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CIRCULATED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE CHIEFS OF STAFF

J.P.(52)108(FINAL)

LIMITED CIRCULATION

27th November, 1952

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

JOINT PLANNING STAFF

PLAN FAIRFAX

Report by the Joint Planning Staff

1. Plan SYCAMORE¹, the current outline of intentions, expires on 31st December, 1952. Plan FAIRFAX, to cover the period 1st January to 30th June, 1953, is at Annex. It should be read in conjunction with Outline Movement Plan XENOPHON.

2. We recommend that the Chiefs of Staff should approve Plan FAIRFAX as the successor to Plan SYCAMORE: Where the text of this Plan differs from Plan SYCAMORE, it has been sidelined.

(signed) D.E. HOLLAND MARTIN
F.J.St.G. BRAITHWAITE
P.G. BLMFORD.

Ministry of Defence, S.W.1.

27th November, 1952

1 COS(52)324

Approved 12/19/52 of DEFE 4 (1952) Note, p 13, COS (52) 193, Congress Annex

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Annex (Part I) to JF(52)108(FINAL)

PLAN FAIRFAX

OUTLINE OF UNITED KINGDOM INTENTIONS IN WAR

PART I

INTRODUCTION AND ASSUMPTIONS

INTRODUCTION

1. FAIRFAX is the Outline of Intentions in War for the period 1st January, to 30th June, 1953. It replaces SYCAMORE¹.

ASSUMPTIONS

Soviet Bloc

2. The following countries and forces will be aligned with the Soviet Union:-

Poland, Eastern Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Roumania, Bulgaria, Albania, China, North Korea and the Viet Minh Forces.

Anti-Soviet Bloc

3. The following countries will be aligned against the Soviet Union:-

(a) NATO Countries. The United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, France, the Benelux countries, Italy, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Portugal, Greece and Turkey;

(b) Other Countries. Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Ceylon, French Union territories outside the NATO area, the Philippines, Japan and Nationalist China.

4. West Germany². The present plan is to raise German contingents within the EDC, whose forces will be placed at the disposal of S.CEUR. These German forces will not however be in existence during the period covered by this study.

5. Austria². Austria has only a small armed police force, but her sympathies are with the West. In the event of a Soviet attack, there will be some guerrilla warfare against the Soviet forces, especially in the mountainous districts.

6. Yugoslavia². In the event of Soviet aggression in Europe, it is probable the Yugoslavia, even if not herself the first victim, will be prepared to participate in hostilities against the Soviet bloc for her own ends.

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Annex (Part I) (Cont'd)

7. Israel². Israel will defend her frontiers against aggression from any quarter. Her present government and probably the majority of her people incline towards the West, and there are fair prospects of Israel collaborating with the West in the event of Soviet aggression in the Middle East,
8. Arab States². The United Kingdom has treaty obligations to Egypt, Iraq and Jordan. It is probable that the governments of the Arab states, except perhaps Egypt, will favour the western powers and make facilities available to them.
9. India and Pakistan². India and Pakistan may well decide to maintain non-belligerent status unless directly attacked, although their attitude towards the western powers will be sympathetic.

Neutral States²

10. The following countries will attempt, initially at least, to remain neutral:-

Persia, Sweden, Switzerland, the Irish Republic, Finland, Afghanistan, Burma, Siam, Indonesia and Spain.

Most of these countries will probably resist if attacked, particularly if given support.

11. We assume that, if French troops are still deployed in Indo-China, they will be withdrawn as far as is practicable after the outbreak of global war. In this case, Indo-China will inevitably fall under Communist domination, to be followed shortly by Burma and Siam. Indonesia will probably remain neutral as long as the British successfully defend Malaya.

12. Spain. Spain will resist Soviet aggression. It seems likely that the United States will, during 1953, conclude an agreement with Spain whereby they will acquire the right to use Spanish naval and also possibly air bases in peace and war. In the event of France being overrun, Spain's early entry into the war may be expected.

13. Central and South America. Guatemala may pursue a pro-Soviet foreign policy and Argentina may persist in a policy of neutralism of effective advantage to the Soviet Union. The other Central and South American republics will favour the anti-Soviet bloc, and some of them will be in active alliance.

Warning Period

14. As a worst case it is assumed that there will be no warning period.

Weapons of Mass Destruction

15. Both sides will use atomic weapons.

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Soviet Strategy³

16. Soviet Object in War. In the event of war between Russia and the allies, the Russians will appreciate that they cannot defeat the entire western world, chiefly because of their inability to overthrow the United States. They will adopt therefore the limited object of trying to create a position in which the Soviet Union would be invulnerable to land attack and considerably less vulnerable to air attack. To achieve this they will attempt to drive allied forces from any land and air bases from which the United States could decisively counter-attack the Soviet Union.

17. Soviet Land Campaigns. The main Soviet land campaigns and the general priority which will be accorded them will be:-

- (a) to overrun western Europe including the Scandinavian and Iberian peninsulas and thus obtain bases from which to attack and isolate the United Kingdom;
- (b) to gain control of Turkey and to occupy as much as possible of the Middle East and the northern seaboard of the Mediterranean without diverting forces from the campaign in western Europe;
- (c) in conjunction with China, to hold or push back allied forces in the Far East and to occupy as much of South-East Asia as possible without diverting resources from the more decisive European area.

18. Russia has sufficient superiority of forces to start simultaneously all three campaigns, but the actual timing of campaigns will depend on the circumstances, on the area in which war breaks out and on the effect of allied strategic bombing.

19. Soviet Air Strategy. The main Soviet strategic air effort will be directed against the United Kingdom, in support of the land battle in western Europe, and against allied bomber bases in an attempt to reduce the threat of atomic attacks on the USSR. The division of effort between these objectives will depend on the course of the land battle, and the success of the Allied air offensive.

20. Soviet Maritime Strategy. In the early stages Soviet maritime forces will be used mainly in direct support of advancing Soviet land forces and amphibious operations and in attacks on sea communications leading to the combat areas. Forces which can be spared from these operations will concentrate upon attacking less localized sea communications, and, once the success of the main land campaigns has been assured, the bulk of Soviet maritime forces will be used to isolate the United Kingdom.

Middle East

21. During the period under review it is extremely difficult to forecast the internal situation in Egypt and consequently the United Kingdom forces deployed in the Middle East. The

Annex Part I (Concluded)

Chiefs of Staff intention is to return 3rd Infantry Division and 16th Independent Parachute Brigade Group to the United Kingdom as soon as possible. In the early months of the war, the Middle East is to be reinforced by one infantry division (TA) and one armoured division (TA). If any part of 3rd Infantry Division is still in the Middle East when war is declared, then so much less of the reinforcing TA infantry division will be sent. For the forces tables in this paper it is assumed that 3rd Infantry Division, except for one brigade, and 16th Independent Parachute Brigade Group, have been withdrawn to the U.K.

Austria and Trieste

22. The brigades in Austria and Trieste will remain in the southern sector.

Force Tables

23. During the period of six months under review the forces in the various theatres do not remain constant, and in some respects are still under examination. It is necessary in compiling the force tables to assume a specific date as the hypothetical D-day. The basic date for the force tables used in Plan FAIRFAX is 30th June, 1953. In employing the tables due allowance must be made for the interval remaining to this date, particularly in assessing RAF availabilities.

PART 2

STRATEGIC APPRECIATION

GLOBAL STRATEGY

24. The report by the Chiefs of Staff on Defence Policy and Global Strategy⁴ foresees global war, if it comes, passing through an initial phase of unparalleled intensity which may last only a few weeks, followed by a prolonged phase during which all forms of enemy attack will be much reduced, although possibly less at sea than elsewhere.

25. We consider that Anglo-American global strategy in the early stages of war should be:-

- (a) to launch a strategic air offensive on the outbreak of war, using both conventional and atomic bombs;
- (b) to hold securely the bases essential for the launching of the air offensive - United Kingdom, north-west Africa, Okinawa, the United States, Canada, Alaska and Greenland;
- (c) to secure the allied main support areas (the United Kingdom and the North American continent) and the support areas (Australia, New Zealand and South Africa);
- (d) to hold western Europe;
- (e) to defend the Middle East;
- (f) to defend such islands in the western Pacific as are considered important;
- (g) to defend to the best of our ability our interests in the Far East and south-east Asia;
- (h) to control sea and air communications essential to the implementation of our strategy.

26. Survival of the United Kingdom base and western Europe in the initial intense phase is of overriding importance.

27. Within the allied strategy outlined above, the critically important objects from the British point of view are:-

- (a) the defence of the United Kingdom against air attack and against invasion;
- (b) the defence of our life lines between North America and Europe and of our home waters;
- (c) the allied strategic air offensive;
- (d) the holding of the front in western Europe;

and, so long as our ability to carry out the above is not jeopardised,

- (e) the defence of the Middle East and the lines of communication thereto.

28. We consider that, both from the allied and British points of view, no other area (such as south-east Asia) must be reinforced to the prejudice of the attainment of these essential objects.

STRATEGIC AIR OFFENSIVE AND DEFENCE
OF ESSENTIAL AIR BASES

29. The mounting of the strategic air offensive is a United States commitment and we have no knowledge of her detailed plan. We have, however, considerable knowledge of her military operating requirements outside the United States, necessary for the implementation of this plan.

30. The United States is alone responsible for the defence of her essential air bases in her home territory and in Alaska and Okinawa. The defence of the air bases in the United Kingdom, north-west Africa and the Middle East involves the wider problem of the defence of those theatres.

DEFENCE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

31. The defence of the United Kingdom will rest upon fulfilment of the following main requirements:-

- (a) an efficient air defence organisation;
- (b) protection of our sea communications;
- (c) ability to launch an air counter-offensive against the bases from which the Russian air, submarine and minelaying offensive would be mounted.

32. We consider that the battle for the United Kingdom in the early stages of a war would be decided on the sea and in the air, and that a prime factor influencing the outcome would be the success or failure of the air counter-offensive. There is, however, a requirement for land forces for a defence against a possible invasion and raids and to assist the civil power. A nucleus land force will be provided by that part of the Strategic Reserve and the Territorial Army not despatched overseas, and by the Home Guard. Equipment will, however, be scarce.

DEFENCE OF WESTERN EUROPE

33. All N.A.T.O. plans and preparations are concerned with the defence of Western Europe as a first priority. The basis of plan FAIRFAX must therefore be that Western Europe will be held.

34. To this end we have agreed:-

- (a) in peace to station four divisions and tactical air forces on the Continent in addition to the three brigades in Berlin, Austria and Trieste;

- (b) in war to reinforce western Europe with two divisions by D plus 90 days.

THE MIDDLE EAST

Strategy

35. Strategic Aims. Our strategic aims are:-

- (a) To hold the Soviet advance as far to the north and east as possible in order to:-
- (i) meet the requirement of the allied air offensive;
 - (ii) secure Turkey's southern flank;
 - (iii) protect as much of the Middle East territory as possible;
 - (iv) secure at least a proportion of the Middle East oil;
- (b) Indirectly to prevent Soviet submarines and surface vessels from debouching into the Mediterranean.

36. Selection of Strategy. The full attainment of these aims is beyond our present resources. Consequently our strategy should be based on light mobile forces deployed as far to the north and east as possible in an attempt to delay a Russian advance.

37. Defence of the Oil Areas. Although the defence of the Bahrain-Ras Tanura-Dhahran-Qatar oil areas has previously been considered an integral part of the Inner Ring strategy⁵, it is clear that this commitment cannot be undertaken during the period under review because of the shortage of land and air forces for the defence of the Inner Ring itself. The defence of these oil areas must, nevertheless, remain one of our Middle East aims.

Air Forces.

38. The efficiency of the aircraft available in this theatre will be gravely prejudiced by acute shortages of radar and other operational equipment. It is most unlikely that these deficiencies will be remedied during the period under review.

Commonwealth Land and Air Contribution

39. South Africa and New Zealand have undertaken to contribute forces to the Middle East and it is hoped that Australia will send her expeditionary force there, although in this case it is unlikely that a firm decision will be made before mobilisation. Australian and South African land contributions have not been taken into account in this plan, because shortage of equipment will adversely affect their readiness for battle during the period under review. The New Zealand contribution will be only partially equipped. Some Commonwealth air forces will, however, be available.

FAR EAST AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA

40. Our strategy in the Far East and south-east Asia must be based on the accepted view that reinforcements must not be allocated to these theatres at the risk of compromising our more important commitments elsewhere.

PART 3

OUTLINE PLAN

COMMAND

62. Emergency planning should be based on existing command arrangements. It should however take into consideration allied commands which are expected to be set up in the near future.
63. It is hoped that early in the war, a Combined Chiefs of Staff will be set up as the highest military body charged with the conduct of the war.
64. The subordinate allied theatre commands are in varying degrees of development:-
- (a) U.K. Home Station - Under a British Commander-in-Chief.
 - (b) Atlantic Ocean - An allied command organisation under a supreme commander has been established.
 - (c) Western Europe - An allied command organisation under a supreme commander has been established.
 - (d) English Channel and Southern North Sea - An allied command organisation has been established.
 - (e) Mediterranean - The establishment of an allied command organisation is under discussion. Until it is established the British Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean will be responsible for the Mediterranean supply lines to the Middle East.
 - (f) Middle East - The establishment of an allied defence organisation is under discussion. Until it is established the Middle East remains a British Command.
 - (g) South-East Asia - As soon as the ANZAM Chiefs of Staff have been established, they will be responsible for the defence of sea and air communications throughout the ANZAM Region, including the Malayan area, but the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff at present retain responsibility for the external defence of Malaya and Borneo.

- (h) Far East - This will be largely a United States responsibility, but details are not yet known. The defence of Hong Kong is a United Kingdom responsibility.

Despite the incompleteness of (e), (f), (g) and (h) above, theatre commanders should, unless otherwise directed, concert with their allied colleagues emergency plans on the agreed lines of FAIRFAX and of corresponding allied plans.

STRATEGIC AIR OFFENSIVE

65. The strategic air offensive will be conducted on behalf of the Allies, largely by the United States Strategic Air Command. Aircraft will be based in North America, the United Kingdom, north-west Africa and Okinawa.

Preparatory Planning and Action Required

66. The United States have requested certain facilities in peace, affecting the following British and British-protected territory:-

(a) United Kingdom

(i) Bases for post-strike staging for heavy bombers, and bases for medium bombers, strategic reconnaissance aircraft and fighters;

(ii) Certain communications, airfields and depots.

(b) Middle East. Discussion is at present in progress, and an attempt is being made to ensure that the requirements of the United Kingdom and the United States are mutually compatible.

Defence of Essential Air Bases

67. The United States will be responsible for the defence of their air bases in North America, Alaska and Okinawa. The defence of those in the United Kingdom, north-west Africa and the Middle East, however, involves the wider problem of the overall defence of those theatres and is dealt with in the appropriate sections below.

DEFENCE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

Intention

68. As a first priority, to defend the United Kingdom and its sea approaches against all forms of attack.

Allocation of Forces

69. The United Kingdom forces which will be available for the defence of the United Kingdom are shown at Appendix A.

Defence of United States Bases in the United Kingdom

70. Certain units of United States Strategic Air Command will be based in the United Kingdom, but will not come under the control of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff. A number of fighter and light-bomber aircraft from other United States air commands, will, however, also be based in this country, the fighters coming under the operational control of the United Kingdom air defence commander. The local defence of all these bases is a United States responsibility, but in some cases initially assistance is to be given by United Kingdom forces until United States forces can be made available.

Reduction of the Scale of Attack on the United Kingdom and its Communications

71. Attack on the air bases of the Russian long-range air force and on their submarine and mine-laying bases is the first line of defence of the United Kingdom and will be one of the main tasks of the medium bombers of the United Kingdom Bomber Command. The Americans are aware of the importance we attach to these operations, and it is expected that substantial assistance will be forthcoming from the American Strategic Air Command.

DEFENCE OF WESTERN EUROPE

Central Sector

72. Intention. To support SACEUR with sea, land and air forces based in the central sector, and with certain air forces based in the United Kingdom.

73. Allocation of Forces. United Kingdom forces shown at Appendix B have been allocated to SACEUR. The necessary additional supporting units to make the existing garrison operational will be despatched from the U.K. as soon as possible after they are mobilised, although not all these units will be equipped in the period under review. In addition a corps of two territorial divisions and their supporting units has been earmarked to reinforce the forces on the continent as soon as possible after the outbreak of war, and in any event by D plus 90 days.

Southern Sector.

74. The British brigades in Austria and Trieste are allocated to this sector. As the necessary logistic support for these forces cannot be arranged in peacetime until after 1953, war plans must be drawn up to cater for the despatch of adequate maintenance stocks to northern Italy immediately after D Day.

Northern Sector

75. Apart from one armoured car regiment, no United Kingdom forces have been allocated to this sector.

ATLANTIC OCEAN

Intention

76. To support SACLANT in the maintenance of sea communications in the Atlantic and Northern North Sea and between the United Kingdom and South Atlantic.

Allocation of Forces

77. The allocation of United Kingdom forces to the Atlantic is shown at Appendix F.

MIDDLE EAST AND MEDITERRANEAN

Intentions

78. Our strategy should be based on light mobile forces deployed as far to the north and east as possible in an attempt to delay a Russian advance.

Allocation of Forces

79. The forces which will be allocated to the Middle East are shown at Appendix G, and include one Territorial armoured division and one Territorial infantry division less one brigade from the United Kingdom. Other re-inforcements will be provided as in plan MACKINTOSH.

80. Maritime forces allocated contain no components for the support of SACEUR's southern flank, which will be primarily an American commitment.

Defence of American Air Bases in the Theatre

81. Where these are sited within British or British-protected territories, their defence will normally be a British responsibility.

FAR EAST AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA

Intention

82. (a) Korea. To withdraw all United Kingdom forces from Korea when they are released by the United Nations command.
- (b) Hong Kong. To resist any Chinese attack.
- (c) Malayan Area. To deny Malaya to the enemy, as far as it is possible to do so, without prejudicing our requirements for forces in more important theatres.

Allocation of Forces

83. Hong Kong and Korea. The forces in Hong Kong and Korea on D Day are given at Appendix D.

84. ANZAM Region. Appendix E shows the forces allocated to the ANZAM Region.

85. United Kingdom Far East Fleet. The United Kingdom Far East Fleet will be redeployed to the Mediterranean and Atlantic within a few months of the outbreak of global war.