

TOP SECRET - COSMIC

70. These estimates are based on the assumption that national plans are accomplished on schedule and that no particular additional emergency will alter the present world situation (i.e. Korea, Indo-China, Middle East, etc.).

71. Also included in these Tables are the requirements for forces necessary to carry out a "forward strategy."

GENERAL CAPABILITIES

72. With the constant improvement of command structures, continued exercises and maneuvers, standardization of equipment and doctrines, etc., the effectiveness of NATO forces should increase greatly as the date for the Medium Term Defense Plan approaches.

a. Although the greater part of the land forces committed on D-Day will be effective, a proportion will be quite unfit for combat, even though they may have to be committed. At present, only about 50% of the land forces mobilized and committed to battle between D-Day and D plus 30 may be considered effective during the first month of combat; the quality of these forces may be expected to improve rapidly if maintained and given adequate replacements. The effectiveness of these D-Day to D plus 30 forces can be expected to improve progressively between now and 1954.

b. It is considered that NATO Naval Forces in regular commission generally will have a high standard of efficiency. Deficiencies in several types of craft, particularly mine-sweepers and ocean escorts will hamper effective naval operations in some respects. Technical improvements which should be ready for operational use by 1954 will also increase the effectiveness of naval forces.

c. Lack of reserves, aircraft, pilots and fuel are such that the majority of air forces now available to SACEUR will be unable to fight effectively for more than a very few

TOP SECRET - COSMIC

days. The quality and effectiveness of air forces by 1954, and in intervening period, will be dependent not only on the production of the necessary quantity of modern front-line aircraft and trained personnel, but equally on the provision in Western Europe of the essential anti-aircraft defense, infrastructure, fuel reserves, control and reporting systems, and ancillary supporting units.

d. It is considered that the advantage in numbers of atomic weapons possessed by the U.S. will not be reduced.

COMPARISON OF THE RELATIVE STRENGTH AND CAPABILITIES  
OF NATO AND SOVIET BLOC FORCES

THE THREAT AND COUNTER DEFENSE IN NORTHERN EUROPE

73. The Soviet Bloc have the ability to attack Scandinavia with a force of up to 17 divisions, at least 800 tactical aircraft, together with units of the Northern and Baltic fleets at any time. Denmark is considered to be the key to the defense of the northern area.

74. The operations in this area will be considerably influenced by whether or not Sweden becomes involved in the war.

75. In order to counter effectively the Soviet attack, a force of 13 divisions and some 900 aircraft are considered to be the irreducible minimum which should be available to the Northern Commander.

76. It is necessary to deploy approximately eight of these divisions in Denmark and the balance in Norway. With these forces an effective defense of both Norway and Denmark should be possible.

77. In the early part of 1952 the forces now promised for use in the area amount to six divisions and some 150 aircraft. With these forces effective defense of the whole of Denmark and Norway is not possible, although certain small areas in Norway may be held in isolation.

TOP SECRET - COSMIC

TOP SECRET - COSMIC

78. By mid-1954, the forces promised for deployment amount to eight divisions and some 500 aircraft in this area. These forces are inadequate for effective defense of the Northern Command. The integrity of Denmark can only be assured by adequate ground forces and substantial air support both from naval aviation and from ground-based air forces outside Denmark (from Central Command and Norway), in addition to those air defense and tactical air forces which can be deployed to Jutland and the Danish Islands.

THE THREAT AND COUNTER DEFENSE IN CENTRAL EUROPE

79. The Soviet Bloc has the capability of launching a campaign against Central Europe\* progressively building up to 75 - 120 divisions, up to 5,000 tactical aircraft; and supported by units of the Baltic Fleet.

80. The line of the Rhine-Ijssel Rivers constitutes a barrier upon which can be based the strongest defense position against an attack from the east. Such a line, however, would exclude a part of the Netherlands, exclude the bulk of Western Germany, and cause the battle to be fought on the frontiers of the Western European nations. NATO policy must therefore be based on a more "forward strategy" which includes these areas within the general framework of the defense.

81. In order effectively to achieve the aims of a "forward strategy" SHAPE considers that forces totalling some 65 divisions and some 8,500 aircraft are necessary in this general area to combat the assessed Soviet threat. (This aircraft figure has not been established.)

82. In the early part of 1952 the forces now promised for use in this area comprise 26 divisions and some 1,000 aircraft. With these forces even the defense of the Rhine-Ijssel line is

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\*For the purpose of this paper, Central Europe is intended to mean the area of the Central European Command.

TOP SECRET - COSMIC

impossible. However, strategic bombing and the use of new weapons (the effects of which cannot yet be foreseen) may do much to enable Allied forces to retain their integrity and to carry out successful delaying actions. The degree to which the Allies could finally retain isolated positions in Western Europe depends on factors which cannot now be assessed.

83. The NATO nations should be able to deploy some 52 divisions in this area. These divisions will be insufficient for a "forward strategy"; but they may be able to stabilize the front on the general line of the Rhine-Ijssel. It must, however, be stressed that without the institution of measures to improve the readiness and effectiveness of forces, there is no possibility whatever of these forces being produced in effective condition at the time required. These troops must, moreover, be able to count on some measure of air superiority to help make up for their disparity of numbers on the ground; yet the total air forces promised amount to only some 3600 aircraft, as against a considered requirement of 5500 for the Rhine-Ijssel position, with which to create a favorable air situation and to support the ground forces. These deficiencies may well prove crucial to both the air and land battles and thus force a consequential withdrawal to the West of the Rhine-Ijssel line.

THE THREAT AND COUNTER DEFENSE IN SOUTHERN EUROPE

84. The military situation which develops in this general area will be profoundly affected by the degree of assistance afforded by Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey.

85. If successful in over-running the intermediate areas the Soviet Bloc has the ability to launch campaigns against Italy with initially 15 - 20 line divisions, possibly all Soviet, and up to 800 tactical aircraft.

## TOP SECRET - COSMIC

86. In order to effectively counter such an attack, a force of some 19 divisions, 1,100 aircraft and considerable supporting naval forces are considered essential.

87. In the early part of 1952 present promises of forces total 12 divisions, some 250 tactical aircraft and the support of naval task forces. With these land forces, and in particular the weakness of the air forces, it is most unlikely that an effective defense of the whole of Italy can be made. The loss of Italy would result in an increased threat to the Central Command through the Italian Northern Plain and Southern France and place the enemy in the center of the Mediterranean Sea. This, of course, will have a serious impact on the withdrawal strategy to be adopted in the Central Command and will create a very serious and critical situation in the vital Mediterranean Sea area.

88. By mid-1954, the NATO nations have now promised, for the defense of the area, 19 divisions and some 850\* tactical aircraft, together with naval task forces. The land forces available then should be sufficient to hold the general line of the Austrian and Yugoslav frontiers of Italy although the number of aircraft available leaves the possible outcome of the air battle in some doubt.\*\*

## THE THREAT TO SEA COMMUNICATIONS

89. The principal strength of the Soviet Navy lies in a large force of coastal and ocean-going submarines. They also possess a considerable number of modern cruisers, destroyers

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\* The attainment of this figure depends almost entirely on the removal of the Italian Treaty limitations.

\*\*However, the Naval Task Forces operating in the Mediterranean will serve to reduce the enemy capabilities in this area.

TOP SECRET - COSMIC

and light craft, with associated aircraft, whose main role is believed to be to support the seaward flanks of the armies. Over 300 submarines are now available and their numbers and effectiveness are likely to increase considerably by 1954. The mine is likely to be a very serious threat due to the technical difficulties involved in sweeping and to the Russian flair for this type of warfare. If the channel ports were occupied by Soviet Forces the threat to British coastal shipping and to our western approaches from both submarine and aircraft would be very greatly increased.

90. NATO naval forces must be capable of meeting these threats and of supporting the flanks of the land campaign.

91. Merchant ships will be exposed to attack by submarines and aircraft on the main convoy routes and in the focal areas and seaward approaches to the ports in the United Kingdom and Western Europe. It is impossible to estimate accurately the efficiency with which these attacks will be carried out, but it is hoped that with the forces promised as available in 1952 it may be possible to keep losses down to an acceptable rate. An increase in the number or efficiency of the Soviet submarines would, however, necessitate an increase in the over-all anti-submarine effort required. By 1954 it is believed that about 270 more destroyers and escorts than will be available under present plans will be required to meet the increased threat due to the replacement of existing submarines by others of an improved type armed with more formidable weapons.

TOP SECRET - COSMIC

92. The minesweeping forces at present available to NATO nations are inadequate to deal with the minelaying campaign which the Russians could now launch. The increase in ocean and coastal minesweepers from 380 to 705 in 1954 though large, is not large enough and an increase to about 1170 vessels of these types is considered necessary to meet this threat.

93. Four fast carrier task forces are needed to carry out the necessary tasks of offensive operations including interdiction of seaborne invasion and attacks at source, and to give adequate support on the flanks of the land campaign. Present plans show as available six fleet carriers with their aircraft less than this requirement, even in 1954. Furthermore, it is important that the carrier task forces be made ready for operations at earlier dates after D-Day than at present planned.

94. To sum up, it is considered that, in view of the lack of experience of the Soviet submarines in ocean warfare, in 1952 it might be possible to keep the losses of merchant ships in convoy to an acceptable rate. But in 1954 this will no longer be the case. In both these years, moreover, the minesweeping forces available will be inadequate and therefore further heavy casualties to merchant ships must be expected and the ports through which the vital supplies from North America must be brought into Europe, may be rendered unuseable. Without adequate carrier task forces it will not be possible to hamper the development of the enemy's offensive by attacks at the source and anti-seaborne invasion operations or to give that support on the flank to the land campaigns necessary for their successful prosecution. The requirements detailed in Table IV are the minimum which will enable the NATO naval forces to carry out their tasks.

TOP SECRET - COSMIC

## THE STRATEGIC AIR THREAT AND COUNTER DEFENSE

95. The Soviet Bloc has the capability to initiate:

- an aerial bombardment by the Long Range Aviation against the British Isles and selected strategic targets on the Continent, with at least 350 medium bombers plus light bombers.
- Air attacks against Canada and the United States, including Alaska and the Aleutians.

96. These attacks may include bombing with both conventional and atomic type bombs.

97. The Long Range Aviation consists of medium and light bombers, and fighters; the total strength of this force in numbers of aircraft is not expected to be increased but it is estimated that the percentage of long range bombers will increase at the expense of the light bombers. It is expected that by 1954 all the fighter strength and a considerable proportion of the light and a small proportion of the long range bombers will be jet-engined types and that the combat efficiency of this strategic force will be significantly increased.

98. The Soviet atomic stockpile will continue to increase. This fact combined with the modernization and improved combat efficiency of Long Range Aviation will create an ever increasing strategic air threat during the period under review.

99. In order to counter this Soviet threat it is estimated that in Europe a minimum of some 950 fighter aircraft for United Kingdom home defense and 600 aircraft for French home defense are necessary, excluding other fighter defense forces under SHAPE.

100. In the early part of 1952 the forces allocated for air defense are some 450 aircraft for British home defense and some 180 for French home defense. At the same time, the forces available



TOP SECRET - COSMIC

to SHAPE for air defense purposes will not exceed 1000.

101. Moreover, the number of all-weather type aircraft will be very small. It is considered that with these forces, we will not be able to prevent the enemy from attacking vital targets with conventional and atomic weapons. In 1952, atomic as well as conventional attacks must be expected. However, the air forces now promised for air defense will be over-extended even against conventional air attacks.

102. The total defense forces planned for 1954 will not meet the requirements as the total forces planned for the central part of Europe will be only 3600 instead of some 8500 required. Even if the total requirements were contributed, concentrated enemy air attacks against vital areas cannot entirely be prevented, and serious losses and damages caused by atomic weapons must be expected.

#### CONCLUSIONS

103. It is concluded that:

a. The Soviet Bloc, as part of its over-all war effort, is now capable of initiating powerful land, sea and air offensives, including atomic attacks, either separately or simultaneously against Western Europe, the North Atlantic area and the Mediterranean. This capability will not diminish in the immediate future.

b. At present NATO forces cannot prevent the Soviet Bloc from overrunning all or most of the NATO area of Continental Europe, seriously disrupting Allied sea communications and launching atomic attacks.

c. In this connection it must be borne in mind that the existing Allied numerical superiority in the realm of atomic weapons will continue.

TOP SECRET - COSMIC

d. The immediate strategic objectives of NATO for the defense of Western Europe cannot be attained without the adoption of a "forward strategy." The forces as set out in the Revised Medium Term Defense Plan Requirements would be adequate for this purpose.

e. The forces at present promised for mid-1954 are inadequate for a "forward strategy," and failure to increase these forces significantly would, in the event of war, result in the probable loss of national territories in Northern Europe, the loss of Western Germany, and grave danger to national territories in Central, Western and Southern Europe.

f. Wars are won, in the end, not only by material power, but also by the influence of moral factors, of leadership, judgment and tenacity. In this connection, a very encouraging progress can be observed since the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In particular, European Forces through NATO, and backed by the developing war potential and the great air power of the United States, are being strengthened.

g. If the North Atlantic Treaty Nations achieve the goal set for them by 1954, that is, if their forces are made effective in morale, manpower, training, leadership, and equipment, then the danger point can be passed.

h. In the near future a German contribution may be expected.