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CIRCULATED FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE CHIEFS OF STAFF

JP(56)133(FINAL)
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CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE
JOINT PLANNING STAFF

SACEUR's EMERGENCY DEFENCE PLAN - 1957

Report by the Joint Planning Staff

1. The Standing Group are considering SACEUR's Emergency Defence Plan for 1957+. They have requested that any comments the Chiefs of Staff may have should reach Washington by 7th September, before the plan is given final Standing Group approval.
2. In anticipation of instructions we have examined the Plan, in consultation with the Joint Intelligence Committee. Our report is at Annex.

Recommendation

3. We recommend that if the Chiefs of Staff approve our report they should send the draft signal at Appendix to Sir Michael Denny.

(Signed) E.D.G. LEWIN
D.S.S. O'CONNOR
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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

+ SACEUR's EDP 1-57
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ANNEX TO JP(56)133(FINAL)

SACEUR's EMERGENCY DEFENCE PLAN - 1957

AIM

1. The aim of this paper is to examine and report on SACEUR's Emergency Defence Plan for 1957.

THE PAPER

2. SACEUR's Emergency Defence Plan for 1957 presents in broad outline what he considers to be his best course of action should war break out in 1957.

3. SACEUR sees the year 1957 as a continuation of the transitional phase of the development of his forces and states that his goal continues to be the full implementation of the forward strategy. He points out, however, that while there have been improvements in his atomic counter-offensive capability, his early warning and air defence systems and in the state of training of his forces, there have been set-backs in other directions. He mentions the lack of a German force contribution and the further withdrawals of French army forces as examples.

4. SACEUR appreciates from the situation described above and from Russia's growing atomic strength that if war comes in 1957 he will be largely dependent on his atomic capability for survival and ultimate victory. He stresses that "the counter-offensive force must survive" and urges all Commanders to protect this force from surprise attack.

5. While no change has been made in the role to be played by SACLANC in supporting SACEUR, it is perhaps not made clear that the British element of the Striking Fleet, which is all that will be available on the outbreak of hostilities, has a very limited capability in support of SACEUR. The reference to it providing "the best possible support to SACEUR" might be interpreted over-optimistically.

PRINCIPAL CHANGES SINCE EDP 1 -56

Tasks

6. In general, the statement of tasks set out in the plan follows the same pattern as in EDP 1-56 but it now places greater emphasis on those tasks which bear directly on SACEUR's ability to retaliate rapidly and effectively with his atomic strike forces.

7. One of the tasks allotted to Central European Command, that of "arresting the Soviet land advance in Central Europe as far to the east as possible", has been amplified by the addition of "..... and contain the Soviet advance forward of the Rhine-Ijssel. Particular attention will be given to the defence of the areas Kassel, Frankfurt and Würzburg". Previous references to minimum essential preparations being made for defence astride the Rhine-Ijssel have been omitted. Presumably, this is a further step in

Annex (Continued)

the transitional phase towards forward strategy, which, possibly, SACEUR considers justified in view of the improvements he reports earlier (paragraph 3 above). It is also, possibly, a reflection of the continued withdrawal of French forces to North Africa and the present absence of a German contribution, inasmuch as SACEUR probably feels that in any war in 1957 he would not have enough reserve land forces in the Central European Command to allot to this task.

8. The tasks allotted to the Southern European Command place less emphasis on any help that may be derived from Yugoslav forces and are less specific about holding as far forward as possible. Mention is no longer made of securing the Erzurum area of Eastern Turkey. No reference is made to the Baghdad Pact, but the task of maintaining contact with the British Middle East Command has been retained.

9. CINCPACED has been allotted the additional task of assisting CINCSOUTH in controlling the Black Sea exits. This is a reasonable corollary of his responsibility for the Black Sea itself.

10. The tasks which relate to more than one of SACEUR's commands have been rearranged and augmented. Tasks relating to survival and atomic retaliation have been placed first and specific mention has been made of the roles of SACEUR's special strike forces in support of CINCENT and CINCSOUTH. Special mention is now made of measures to improve passive defence and early warning, the implementation of "Alert measures" and the development of the most effective air defence system. These changes are in accord with SACEUR's assessment that he will be largely dependent for the success of his mission upon the security of his atomic strike force.

11. Certain definitions have been added. These include M-Day (Mobilisation Day) and R-Hour (the time of release of atomic warfare by SACEUR).

Intelligence

12. No intelligence annex has been included in this year's EDP. Instead, attention has been drawn to the Standing Group paper on Soviet Bloc Strength and Capabilities (SG 161/9), as well as to various SHAPE Intelligence reports and documents. The following are additions to the list published in last year's EDP :-

- (a) SHAPE Basic Intelligence (Ground Force, Air Forces and Logistics).
- (b) SACLANT's Soviet Naval Order of Battle (with SH. E supplement).

Annex (Concluded)

3. The appreciation of the capabilities of the Soviet bloc forces includes two changes :-

- (a) The task of the "Defence of the USSR" has been widened and is now the "Defence of the Soviet bloc nations".
- (b) "Intensified political, economic and psychological offensives in all areas outside the Soviet bloc" has been added.

4. We consider that for purposes of the EDP the new references are an improvement on the former Intelligence Annex.

Atomic Weapons

15. SACEUR has completely re-drafted the Annex which deals with atomic weapons. The main effect of the redraft is to omit such matters of doctrine as may be found in his Atomic Strike Plan (ASP) and also guidance on supporting operations, while including the recently approved amendments to his operating procedures formulated as a result of experiences in recent exercises. The former Appendix, which gave the characteristics of various weapons and means of delivery, is omitted. The new arrangement appears to be more appropriate to an Emergency Defence Plan.

CONCLUSION

16. We conclude that the Plan is acceptable. We feel, however, that SACEUR's and SACLANM's attention should be drawn to the fact that the British element of the Striking Fleet Atlantic, which is all that is likely to be available at the outbreak of hostilities, has a very limited capability in support of SACEUR.