

Manpower

17. We estimate that during the past several years total strength of the East European forces, including militarized security forces, has remained relatively stable at around 1.3 million men. However, there was evidence in 1963-1964 of a small reduction in the size of the Bulgarian armed forces, and Rumania has recently reduced the term of service for conscripts. Labor shortages in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and East Germany will undoubtedly exert pressures for manpower reductions. Moreover, the acquisition of advanced weapons in quantity has increased the need for more highly qualified technicians, imposing new requirements on the limited supply of skilled manpower in Eastern Europe.

III. EAST EUROPEAN ARMED FORCES

Command Structure of the Warsaw Pact

18. The supreme command of the Warsaw Pact organization is vested in the Combined Armed Forces Command, located in Moscow. This command is composed of military officers from all the Pact countries, and is headed by Soviet Marshal Andrey A. Grechko, who appears to be the second-ranking officer in the Soviet Ministry of Defense. We believe that the East European officers serving on the Combined Command are little more than liaison officers, and that all important plans and policies relating to Pact forces are formulated in the Soviet general staff.

19. The formal chain of command runs from the Combined Armed Forces Command in Moscow, through the East European defense ministers (who are titular deputy commanders), and then down to the various military districts and field commands. In peacetime, the main functions of the Combined Command appear to be to coordinate development and training of the East European armed forces and to plan for the integration of these forces into the regular Soviet command structure in the event of war. In wartime, the Combined Armed Forces Command and the various national Ministries of Defense would almost certainly be bypassed, and the chain of command would run from Moscow through the Soviet Front commanders to the commanders of the East European field armies.

Ground Forces

20. The East European ground forces generally follow Soviet organizational patterns. We estimate that in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania the TOE strength is 8,500 men for a tank division and 10,500 for a motorized rifle division. In Bulgaria the TOE strengths are believed to be slightly less (7,500 in a tank division, with two instead of three tank regiments, and 9,000 in a motorized rifle division), while in Hungary they are slightly higher (9,000 men in a tank division and 11,000 in a motorized rifle division). The quality of our evidence varies with respect to both TOE and actual

strengths, but in general our information on the East German, Polish, and Czech armies is better than for the other East European countries. We believe that the larger units of the East European ground forces generally are not as well trained as their Soviet counterparts.

21. All of the East European ground forces have army level support units such as surface-to-surface missiles, field and antiaircraft artillery, engineer, signal, and chemical units. In general, however, they are light in combat and service support even by Soviet standards, and it is doubtful whether they could function effectively in sustained combat without either mobilizing additional units or receiving direct support from Soviet units.

22. The criteria for assessing the readiness of East European divisions are inexact. They include peacetime manning levels, training, and equipment. However, they also involve the judgment that the East European countries would plan to commit their better divisions promptly should the need arise. There are therefore wide variations among the divisions which we classify as ready for early commitment, i.e., within a few days. For example, the manning level of these divisions ranges from about 70 to 90 percent of TOE strength, and most of these forces fall short of Soviet standards of equipment, particularly in armored personnel carriers.

23. Considering all these factors, we believe that 23 of the 35 East German, Polish, and Czech divisions can be considered available for early commitment. In terms of manning, training, and equipment, the East German divisions are generally comparable to the Soviet divisions stationed in East Germany, and the ready Czech and Polish divisions are somewhat below that standard. We believe that the armies of these three countries would be considerably more effective than those of the other East European countries. We estimate that 12 of the 22 Bulgarian and Rumanian divisions and none of the six Hungarian divisions are available for early commitment. The numbers and types of East European line divisions are shown in the following table.

EAST EUROPEAN ARMY DIVISIONS*

	MOTORIZED		AIRBORNE/ ASSAULT LANDING		TOTAL
	RIFLE	TANK			
East Germany	4 (4)	2 (2)			6 (6)
Poland	9 (4)	4 (4)	" 2 (0)		15 (8)
Czechoslovakia	9 (4)	5 (5)			14 (9)
Hungary	5 (0)	1 (0)			6 (0)
Rumania	8 (4)	2 (2)			10 (6)
Bulgaria	8 (4)	4 (2)			12 (6)
TOTAL	43 (20)	18 (15)	2 (0)		63 (35)

* Numbers in parentheses are those estimated available for early commitment, but even among these divisions there are wide variations in manning and equipment.

* One airborne and one assault landing division. The airborne unit, which has an estimated strength of 3,000-4,000 men, is classed as a division by the Poles, but in terms of capabilities more nearly equates to a brigade. At present the assault landing division is a motorized rifle division in which one of the three rifle regiments is composed of naval infantry.

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ESTIMATED PERSONNEL STRENGTH OF THE EAST EUROPEAN ARMED FORCES
MID-1965

	POLAND	CZECHOSLOVAKIA	EAST GERMANY	HUNGARY	ROMANIA	BULGARIA	TOTAL
Ground Forces	225,000	175,000	90,000	100,000	175,000	125,000	890,000
(Number in Combat Divisions)	(110,000)	(95,000)	(53,000)	(45,000)	(80,000)	(73,000)	(465,000)
Naval Forces	18,000	15,000	1,000	8,000	6,000	48,000	98,000
Air Forces	25,000	20,000	12,000	5,000	8,000	12,000	82,000
TOTAL ARMED FORCES	268,000	195,000	117,000	108,000	191,000	143,000	1,020,000
Militarized Security Forces	45,000	40,000	69,000	35,000	50,000	17,000	256,000

Trends in Ground Force Organization and Equipment

24. The appearance of East European field armies in exercises indicates that these forces are acquiring the experience and equipment to operate in large units. We previously estimated that the East European divisions would be integrated into Soviet field armies during wartime, but we now believe that these divisions for the most part would serve in their own field armies, which in turn would be integrated into Soviet Fronts. This development implies increasing Soviet confidence in the military capabilities of these forces.

25. The East European forces, like the Soviets, have increased the number of tank divisions in recent years. Poland and Czechoslovakia now have four and five tank divisions, respectively, and appear to be developing the capability to field tank armies. Airborne and amphibious training has received increased attention, although lift capabilities are limited to small-scale operations. In the late 1950s, the Poles created an airborne unit of brigade size which they term a division, and in 1964, began to convert a mechanized division into an "assault landing" division. Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Bulgaria, and Rumania have each created small airborne units. Some of these units have probably received training in unconventional warfare.

26. The East European armies are significantly improving the quality of their land combat equipment. The T-54 medium tank has replaced the World War II T-34 in East German tank divisions, and is appearing in increasing numbers in the armored units of the other East European countries. Armored personnel carriers are also being introduced in greater numbers than in previous years. In addition, the Soviets have begun to supply the Snapper, a wireguided antitank missile, to their Warsaw Pact allies.

27. The equipping of East European armies with tactical missiles and rockets is well underway. On the basis of past Soviet practice, we estimate that one

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battalion of two Frog launchers per division and one brigade of six Scud launchers per field army have been established as the standard for equipping these forces. We believe that Poland, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia already have their full complement of Frogs (23 battalions); and Scuds (6-8 brigades). Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania probably have a sufficient number of Scuds (4-6 brigades); but have not received their full complement of Frogs. All the East European countries will probably receive additional tactical missile launchers in the next few years.

Tactical Air Support

28. The primary mission of all of the East European air forces is national air defense. Nevertheless, the Polish and Czech air forces and possibly the Bulgarian and East German air forces as well have been reorganized so that, while most of the fighter regiments perform the air defense role, others function as a tactical force. However, all East European fighter units, whether air defense or tactical, are trained in both air interception and in ground attack techniques. East European tactical air capabilities are improving with the introduction of current model Soviet aircraft. The MIG-21 (Fishbed) has been supplied to all East European air forces, and the Czechs and the Poles have received the SU-7 (Fitter). All of these countries except Hungary have obsolescent IL-28 (Beagle) light bombers, but only Poland and Czechoslovakia have them in any significant quantities; these are employed both in bombing and reconnaissance roles. It is likely that these air forces will increasingly emphasize the ground attack mission.

Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons

29. For a number of years, East European forces have participated in field training in a simulated nuclear environment. More recently, these forces have simulated their own delivery of nuclear weapons. This development, together with the acquisition of nuclear capable delivery systems, (Scuds, Frogs, and fighters), suggests that East European commanders expect to have access to such weapons in the event of war. While we believe that the Soviets will not give East European forces nuclear weapons in peacetime, in the event of war these weapons would probably be made available under strict Soviet control.

30. The East European forces have trained extensively in defense against chemical and biological weapons. All the armed forces have the capability of delivering CW agents by artillery, aircraft, and missiles. The Czechs, East Germans, and possibly the Poles have the capability to manufacture CW toxic agents but we have no evidence of stockpiling. We believe that in a war the East European armed forces would be dependent on the Soviets for the bulk of their chemical munitions and that these forces would not employ such agents except upon Soviet directive or authorization. All of these countries

could produce BW agents on a small scale, but there is no evidence that any of them has an offensive biological warfare development program.

National Air Defense

31. Air defense of the East European countries is composed of separate national systems. They are, nevertheless, coordinated with each other and with the Soviet air defense organization, and there are increasing signs of closer cooperation in the performance of their missions. Although these systems are not formally subordinate to Soviet air defense, they constitute for most practical purposes an extension of it. East European air defense systems are equipped almost exclusively with Soviet materiel. The best equipped, and probably the most effective, are the air defense forces of East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.

32. Early warning (EW) and ground controlled intercept (GCI) radar sites are densely deployed in peripheral areas and provide overlapping coverage. The density of coverage provides good detection and tracking capabilities, and frequency diversification provides some defense against electronic countermeasures. The Soviets have been improving the EW-GCI capabilities of the East European systems in recent years by supplying some of the best radars in the Soviet inventory and semi-automatic data transmission equipment for vectoring fighter aircraft against targets. However, around 80 percent of the approximately 2,400 fighter aircraft are older model fighters.

33. SA-2 sites have been deployed largely in defense of the capital cities and other key urban-industrial areas. In addition to the 33 sites in East Germany, Poland, and Hungary which the Soviets operate in support of their own forces, there are about 125 SA-2 sites in Eastern Europe. Present deployment patterns suggest that an additional 25 to 50 SA-2 sites will be deployed. There are at present no SA-3 sites; defense against low altitude attacks is provided by light and medium AAA.

34. The combination of area and point defenses provided by the present force of fighters and SAMs affords a fair defense throughout the area against medium and high altitude air attacks; in East Germany the concentration of SAMs and interceptors provides a better defense in their area. However, the East European air defense systems have limited low altitude and all-weather capabilities, and special difficulties are posed by Western supersonic aircraft and standoff weapons. We believe that over the next few years, these capabilities will improve with the wider deployment of new EW and GCI radars and semi-automatic control systems and with the acquisition of more advanced interceptors, such as the SU-9 (Fishpot). A low altitude SAM system may be deployed during the period of this estimate. We do not believe that the East Europeans will acquire any antiballistic missile defenses during this period.

ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT IN THE EAST EUROPEAN AIR FORCES

1 August 1965

Country	MIG-15/17 (Fagot/Presco A, B, C)	MIG-17 (D, E)	MIG-19 (Farmer)	SU-7 (Fitter)	MIG-21 (Fishbed C, E)	MIG-21 (Fishbed D)	YAK-27 (Man-Grove)	IL-28 (Beagle)	Total by Country
	Bulgaria	150	55	75	0	25	0	0	15
Czechoslovakia	250	60	135	60	35	45	10	40	635
East Germany	120	75	25	0	70	70	0	10	370
Hungary	25	10	40	0	65	30	0	0	140
Poland (Including naval)	540	170	20	5	25	25	5	60	850
Rumania	150	10	30	0	40	10	0	15	255
Total by Type:	1,235	380	295	65	260	180*	15	140	2,570

* As many as 35 additional Fishbed-Ds may be present in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland.

Naval Forces

35. The East European naval forces are organized and equipped for limited naval operations: coastal patrol, mine warfare, and short-range amphibious operations. The East German, Polish, and Bulgarian navies are continually adding newer ships, and ships in the current inventory are being retrofitted with additional electronic gear and improved armament. These three forces are deploying coastal defense missile sites, and Poland and East Germany have recently acquired guided missile motor boats. The Polish Navy has a small air arm, which includes about 70 older model fighters.

EAST EUROPEAN NAVAL SHIPS (Mid-1965)

	BALTIC		BLACK SEA	
	East Germany	Poland	Rumania	Bulgaria
Destroyers		3		2
Destroyer escorts	4			2
Submarines		9		2
Motor torpedo boats	37	19	8	8
Guided missile FPBs	4	4-5		
Coastal escorts	63	11	12	8
Fleet minesweepers	20	17	4	2
Other minesweepers	38	26	26	22
Amphibious types	17	26	8	10

Militarized Security Forces

36. East European countries maintain large militarized security forces consisting of frontier guards and internal security troops. Most of these forces have received basic military training. They are armed with light infantry weapons, and in some cases have limited combat support elements. In wartime these forces could participate in limited military operations or perform specialized functions such as rear area security and traffic control.

IV. WARTIME CAPABILITIES

Mobilization Potential

37. The traditional European military conscription system is in effect throughout Eastern Europe. Almost all fit males perform a period of active military service, and then remain in the reserves until a specified age. In time of war the East European countries could draw on a manpower pool of several hundred thousand men, all of whom have had recent military experience. There is a system of periodic refresher training. The governments have set up mobilization systems which provide for the augmentation of existing forces and the creation of new units.

38. The major limiting factor on mobilization potential is the availability of equipment for newly created units. Poland and Czechoslovakia probably have sufficient stocks of obsolescent equipment to equip some additional divisions. The other countries have small stocks of equipment in reserve. Almost all the newly created units would be poorly equipped by modern standards. We do not believe that in the event of mobilization the USSR could supply much additional equipment to Eastern Europe for the creation of new units.

39. In the event of mobilization, East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia could deploy within a week 23 divisions, organized into as many as 6 field armies. Poland and Czechoslovakia could bring up to full strength and prepare for combat within 2 or 3 weeks an additional 10 adequately equipped divisions which are now in existence. Because of deficiencies in air and sea lift only small elements of the 2 specialized Polish divisions could be committed in their primary role. Within 30 to 60 days after mobilization, East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia could probably put together another dozen poorly equipped infantry divisions out of their own resources. In addition, these 3 countries could support military operations with more than 1,800 combat aircraft.

40. In the event of hostilities, Bulgaria and Rumania could probably field within a week 12 divisions, which would be organized into 2-3 field armies. These forces could be reinforced with an additional 6 Bulgarian divisions and an additional 4 Rumanian divisions within another week or two. Bulgaria and Rumania can currently support a campaign with a total of 575 combat aircraft, mostly older models. We do not believe that the Soviets consider the Hungarian armed forces sufficiently prepared or reliable to take part in offensive operations.

V. FUTURE TRENDS

Military Capabilities

41. We believe that modernization of the East European armed forces will continue at about the present rate. Although manpower levels of the East European armed forces will probably remain about the same, the military capabilities of these forces will increase as a consequence of the continued introduction of more modern equipment. By 1970, the total number of divisions avail-

able for immediate commitment will probably show a slight increase, and include a greater proportion of tank divisions. Additional airborne and amphibious units may be organized, and lift capabilities almost certainly will improve. We also believe that combat support will continue to improve and that the East European forces will receive sufficient tactical missiles to bring their inventories up to Soviet standards.

42. The total number of aircraft in the Warsaw Pact air forces will probably decline slightly. However, the capabilities of the forces will increase as the share of new generation combat aircraft grows to about half of the total by 1970. The YAK-28 (Brewer), a light jet bomber, and the SU-9 (Fishpot), an all-weather jet interceptor, will probably be introduced into the East European air forces during the period of this estimate. Naval forces in the Baltic and Black Seas will probably continue to improve with the introduction of additional ships and improved armament and electronic gear.

Coherence of the Pact

43. We believe that the Warsaw Pact will continue in existence for the period of this estimate. Soviet interest in the alliance and Soviet power in the area will probably of themselves be sufficient to secure its continuance. In addition, the collective security provided by the Pact and the general community of interest among Communist regimes will continue to be cohesive factors in the alliance. Changes in the structure of NATO probably would have some influence on the Warsaw alliance. Most important, any change which led to a substantial increase in the role of West Germany would strengthen the special relationship among East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR. Any form of nuclear sharing with West Germany would impel the Soviets to respond, perhaps with a Warsaw Pact atomic command; we believe, however, that they would retain strict control over nuclear weapons.

44. The trend toward political divergence in Eastern Europe will probably continue, and the interplay of national interests will become increasingly important in Pact decisions. The political and economic effects of continued expenditures to fulfill Pact commitments may lead to disputes over the real requirements of Pact forces and the proper size and character of individual contributions. Rumania will probably seek to minimize its participation in the Pact, but we do not believe that it will attempt formally to withdraw.

45. We believe that the Soviets will continue their efforts to strengthen the Warsaw Pact. However, the growing independence of Eastern Europe will make it difficult to obtain agreement on specific courses of action. For example, the Soviets may seek to place some national units directly under the Pact commander in peacetime, bypassing the national ministers of defense. There are indications that Rumania, for one, would strongly resist such a move. Another possibility which may now be under discussion is that East European Pact members station token units on one another's territory as evidence of closer ties. We believe, however, that traditional antagonisms would make some Pact members unwilling to participate in this type of reciprocal arrangement.

ANNEX

ALBANIA AND YUGOSLAVIA

Albania

1. Although it is still nominally a member of the Warsaw Pact, Albania takes no part in Pact activities and rejected a Pact invitation to send Albanian representatives to the Political Consultative Council session in January 1965. Without a reconciliation between Albania and the USSR, Albania probably will not renew military relationships with the Warsaw Pact. In event of war, the Albanians would not necessarily follow Pact leadership, but would be guided by their view of their national interests.

2. Albania has received no Soviet equipment since diplomatic relations were severed in 1961. Since that time Communist China has provided small amounts of ammunition, small arms, and electronic equipment and a few motor torpedo boats. Consequently, the 30,000 ground force troops and 12,500 frontier and security troops are poorly equipped and have had little experience with modern materiel. Six infantry brigades are the basic tactical units of the ground forces. While these brigades are below strength and poorly trained, they could be brought up to strength from internal Albanian resources. Weapons and equipment consist principally of Soviet World War II types, although some postwar equipment was furnished before 1961. The ground forces are severely limited as to equipment and training; they have a high potential for guerrilla fighting, however, and are capable of waging determined resistance on a small-unit basis from isolated mountain areas.

3. The small air and naval forces are also primarily defensive in character. The air force is organized into 2 regiments, including 2 squadrons equipped with the Fresco D fighter, which have a limited all-weather capability. The navy has 4 W-class submarines, which seldom exercise at sea, and some 28 other small-coastal defense boats.

Yugoslavia

4. While Yugoslavia has been growing increasingly close to the Warsaw Pact countries during the last four years, the Yugoslav regime has been careful to avoid any military relationship which would tie the country to the Warsaw Pact

organization. Belgrade has in principle avoided alignment with military or political blocs, and has de-emphasized the military aspects of its policy. Exchange visits of military delegations and purchases of Soviet equipment have been no more extensive than those engaged in by many other "nonaligned" countries. Moreover, the Yugoslavs continue to express an interest in purchasing military items from the West. Reports of more detailed military cooperation and combined planning cannot be supported. It is unlikely that Yugoslavia's policies toward the Warsaw Pact will change in the near future.

5. The Yugoslav military establishment is roughly equal in personnel strength to that of Czechoslovakia or Poland. The ground forces—comprising 17 infantry and 3 armored divisions, 37 independent brigades, including 1 airborne, and other support troops—are deployed throughout the country in a manner calculated to support either general defense of the country or possible guerrilla warfare. These units, some of which are maintained at only 20 percent of full strength, could be brought up to strength within a few days. The field units are controlled by 19 subdistrict headquarters and by 5 army district headquarters. These territorial commands exercise both administrative and command functions. Individual and small-unit training is especially intensive, and guerrilla training continues to be emphasized.

6. The Yugoslav ground forces are equipped with a variety of Soviet, US, and other conventional equipment. The US has not made any significant deliveries since 1957, and the Soviet T-54/55 tanks, self-propelled artillery, and antiaircraft guns received since 1961 are probably not sufficient to outfit a single division. Yugoslav production of ammunition and small arms is large enough to permit export. However, production of artillery up to 155 mm howitzers is not likely to increase sufficiently to solve current deficiencies in quantity and standardization. Yugoslav doctrine calls for the use of chemical weapons in support of small guerrilla operations, but the ground forces have yet to develop any significant CW offensive or defensive capability.

7. The Yugoslav Navy of 3 destroyers, 3 destroyer-escorts, 3 submarines, and over 270 smaller craft is well adapted to its primary mission of coastal patrol. Although the level of training of its 22,000 personnel is adequate, current naval forces are insufficient for effective defense of the entire coast. A gradual strengthening of the navy is expected, especially through addition of mine warfare and smaller ASW ships with the help of a growing ship building industry.

8. The US aircraft delivered up to 1957 have given the Yugoslavs relatively superior tactical air support for their ground forces, and a somewhat less effective air defense. In the last few years the ground support capability has been reduced by the fact that at least a quarter of the total jet inventory of about 400 planes has not been operational because of the lack of spare parts. During this time the USSR has sold Yugoslavia about 40 Fishbed Cs but has furnished no all-weather interceptor aircraft. The USSR has also sold the Yugoslavs

sufficient SA-2s plus associated radar equipment to establish 4 operational sites in the vicinity of Belgrade; 8 others are scheduled to be constructed.

9. Yugoslavia's military forces would defend well against attack, and could conduct effective guerrilla operations. Yugoslavia has no significant offensive capabilities except against Albania, but could organize and support guerrilla operations in neighboring countries.

10. In the event of a general war, Yugoslavia would try to remain neutral, cooperating with the USSR only if the war should progress favorably for the Soviet Bloc. The overriding consideration would be to maintain the regime in power.

ARMED FORCES OF ALBANIA AND YUGOSLAVIA

PERSONNEL	ALBANIA	YUGOSLAVIA
Ground Forces	30,000	* 249,000
Air Forces	2,000	16,000
Naval Forces	3,000	22,000
Total Armed Forces	35,000	287,000
EQUIPMENT		
Combat Aircraft	70	280
SA-2 Sites	2	4
Submarines	4	3
Destroyers and Destroyer Escorts	0	6
Motor Torpedo Boats	9-12	67
Minesweepers	8	51

*Including 15,000 frontier guard troops.