tanks and armored vehicles.

(3) Increase the capability of its forces to conduct special operations to include amphibious and unconventional warfare.

(4) Attempt to strengthen its internal economic base by renewed emphasis on attaining a better balance between heavy industry and agriculture while simultaneously giving light industry a boost in an effort to meet demands for consumer goods.

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- (5) Adhere basically to the policy of "peaceful coexistence."
- (6) Attempt to reverse or mitigate the effects of the trend toward political and economic independence among Satellites.
- (7) Continue, on a selective basis, the modernization and strengthening of the armed forces of the European Satellites.
- (8) Continue to press for a solution of the German and Berlin problem on the basic assumption of the existence of two German States and a separate political entity, West Berlin.
- (9) Attempt to disrupt Western unity, particularly with regard to the Multilateral Force (MLF) and the association of nations in the European Economic Community (Common Market).
- (10) Continue covert insurgency operations in the developing nations of Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America.
- (11) Continue direction of extensive and more sophisticated espionage activities against US and Allied Forces.
- (12) Continue to build the strength and potential of Communist Parties in Western Europe with emphasis on attempting to achieve and maintain their orientation towards Moscow. Subversive activities will not be of direct significance to USAREUR.
- (13) Continuing training for sabotage operations and improve intelligence holdings on US and Allied targets selected for sabotage attack in event of hostilities.

c. The Soviets will not permit any major incidents in East Germany or Berlin and will continue to restrain the East Germans in order to reduce the possibilities of general war. The USSR, however, may at any time permit, or sponsor, tensions either in the Berlin area, or over its access routes, in order to emphasize the Soviet position that settlement of the Berlin question on Soviet terms is essential to the maintenance of European security.

d. The USSR will not deliberately initiate hostilities in Europe during 1965.

e. Soviet or Satellite actions to harass or annoy the Western powers, accompanied by a miscalculation of Western

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capabilities and determination to resist, are the most likely circumstances that could lead to hostilities in Europe in 1965.

f. In the unlikely event the Soviet do initiate hostilities in Europe, it is estimated that they would most probably initiate a rapid, limited reinforcement in the European Satellite areas before the attack. Detection of this buildup could possibly provide from approximately 3 to 9 days' warning time.

g. If the USSR should start a war without any previous reinforcement of the forward areas, the period of warning gained through detection of forward movement of ground forces would vary from 0 to 12 hours. The timely collection and accurate interpretation of other imminence factors could extend this warning time.

h. In the event of a Soviet decision to initiate general war in central Europe, either with or without reinforcement, the Soviets would be prepared to support their attack with nuclear weapons.

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POLITICS .

1. (U) ~~(S)~~ USSR.

a. The date 14 October 1964 may well go down in history as an important juncture in the development of Communism in the Soviet Union and in the world at large. It was on this day that the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party accepted Khrushchev's resignation. The original Soviet explanation for Khrushchev's retirement, namely advanced age and deteriorating health, has, in the meantime, been overshadowed by a spate of official and unofficial reasons. It is believed most plausible that Khrushchev was ousted because of the following major reasons: one-man rule, i. e. failure to consult the ruling Party Presidium on important decisions; economic and political failures, e. g. agriculture and Cuba, deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations and the gradual decrease of political and economic influence over the East European satellites. Khrushchev's plan, announced in early October, to reduce capital goods and armaments production priorities in favor of consumer goods production may have been the last straw. It appears, judging from speeches and Soviet press releases made after Khrushchev's fall, that he was not ousted because of his policies but his methods. The basic foreign policy of "peaceful coexistence," which Khrushchev developed, has been taken over by the new leaders and the differences with the Chinese appear to be irreconcilable, although an attempt is being made to find some sort of modus vivendi between the two largest Communist states.

b. These dramatic changes in leadership have not changed the fact that the Soviet Union is a Communist dictatorship in which all political power rests with the ruling party. All government decisions are based on corresponding and preceding Party decisions. The highest ruling Party body is the Presidium. Following the October coup which ousted Khrushchev, Leonid I. Brezhnev emerged as First Secretary of the Party, while Alexei Kosygin took over the position of Premier or Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Although the new Soviet leaders have been asserting that true "collective leadership" will henceforth prevail in the Soviet Union, as against the "one-man rule" allegedly exercised by Khrushchev, it is generally considered doubtful that the present collective team will last very long. It must be assumed that a struggle for power is going on in the Kremlin at this time. Brezhnev has brought Alexei Shelepin into the Presidium, probably out of gratitude for his help in the operation of the Khrushchev

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ouster. This has made Shelepin an extremely powerful figure. His past and present positions tend to give him considerable influence in the important fields of security control (he is the former KGB (secret police) chief), Communist youth (he used to head the Communist youth organization), and cadres (he is Party Secretary for Party and State Control, the organ which controls personnel matters). Shelepin is also a Deputy Premier. He is only 46 and ambitious. Podgorny is the other Presidium member whose name had often been linked with the successorship of Khrushchev.

c. The reaction by the East European satellites of the Soviet Union to the fall of Khrushchev indicates that these countries have no intention of relinquishing the relative independence which they have gradually gained since the days of the Hungarian and Polish revolutions in 1956. It would, on the contrary, appear that they are exploiting the present period of uncertainty within the Soviet Union in order to consolidate and increase their independence. The one exception, of course, is Albania which continues to be a faithful satellite of Stalinist China. A new flare-up of the Sino-Soviet ideological conflict late in 1964 indicates that the new Soviet leaders have no intention of making any basic concessions to Communist China. The major change in Sino-Soviet relations seems to be the absence of personal polemics which, under Khrushchev, had reached the point of no return.

d. No change in basic Soviet foreign policy is foreseen under the present Brezhnev-Kosygin regime. The Soviets have demonstrated in Cuba in October 1962 that they wish to avoid nuclear conflict. The result of this decision has been a period of relatively relaxed East-West relations leading to the partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty which was concluded in Moscow on 5 August 1963 between the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Many explanations have been advanced why the Soviets were then willing to agree to a partial test ban which had been previously recommended by the US and rejected by them. Of all these explanations, the following appear to be the most valid: The Soviet leaders are genuinely afraid of nuclear war; they have come to realize that there would be no winner in an all-out nuclear conflict; they have decided that the United States is not a "paper tiger" and they have accepted the present equilibrium of power between the two large cold-war adversaries. Financial considerations are, in fact, another reason why the Soviets wish to end or at least slow down the arms race. Poor results of Khrushchev's agricultural experiments and many other economic problems are forcing them to divert considerable sums of money from the military and technological fields to agriculture, consumer goods industries and personal services. The

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new Soviet regime, at a meeting of the Supreme Soviet (Parliament) on 9 December 1964, announced a cut in the annual defense budget of about 555 million dollars. The reaction of Soviet military leadership to this cut cannot be assessed at this time. It must be assumed, however, that they have been reassured in advance of the announcement. Moreover, Soviet budget figures cannot be accepted at their face value, since many defense expenditures are camouflaged in other figures of the national budget. With the general trend toward modernization of military techniques, it is believed plausible that the Soviets can cut defense expenditures without reducing their striking power.

e. The main stumbling block standing between East and West remains the German problem and, especially, Berlin. It is difficult to visualize further progress in the direction of an East-West detente without some sort of mutual agreement concerning the status of Berlin. The Soviets probably feel that they can always use the Berlin question to their advantage. If the Western powers should agree to the Soviets' demand for the transformation of West Berlin into a separate political entity, the Soviets would undoubtedly view this as a long step toward their ultimate goal, namely, complete Communist control over the city. Since the Allies are honor-bound to defend the freedom of West Berlin, the Soviets will be able to use this unresolved obstacle to "European Security," as the new leaders call it, to exert periodic pressure on the Allies. The year 1964 was almost entirely free of harassment of Allied access along the vital rail, highway and air routes to West Berlin. This relative calm has undoubtedly been a result of Allied firmness and solidarity demonstrated in connection with the autobahn detentions of October and November 1963. Nevertheless, new Soviet-instigated incidents along the access routes must be expected. The Soviets have always managed to turn their retreat from these situations into a propaganda victory by assuming the role of peacemaker as against the "aggressive, imperialist" trouble-makers. Occasional incidents of this type may also be instigated by the Soviets in order to test Allied resolve and, at the same time, to obtain Allied contingency plans. The Soviets will always wish to know how far they can go, how large a piece of the "salami" they might be able to cut off without the risk of a military confrontation. Finally, and most important, the Soviets will want to demonstrate their contention that the "remnants of World War II," i.e. the Allied occupation of West Berlin and all conditions accompanying it, especially Allied free access to the city, must cease and that "sovereign" East Germany attain control over its territory on which Berlin is located. Even accepting that the Soviets are sincerely willing to seek relaxation of tension and East-West cooperation in other areas, there has been no evidence that Soviet views and intentions regarding Berlin and Germany have changed.

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2. ~~(U)~~ ~~(C)~~ Satellites.

a. ~~(U)~~ ~~(C)~~ East Germany.

(1) The population of East Germany is largely opposed to the Communist regime, as was evidenced by the steady stream of refugees who fled before the Berlin wall went up in 1961. Between 1949, when the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was founded, and the end of 1962, about 2,760,000 persons fled from East Germany to the West. Although the opportunities for flight are steadily decreasing, a total of 19,705 refugees fled from East Germany at the risk of their lives during the three years since the "wall" was erected on 13 August 1961. In 1953, when the regime showed some inclination toward limited relaxation of economic control, the population staged the now historic uprising of 17 June. It was suppressed by Soviet tanks after the East German security apparatus had proved incapable of coping with the situation. Since then, the security forces have been reorganized and strengthened, especially through the organization of the Kampfgruppen, ostensibly factory guards. It is nevertheless improbable that the East German security forces would be able, or willing, to suppress another uprising if it occurred. It is estimated that the GDR population would revolt immediately if the Soviets were to withdraw their troops completely. It is these troops which protect the dubious "sovereignty" of the East German state. The Western nations and, especially, West Germany have been strenuously objecting to granting any kind of recognition to the GDR whose very existence is entirely dependent on Soviet bayonets and tanks. The West German state, the Federal Republic, was formed on the basis of free democratic processes and therefore claims to speak for all of Germany. In November 1958, the Soviets attempted to settle the German problem by issuing an ultimatum to the Western Allies demanding their withdrawal from West Berlin within one-half year, and the transformation of West Berlin into a "demilitarized, neutral free city." The additional threat of a separate peace treaty between the USSR and the GDR has only rarely been heard since the Cuban crisis of October 1962. But the Soviet and East German demand for a peace treaty with "both German states" and, on its basis, the transformation of West Berlin into a "free" city has continued to be a standard portion of Communist policy declarations. In December 1964, during his stay in New York for the UN General Assembly, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko declared that the solution of the German problem is "acute," i.e. should be attacked now. In the meantime, the Soviets have given their East German satellite a friendship and mutual assistance pact which may be called a separate peace treaty without teeth. The most important features of

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the treaty, dated 12 June 1964, are (a) that the present borders of the GDR are guaranteed and (b) that West Berlin is termed a separate political entity. The new leaders of the Soviet Union have told Ulbricht that they intend to uphold this treaty concluded by their predecessor, Khrushchev. It may therefore be assumed that they will use the provisions of this pact as a basis for any future Germany-Berlin negotiations with the West. That means that the status quo, as interpreted by them, will serve them as a non-negotiable basis for discussions.

(2) Ulbricht, the East German dictator, has in the meantime not been idle. He has used every opportunity to offer negotiations between the "two German states" and to establish government-level relations, separately, of course, with West Berlin. His offer made to West Germany at the Sixth Party Congress of the SED (East German Communist Party), held between 15 and 20 January 63, still stands:

- (a) Mutual respect for the existing political and social systems;
- (b) Respect for each other's frontiers and a solemn renunciation of any attempts at their change;
- (c) Renunciation of nuclear weapons;
- (d) Mutual agreement not to increase military expenditures, but to work toward disarmament;
- (e) Reciprocal recognition of passports and citizenship as a prerequisite to the normalization of travel;
- (f) Establishment of normal sports and cultural relations, and elimination of "NATO discrimination against the citizens of the GDR through the travel board buro in West Berlin;"
- (g) Conclusion of a Bonn-Pankow trade agreement to replace the present interzonal trade agreement.

In the meantime, Ulbricht has modified his demands and has spoken of "small steps" toward rapprochement between the "two German states." But Ulbricht's aims, basically, remain the same: relations on government level with the West German state in order to deepen the division of Germany on one hand, and enhance the status of his regime on the other. Here a truly paradoxical situation exists. Since the Communists wish to perpetrate the division of Germany - unless it can be

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reunited under Communist rule - they do recognize the present Bonn government. The latter, however, wishes to attain reunification through free elections in both parts of Germany. It cannot recognize the East German regime which owes its very existence to the military protection of the Soviet occupation forces. Ulbricht's seven-point plan, listed above, would moreover eliminate certain conditions which resulted from World War II and date back to the time when all of Germany was still occupied territory. Since Allied rights to be in West Berlin and to have free access to the city are based on victory in World War II, it is obvious that both Soviet and East German plans for Berlin and Germany are aimed at eliminating these rights. There are no signs of any possible compromises through which the touchy Germany-Berlin question could find at least a temporary solution. It is certain, however, that, if negotiations on this subject should take place - a possibility which cannot be ruled out for 1965 - the degree of recognition to be granted to the GDR will be the key to success or failure.

(3) Ulbricht, the East German Party boss, has undoubtedly contributed considerably to the failure of all East-West discussions on Germany and Berlin which have so far taken place. While paying lip-service to the Soviet program of de-Stalinization, he has been ruling his captive population with typically Stalinist methods. The Soviet leaders have, so far, not let him fall, probably because they fear that relaxation of controls might, as in 1963, lead to revolution. Still, in consideration of the Satellite-wide trend toward liberalization, an eventual and gradual relaxation of dictatorial methods seems inevitable also in East Germany. Ulbricht himself is over 70 years old and may, whenever it pleases the Soviets, be dropped for the same reasons and by the same methods which were used to depose Khrushchev. His long-time figure-head Premier Otto Grotewohl died on 21 September 1964. He was replaced by Willi Stoph who had for several years been acting premier. There has been no indication that Stoph is wielding more actual power than his predecessor. The logical contender for Ulbricht's position remains therefore Erich Honecker, a Presidium member who has on several occasions acted for Ulbricht. Although Honecker is considered a faithful follower of Ulbricht, the very disappearance of the hated Ulbricht could possibly clear the atmosphere for some compromise settlement - if only a temporary one - of the German and Berlin question.

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b. ~~(U)~~ (S) Bulgaria.

(1) The Bulgarian Communist Party, estimated to be approximately 6.5 percent of the population, dominates the government apparatus and controls the country's life through a variety of means, including mass organizations, internal security forces, and propaganda.

(2) The Party's organization is based on the territorial subdivisions of the country, with its central body in the capital, Sofia. Ultimate political power is held by the Party's Politburo, which is composed of a small group of leading Communists who are dependent upon the Soviet Union for support.

(3) Party factionalism plagues the regime headed by Todor Zhivkov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers (or Premier) and Party Chief. Zhivkov and his group, the pragmatic and moderate element within the Party, are opposed by a "Stalinist" faction which is well established, particularly at the lower Party levels. Another principal factor jeopardizing Zhivkov's political position is his apparent inability to solve critical economic problems which give rise to widespread discontent among the population. Overall, Zhivkov's leadership has not been too effective and there are signs that the regime's stability is weakening. Nonetheless, while Zhivkov's downfall is repeatedly rumored, it presently appears that his leadership is sufficiently secure and is likely to remain so for the near future.

(4) Bulgaria is undoubtedly the most pro-Soviet of all European satellites. The regime has made it clear that Bulgaria has no intention of following more nationalistic foreign and economic policies, such as have been cropping up in other satellite areas, notably Rumania. Zhivkov can be expected to adhere to Soviet decisions. Nonetheless, national interests and domestic problems will periodically cause difficulties in implementing these decisions.

c. ~~(U)~~ (S) Czechoslovakia.

(1) Czechoslovakia, like the other European satellites, is dominated by a Communist Party. Until recent years the Czechoslovak Communist regime was relatively stable and comparatively successful in revamping the country into a model Communist state noted for its adherence to Soviet decisions. However, since the 22d Soviet Party Congress in 1961, the Czechoslovak Party strife over the leadership's failure to carry out substantive de-Stalinization measures, its own involvement in the purges of the Stalinist era, cultural dissidence

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and sagging economic performance swelled into a tide of intra-Party and popular discontent. This regime seemed unable to cope with its problems and its stability deteriorated rapidly. Consequently, the political future of Party First Secretary and President Antonin Novotny was jeopardized. This unstable situation was somewhat alleviated in 1963 by a number of personnel changes in the leadership group.

(2) In any case, the regime has so far failed to solve its major problems, particularly economic. It may be that in the long-run these problems may necessitate a drastic shake-up in the Czechoslovak leadership. Nevertheless, Novotny's removal does not appear imminent, as evidenced by his recent unanimous re-election as President. For the new term his political future seems secure.

(3) Several recent events tend to suggest that the Czechoslovak leadership is attempting to bolster its domestic position by a show of independence from Moscow's control and influence. The regime's policies appear to be gradually changing - becoming more liberal and nationalistic.

(4) Should this current trend continue, it will enlarge considerably the already present spirit of independence in the satellite area. Consequently, the ties of Eastern Europe with the Soviet Union would be further loosened. As a result, significant opportunities would open up for the Western World to weaken the power position of the Soviets, especially in Europe.

d. (U) (S) Hungary.

(1) The Hungarian regime of Janos Kadar, spurred by fears of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, has sought to orient its policies to provide an accommodation with the people. Soviet troops are still in the country and the Kadar regime is Communist in all respects. But, today, Hungary is a relatively liberal European satellite.

(2) Political life has been liberalized in an attempt to win popular support. Today, one does not have to be a member of the Communist Party to be a candidate for parliamentary elections. But the regime has made it clear that it has no intention of letting the democratization program get out of hand. Kadar publicly declared that the multi-party system of pre-Communist times is a thing of the past.

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(3) The former repressive atmosphere has been relaxed through a number of measures. An amnesty released several thousand persons from prison, of whom a considerable number were political prisoners. The intelligentsia is allowed substantial freedom, even to the extent of mocking some of Hungary's Communist sacred cows. Moreover, a historic agreement between the Vatican and Hungary was signed in September 1964. The accord, though far from granting religious freedom, nonetheless was a major step toward normalization of State-Church relations. Significantly, it is the first "formal" State-Church pact between the Vatican and an Eastern European Communist country.

(4) In foreign affairs Kadar has followed the Moscow line, while achieving some degree of independence for the regime in its relationship with the Soviet Union. Desiring an improvement in relations with the West, Hungary is resuming efforts to open the way for normal diplomatic relations with the United States which were impaired by the aftermath of the 1956 revolution and the exile of Cardinal Mindszenty in the U.S. Legation in Budapest.

e. ~~(S)~~ Poland.

(1) Polish Communism differs from that practiced elsewhere in the Soviet Bloc, particularly in the small amount of collectivization in agriculture. However, the regime of Wladyslaw Gomulka is undeniably Communist, and the country is one of the more stable satellites. Poland is a bulwark for the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe.

(2) Present-day Poland represents Communism in a relatively moderate form. However, in failing to press collectivization, Gomulka has not abandoned state ownership as a goal, but instead has adopted an approach so gradual as to be nearly imperceptible. Nevertheless, the pressures are unrelenting. The state and the Roman Catholic Church in Poland ostensibly have declared a truce. However, in this area also a campaign of attrition is being waged. Some observers believe that the tension between the church and the government is greater today than at any time since 1956, the year Gomulka returned to power. On the surface, freedom of expression is allowed. Under the surface, however, various pressures limit the apparent freedom of expression, and thus censorship does exist.

(3) In international affairs, both intra-Communist and those involving the rest of the world, Poland plays the role of one of the Soviet Union's closest collaborators and supporters. With its

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thorough de-Stalinization, the Polish experiment and its relative success became anathema to the Chinese Communists. In relations with the rest of the world the Soviet Union often seeks to depict Poland as a neutral. This is hardly the case, but the Poles do exercise a degree of independence in foreign affairs, although far less than in the case of Rumania.

(4) The government's economic failures and its campaign against the church and intellectuals have caused a tense atmosphere and popular mood that has been described as reminiscent of the kind of unrest that led to the Poznan riots of 1956. Labor unrest and public protests have been reported in widely scattered places. Ferment among the intellectuals is particularly strong. Nonetheless, popular resentment is not likely to result in the overthrow of the regime, since there is no realistic alternative.

(5) In the Polish Communist leadership several factions are engaging in a bitter fight for power. Several events indicate that Gomulka has been successful, temporarily at least, in maintaining a factional balance between hard-line Communists and those backing more liberal policies. For the time being, Gomulka apparently has achieved an appearance of Party unity. This unity is only surface deep, however, and factionalism will continue to plague the regime. Nonetheless, for the foreseeable future Gomulka's own position seems safe.

(6) It can be expected that in the foreseeable future Gomulka's present-day difficulties will continue. Party factionalism, Polish intellectuals, the Roman Catholic Church, gradual collectivization, and shortcomings of the domestic economy will continue to give rise to tensions within the Party and among the population.

f. ^(c) ~~(S)~~ Rumania.

(1) The Rumanian People's Republic is ruled by one of the strongest and most stable Communist regimes in Eastern Europe. Control of the party resides with a small and unified group led by Gheorghe Gheorghiv-Dej who is the long-time Party First Secretary. Dej has been successful in ridding the party of opposition elements, particularly those who had connections with Moscow. Today, the top leadership group includes only a few persons who were trained in Moscow. Dej's successful purges account for the absence of factionalism which has weakened other ruling Communist groups.

(2) In domestic affairs the regime adheres to a hard line which has led to popular dissatisfaction and some passive unorganized resistance. There is no widespread organized opposition, owing

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largely to the efforts of police and security forces. On the whole, the people are politically apathetic. Presently, it does not appear that there will be any significant relaxation of police-state controls.

(3) During the last several years, Rumania, once an obedient satellite, has openly and successfully defied Moscow's control. The largest source of Rumania's disaffection is mainly economic. The Dej regime outrightly refuses to participate in some East European economic plans which, it feels, would relegate the country to an agrarian role within the Bloc. In political affairs, as in contrast to national economic interests, the Rumanians are not as aggressive in resisting Soviet policy. Nonetheless, while generally going along with the Soviet Union on the political front, Rumania has, amongst other things, voted against the Soviets in the United Nations, plays an independent mediator role in the Sino-Soviet rift, is rapidly resuming contacts with the West, and instituted a series of measures designed to lessen Russian influence within the country. The sharpest blow to Soviet domination came in April of 1964, when the regime publicly announced it intended to adopt a course of independent action in all matters. In general, the Dej regime opposes any diminution of national decision making as contrary to the country's best interests. This has been made possible by Rumania's adroit use of the Sino-Soviet split and the relatively relaxed atmosphere between East and West.

(4) It seems that Rumania will continue to be independent in Bloc affairs as well as in relations with the West. A complete break with the USSR is not foreseen. The geopolitical realities of the nation's location inveigh against this. Yet there is not too much, short of military action, that the Soviet Union can do. The Soviets cannot afford another Albania and therefore can be expected to be conciliatory with the Rumanians.

(5) Rumanian defiance has weakened Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. It is the most critical crack in the Bloc since the Yugoslav defection in 1948. There can be little doubt that other East Bloc communist regimes are watching the situation carefully and will use it to their own advantage. For the West, the Rumanian revolt against Soviet control offers significant opportunities to loosen the Soviet grip on Eastern Europe.

3. (U) (S) Albania.

a. Albania's Communist regime is one of the most stable of the European Communist countries, and party leadership apparently is united in support of First Secretary Enver Hoxha. Since Albania

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and the Soviet Union broke diplomatic relations in December 1961, Albania divorced itself from the other countries of the Soviet Bloc. Although Albania's split with the Soviet Bloc has been termed an ideological rift, it probably can better be explained in the much simpler terms of pure power relationships. The Albanian Communist leadership, headed by Party leader Enver Hoxha and Prime Minister Mehmet Shehu, seemed to have sensed quite early the implications for them personally of the growing differences between Moscow and Peiping and the improvement in relations between Moscow and Belgrade. The regime's opposition to Moscow has gained it a measure of popular support.

b. Although the Albanians now have to echo Peiping's invective on the dangers of Western imperialism, they probably are aware that this really is one of their lesser worries. They do class the Yugoslavs as servants of Western imperialism, and the Yugoslavs, indeed, do pose a threat. However, the Albanians also have sought to improve economic relations with the West, since their Chinese Communist ally is far away and hardly a great maritime power. It is doubtful that the Chinese Communists could do anything to help the Albanians if a real need arose.

c. As matters now stand, no basic change in the Albanian situation is foreseen. It seems clear that the Hoxha regime will maintain itself in power and retain its anti-Moscow and anti-Western views. The Soviet Union can do little to alter Albania's defiance since it lacks a common frontier with tiny Albania. A serious economic deterioration could, of course, gravely weaken the regime's stability. However, such an event is not presently in sight. Nor does an anti-Communist coup seem likely even though the majority of the population appears to be hostile to most of the regime's aims. For the near future, the Hoxha regime seems secure.

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ANNEX 9
STRENGTH

1. ~~(U)~~(S) USSR.¹

| | <u>Ground Forces</u> | <u>Security Forces</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|--|---------------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------|
| USSR (east of the Ural Mountain- Caspian Sea line) | 220, 000 | 75, 000 | 295, 000 |
| Western USSR (west of the Ural Mountain-Caspian Sea line) | 772, 000 | 150, 000 | 922, 000 |
| Group of Soviet Forces, Germany | 280, 000 | | 280, 000 |
| Northern Group of Forces, Poland | 25, 000 | | 25, 000 |
| Southern Group of Forces, Hungary | 50, 000 | | 50, 000 |
| | <u>1, 347, 000</u> ² | <u>225, 000</u> | <u>1, 572, 000</u> |

1 Excluding Air Armies

2 Does not include ground forces personnel assigned to the Ministry of Defense, Air Defense Troops, and Strategic Rocket Troops.

2. ~~(U)~~(S) Satellites.

| | <u>Ground Forces</u> | <u>Security Forces</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|---------------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------|
| East Germany | 85, 000 ¹ | 63, 500 ² | 148, 500 |
| Bulgaria | 140, 000 ³ | | 140, 000 |
| Czechoslovakia | 200, 000 | 40, 000 ⁴ | 240, 000 |
| Hungary | 100, 000 | 35, 000 | 135, 000 |
| Poland | 200, 000 | 45, 000 | 245, 000 |
| Rumania | 195, 000 ⁵ | 30, 000 | 225, 000 |
| | <u>920, 000</u> | <u>213, 500</u> | <u>1, 133, 500</u> |
| 3. (U) (S) <u>Albania.</u> | 30, 000 ⁶ | 12, 500 ⁷ | 42, 500 |

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- 1 Includes East German Army Guard Regiment subordinate to the East Berlin City Commandant and air defense units other than air force flying units.
- 2 Includes Border Command, Berlin Border Brigades, Alert Police, and Security Guard Police Regiment. The Berlin Border Brigades are subordinate to the East Berlin City Commandant.
- 3 Includes 15,000 frontier troops subordinate to the Ministry of Defense.
- 4 Includes 30,000 Border Guard and 10,000 Interior Guard troops.
- 5 Includes 20,000 frontier troops subordinate to the Ministry of Armed Forces.
- 6 Includes ground force elements of Air Defense and Coastal Defense Commands.
- 7 Includes 7,500 frontier and 5,000 interior troops.

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ANNEX 10

COMPOSITION

1. ~~(U)~~(S) USSR Ground Forces¹ (See Figure 10-1)

Soviet ground forces are estimated to consist of 19 armies and 8 corps. The 138 line divisions are composed of 88 motorized rifle, 43 tank, and 7 airborne divisions.

2. ~~(U)~~(S) Satellite Ground Forces¹ (See Figure 10-2)

Total Satellite ground forces consist of 63 line divisions (excluding Albania). This total is composed of 47 motorized rifle, 15 tank, and 1 airborne division. The term motorized rifle division includes the mechanized divisions in Poland.

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¹ For strength of paramilitary forces, see Annex 9.

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COMPOSITION, USSR GROUND FORCES

| Area | Military District (MD) | Armies | Corps | LINE DIVISIONS | | | |
|--|---|--------|-------|------------------|----|-----|-------|
| | | | | MRD ¹ | 2 | ABN | TOTAL |
| West of Ural Mountain-Caspian Sea line | Northwestern USSR (Leningrad MD) | 1 | 0 | 6 | | 1 | 8 |
| | Western USSR (Baltic, Belorussian, Carpathian, and Moscow MD's) | 7 | 0 | 25 | 14 | 3 | 42 |
| | Southwestern USSR (Kiev and Odessa MD's) | 3 | 2 | 10 | 4 | 0 | 14 |
| | Southern USSR (North Caucasus and Transcaucasus MD's) | 2 | 2 | 14 | 3 | 1 | 18 |
| | West-central USSR (Ural and Volga MD's) | 0 | 0 | 5 | 1 | 0 | 6 |
| | SUBTOTAL | | 13 | 4 | 60 | 23 | 5 |
| East of Ural Mountain-Caspian Sea line | East-central USSR (Siberian MD) | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| | Southern USSR (Turkestan MD) | 0 | 3 | 6 | 2 | 1 | 9 |
| | Far Eastern USSR (Transbaykal and Far East MD's) | 1 | 1 | 7 | 4 | 1 | 12 |
| | SUBTOTAL | | 1 | 4 | 16 | 6 | 2 |
| Outside USSR | Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG) | 5 | 0 | 10 | 10 | 0 | 20 |
| | Southern Group of Forces (SGF) | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 4 |
| | Northern Group of Forces (NGF) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 |
| | SUBTOTAL | | 5 | 0 | 12 | 14 | 0 |
| GRAND TOTAL, Soviet Forces | | 19 | 8 | 88 | 43 | 7 | 138 |

1 Motorized rifle division

2 Unlocated

3 Two estimated army corps.,

Southern USSR, unlocated.

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Figure 10-1

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COMPOSITION, SATELLITE GROUND FORCES

| Country | Military District (MD) | Armies | LINE DIVISIONS | | | |
|---------------------------|--|--------|------------------|-----------|-----|--------------------|
| | | | MRD ¹ | TK | ABN | TOTAL |
| East Germany | MD 3 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 3 |
| | MD 5 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 3 |
| | SUBTOTAL | 0 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 6 |
| Bulgaria | 0 | 3 | 7 | 3 | 0 | 10 |
| Czechoslovakia | MD 1 | 2 | 3 | 5 | 0 | 8 |
| | MD 2 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 6 |
| | SUBTOTAL | 2 | 9 | 5 | 0 | 14 |
| Hungary | 0 | 0 | 5 | 1 | 0 | 6 |
| Poland | Warsaw MD | 0 | 4 mech | 0 | 1 | 5 |
| | Pomeranian MD | 0 | 3 mech | 2 armd | 0 | 5 |
| | Silesian MD | 0 | 2 mech | 3 armd | 0 | 5 |
| | SUBTOTAL | 0 | 9 mech | 5 armd | 1 | 15 |
| Rumania | Military Region 2 | 0 | 6 | 1 | 0 | 7 |
| | Military Region 3 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| | SUBTOTAL | 0 | 11 | 1 | 0 | 12 |
| Albania | GHQ Troops: 6 inf bdes, 2 mech regts, 1 tk regt Coastal Defense Command: 1 inf bde, 2 inf regts | | | | | 3 divs equiv |
| GRAND TOTAL, ² | Satellite Forces | 5 | 45 | 17 | 1 | 63 |

1 Motorized rifle division.

2 Total does not include Albania.

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Figure 10-2

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ANNEX 11

LOCATIONS AND DISPOSITIONS¹

1. ~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ USSR

- a. ~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ USSR West of Ural Mountains Figure 11-1
- b. ~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG) Figure 11-2
- c. ~~(U)~~ ~~(C)~~ Northern Group of Forces, Poland (NGF) Figure 11-3
- d. ~~(U)~~ ~~(C)~~ Southern Group of Forces, Hungary (SGF) Figure 11-4

2. ~~(U)~~ ~~(C)~~ Satellites

a. ~~(U)~~ ~~(C)~~ East Germany

- (1) Army Figure 11-5
- (2) Border Command Figure 11-6
- (3) Security Forces Figure 11-7

b. ~~(U)~~ ~~(C)~~ Bulgaria

- (1) Army Figure 11-8
- (2) Frontier Troops Figure 11-9

c. ~~(U)~~ ~~(C)~~ Czechoslovakia

- (1) Army Figure 11-10
- (2) Security Forces Figure 11-11

d. ~~(U)~~ ~~(C)~~ Hungary

- (1) Army Figure 11-12
- (2) Security Forces Figure 11-13

¹ For more detail concerning locations, see current USAREUR order of battle handbooks.

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e. ~~(S)~~(C) Poland

(1) Army

Figure 11-14

(2) Security Forces

Figure 11-15

f. ~~(S)~~(C) Rumania

(1) Army

Figure 11-16

(2) Border and Security Troops

Figure 11-17

3. ~~(S)~~(C) Albania

a. Army

Figure 11-18

b. Frontier Troops (Border Guard)

Figure 11-19

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USSR

DISPOSITION OF SOVIET FORCES IN USSR WEST OF URAL MOUNTAINS.

TOTAL DIVS WEST OF THE URAL MOUNTAINS.

60 MRD
23 TANK DIVS
5 ABN DIVS

88 TOTAL




Figure 11-1

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