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Authority NND 959000  
By 107 NARA Date 8/27/01

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THIRD SESSION NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING - 10:15 A.M. DEC 15.

STATEMENTS BY CHAIRMEN OF STANDING GROUP AND MILITARY COMMITTEE; RESOLUTION ON 1965 ANNUAL REVIEW.

1. INTELLIGENCE APPRECIATION BY CHAIRMAN, STANDING GROUP.

AS REQUESTED BY NAC, CHAIRMAN SGN (ADMIRAL WARD) GAVE ORAL PRESENTATION ON RECENT TRENDS SOVIET DEFENSE EFFORTS. OVER ONE-HALF OF SOVIET SPENDING IN STRATEGIC ATTACK AND DEFENSE FORCES HAS BEEN DEVOTED TO AIR DEFENSE AT AN AVERAGE RATE OF \$5 BILLION A YEAR. THIS HAS PROVIDED SUBSTANTIAL ANTI-AIRCRAFT CAPABILITY AT MEDIUM AND HIGH LEVELS COMBINING FIGHTER FORCES WITH SAM'S DEPLOYED TO PROTECT ALL SOVIET CITIES OF MORE THAN 200,000 POPULATION. AIR DEFENSE PROGRAMS THROUGH 1964 SUGGEST AN OVERALL UPWARD TREND IN SPENDING INCLUDING EXPENDITURES DEVOTED TO ANTI-MISSILE DEVELOPMENT. ALTHOUGH SOVIETS HAVE CLAIMED AN ABM CAPABILITY, NONE TO OUR KNOWLEDGE IS CURRENTLY OPERATIONAL. IT IS BELIEVED, HOWEVER, THAT ELEMENTS OF AN ABM DEFENSE ARE BEING DEPLOYED IN MOSCOW AREA. IN THIS FIELD, SOVIETS MAY HAVE REACHED POINT IN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT WHERE THEY CAN MOVE TO IMPLEMENT ABM DEFENSE; TO DO SO, WOULD INVOLVE SERIOUS ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES.

RE ICBM'S, SOVIET EXPENDITURES IN 1964 EMPHASIZED HEAVILY ICBM'S OVER LONG-RANGE BOMBERS. RECENT SOVIET EXHIBITS OF LONG-RANGE MISSILES IN MOBILE CONFIGURATION MIGHT INDICATE TREND IN DIRECTION OF IMPROVING SURVIVABILITY OF STRATEGIC ATTACK FORCE. THERE IS NO HARD EVIDENCE TO INDICATE, HOWEVER THAT A MOBILE SOLID PROPELLANT ICBM HAS YET BEEN DEVELOPED TO

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OPERATIONAL STAGE. IN THIS FIELD, WE CAN EXPECT CONTINUED EMPHASIS ON IMPROVED SURVIVABILITY AND INCREASED FORCE LEVELS. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT IN NEXT TWO YEARS NUMBER OF ICBM'S ON LAUNCHER COULD DOUBLE AND NUMBER OF HARDENED SITES COULD TRIPLE.

RE INTERMEDIATE AND MEDIUM RANGE STRIKE FORCES, THESE WEAPONS ARE PRIMARILY SUITED FOR EMPLOYMENT AGAINST ACE. LAND-BASED MISSILE STRENGTH OF THE FORCE HAS LEVELED OFF AT ABOUT 750 MISSILES. MEDIUM BOMBER FORCE IS HOLDING STEADY AT ABOUT 800 WITH GRADUAL INTRODUCTION INTO THE FORCE OF A NEW MEDIUM BOMBER WITH SUPERSONIC CAPABILITIES. IN PREEMPTIVE ATTACK THIS FORCE COULD DELIVER WEAPONS RANGING UP TO MULTI-MEGATON YIELDS ON IMPORTANT STRATEGIC TARGETS DISTRIBUTED OVER THE WHOLE OF ACE. IN THIS AREA, THERE IS A DOWNWARD TREND IN SPENDING INDICATING THAT SOVIETS MAY HAVE REACHED COMFORTABLE POSTURE IN THIS CATEGORY AND CAN NOW CONCENTRATE ON MODERNIZATION AND IMPROVEMENT.

ORBITAL MISSILE. THERE IS NO HARD EVIDENCE TO INDICATE THAT SYSTEM OF THIS KIND HAS REACHED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY. HOWEVER, WE MUST PRESUME SUCH CAPABILITY CAN BE ACHIEVED. AT ITS BEST, AN ORBITAL SYSTEM DOES NOT REPRESENT SIGNIFICANT BREAK-THROUGH IN MILITARY TECHNOLOGY. IN TERMS OF SURVIVABILITY, ACCURACY, AND COST, OTHER WEAPONS SYSTEMS OFFER DISTINCT MILITARY ADVANTAGES. HOWEVER, WE SHOULD NOT DISMISS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF DEMONSTRABLE SOVIET CAPABILITIES IN THIS FIELD. USSR HAS ALSO ORBITED RECONNAISSANCE AND COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITES. WE BELIEVE THEY WILL EXPERIMENT WITH VARIETY OF SPACE SYSTEMS WHICH COULD BE USED FOR MILITARY PURPOSES.

RE NAVY, STEADY INTRODUCTION NEW SHIPS HAS BEEN NOTED PARTICULARLY CRUISE MISSILE SUBMARINES. THESE NOW NUMBER 40 OF WHICH 16 TO 18 ARE NUCLEAR POWERED. THE OVERALL TREND IN SOVIET FORCES IS TOWARD STEADY RISE IN COMBAT CAPABILITIES THROUGH FORCE MODERNIZATION. SOVIET NOW HAS CAPABILITY WAGE WIDE RANGE OF NUCLEAR, CONVENTIONAL, AND CHEMICAL WARFARE.

2. BRIEFING BY CHAIRMAN OF MILITARY COMMITTEE

CHAIRMAN (GENERAL DE CUMONT-BELGIUM) POINTED OUT THAT REAL PROBLEMS OF ALLIANCE APPEARED TO BE MORE POLITICAL THAN MILITARY. CHAIRMAN DEPLORED SLOW RATE AT WHICH MILITARY DEFICIENCIES WERE BEING REMEDIED. WITH THE ANTICIPATED DEPLOYMENT OF 39 NEW HAWK BATTERIES IN 1966 THIS WOULD RESULT IN TOTAL OF 79 OUT OF 124 BATTERIES WHICH COUNTRIES HAVE ACQUIRED. THIS WOULD STILL LEAVE GAPS IN NATO'S AIR DEFENSE. DE CUMONT EXPRESSED GRAVE CONCERN OVER DEADLOCK ON INFRASTRUCTURE

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COST SHARING. HE STRESSED NEED FOR MODERNIZATION OF NATO COMMUNICATIONS, AMONG OTHER THINGS, TO ENABLE POLITICAL AUTHORITIES TO CONSULT IN TIME OF CRISIS. CHAIRMAN ALSO STRESSED THAT EVIDENCES THAT NATO SOLIDARITY NOT AS STRONG AS IT WAS WHEN ALLIANCE FOUNDED MIGHT TEMPT ENEMY. AS EXAMPLE, HE CITED RECENT HELLENIC THRACE CONTINGENCY STUDY WHICH DID NOT PROVIDE FOR TURKISH PARTICIPATION. IF BULGARIANS WERE TO LEARN OF THIS, THEY MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO MAKE MILITARY MOVES IN THE BELIEF THAT A NATO RESPONSE MIGHT NOT BE FORTHCOMING. (LATER IN THE MORNING, TURKISH DEFMIN TOPALOGLU REPLIED THAT TURKEY CONSIDERED CONTINGENCY STUDY TO BE A HYPOTHETICAL STUDY. TOPALOGLU STRESSED TURKEY WAS READY TO CARRY OUT ALL OF ITS TASKS UNDER NATO PLANS.) DE CUMONT CLOSED WITH A PLEA FOR CLOSE COLLABORATION BETWEEN NAC AND NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES.

3. RESOLUTION ON 1965 ANNUAL REVIEW

RESOLUTION IN CM(65)134 ADOPTED WHEREBY COUNTRIES UNDERTOOK AS FIRM FORCE COMMITMENTS TO NATO FOR 1966 FORCES CONTAINED IN THEIR COUNTRY CHAPTERS.

OTHER MILITARY SUBJECTS (NATO FORCE PLANNING, DEFENSE AID TO GREECE AND TURKEY, CIVIL EMERGENCY PLANNING) ARE REPORTED IN SEPARATE MESSAGE.

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