

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

NUMBER 12-65



Eastern Europe and the Warsaw Pact

Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
As indicated elsewhere
26 AUGUST 1965

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DISSEMINATION NOTICE

1. This document was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy is for the information and use of the recipient and of persons under his jurisdiction, on a need to know basis. Additional essential dissemination may be authorized by the following officials within their respective departments:

- a. Director of Intelligence and Research, for the Department of State
- b. Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, for the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- c. Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, for the Department of the Army
- d. Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), for the Department of the Navy
- e. Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force
- f. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission
- g. Assistant Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
- h. Director of NSA, for the National Security Agency
- i. Director of Central Reference, CIA, for any other Department or Agency

2. This document may be retained, or destroyed by burning, in accordance with applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by arrangement with the Office of Central Reference, CIA.

3. When this document is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain it for a period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the document should either be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be requested of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D-69/2, 22 June 1953.

4. The title of this document when used separately from the text should be classified: FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DISTRIBUTION:

White House
National Security Council
Department of State
Department of Defense
Atomic Energy Commission
Federal Bureau of Investigation

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, and NSA.

Concurring:

Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Director of the National Security Agency

Abstaining:

The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USB and the Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.

WARNING

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

NUMBER 12-65

Eastern Europe and the Warsaw Pact

This document has been approved for release through the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Date 1/24/94

HRP 9403

SECRET

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
THE PROBLEM	1
CONCLUSIONS	1
DISCUSSION	3
I. THE WARSAW PACT AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOVIET POLICY	3
Development of the Pact	3
Value of the Pact to the USSR	3
East European Attitudes Toward the Pact	4
East European Reliability	4
II. EAST EUROPEAN MILITARY EXPENDITURES	5
Defense Budget	5
Equipment Procurement	6
Manpower	7
III. EAST EUROPEAN ARMED FORCES	7
Command Structure of the Warsaw Pact	7
Ground Forces	7
Table: East European Army Divisions	8
Table: Estimated Personnel Strength of the East European Armed Forces	9
Trends in Ground Force Organization and Equipment	9
Tactical Air Support	10
Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons	10
National Air Defense	11
Table: Estimated Strength of Combat Aircraft in the East European Air Forces	12
Naval Forces	12
Table: East European Naval Ships	12
Militarized Security Forces	12
IV. WARTIME CAPABILITIES	13
Mobilization Potential	13
V. FUTURE TRENDS	13
Military Capabilities	13
Coherence of the Pact	14
ANNEX	15
Albania	15
Yugoslavia	15
Table: Armed Forces of Albania and Yugoslavia	17

EASTERN EUROPE AND THE WARSAW PACT

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the significance of the Warsaw Pact as a military alliance, the military capabilities of the non-Soviet members' and probable trends over the next five years or so.

CONCLUSIONS

A. For years little more than a paper organization, the Warsaw Pact has become an important element in Soviet European policy and military planning. In the early 1960s, the USSR moved to establish a new military relationship with the countries of Eastern Europe, to improve their military capabilities and to tighten the Pact as a military organization. Of late, the East European countries have manifested in varying degrees an increasing independence of the USSR in their political and economic policies. The loosening of Soviet controls in Eastern Europe has increased the importance of the Pact to the USSR as an institutional tie. For their part the East European countries see the Pact as an assurance that the Soviets will continue to underwrite their regimes and to safeguard existing boundaries. (Paras. 1-8)

B. Improvements over the past five years have made East European military forces a more useful adjunct to Soviet military power. We estimate that 35 of the 63 East European line divisions, varying considerably in quality, could be deployed within a few days. East European air defense systems are coordinated with each other and

¹ The active East European members of the Warsaw Pact are Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania. The military capabilities of Albania, which has not actively participated since 1961, and Yugoslavia, never a member, are considered in an annex. Soviet strategic concepts with respect to a war in Europe and the relevant Soviet forces will be discussed in the forthcoming NIE 11-14-65, "Capabilities of Soviet General Purpose Forces."

SECRET

with the Soviet air defense organization. With 125 SAM sites and 2,400 fighter aircraft these systems afford a fair defense throughout the area. While we believe that the Soviets will not give East European forces nuclear weapons in peacetime, in the event of war these weapons would probably be made available under strict Soviet control. (Paras. 23, 29, 31-34)

C. The Soviets will probably continue their efforts to strengthen the Warsaw Pact. The growing independence of Eastern Europe, however, will make it difficult to obtain agreement on specific courses of action. Changes in NATO will influence developments in the Warsaw alliance; in particular, any substantial increase in the role of West Germany would strengthen the special relationship among East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR. Rumania will probably seek to minimize its participation in the Pact, but we do not believe that it will attempt formally to withdraw. (Paras. 43-45)

D. In a crisis situation threatening general war, we believe that the East European regimes would attempt to exert a moderating influence on Soviet policy. If the USSR ordered mobilization, their responses would probably differ, ranging from immediate compliance by the East Germans to recalcitrance on the part of the Rumanians. In the event of armed conflict, we believe that the East European armed forces could be relied upon to take part, at least initially, in military operations in conjunction with Soviet forces. (Paras. 9-11)

SECRET

DISCUSSION

I. THE WARSAW PACT AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOVIET POLICY

Development of the Pact

1. The Warsaw Pact was created by the USSR in May 1955 as a political response to the rearming and admission into NATO of West Germany. During the first five years of its existence, the Pact had little practical significance in the military relationships between the USSR and Eastern Europe. Executive bodies met only irregularly, and very little multinational planning or training took place under Pact auspices. Actual military relationships between the USSR and other members were governed by a series of bilateral treaties and status-of-forces agreements. During this period there was a general slackening in the military efforts of the East European countries; defense expenditures and the strength of the East European armed forces gradually declined. By about 1960, the Soviets evidently concluded that these forces had to be modernized in view of growing NATO strength.

2. At about the same time there was a definite shift in Soviet policy; the USSR began to establish a new military relationship with the countries of Eastern Europe. Soviet propaganda and doctrinal statements began to stress the probability that any future war would be a war of coalitions and to emphasize the importance of close military collaboration within the Bloc. At the same time, the Soviets began to take concrete steps to build up the military capabilities of their East European allies and to strengthen the military organization of the Warsaw Pact. In the last five years, modernization of equipment and weapons has been stepped up, command and control arrangements have been improved, and large-scale multinational training exercises have taken place.

Value of the Pact to the USSR

3. These improvements have occurred during a period in which the East European countries have manifested, in varying degrees, increasing independence of the USSR in their national policies. On the surface there is apparent inconsistency in the USSR's policy of strengthening its East European allies militarily at the very time when they are becoming less tractable politically. But the Soviets probably saw a number of reasons—economic, military, and political—for setting this new course.

4. Problems in the allocation of resources and manpower in the USSR led Khrushchev in 1960 to institute large-scale force reductions, chiefly at the expense of the general purpose forces. It is possible that the Soviets sought

to offset these reductions to some degree by improving the military capabilities of Eastern Europe. At the same time, a debate in the USSR over military strategy and doctrine led to a re-examination of previous assumptions about the probable character of a future war. Growing doubts concerning the possibility of reinforcements in the European area under conditions of general nuclear war and realization that such a war might have to be fought largely with forces in place may have influenced the Soviet decision.

5. The Soviets probably also expected political returns from a change in policy which would counteract, to some extent, centrifugal tendencies in Eastern Europe. They probably hoped to arrest or at least slow the trend toward political diversity by exploiting both the fear of war and the necessity for common planning to meet this danger. In any event, the loosening of Soviet controls over Eastern Europe has increased the importance of the Pact as an institutional tie. For example, the Soviets have been trying to revive the Political Consultative Committee to serve as a formal mechanism for foreign policy consultation. As the Sino-Soviet dispute has worsened, the USSR has turned increasingly toward its East European allies for political support.

6. From the Soviet point of view, Eastern Europe adds considerably to Soviet military power. The Soviets have long regarded the region as a valuable buffer zone, and probably consider that in a general war it would bear some of the initial impact of a Western attack. They probably also consider that the presence of East European national forces reduces the requirement for Soviet forces in the area.

East European Attitudes Toward the Pact

7. Although the East European countries had no real choice about joining the Pact, they have derived some benefits from it. The collective security arrangements of the Pact give them a greater measure of defense than they could ever obtain with their own resources. In their view, the Warsaw Pact represents a Soviet guarantee to support the continuance of Communist regimes and existing boundaries in Eastern Europe. The latter consideration is particularly weighty in the cases of East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, which consider a re-armed West Germany a threat to their national security. This common apprehension has led to a special relationship among these three countries and the USSR. In the cases of Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria, their governments must balance the general security offered by the Pact against possible involvement in German issues which they do not regard as directly affecting their national interests.

8. In spite of the increasing independence of the East European countries, their national policies still generally coincide with those of the USSR. But cooperation and coordination can no longer simply be dictated in Moscow. Many decisions must now be reached on the basis of a consensus among countries which are no longer willing to subordinate completely their national interests

to the demands of Moscow. Concern that Soviet protection carries with it the risk of involvement in a nuclear war is likely to increase, and Pact members may begin to demand more of a voice in decisions which might involve their national survival.

East European Reliability

9. The responsiveness of East European countries to Soviet direction and the reliability of their forces would depend primarily on the nature, causes, and locale of the conflict. In any crisis situation which carried the threat of general war, we believe that the East European regimes would attempt to exert a moderating influence on Soviet policy. If the USSR should order mobilization, their responses would probably differ, ranging from immediate compliance by the East Germans to recalcitrance on the part of the Rumanians. The Poles, located astride the line of communications to Soviet forces in Germany, would accede reluctantly to Soviet demands, reasoning that it would be impossible for them to avoid becoming involved. Czechoslovakia would probably follow suit for much the same reason. In a particularly threatening situation, Rumania and possibly others might procrastinate in an attempt to remain neutral and might communicate privately with the other side.

10. In general, we believe that East European forces would fight with far more determination in defense of their own territory than as part of a Soviet offensive operation against NATO. The nationality of the opposing forces would also be an important factor. For example, the Poles and the Czechs would probably fight well against anything which they regarded as German aggression, and the Bulgarians have a longstanding antagonism toward Greeks and Turks.

11. Because of strict discipline, party indoctrination, careful screening of officers and key troops, and the very nature of military organization, the better East European divisions could probably be relied upon to take part, at least initially, in military operations in conjunction with Soviet forces. In a fast moving situation the East European forces, including the East Germans, would probably continue to function as long as command channels remained intact and the forces involved did not suffer any serious reverses. If, however, major reverses should occur and victory of the NATO forces appeared imminent, the reliability of the East European forces would probably deteriorate rapidly, and some troops might even seek to shift sides.

II. EAST EUROPEAN MILITARY EXPENDITURES

Defense Budget

12. Because the armed forces of the East European countries have few advanced weapons systems and are not involved in the development of costly