

Annex (Continued)

28. We consider that SACEUR's study complies generally with the principles of MC.48. The main changes result from a revision of his concept of the form the war will take. One effect of this has been that SACEUR has, at any rate by implication, toned down the extent and intensity of operations in Phase 2. While this may be true of the land battle, we do not consider that the diminishing importance of the post-nuclear phase will necessarily apply to maritime operations. On the contrary those Soviet submarines which were at sea when the nuclear phase opened might continue operations against our shipping.

Force Goals

29. The net total changes between the planned force goals for 1956 and 1960/62 are summarised below:-

Increase or Decrease
of 1960/62 figures
compared with 1956

NAVAL FORCES

Attack Carriers	Plus 2 (D-Day figures)
ASW Carriers	Plus 1
Light Fleet Carriers	Minus 1
Cruisers	Minus 6
Destroyer Type	Plus 5
A/S Ships	Plus 8
Maritime Aircraft	Plus 42
Submarines	Plus 14
Fast Minelayers	No change
Coastal Minelayers	Plus 4
Minesweepers	Plus 18
Fast Patrol Boats	Plus 12

Comparison of D plus 30 figures show decreases in all cases except ASW Carriers, which is plus 1, and maritime aircraft, which is plus 24.

LAND FORCES

Divisions	M-day	Plus 11 2/3
	1st Echelon	Plus 2
	2nd Echelon	Minus 5 2/3
	Total	Plus 8

AIR FORCES

Aircraft (Squadrons)	Plus 13.
Guided Missile (units)	Plus 34
Anti-aircraft (units)	Minus 25

30. In considering the above table we must take account of the German contribution. However even when this becomes available, it is unlikely that it will do more than make good the apparent deficit. It does not therefore appear that SACEUR's plan would offer much scope for reductions in individual force contributions. Further, the provision of up-to-date nuclear weapons will be an added burden for national defence budgets. We are doubtful therefore whether the expenditure necessary to achieve SACEUR's force goals would be politically acceptable to most NATO nations.

*WPS
answer of JACB
New July 1954*

OUR VIEWS

COMPARISON WITH THE MILITARY REQUIREMENTS CONTAINED IN THE UNITED KINGDOM DRAFT POLITICAL DIRECTIVE

General Considerations

31. In examining the study we have been mindful of the following fundamental principles which underlie the United Kingdom wish for a new political directive:-

- (a) In the light of recent Soviet tactics and the mounting cost of new weapons, a number of NATO countries, including the United Kingdom, must reduce their defence expenditure if Russia is not to achieve her ends by political and economic means.
- (b) The policy of the Western Powers is to devote first priority to preventing a global war since nuclear warfare would inevitably result in unprecedented destruction.
- (c) The primary deterrent to global war is the thermo-nuclear weapon, backed by the manifest readiness, determination and intention to use it.

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32. The United Kingdom therefore contends that apart from forces for the strategic air offensive, the military forces maintained by NATO should be the minimum needed to meet the following requirements:-

- (a) To keep confidence in the military effectiveness of the NATO defence organisation, and thereby contribute to the deterrent to aggression; and to prevent external intimidation.

- (b) To deal with local infiltrations and incursions.
- (c) To enable Soviet or satellite aggressive intentions at sea, on land or in the air to be identified as such, to provide a shield against a Satellite attack, and to hold an identified Soviet aggression until the strategic counter-offensive becomes effective.
- (d) To secure the radar facilities required for the full use of the strategic bomber forces.

33. SACEUR's study, is an exposition of the force requirements he considers necessary to defend territory in a land battle involving tactical atomic weapons. This conflicts with the above principles and requirements in certain respects which we elaborate below.

The Interdependence of the Economic, Political and Military Factors

34. We consider that SACEUR's statement that he has "worked within the broad parameters established by the economic facts of N.A.T.O. life" is difficult to reconcile with the force requirements set out in his study. Although there are reductions in certain types of forces, the force requirement shows a small net increase over the 1956 figures. The German contribution will help to relieve other nations of this increased burden but since any reductions in conventional arms are likely to be offset by increases in nuclear and guided missile weapons, it is unlikely that any economy to national budgets would in fact be effected. Should SACEUR's study be approved it is difficult to see how nations could effectively meet the "Cold War" threat.

The Deterrent

35. The United Kingdom political directive recognises that it is the strategic nuclear capability of the West which provides the primary deterrent to Soviet aggression, and that its existence makes global war unlikely. SACEUR however believes that in addition to the strategic nuclear capability, the deterrent must include all measures to resist aggression, by maintaining in being a force capable of defending NATO Europe against a full scale Soviet attack. The United Kingdom directive requires that forces in Europe need only be capable of identifying aggression, and of holding an identified Soviet attack until the strategic counter-offensive becomes effective. SACEUR has thus over-emphasised the contribution his forces make towards supplementing the primary deterrent.

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36. We are not in a position to criticise the size of the SHIELD he considers he needs even if his aim is modified to that stated in the United Kingdom draft directive. However, it appears that SACEUR's force requirement for 1960/62 may give over-insurance for the following reason. SACEUR

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envisages a war of two phases and considers that the first phase may last for 30 days. The United Kingdom directive specifically omitted any forecast of the duration of the first phase and contains no reference to the second phase. We consider that, bearing in mind the probable effects of the nuclear exchange in 1950/62, the first phase may be much shorter than SACEUR thinks. If this is correct, then it may be a further argument in favour of our contention that SACEUR's force requirements are an over-insurance.

CONCLUSION

37. We conclude that SACEUR's study is broadly in accordance with current NATO doctrine, but his toning down of the intensity and duration of the second phase does not necessarily apply to the war at sea, since those Soviet submarines which were at sea when the nuclear phase opened might continue operations against our shipping.

38. SACEUR's force requirements for 1960/62 may be an over-estimate of the land and air forces which might be needed to meet the military requirements set out in the United Kingdom draft political directive because:-

- (a) He over-estimates the contribution which his forces make to the deterrent.
- (b) He considers that his mission, should the deterrent fail, is to defend NATO Europe and postulates forces capable of "violent organised fighting" for 30 days, thereby implying that the nuclear counter-offensive may not become effective for a considerable time.

39. SACEUR postulates forces to fight a second phase of global war, whereas no mention is made of such a phase in the United Kingdom draft political directive. This question cannot be resolved until there has been agreement on a new political directive which would have to take into account what preparations, if any, should be made for a second phase.

40. We further conclude that the continued development of NATO strategy along these lines would perpetuate the political and economic difficulties facing us which, with the realisation of the implications of nuclear warfare, led the United Kingdom to propose a new concept of strategy.

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Appendix to Annex to JP(56)162 (Final)

DRAFT SIGNAL

FROM : MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, LONDON

TO : R.J.S.M., WASHINGTON

November, 1956

ROUTINE

COS(W)

For DENNY from Chiefs of Staff.

Subject: SACEUR'S FORCE REQUIREMENTS FOR 1960/62.

Reference: SHAPE/56/230 and 231.

We understand that the Standing Group has appreciated that time does not allow for preparation of complete papers on SACEUR's and SACLANT's studies for processing through the MC in time for the December Council meeting; and that instead they intend to prepare a non-controversial report on these studies, high-lighting the principal features and relating it to current doctrine.

2. We have examined SACEUR's study in the light of MC 48 principles and conclude that it is generally in line. The chief effect of SACEUR's study has been the toning down of the intensity and duration of the second phase. Whilst this may well be true of the land battle, it may not apply to the same extent to the war at sea where a Soviet submarine threat may continue beyond the nuclear phase. Apart from this we have no comment of substance.

3. We feel that the fact that the Standing Group report will presumably state that the studies are broadly in accordance with the current concept will tend, however illogically, to support any opposition to our new draft

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political directive. We therefore hope that the Standing Group report will be an entirely innocuous document.

4. We appreciate that you cannot obtain Standing Group approval to adopt the United Kingdom draft political directive as a basis for examining the long range studies, but you should be aware of our views about them so that you can influence, in the light of recent Council discussions; any part of the Standing Group report which may by implication prejudice consideration of the United Kingdom draft political directive by the Council.

5. We therefore summarise below our views on SACEUR's study in relation to the United Kingdom draft political directive.

6. We consider that SACEUR's force requirements for 1960/62 may be an over-estimate of the land and air forces which might be needed to meet the military requirements set out in the United Kingdom draft political directive because:-

- (a) He over-estimates the contribution which his forces make to the deterrent.
- (b) He considers that his mission, should the deterrent fail, is to defend NATO Europe and postulates forces capable of "violent organised fighting" for 30 days, thereby implying that the nuclear counter-offensive may not become effective for a considerable time.

7. SACEUR postulates forces to fight a second phase of global war, whereas no mention is made of such a phase in the United Kingdom draft political directive. This question cannot be resolved until there has been agreement on a new political directive which would have to take into account what preparations, if any, should be made for a second phase.

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Appendix (Concluded)

8. We further conclude that the continued development of NATO strategy along these lines would perpetuate the political and economic difficulties facing us which, with the realisation of the implications of nuclear warfare, led the United Kingdom to propose a new concept of strategy.

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