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~~UNITED STATES~~ ARMY, EURO  
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff  
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# USAREUR INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE-1965 (U)

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FOREWORD

(C) THE "USAREUR INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE-1965 (U)" IS A COMPILATION OF INTELLIGENCE APPRAISALS ON SOVIET AND SATELLITE DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE PAST YEAR, AND INCLUDES THE BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON WHICH THE OVERALL ESTIMATE IS BASED. THE POSTURE OF THE ENEMY IS PRESENTED BY POINTING OUT HIS AREA OF OPERATIONS AND CAPABILITIES IN WEAPONS, AND HIS LOGISTICS, ESPIONAGE, SUBVERSION, AND SABOTAGE ACTIVITIES. THIS ESTIMATE ALSO PRESENTS, BY INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY OR FORCE, OR BY GENERAL COVERAGE, IF AVAILABLE, TACTICAL INFORMATION AS TO STRENGTHS, COMPOSITION, POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS, AND SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL ADVANCEMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS EUROPEAN SATELLITES. IN ADDITION, THE ESTIMATE ILLUSTRATES SIGNIFICANT NEW TRENDS AND ACTIVITIES THAT INFLUENCE SOVIET OR SATELLITE CAPABILITIES AND ANALYZES THE PROBABLE LIMITATIONS AND COURSES OF ACTION.

*Walter M. Higgins, Jr.*

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Brigadier General  
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USAREUR INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE--1965

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REFERENCES: Maps: 1:250,000, AMS Series M501  
Basic intelligence documents listed in the current  
"Catalog of USAREUR Intelligence Publications."

1. ~~(S)~~ (S) MISSION.

The mission of the Commander in Chief, United States Army, Europe is as follows:

a. Command the United States Army, Europe, and plan for the combat readiness of assigned United States Army forces. In the event of an emergency, exercise operational command of forces assigned to USAREUR, unless otherwise directed.

(1) Support SACEUR's and US CINCEUR's tactical operations.

(2) Discharge United States responsibilities relating to all Germany, including Berlin.

(3) Coordinate and direct intelligence.

(4) Provide communications service.

(5) Coordinate and conduct civil affairs activities.

b. As a component commander under the Commander in Chief, United States European Command, exercise assigned responsibilities pertaining to alert matters, noncombatant evacuation, and liaison with the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany, (GSFG).

c. As Commander of Central Army Group (CENTAG), an integrated NATO headquarters subordinate to the NATO Headquarters, Allied Land Forces, Central Europe (LANDCENT) supervise the peacetime preparation of forces, assigned and earmarked for assignment, for their wartime tasks and, in time of war, exercise operational command of CENTAG forces.

d. Using the Southern European Task Force (SETAF), is prepared to provide special weapons support for Allied forces in

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Italy in accordance with the plans of appropriate NATO commanders.

e. In conjunction with the Commander in Chief, United States European Command, insure the custody, security, maintenance, and operational readiness of special weapons deployed in support of non-United States NATO forces.

f. Plan for, train, and prepare United States forces for use in support of contingency plans.

g. Provide instruction and training, particularly with respect to special weapons and techniques, for Allied officers and men.

h. Operate and maintain a logistic support system capable of providing complete supply support for United States Army forces in peacetime and immediately adaptable for transition to wartime conditions.

i. Provide housing, medical services, dependent education and other administrative support services, to ensure the health, welfare, and morale of military and civilian personnel and their dependents assigned to the United States Army, Europe, and of personnel of other designated forces and agencies.<sup>1</sup>

2. ~~(U)~~(S) ENEMY SITUATION.

a. Characteristics of the Area of Operations.

(1) (U) Climate and Weather (See Annex 1)

(a) Central Europe<sup>2</sup>

In central Europe the most ideal months for military operations are May through September. The climate

<sup>1</sup> The subsidiary responsibilities that contribute to the fulfillment of each mission are indicated in the classified supplement to the Program and Budget Guidance to USAREUR Commands FY 64-FY 68) (U), dated 10 September 1963.

<sup>2</sup> Central Europe is defined as West Germany, East Germany, those portions of Austria and Switzerland that lie north of the Alps, and those portions of Austria and Czechoslovakia that lie west of longitude 15° E.



in the central European area generally is temperate. The temperature and rainfall range is small. Summer temperatures average about 70° F, and winter temperatures seldom fall below 0° F. The frost free season is about 190 days. The annual rainfall, averaging 20 inches, is well distributed, with 9 to 13 inches falling from May to September. Light rains and drizzles are common. Winter is the cloudiest season, and December the cloudiest month. Winds are mostly westerly throughout the year. Good visibility beyond 6 miles may be expected during more than half of the summer. Fog occurs 30 to 40 days each year, increasing in the industrial areas. Fogs are common during autumn, occurring most frequently in November.

(b) Southern Europe<sup>3</sup>

In southern Europe the most ideal months for military operations are June through September. September and early October are usually the months of minimum cloud cover and moderate temperatures. Less rain falls during this period than in the summer or late fall months. The "highland and alpine" climate of northern Italy, northwestern Yugoslavia, and Austria is characterized by variability and changeability. The mountainous areas experience sudden gusts of rain or snow, followed immediately by intense sunlight, and the weather change within a 24-hour period is likely to be greater than in the adjacent lowlands. In the alpine areas the severe snowstorms of the winter months, together with the closing of minor passes and temporary blocking of major passes, restrict mobility and visibility. This factor, combined with the low temperatures and high winds of the area, would generally limit and temporarily block movement through the minor avenues of approach. During the transitional period of spring and summer, mist, clouds, and rain restrict visibility. Streams overflow, blocking mountain valleys and converting valley floors to bogs. Since the main routes of approach follow river valleys, these conditions would adversely influence the ability to move rapidly. However, the clear and warm summer months normally do not present climatic conditions that would interfere with military operations.

(2) ~~(U)~~(S) Terrain (See Annex 2)

(a) Central Europe

1 General.

The terrain of central Europe.

<sup>3</sup> Southern Europe is defined as Italy, Yugoslavia, Albania and Greece.

gradually rising from the low northern plains to the southern mountain areas, is divided by numerous rivers, streams, and canals, many of which are navigable. Vegetation in central Europe varies from the sparsely wooded plains to the densely covered hill and mountain slopes. The terrain is a natural barrier to movement around most of central Europe and generally channels movement into central Europe. This barrier consists of the Alps, the North Sea, the unstable northwest coast of the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Rhine River, combined with several areas of high hills and low mountains along the western border of the Federal Republic of Germany.

2 Avenues of Approach.

There are eight main avenues of approach into central Europe:

a The Northern Approach, from the eastern coast of Denmark through the northern plains of East Germany and the Federal Republic of Germany. The main obstacles to movement from Denmark south to the Elbe River are the Kiel Canal and the inlet from Kieler Bucht to the town of Schleswig.

b The North European Plain Approach, running from Poland across Germany into the low countries. This main avenue of approach is somewhat hindered by the unstable area northwest of Berlin.

c The Hessian Corridor and its continuations, leading from Eisenach to Frankfurt. Rain greatly hinders movement in this area.

d The Meiningen Gap, skirting the Rhone upland, then extending south and southwest across the Main and Neckar Scarplands.

e The Hof Gap, extending from Vogtland across the Munchberg upland and into the Main-Naab Hills.

f The Cheb Gap, passing through the Fichtel Gebirge and into the Main-Naab Hills on the northern approach, and through the Upper Palatinate Hills into the Main-Naab Hills on the southern approach.

g The Furth Gap, the break in the highland rim that separates the Pilsen Lowlands from the Upper Palatinate Hills.

h The Danube Gap, crossing the East Bavarian Hills and the Lower Isar Valley into the Danube-Isar Hills.

(b) Southern Europe.

1 General.

The terrain of southern Europe consists of rugged mountains traversed by narrow passes and a few broad plains associated with important rivers. Rugged mountainous terrain extends across northern Italy, blocking access to the strategic plains of northern Italy. The northern plains of Yugoslavia are vulnerable to attack from the north and east; however, the rough terrain of western and southern Yugoslavia forms an obstacle to invasion of Greece from the north.

2 Avenues of Approach.

There are two main avenues of approach available through the mountainous terrain of the area:

a The Western Approach, beginning in Czechoslovakia or western Hungary, involving a series of mountain passes through the Alps affording access to the Northern Italian Plain.

b The Eastern Approach, beginning in southern Hungary, crossing the broad plains of northern Yugoslavia, and developing into a series of connected valley routes through southern Yugoslavia and northern Greece before terminating on the southern coast of Greece.

(3) ~~(u)~~(c) Transportation (See Annex 3).

(a) USSR.

1 The Soviet transportation network is heavily concentrated in the western USSR, where the railroads are the most dependable means of long-distance land transportation. Highways are used primarily for short hauls. Although the Soviet rail gage is wider than the gage of Satellite railroads, adequate trans-loading facilities exist to insure that the difference does not greatly impede international rail traffic. Ports are adequate and are continuously being improved. The inland waterways significantly supplement

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the railroads as transportation for bulk shipments, but are of lesser importance than the other modes of surface transport. The civil air transportation system compares favorably with those of Western nations and supplements the railroads as transportation for travelers.

2 East of Moscow, railroads connect all major cities, but the system is less consolidated. Rail is the primary means of transportation, since distances between cities are vast, and the highways are in poor condition. The major inland water route east of Moscow is the Volga River, which flows in a southeasterly direction to the Caspian Sea and carries nearly 90 percent of the inland waterway traffic.

(b) Satellites.

1 The civil transportation systems of the Satellites are generally adequate to meet present needs. Several of these countries are traversed by important international transportation routes that connect Western Europe with the Near East. These routes include highway and railroad connections, in addition to the waterway systems of the Danube, Elbe, Oder, Drava, and Sava Rivers.

2 The railroad systems in the Satellite countries carry the largest amount of traffic. Motor vehicle transport, predominantly local in nature and consisting of short-distance hauls rather than long-distance movements, augments rail transport. Efforts are being made to divert short-haul railroad traffic to motor vehicles in order to relieve the railroad systems of uneconomic operations and release rolling stock for long-distance traffic.

3 The inland waterway systems of the Satellites are an important mode of transportation but are secondary in importance to railroads and highways. Inland waterways are vulnerable to droughts and ice conditions.

4 Civil airlines of the Satellites are becoming increasingly more important, with emphasis placed on modernization of airfields and communications equipment. The gradual introduction of jet aircraft into the civil air systems will further increase their importance.

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