POLAND
DISPOSITION OF MAJOR UNITS, NORTHERN GROUP OF FORCES

(U) (C) Figure 11-3



HUNGARY
DISPOSITION OF MAJOR UNITS, SOUTHERN GROUP OF FORCES

(U) (C) Figure 11-4

EAST GERMANY

DISPOSITION OF MAJOR UNITS,
EAST GERMAN ARMY



(U) (C) Figure 11-5



(U) (C) Figure 11-6

EAST GERMANY

DISPOSITION OF EAST GERMAN SECURITY FORCES (LESS BORDER COMMAND)



NOTE 1. BERLIN BORDER BRIGADE SUBORDINATED TO EAST GERMAN BERLIN CITY COMMANDANT. STRENGTH 13,500
2. ALERT POLICE SUBORDINATED TO DISTRICT HQ OF PEOPLE'S POLICE (BDVP). TWO BEPO UNITS FOR DISTRICTS MAGDEBURG, LEIPZIG, AND HALLE. THREE BEPO UNITS LOCATED IN BASDORF REPORTEDLY ARE RESERVES FOR MINISTRY OF INTERIOR. BEPO UNITS STILL BATTALION SIZE. GOAL FOR 1965 IS TO HAVE 700 MEN IN EACH UNIT.
3. SECURITY GUARD POLICE REGIMENT SUBORDINATE TO MINISTRY FOR STATE SECURITY. STRENGTH APPROXIMATELY 4,500-5,000

LEGEND:
BEPO-ALERT POLICE
BBB-BERLIN BORDER BRIGADE
BSP-SECURITY GUARD POLICE

(U) Figure 11-7

BULGARIA
DISPOSITION OF MAJOR UNITS, BULGARIAN ARMY

(U) ~~(C)~~ Figure II-8



* SECURITY TROOPS UNLOCATED, POSSIBLY DISBANDED OR REDUCED IN STRENGTH.

(U) (C) Figure 11-9

(U) (C) Figure 11-10

Figure 11-11

(U) Figure 11-12

Figure 11-13



(C) Figure 11-14



(U) Figure 11-15

RUMANIA
DISPOSITION OF MAJOR UNITS, RUMANIAN ARMY



(a) (c) Figure 11-16

SECRET

(U) Figure 11-17

ALBANIA

DISPOSITION OF ALBANIAN FRONTIER TROOPS (BORDER GUARD)



LEGEND

FTD – FRONTIER TROOP DIRECTORATE

(U) Figure 11-18

ALBANIA
DISPOSITION OF ALBANIAN ARMY



(U) (C) Figure 11-19

ANNEX 12

AIR*

1. (U)(S) Soviet.

a. General.

(1) (U)(S) Soviet military aviation comprises one of the world's largest air forces and is considered capable of providing support to any major military action the Soviets might launch in Western Europe. Currently the capability of this force is being slightly decreased quantitatively, but at the same time it is being significantly increased qualitatively. At this point in time, the development of a considerable Soviet missile capability does not indicate a decline in Soviet reliance on manned air weapons systems. The missile force complements and enhances the striking power of the air forces, and in view of the present state of the missile art, it is probable that the Soviets will rely on this mixed force in the foreseeable future.

b. Strengths, Compositions, and Dispositions.

(1) (U) See Figure 12-1 "Tabular Summary of Soviet Bloc Aircraft and Personnel in the Western USSR and Eastern Europe."

(2) (U)(S) The major components of the USSR's military aviation establishment are as follows:

Long Range Aviation

Tactical Aviation

Naval Aviation

Military Transport Aviation

Fighter Aviation of Air Defense

(3) (U)(S) In western USSR and the Forward Area, Soviet and Satellite air forces have more than sufficient first class air facilities from which to launch strike forces. Additionally, numerous

* This Annex with facts and figures provided by USAFE.

unoccupied airfields are available, affording obvious advantages in operational flexibility for either nuclear or conventional warfare campaigns.

(4) (U)(S) Long Range.

Medium bomber strength in the 1st and 2nd Long Range Air Armies in the western USSR consists of approximately 670 BADGER and 30 BLINDER bombers. From this force it is estimated that between 200 and 300 bombers would be made available for strikes primarily against NATO nuclear delivery weapons systems and key control centers. Of this number it is believed a small specially trained segment will make low level strikes (combined with surface-to-surface missiles), against extremely vital targets to increase destruction probabilities. However, the primary BADGER strike force, airborne prior to the first missile detonations, will probably penetrate tactical warning systems at medium and high altitudes after the missiles have detonated and the low altitude BADGERs have penetrated. Staging of BADGERs from Forward Area bases would permit a large number of minimum altitude strikes, a desirable approach in view of our increasing high altitude capabilities against intruding aircraft. The location of the 2nd Long Range Air Army strongly suggests a primary mission against NATO targets on the Afro-European land mass; i.e., North Africa, Spain, France, and the United Kingdom, while the 1st Long Range Air Army will probably be reserved for strikes against longer range targets.

(5) (U)(S) Naval.

Aside from those BADGERs found in the Long Range Air Armies, there are approximately 225 assigned to naval air units of the Baltic, Northern, and Black Sea Fleet Air Forces. These aircraft are mostly associated with an air-to-surface missile (ASM) capability. Their mission is expected to be directed primarily against surface craft, submarines, and port facilities.

(6) (U)(S) Tactical.

a. (U)(S) That part of the offensive air strength which immediately confronts Western Europe is found in the Soviet tactical air forces. These forces include the 24th Tactical Air Army (TAA) in East Germany (See Figure 12-2), the 37th TAA in Poland, and the Soviet Air Force (SAF) Hungary. These forces have approximately 1,000 jet fighters and 175 jet light bombers deployed. Additionally,

some 850 fighters and 170 light bombers are deployed along the peripheral areas of western and southwestern USSR.*

(b) (U)(S) Current modernization of these TAAs with new generation FISHBED, FITTER, and BREWER aircraft greatly enhances the Soviet air capability and demonstrates a continued reliance upon manned aircraft for air superiority and close support or interdiction operations. These new generation aircraft are augmented by diminishing, yet substantial, numbers of the older FRESCO, FARMER, and BEAGLE aircraft. Operationally, the FRESCO and FITTER are considered the primary ground attack aircraft; however, air defense fighter units (including some equipped with the all-weather interceptor FISHBED D) maintain a secondary proficiency in ground attack techniques. The supersonic BREWER light bomber is currently replacing BEAGLEs assigned to the three Soviet bomber units in East Germany. Equipping of these units is believed to be about two-thirds complete at present, and it is expected that full conversion to BREWER will probably occur during the period of this estimate. Introduction of BREWER into TAAs located in western and southwestern USSR is also underway, and it is anticipated that modernization of light bomber units in USSR will continue during 1965.

(c) (U) See Figure 12-3 "Aircraft Characteristics and Armaments Close Support Performance."

(7) (U)(S) Airlift Capability.

(a) (U)(S) In the event of hostilities, Soviet airborne elements of up to division size could be airlifted to support the tactical operational zone, although it is doubtful whether airborne units would be employed in larger-than-regimental size. Missions executed by paratroops and/or air-transported elements might include seizure of critical terrain features dominating a route of advance, creation of a diversion, support of river crossings, and attacks against enemy missile sites and/or headquarters. In addition to tactical operations and special warfare missions, Soviet military theorists occasionally mention large scale airborne operations in the enemy's strategic zone (see (c) below). In a conventional war situation, airborne operations would probably occur in conjunction with fast-moving armored thrusts supported by tactical airpower and small missiles with conventional warheads. In a nuclear war, they would probably follow the initial nuclear exchange depending on the nature and outcome of that exchange.

*Consists of the Baltic, Belorussian, Carpathian, Leningrad, and Odessa Military Districts.

(b) (U)(S) The USSR is estimated to have seven air-borne divisions. For the most part, airborne units are armed with standard infantry weapons and supported by mortars and light artillery. Some specialized weapons, such as the 57mm SP gun, which can be transported by helicopter or by some of the new transport aircraft, have been produced for airborne troops. There is evidence to indicate that the fire-power of the airborne division may have been increased recently by the addition of a new 100mm self-propelled gun. It is still doubtful, however, whether this weapon can, in fact, be lifted by any of the currently known Soviet transport aircraft, and it has not yet been accepted as a normal part of airborne division equipment.

(c) (U)(S) A total of 336 CUBs are required to lift a Soviet light airborne rifle division, including personnel and equipment, a distance of 100 NM; 556 are required to move the division 500 miles. (If all personnel and equipment are to be dropped rather than landed, 25 percent more transports are required.) Total current Soviet airlift capability, therefore, is somewhat short of the force needed to carry out in a single lift a deep penetration at division strength. Capabilities are adequate to support airborne or paradrop operations up to regimental size and to support the operation until completion of link up with forces on the ground. Airlift capabilities of the TAAs probably are designed to support battalion size operations.

(d) (U)(S) A total of 452 aircraft are assigned to Military Transport Aviation (VTA) for movement of airborne forces. Total airlift capability of these aircraft to airlift troops, equipment, and allowances for bulk cargo is presented in the following table. These capabilities are computed against an aircraft in-commission rate of 90 percent plus a 5 percent ground or pre-target abort rate.

SOVIET AIRLIFT CAPABILITY

Type A/C	AOB Holdings	Soviet Light Airborne Rifle Units 500 N. M. Div	Rgt	Bn	100 N. M. Div	Rgt	Bn
CAB	12	.00	.01	.12	.00	.03	.21
COACH	32	.02	.04	.32	.01	.08	.56
CAMP	62	.08	.46	3.68	.11	.62	4.37
CUB	346	.51	2.87	22.76	.89	4.70	32.87
TOTAL	452	.61	3.38	26.88	1.01	5.43	38.01

(e) (U)(S) The Soviets are estimated to have approximately 700 helicopters in the western USSR and the European Satellites. The subordination of helicopter organization and mission is uncertain. However, they would undoubtedly be used in the transportation and supply of ground forces, as well as in command reconnaissance, target acquisition, and fire control roles, in accordance with their range and load limitations. Total number by type and cargo carrying capacities are estimated to be as follows:

Type	Number	Number of Troops	Amount of Cargo (lbs)
HARE (MI-1)	226	3	350 - 600
HOUND (MI-4)	416	11 - 15	2,640 - 3,500
HOOK (MI-6)	53	80 - 120	20,000-28,600

c. (U)(S) Aircraft Armament.

For a selective sampling of armament capability, see Figure 12-3, "Aircraft Characteristics and Armaments Close Support Performance."

(1) (U)(S) Fighters.

(a) (U)(S) Soviet weapons for tactical operations include guns, air-to-ground rockets, napalm, and bombs.

(b) (U)(S) Standard armament on Soviet fighters consists of 23mm, 30mm or 37mm guns. These weapons, because of their relatively low density of fire and the small amounts of ammunition, have limited air-to-air capability. They continue to have an excellent capability for close support of ground forces, on fighter sweeps, and on strafing missions. Accuracy on these type missions, conducted visually, is expected to be good.

(c) (U)(S) The Soviets have unguided rockets suitable for air-to-ground military use. Since the guns in Soviet fighters are installed as fixed arrangement, rocket munition has been utilized to supplement or augment the armament capability. This is achieved by externally mounted launchers for the smaller rockets and racks for the larger rockets. Unguided rocket armament launched from underwing racks would accommodate from two to six 210mm fixed fire rockets for air-to-ground use (depending on type of fighter). This rocket has

a 70 pound HE warhead and is primarily designed for use in close support/ground attack operations. Rocket launchers include the [redacted]-shot and 16-shot 57mm rocket pods.

(d) (U)(S) Available intelligence indicates Soviet fighters may be equipped with a toss bombing or low altitude bombing system. In general the range of expected Circular Error Probable (CEPs) would be from 800 to 2,000 feet. Since the fighters can carry up to 2,400 pounds of external stores (including fuel), there are a large number of high explosive bombs, which could be carried. Older fighters appear to have a limited nuclear capability. Weapons believed compatible with Soviet fighters include the 450 pound, 3-10 kiloton (FRESCO, FARMER, FISHBED, and FITTER); the 1,000 pound, 4-25 kiloton (FISHBED and FITTER); and the 2,000 pound, 1,000 kiloton (FISHBED and FITTER). Of all these aircraft, FITTER appears to have the greatest potential as a nuclear carrier. Delivery systems employed would be low-altitude bombing system (LABS). Practice toss-bomb maneuvers have been observed in East Germany.

(e) (U)(S) The Soviet nuclear tests have indicated that a 3 to 10 kiloton tactical weapon is included in their nuclear stockpile. This weapon is compatible for delivery by all Soviet tactical fighter type aircraft, hence there is a possibility that it has been selected for standard ground support missions and destruction of point targets by fighters.

(2) (U)(S) Bombers.

(a) (S) The BREWER light bomber has a primary role as a tactical strike aircraft and is capable of delivering weapons from both high and low altitudes. Offensive armament is carried in an internal bomb bay which is large enough to accommodate a maximum payload of 6,600 pounds. The normal payload of 3,300 pounds is, however, more favorable in terms of achieving optimum mission performance. Both general purpose bombs and several types of nuclear weapons are within the weight and bomb bay limitations of BREWER. CEP is estimated to be 1,000 feet under optical bombing conditions; 2,000 feet under conditions requiring radar bombing. Defensive armament consists of one 30mm forward firing gun located on the starboard side of the nose. Defense electronics consists of ECM jammers, chaff, and IR flares.

(b) (U)(S) BEAGLE was designed to fulfill the high-altitude, light bomber role; however, some provisions for ground

support have also been incorporated. These bombers have been observed in training in ground strafing and low-level bombing against area and specific targets. As a light bomber, it is a relatively effective weapons system. The BEAGLE has a maximum capacity of eight 500 pound general-purpose bombs, with a designed bomb load of up to 6,600 pounds. The Soviets also have several nuclear weapons which are within the weight and bomb bay limitations of the BEAGLE. In the high altitude role, it is estimated that a CEP of 1,000 feet could be attained by visual delivery means. Defensive armament consists of a manned tail turret with two 23mm guns and two 23mm fixed forward firing guns installed in the nose of the fuselage. In addition, ECM capabilities for chaff dispensing, noise jamming of VHF through X-bands, and warning and search receivers may be employed on the BEAGLE.

(c) (U) (S) The number of BADGERs produced, the number still in service, and the recent modifications for air-to-surface missiles indicate that this medium bomber is a reliable weapons system that will remain in use by the Soviets during the time period of this estimate. The bomb bay permits a maximum bomb load of 22,000 pounds of conventional bombs, and up to 20,000 pounds in nuclear stores. The CEP for the BADGER's optical bomb sight is estimated to be 1,000 feet while the radar CEP is estimated to be no more than 2,500 feet under operational conditions. Defensive armament consists of guns contained in the upper, lower and tail turrets. ECM will probably provide an effective defense with chaff dispensers, warning and search receivers, noise jamming of HF through X-bands, and manually tuned spot/barrage microwave jammers. In addition, infrared countermeasure flares may be used to counter our AA infrared interceptor missiles.

(d) (U) (S) The new generation BLINDER has been developed to augment the Soviet medium bomber force, and may eventually replace the BADGER. It is estimated that the BLINDER will, at least initially in its service life, be limited to the use of free-fall weapons in attacks against even well-defended targets. However, a second version of this supersonic dash bomber has been observed with an air-to-surface missile semi-submerged in the fuselage. A bomb load of up to 20,000 pounds is estimated for the BLINDER. General purpose and other conventional bombs could be carried, as well as nuclear weapons currently in the Soviet stockpile. Defensive gun armament consists of one 30mm high velocity revolver gun installed in a remotely controlled ball turret at the base of the aft fuselage section. Defensive ECM equipment will be the same as for the BADGER except that chaff rockets may replace the chaff dispensers and equipment for deception and confusion techniques may be added.

2. (U)(S) Satellites.

a. General.

(U)(S) The Satellite air forces have jet fighters (FAGOTs, FRESCOs, FARMERs, and FISHBED) and jet light bombers (BEAGLEs) assigned to operational units. The primary mission of these forces is air defense and air superiority in the national limits of their respective countries.

b. Strengths, Compositions, and Dispositions.

(1) (U)(S) The overall inventory of fighter aircraft in the Satellite air forces is about 2,300. This inventory consists of clear air mass and all-weather aircraft with the latter estimated at a little more than 18% of the total. Although the major portion of this force will continue to be FAGOTs and FRESCOs during the period of the estimate, the present trend to improve the quality of the Satellite air forces is expected to continue, with an increasing number of the new fighters replacing a portion of some of the more obsolescent aircraft.

(2) (U)(S) We have no evidence of reserve pilots actually flying combat aircraft in the Satellites. As a matter of fact, the flying hours attributed to each assigned combat pilot are on the borderline for proficiency. Although there are many civil programs in the form of air leagues and paramilitary units, the short term mobilization potential rests in the area of low-grade maintenance and administrative support. The mobilization of these types would have no short term effect on air capability. Based on the above factors, we give the Satellites no mobilization potential to increase air capability without long-term training programs.

(3) (U)(S) When considered as a whole, the Soviet and national air forces available in the European Satellite countries present a relatively formidable daylight defensive force, particularly in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany. However, the national forces, when considered unilaterally, are ill equipped to provide truly effective defenses against mass bomber forces, particularly if the offensive force employed minimum altitude tactics and/or penetrations in darkness or bad weather.

(4) (U) See Figure 12-1 "Tabular Summary of Soviet Bloc Aircraft and Personnel in the Western USSR and Eastern Europe".