

~~SECRET~~

and West Germany.

(c) Continuing a trend that had begun in 1963, KPD members received increasing amounts of propaganda from Communist China. This material criticized the policies of the Soviet Union in general and deposed Party Chairman Khrushchev in particular. Although still a minority, a significant element of the KPD, primarily older members, is in basic sympathy with the harder "Stalinist" line of the Chinese Communists.

(d) The KPD also devoted increased attention to foreign workers employed in West Germany. In addition to propaganda material supplied by the Communist Parties of Italy, Greece and Spain for distribution in West Germany, KPD elements themselves also produced foreign-language propaganda directed to Italian and Spanish workers.

(e) A new recruiting drive was announced in 1964 with a goal of 2,000 new KPD members, primarily young people. An unusually attractive brochure addressed to youth in West Germany was prepared in East Germany and distributed by the KPD in support of the drive.

(3) Estimate of Future Activities Affecting
USAREUR.

(a) The KPD as a party will not be involved in sabotage or espionage activity during 1965, and direct propaganda attacks upon US Forces will probably continue to be limited.

(b) Removal of Khrushchev in the fall of 1964 will have a definite effect on KPD policy. As noted above, there is a "Stalinist" element in the KPD, and if the situation in the Soviet Union leads to an open conflict between hard-line opponents of peaceful-coexistence and supporters of the Khrushchev policies, a similar conflict could easily arise within the KPD. If, however, the power change in the Kremlin is accomplished quietly and smoothly, it is unlikely that open conflict will occur within the KPD.

(c) The KPD will continue its efforts to recruit new members and to influence foreign workers. Barring unforeseen changes in world-wide Communist policy as a result of the developments in the Soviet Union, propaganda will remain the main

23-16 REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON NOV 08 1994
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

~~SECRET~~

369

~~SECRET~~

KPD activity and will focus upon the themes of negotiations with East Germany, restoration of legal status to the Party, support of the SPD election campaign, and formation of a popular front movement. Overt agitation by avowed Communists will probably remain a favored method of operation.

(d) Except for those engaged in the peace and anti-nuclear movement, front groups will be of little significance. Peace groups can be expected to continue propaganda and demonstrations in support of disarmament, negotiations between East and West to reduce tensions, and the removal of nuclear weapons from West Germany. It is in this area that US Forces are most likely to be attacked, if at all.

c. Communism in West Berlin.

(1) Status and Capabilities.

(a) Total Communist strength in West Berlin, including members of the Socialist Unity (Communist) Party (SED-WB), members of front groups, and nonaffiliated sympathizers, is believed not to exceed 20,000. The SED-WB itself has an estimated 5,000 members, and an additional 10,000 belong to one or more of the major front groups, including the German Soviet Friendship Society (GDSF), the Democratic Women's League (DFB), the Free German Youth (FDJ), and the Union of Persecutees of the Nazi Regime (VVN). The Communist Free German Trade Union Federation (FDGB) has approximately 5,000 West Berlin members, but most are employees of the East German-owned railway system for whom membership is virtually mandatory. The percentage who are actual Communist sympathizers cannot be determined, but it is relatively low since there has been considerable resistance to Party work among railway employees. Although ostensibly independent, the SED-WB is under the direct control of the East German SED Central Committee through a liaison office in East Berlin.

(b) Communist activity in West Berlin is generally restricted to propaganda distribution and efforts to infiltrate con-Communist elements through joint sponsorship of various campaigns. The FDJ organization also sponsors activities designed to attract young people who can later be indoctrinated politically. The SED-WB places particular emphasis on work

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON NOV 08 1994
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

~~SECRET~~

23-17

379

~~SECRET~~

within the factories, where Party members attempt to gain positions of influence on the employees' work councils and in the unions. The main propaganda medium is the official SED-WB journal "The Truth" (Die Wahrheit), which has approximately 9,000 subscribers and is printed in special editions of 15,000 to 20,000 on such occasions as May Day.

(c) The SED-WB and front groups are all faced by declining membership, a tendency toward inactivity by those members remaining, and isolation from the West Berlin public. Nevertheless, the Party does represent a potential source of espionage, sabotage, and diversionary activity in emergency periods. Party members now perform low-level espionage in their places of employment and also report on public reaction in times of increased tension. Moreover, a number of Party members are employed in transportation and communications installations that would be primary sabotage targets. Despite these facts, there are no known plans or directives for Party members to engage in violence or diversionary actions, and there is no evidence of training for such activity.

(2) Trends.

(a) In general, it appears that both Party and front group members increased their activity slightly in 1964 as compared with 1963. At the same time, the SED-WB apparently made a more realistic appraisal of the temper of the West Berlin citizens and keyed propaganda activity more to the legitimate interests of the general populace. Thus, the Party's potential to influence non-Communists may have increased slightly.

(b) One major concern was to demonstrate the legality of the SED-WB and thereby to increase contacts with non-Communist segments of the population. To this end, Party and front groups placed greater emphasis on open meetings to which the public was invited. Included were cultural, social and political discussion meetings, and at least some public response was reported.

(c) Another aspect of the publicity campaign called for members of the Party and front groups to attend meetings of non-Communist groups and organizations to argue the Party line during discussion periods. A degree of success was reported.

(d) Efforts to improve public contacts through increased sales of Die Wahrheit apparently failed, however, and circulation is believed to remain at approximately 9,000.

23-18 REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON NOV 08 1994
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(e) Propaganda throughout the year concentrated on efforts to achieve recognition of the East German regime and acceptance of the Communist "three Germanys" theory. The heaviest emphasis was placed on propaganda in support of the negotiations between the West Berlin Senate and the East German regime that led to an agreement to issue passes permitting West Berliners to visit East Berlin. After the successful completion of the negotiations the campaign was continued, but it urged similar negotiations on other subjects to "normalize" relations between West Berlin and East Germany. A second major theme centered upon the friendship treaty signed by East Germany and the Soviet Union on 12 June 1964. Allegedly the treaty guaranteed the independence of West Berlin, and Communist propaganda featured the claim that West Berlin was a separate political entity that should sever its ties with West Germany in order to benefit from increased trade and cultural contacts with the East.

(f) Indications of financial difficulties were also received during the year. The SED-WB began a program to reduce the number of paid functionaries employed by the party, the Party-owned printing firm Druckhaus Norden attempted to secure commercial printing contracts to improve its financial position, and it was reported that the SED-WB received monthly subsidies of 100,000 West German Marks from the East German regime to support operations in West Berlin.

(g) Finally, the distribution of anti-Soviet propaganda by Chinese Communist elements to members of the SED-WB continued during 1964 and probably increased in volume. At least some SED-WB members are believed to be in basic sympathy with the harder "Stalinist" line of the Chinese Communists.

(3) Estimate of Future Activities Affecting USAREUR.

(a) Assuming no major change in Communist goals as a result of the power change in the Soviet Union, activities of the SED-WB and front groups are expected to remain essentially unchanged. Major emphasis will be placed upon efforts to improve the public image of the SED-WB and to establish closer ties with the non-Communist populace. To this end, a significant amount of propaganda activity will be directed to the legitimate interests of the citizens of West Berlin.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON NOV 08 1994
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 520C 1-R

~~SECRET~~

23-19

372

~~SECRET~~

(b) At the same time, however, the main propa-
ganda effort will be devoted to attempts to force recognition of the
East German regime. In this case, appeals for further negotiations
with West Germany and calls upon the West Berlin government to act
independently from the West German government will predominate.

(c) In routine Party activity, attempts to recruit
new members, to increase the circulation of Die Wahrheit, and to
place the Party on a sound financial footing, will probably remain of
primary concern.

(d) Despite a potential capability for espionage
and sabotage, the Party is not expected to engage in such activities.
Similarly, except for routine attacks on Berlin Command in the Party
press, propaganda concerning US forces will probably continue to be
limited.

3. ^(U)~~(S)~~ Sabotage.

a. General.

The hostile intelligence services, certain elements of
the Soviet Bloc armed forces, and the national Communist Parties have
a capability to conduct, control, or support sabotage operations in the
USAREUR area (See Annex 20, "Unconventional Warfare").

b. Status and Capabilities.

(1) The most specific information available concerns
operational or administrative sabotage elements organic to the Soviet
Bloc intelligence services. The Soviet KGB has traditionally main-
tained a sabotage department that is apparently responsible for
operations in wartime and for "terrorist" activities during peacetime.
The Soviet military intelligence service is not known to have an organic
sabotage section, but agents of the organization do collect information
on sabotage targets and would probably be permitted to control
military personnel for operations in wartime. Both the East German
V-12 and MfS have had sabotage sections for a number of years.
MfS/HVA Department 8 has a well-defined sabotage mission against
sensitive centers of communication, transport, power and water
supply, industry, and military equipment in West Germany. The
department also appears to have established a significant capability
to accomplish this mission, particularly in the industrial/shipping
centers of North Germany. A department for "aggressive reconnaiss-
ance" was also created in the V-12 to replace an earlier element which

23-20 REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON NOV 08 1994
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R-

~~SECRET~~

373

~~SECRET~~

c. Modus Operandi.

(1) The extremely secretive nature of sabotage planning and the lack of sabotage incidents in the current situation reduce the number of indicators of Soviet Bloc sabotage modus operandi. However, sabotage training based on Soviet doctrine that was given to selected EGA personnel indicates primary targets will include nuclear weapons storage sites, bridges, major supply points, and transportation networks. While it is possible that sabotage may be conducted in the target country by Communists, pre-placed agents or malcontents motivated by personal reasons, it is believed that the majority of the significant sabotage will be conducted by special teams dispatched from the Bloc against specific targets, with assistance from operational support teams present in the target country. At the same time, it is probable that conventional airborne units will be used for disruptive operations in the USAREUR rear.

(2) The belief that the more significant sabotage operations will be conducted by specially trained teams is supported by reports of HVA sabotage support teams active in the Federal Republic of Germany. Their mission is the collection of demolition target information, establishment of communications links, providing concealed storage facilities for operational supplies, and preparing for countersurveillance/security of demolition agents. Another agent category has been trained in the preparation of explosives, incendiary materials and detonators from ingredients readily available on the retail market in West Germany.

(3) Hostile intelligence sabotage planning is further indicated by efforts to determine vulnerabilities of certain USAREUR targets. Critical installations, including advanced weapons, ammunition storage sites, and POL dumps have been reconnoitered by agents with EEI to determine the extent and adequacy of physical defenses, routes of approach and means of clandestine entry. The MfS has issued EEI which extend to a determination of the points at which the introduction of explosives would produce the greatest possible effect in shipyards, port facilities and locks, industrial complexes, and rail centers.

d. Estimate of Future Operations Affecting USAREUR.

Assuming there is no significant deterioration in the current East-West political and military situation, it is estimated that no active sabotage will occur in the USAREUR area in 1965.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

23-22 ON NOV 08 1994

BY CDR USAINSCOM FORPO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

was responsible for sabotage and "special missions." There is no specific information on the designation of sabotage elements of the other Satellite services. However, in mid-1960 the KGB reportedly commended the Czech and Hungarian services for their progress in establishing an effective program for sabotage and intelligence in wartime.

(2) In the USSR, four schools conducted by the RU for training in sabotage have been reported. The RU also has intelligence regiments and battalions assigned to various Soviet Army combat echelons for conduct of wartime sabotage. These units have a mission to dispatch agent-saboteur groups against nuclear weapons and transportation networks in enemy rear areas. In East Germany an HVA sabotage school, located in Woltersdorf, near Berlin, is reported to give training in both demolition and sabotage support functions. Elsewhere, training for guerrilla warfare, sabotage, and deep reconnaissance has been given to selected personnel from the army and the intelligence services. Also, airborne reconnaissance units (17-man size) were reportedly assigned to each EGA line division before 1960. In addition to their regular functions, these units are assigned sabotage missions against selected targets in enemy rear areas. There has been no recent information on these units, and there is doubt concerning their current status. In Poland a special parachute battalion reportedly has been in existence since 1950 under the operational and administrative control of the Polish military intelligence service. The battalion is supplemental to conventional airborne elements of the Army and in the event of hostilities would be formed into sabotage teams for dispatch against targets selected by the military intelligence service. The rest of the Satellite armies (except Hungary) have airborne elements varying in size which provide a built-in capability for sabotage operations.

(3) Despite the obvious potential in the numerically strong Communist Parties within the USAREUR area, there is no available information on any training, targeting, or operational planning for sabotage for these elements; however, a capability for violence employing sabotage or sabotage-type tactics has been demonstrated by Communist elements in Spain, Greece, France and Italy. Particularly in France and Italy, the national Communist Parties have the capability to conduct independent sabotage operations, especially with respect to the lines of communication. In other areas Communist elements have the capability to conduct sabotage activities which could have a harassing effect and, in isolated instances, could be seriously damaging. In all areas Communist elements have a capability to support Soviet Bloc sabotage operations.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON NOV 08 1994
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

~~SECRET~~

23-21

374

~~SECRET~~

Activity will be limited to planning for wartime sabotage operations, recruiting and training of sabotage personnel by the Soviet Bloc, and collecting information on the vulnerabilities of targets. Previous estimates of priority targets in the event of hostilities, including advanced weapons and storage sites, critical industries, POL installations, communications systems, transportation networks, and power facilities, are considered still valid.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON NOV 08 1994
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

~~SECRET~~

23-23

376

~~SECRET~~

ANNEX 24

SIGNIFICANT STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

1. ~~(U)~~ (S) USSR.

a. General.

(1) Strengths.

(a) The personnel strength of the Soviet field theater forces includes 1.8 million ground combat forces and 100,000 tactical aviation personnel. In addition to the 138 line divisions, there are 7 artillery divisions and a number of separate artillery brigades and regiments. It is estimated that the Soviets have sufficient trained reserves to mobilize 250 divisions by M+90.

(b) The Soviet airborne threat to central Europe consists of three readily available airborne divisions with sufficient transport aircraft to support only one airborne division from western USSR bases to probable objectives in the vicinity of the Rhine River.

(c) The Soviets are continuing to improve and increase their firepower, mobility, and combat capability by increasing the quality and quantity of tactical missile support and by augmenting their current arsenal with new conventional weapons, assault bridges, snorkel-equipped tanks, new wheeled, tracked, and amphibious vehicles, improved communications, and infrared devices for combat vehicles.

(d) Tactical air armies are under the operational control of the army, ensuring continued and close support to ground units.

(2) Weaknesses.

(a) Primary dependence on railways for transportation within the USSR reduces the flexibility of the supply system.

(b) Soviet lines of communications to support forces in central Europe are vulnerable to interdiction and must cross, for the most part, Satellites of questionable political reliability.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON NOV 08 1994
BY CDR USA/NSCOM FOI/PO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

~~SECRET~~

24-1

379

~~SECRET~~

(c) The lack of a low level air defense capability against high performance aircraft reduces effectiveness of the air defense system.

2. ~~(U)~~(C) Satellites.

a. Strengths.

The personnel strength of the ground combat forces of the European Satellites (excluding Albania) is 945,000. There are currently 63 line divisions, 23 of which are considered combat ready and available for commitment against central Europe. In general, these forces conform to Soviet concepts of organization, training and tactics. The combat ready divisions are well trained and relatively well equipped. New modern equipment has been introduced into all the Satellites during 1963. Except for Czechoslovakia and Poland, the Satellites have a limited capacity for producing heavy armaments; however, in the field of motor transport, construction equipment and infantry weapons, most of the countries are showing a remarkable gain in capabilities. Both Czechoslovakia and Poland have each converted a motorized division to a tank division in 1963; this gives the Soviet command added exploitation potential. Most of the Satellites have trained reserves sufficient to activate new combat and support units.

b. Weaknesses.

The primary weakness of the Satellite armed forces continues to be the dependence on Soviet logistical support for sustained combat operations. With the introduction of new equipment, maintenance problems i. e., training of skilled technicians and the replacement of parts for all systems, new and old, can prove to be a current weakness. Though new equipment has been introduced into the Bloc countries, quantities this year are still limited. The political reliability of the Satellite Armies in fighting for the Soviet cause outside of their native lands is still questionable. However, each year as modern youth becomes indoctrinated with political ideologies and the ties become stronger to the Soviet Union, this weakness will tend to diminish. Further, because of the dedicated corps of officers and non-commissioned officers, the disciplined responsiveness of the fighting men and the increased mobility of the armies, the Soviets can increasingly rely on the Bloc members to fight with the Soviet Union.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

24-2

ON NOV 08 1994
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/SECRET
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

380

~~SECRET~~

3. ^(u) ~~(S)~~ Warsaw Pact.

Two basic strengths of the Warsaw Pact are the aggregate personnel strengths of Soviet and Satellites ground forces coupled with the centralized Soviet control of this vast manpower reservoir. However, the variance of the levels of training of Satellite ground forces and the complexity of command, control, and communications under combat conditions of such a multinational force pose formidable problems for the Soviets. In addition, the primary dependence of the Satellite forces on Soviet logistical support for sustained combat operations adversely affects the overall Warsaw Pact value for war.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON NOV 08 1994
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
AUTH PARA 1-503 DoD 5200.1-R

~~SECRET~~

381

24-3

~~SECRET~~

ANNEX 25

LAND CAMPAIGN IN CENTRAL EUROPE

1. ^(A) (S) Soviet Bloc Forces Available.

a. Combat ready divisions available for an attack in central Europe without prior buildup.

	<u>MRD</u>	<u>TANK</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Group of Soviet Forces, Germany	10	10	20
Northern Group of Forces, Poland	0	2	2
Southern Group of Forces, Hungary ¹	2	2	4
East German Army	4	2	6
Polish Army	3	5	8
Czech Army	4	5	9
	<u>23</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>49</u>

b. Combat ready divisions available for an attack in central Europe after reinforcement in the forward areas.

(1) Soviet divisions outside USSR:

	<u>MRD</u>	<u>TANK</u>	<u>AIRBORNE</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Group of Soviet Forces, Germany	10	10	0	20
Northern Group of Forces, Poland	0	2	0	2
Southern Group of Forces, Hungary ¹	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>4</u>
Subtotals	12	14	0	26

¹ It is estimated that these four divisions would not be deployed against central Europe but would be used in northern Italy (See Annex 26).

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(2) Soviet divisions in Western USSR:²

	<u>MRD</u>	<u>TANK</u>	<u>AIRBORNE</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Baltic Military District	3	1	1	5
Belorussian Military District	4	5	0	9
Carpathian Military District	3	4	0	7
Moscow Military District	2	1	1	4
Subtotals	<u>12</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>25</u>
TOTAL SOVIET DIVISIONS	24	25	2	51

(3) Satellite combat ready and available divisions:

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>MRD</u>	<u>TANK</u>	<u>AIRBORNE</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
East Germany	4	2	0	6
Poland	3	5	0	8
Czechoslovakia	4	5	0	9
	<u>11</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>23</u>
GRAND TOTALS	35	37	2	74

2. (u)(S) Soviet Tactical Doctrine.

Soviet tactical doctrine indicates that the following factors will significantly influence the employment of Soviet Bloc forces:

a. Frontages and Depths.

Normal frontage for a Soviet Front³ is from 250 to 350 kilometers. The 700 to 800 kilometer length of the eastern frontier of the Federal Republic of Germany with East Germany and Czechoslovakia indicates the employment of two or three Soviet Fronts. A Front normally has a depth of 200 to 250 kilometers, which is the approximate east-west width of East Germany.

² By M+10, an additional 15 motorized rifle and tank divisions could be made available in the Western USSR for commitment as required.

³ A Soviet wartime Front is an echelon comparable to a Western army group.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b. Ratio of Forces.

Soviet doctrine calls for a 3 to 1 superiority of force in the area of the main attack. In view of the initial availability of NATO forces and the difference in size of the opposing divisions, it is estimated that a force of approximately 63 Soviet Bloc divisions is required for a Soviet attack to have the required superiority of forces for the main effort while maintaining necessary force strength for secondary efforts.

c. Organization.

The typical Soviet Front consists of four Combined-Arms Armies, one Tank Army, and one Air Army, plus normal service and support elements. Normally, the Combined-Arms Army is composed of four motorized rifle divisions and one tank division; the Tank Army is composed of four tank divisions.

d. NATO Nuclear Threat.

The size of the Soviet Bloc force required for an attack in central Europe must be viewed in the light of NATO's capability to employ nuclear weapons to deter, impede, and defeat such an attack. This nuclear threat dictates that the attacking force maintain dispersion in depth, as well as width, while concurrently retaining the ability to concentrate forces to achieve strength superiority at the decisive point.

3. (S) Optimum Composition and Employment of Soviet Bloc Forces (See Figure 25-1).

In view of Soviet doctrine, the terrain, and the opposing forces, it is estimated that optimum employment of Soviet Bloc forces would be three Fronts on line from the Baltic Sea to Austria along the frontier with the Federal Republic of Germany.

a. The Northern Front would be assigned the main effort. This Front consists of 24 line divisions (12 motorized rifle and 12 tank divisions). Initially, this Front would have a frontage of approximately 250 kilometers extending from the Baltic Sea to the vicinity of Quedlinburg (PC4940). The main attack is envisioned as a deep penetration across the North German Plain, with a major turning movement toward central France. The secondary objective of the main attack would be the channel ports in Holland, Belgium, and France.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON NOV 08 1994
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

~~SECRET~~

25-3

386

~~SECRET~~

b. The Central Front would be assigned a supporting mission. This Front consists of 24 line divisions (12 motorized rifle and 12 tank divisions). Initially, this Front would have a frontage of approximately 250 kilometers extending from the vicinity of Quedlinburg to the junction of the borders of East Germany, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Czechoslovakia. This supporting attack is visualized as a penetration of the Federal Republic of Germany to seize the dominating terrain on the west bank of the Rhine River, with a turning movement south to trap the main Central Army Group (CENTAG) force against the Alps.

c. The Southern Front would also be assigned a supporting mission. This Front consists of 15 line divisions (9 motorized rifle and 6 tank divisions). Initially, this Front would also have a frontage of approximately 250 kilometers extending from the junction of the Federal Republic of Germany-East German-Czech borders to a junction of the Federal Republic of Germany-Czech-Austrian borders. This supporting attack would have limited objectives in an attempt to fix CENTAG forces in their forward positions and limit CENTAG strength available for use against the main attack.

d. The armies employed in the first echelon of an attack would consist of approximately 45 divisions (possibly 24 Soviet, 6 East German, 6 Polish, and 9 Czech). The second echelon and/or reserve armies would consist of approximately 18 divisions (possibly 16 Soviet and 2 Polish).

e. East German and Czech forces would probably be controlled by respective national armies, while the Polish divisions would probably be integrated into Soviet Armies.

f. Two combat-ready Soviet airborne divisions are located in Western Russia. However sufficient airlift is available for the employment in central Europe of only one division initially. Under conditions of nuclear warfare, these airborne forces would probably be employed in regimental and smaller increments. Missions most likely assigned the airborne units would include seizure and retention of terrain of tactical importance along the axis of the major thrust, such as road junctions, bridgeheads, crossings over water obstacles, and mountain passes; exploitation of nuclear strikes by forestalling the enemy's attempt to close the breach in his defense; seizure or destruction of important objectives, such as nuclear delivery sites, major headquarters, communications centers, and logistical installations; seizure of airfields for subsequent airlandings of additional

25-4 ON REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
NOV 08 1994
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

~~SECRET~~

387

~~SECRET~~

ground and air forces, or destruction of the airfields; prevention of the enemy's withdrawal and isolation of his reserves; conduct of reconnaissance, diversionary, and sabotage tasks, and support of partisans and guerrillas. It is estimated that at least an additional 22 Soviet line divisions are combat ready and available for theater reserve. This theater reserve would probably be located in western Poland and central Czechoslovakia.

4. ~~(U)~~(S) Summary.

To preclude occupation of prepared positions by the defending forces before the initiation of hostilities, the Soviets would probably attempt to achieve maximum surprise. To this end, they will probably employ the maximum number of units, including Satellite units now in forward areas, limiting initial reinforcement from the Western USSR to the divisions required to establish a total force of about 63 divisions. Since 45 divisions are already in the forward area, reinforcement with 18 divisions from the Western USSR is probable before the initiation of hostilities. At the rate of three division slices each day, this reinforcement could be accomplished within nine days after the starting movement. The Soviet main attack would be in the Northern Army Group area, which includes the terrain most favorable for rapid Soviet advance. The Central and Southern Fronts would have the mission of preventing CENTAG forces from interfering with the northern Front's advance by pinning the CENTAG forces against the Alps while the Southern Group of Forces, Hungary protects the Soviet southern flank, possibly by attack into northern Italy.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON NOV 08 1994
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

~~SECRET~~

25-5

388

LAND CAMPAIGN IN CENTRAL EUROPE




Figure 25-1

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON NOV 08 1994
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

~~SECRET~~

ANNEX 26

LAND CAMPAIGN IN SOUTHERN EUROPE

1. ~~(U)~~(S) General.

In addition to the major offensive in central Europe, an offensive operation in northern Italy is possible. This operation could have the mission of protecting the southern flank of the Bloc attack in central Europe by the seizure of northern Italy, or it could of itself be a major attack.

2. ~~(U)~~(S) Climate and Weather, and Terrain.

See Annex 1, "Climate and Weather," and Annex 2, "Terrain."

3. ~~(U)~~(S) Forces Available.

a. The Soviet force immediately available for employment against Italy is the Southern Group of Forces, Hungary (SGF) (two of the forces assigned as Reserve of the High Command in the central European area (see Annex 25, "Land Campaign in Central Europe") might be diverted). In this event, the additional force would probably be limited to those forces that could be introduced into Hungary in a 4- to 6-day period prior to the initiation of hostilities. Considering a reinforcement rate into Hungary from the western USSR of approximately one division slice per day, the total reinforcement would amount to four to six divisions. Because of the terrain in the area of operations, these units would probably be motorized rifle divisions. Thus, the total Soviet force in Hungary available for employment against northern Italy could comprise as many as 10 (2 tank and 8 motorized rifle) divisions.

b. The Hungarian and Rumanian armies might be employed against northern Italy. Use of these forces may be limited to providing security to lines of communication and to maintaining order among the civilian population.

c. Elements of one Soviet airborne division might be employed in this area in increments of less than regimental strengths. The employment of airborne forces would be contingent, however, on Soviet requirements in other areas. Sufficient airlift is not available to allow the use of large airborne forces in more than one area at a time.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON NOV 08 1994
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

~~SECRET~~

26-1

393

~~SECRET~~

4. ~~(u)~~ ~~(S)~~ Concept of Operation (See Figure 26-1).

A Soviet attack would probably cross Austria via the lowland routes from Western Hungary through the Klagenfurt Basin to Tarvisio and Dobbiaco, and from southern Czechoslovakia and western Hungary through the Passau-Linz-Salzburg triangle through Innsbruck to the Brenner and Reisa Passes. The capability of the Soviets to support this operation with airborne and amphibious assaults would depend upon requirements in other areas, and the requirement for opening the Turkish Straits and passing the Sixth United States Fleet before mounting amphibious operations on the Adriatic Coast. The main Soviet attack would probably follow the Linz-Salzburg-Innsbruck axis and be made with up to four motorized rifle divisions. An additional motorized rifle and three tank divisions would probably be used in this area to cover the flank of the attacking force as it became exposed to CENTAG forces along the Austrian-West German border. A secondary attack with two motorized rifle divisions might be launched along the Klagenfurt-Tarvisio axis, farther east.

5. ~~(u)~~ ~~(S)~~ Logistics.

See Annex 19, "Logistics."

6. ~~(u)~~ ~~(S)~~ Summary.


It is unlikely that the Soviets would attempt to launch a major campaign against northern Italy until they had made sufficient gains in other areas to enable them to divert significant forces to this area, or until an Allied buildup in Italy made the operation necessary from a defensive point of view. Yugoslav resistance could make any movement across that country with the forces available to the Soviets very difficult. Violation of Austrian neutrality would also open the way for the movement of Allied forces across Austria, thus exposing the flank of the forces involved in the major Soviet attack in central Europe. The removal of the SGF from Hungary would create a major rear area security problem. Therefore, it is estimated that the Soviet forces now in Hungary would initially provide a reserve for Bloc forces operating in central Europe and against Greece and Turkish Thrace.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

ON NOV 08 1994
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

~~SECRET~~

LAND CAMPAIGN IN SOUTHERN EUROPE



REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON NOV 08 1994
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

Figure 26 -1