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Approved at COS(56)124 Meeting Min. 2
CIRCULATED FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE CHIEFS OF STAFF

J.F.(56)162 (Final)

16th NOVEMBER 1956

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

JOINT PLANNING STAFF

SACEUR'S FORCE REQUIREMENTS 1960/62

Report by the Joint Planning Staff

At their meeting⁺ on 9th October, 1956, the Chiefs of Staff when discussing a study^o by SACEUR on his Force Requirements for 1960/62 agreed that:-

- (a) It might be necessary for their views on the study to be sent to their representative on the Standing Group at short notice.
- (b) An examination should be undertaken so that a report on SACEUR's requirements could be prepared quickly if required.

2. Since then the United Kingdom draft political directive has been presented to the Council, and we understand that the Council will have before them SACEUR's study and a parallel study by SACLANC when they consider the question of a new political directive at their meeting in December. We have accordingly examined SACEUR's Force Requirements for 1960/62 and our Report is at Annex.

3. We have consulted the Foreign Office.
recommendation

4. We recommend that if the Chiefs of Staff approve our report they should send the signal at Appendix to Admiral Denny.

(Signed) D.S.S. O'CONNOR
J.G. DAVIS
L.W. NAPIER

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

+ COS(56)97th Meeting, Min. 3(c)
o SH.LP/56/230 and 231

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Annex to J.P. (56)162 (Final)

SACEUR's FORCE REQUIREMENTS 1960/62

1. SACEUR, on his own initiative has undertaken a study to determine the force posture of Allied Command Europe for 1960/62. The NATO Council have copies of this study, together with a parallel study by SACLANT, and they will be taken into account when the Council discusses the question of a new political directive.

2. Although the Council have instructed the Military Committee to submit reports on both these studies in time for consideration at their December meeting, we understand the the Standing Group have agreed that time does not allow for this to be done. Largely at Admiral Denny's insistence the Standing Group have decided instead to prepare a report on these studies based on the current concept. We understand that it is intended that this report will be non-controversial and will do little more than highlight the principal features of the two studies. We also understand that the report may be prepared in the form of a brief for the Chairman of the Standing Group to read to the Council.

3. It may well be that the Standing Group report, and the studies, will inspire argument and discussion when considered by the Council in the light of a new political directive. Our representatives in Paris and Washington will therefore require the United Kingdom military comments on SACEUR's study, in its relation both to the existing concept and to the military requirements contained in the draft political directive forwarded by the United Kingdom.

AIM

4. The aim of this report is to examine the SHAPE paper^s - "FORCE POSTURE ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE 1960/62" to determine the extent to which it conforms with:-

- (a) Existing NATO Doctrines.
- (b) The military requirements contained in the United Kingdom Draft Political Directive.

SACEUR's COVERING REMARKS

5. In a covering letter[@] General Gruenther says that his intention was to transmit the overall results by late 1957, but, in view of the great interest expressed by the Council, a study for the period 1960/62 was accelerated. The study, from which the paper under examination was derived was therefore neither as complete nor as precise as would result from the normal planning cycle; however, General Gruenther comments, he has confidence in the broad conclusions of the report.

① SHAPE/230/56
② SHAPE/231/56

Annex (Continued)

6. SACEUR after summarising the main conclusions of the paper states that the force requirements postulated for 1960/62 have been formulated "within the broad parameters established by the economic facts of NATO life" and that they do not, therefore, represent ideal requirements but rather "a level of forces established on a minimum adequate basis". He concludes that any appreciable shortfall in achieving the goals set out in the study might "involve dangerous risks to our security" and the study has added weight to his belief in the soundness of MC.48.

SACEUR's STUDY - PART I

Aim

7. The aim of the study is to evolve the force posture for Allied Command Europe for the period 1960/62.

Future Trends

8. SACEUR states that factors which may affect the force posture up to 1966 have been considered so that the posture evolved for 1960/62 will be suited to the future.

9. SACEUR appreciates that from 1960 onwards both sides will have "adequate" stockpiles of nuclear weapons, and believes that nuclear "sufficiency" will discourage Russia from resorting to nuclear war but that this "will apply only so long as the Allies are prepared to fight a general war". From this premise SACEUR argues that his Command can assist Cold War operations by "providing an environment of military security and confidence". "In particular", he argues, "the maintenance of adequate forces-in-being, properly positioned and fully trained, would constitute convincing evidence that any local aggression on a scale less than that likely to lead to general war, can be contained, and hence would be unprofitable". He concludes his examination of this aspect of the problem by saying that "the broad problem of meeting possible economic and political pressures must rest with individual governments".

The Threat

10. SACEUR appreciates that a general war would probably start with a massive nuclear offensive by the Russians and that there will almost certainly be accompanying land, sea and air campaigns to isolate and seize NATO Europe. He considers that the need for Russia to achieve surprise will limit pre D-day deployment of forces, particularly submarines and ground forces.

General War

11. SACEUR sees a general war in two phases:-

- (a) Phase 1. A period of violent organised fighting, not exceeding 30 days, the first few days of which would be characterised by the greatest intensity of nuclear exchange.

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- (b) Phase 2. A period of re-organisation, re-supply and limited military operations leading to a conclusion of the war. A large scale invasion of the Soviet Union is not envisaged.

12. SACEUR states that in the "initial and decisive phase the Allies would need to conduct a series of overlapping mutually dependent campaigns of maximum intensity and of minimum duration" with the object of "defending the populations, territories, vital sea areas and offensive striking power of NATO, whilst launching an immediate nuclear retaliatory campaign designed to neutralise the opponent's military capability, initially through the destruction of his nuclear delivery systems". He further states that the "character and duration of the second and final phase cannot be predicted with any assurance of accuracy".

Quartz

SACEUR's Mission

13. SACEUR states that the essential elements of his mission are:-

- (a) To assist in deterring aggression.
- (b) To assist in maintain confidence in Europe by providing an environment of military security.
- (c) To defend the peoples and territories of NATO Europe if attacked.

Requirements

14. SACEUR states that the primary task of his military forces is to deter aggression. He sees "the military establishment accomplishing this task by providing visible evidence of the Allied capability and manifest readiness to employ all measures, including nuclear weapons, to resist aggression." The deterrent must be such that Russia will always believe that resort to general war will certainly lead to the destruction of the USSR and it must also convince the Russians that they cannot attain even limited objectives.

15. SACEUR states that should the deterrent fail, the task is to defend NATO Europe. To accomplish this task in a situation where an aggressor would have the initiative, SACEUR's forces must be able:-

- (a) To obtain maximum warning of attack and to sustain least possible damage from the initial blow.
- (b) To apply immediate offensive nuclear firepower to destroy the enemy within the sphere of responsibility of Allied Command Europe.
- (c) To deploy and to manoeuvre quickly land, sea and air power to meet any form of enemy attack.

16. He states that five mutually supporting elements and conditions are essential. These are:-

- (a) Strategic and tactical intelligence systems capable of detecting impending attack.
- (b) An active and passive air defence, including associated early warning systems.
- (c) Nuclear strike forces, at a high state of readiness.
- (d) A strong SHIELD of land, sea and air forces.
- (e) Ready reserves which could be deployed quickly to reinforce an area.

17. Of these requirements SACEUR elaborates two: the SHIELD (the capitals are his) and the ready reserves. The SHIELD of land, sea and air forces, SACEUR states "must be in such strength and so deployed that there can be no hope in an aggressor's mind of limited gain or favourable compromise. The SHIELD must raise the stakes to a point where an aggressor who decides to attack, faces the devastating consequences of total nuclear war. In the event of war, the SHIELD, in conjunction with other forces, must defend the peoples and territories of NATO Europe. To do so under conditions of surprise attack the SHIELD forces must adopt a forward strategy". The ready reserve forces are required, SACEUR states, in order to add flexibility and depth to the SHIELD. In addition, certain units of SACEUR's forces should, he states, be trained for the additional mission of acting as a highly mobile reserve force, capable of immediate movement in peace and war to any threatened area within SACEUR's responsibility. The deterrent value of such a force, SACEUR states would be enhanced if its components could be drawn from two or more different national forces.

> *quest*!

SACEUR's STUDY - PART II

Force Posture

18. In this part of his study SACEUR describes the force posture he requires to implement the concept and mission outlined in Part I. The principal changes required for this period are listed below:-

- (a) "Land Forces"
 - (i) A deployment forward and in depth of D-day forces, particularly in Central Europe.
 - (ii) Increased atomic integration and flexibility.
 - (iii) The elimination of 3rd Echelon forces."

Annex (Continued)(b) "Air Forces —

- (i) An increased nuclear strike capability
- (ii) A reduction of conventional strike forces.
- (iii) A large reduction in heavy anti-aircraft units.
- (iv) A substantial augmentation of the surface to air missile component of the air defence force.
- (v) A slight increase in the all-weather interceptor force.
- (vi) A considerable reduction in interceptor day fighters.
- (vii) A large augmentation of reconnaissance forces."

John Jones

and

W. H. Jones

(c) "Naval Forces

- (i) An increase in D-day availability of striking forces.
- (ii) A redeployment of D-day forces to assure adequate control of front line areas.
- (iii) A reduction in numbers of certain types of ships.
- (iv) Elimination of most categories of post D-day forces."

19. SACEUR in Enclosures 1-3 to this part of his study tabulates figures showing the net total changes between the planned force goals for 1956, 1958 and 1960/62.

Transition

20. Finally, SACEUR emphasises that the adoption of his new posture must be carefully phased over the intervening years so that major weaknesses are avoided during transition.

OUR VIEWSCOMPARISON WITH EXISTING N.A.T.O. DOCTRINE

UK mil news

Mission

21. SACEUR's mission as contained in his Emergency Defence Plan for 1957, is stated as being to:-

"Defend the area of Allied Command Europe so as to provide essential protection and control of areas and LOC's of vital importance; provide protection of Allied

mobilization and reinforcement preparatory to sustained defence and/or subsequent offensive operations; and conduct an air offensive and such other offensive operations, as forces available will permit, to attain Allied objectives."

22. His revised version (paragraph 13 above) emphasises the greater deterrent value of his growing nuclear offensive capability, whilst at the same time it recognises the need to defend the peoples of Europe if attacked. It also takes account of the need to create an atmosphere of security in Europe. This is in accordance with the principles in MC 48, paragraph 2.

Discharging His Mission

23. SACEUR considers that his best chance of achieving his two primary aims of deterring aggression and creating an atmosphere of security, will be by displaying manifest readiness to fulfil his global war mission of defending NATO Europe. This is directly in line with MC.48 paragraph 3(a).

24. The three main pre-requisites (paragraph 15 above) which SACEUR says his forces must have to achieve his task of defending NATO Europe if attacked are in agreement with MC.48. Furthermore the first three of his five "essential mutually supporting elements and conditions" (see paragraph 16 above) are also in agreement with MC.48 and MC.48/1.

25. The two remaining "essential elements" (paragraphs 16(d) and (e) above) represent a shift of emphasis. Where SACEUR formerly spoke of "Forces in Being" he now speaks of a "Shield" and "Ready Reserves". In fact SACEUR says that his Shield must be capable of defending NATO Europe "in conjunction with other forces". By no longer stipulating the need for 3rd Echelon land forces he implies that there would be insufficient opportunity to mobilise such forces. We consider that SACEUR's "Shield" is not a departure from existing NATO doctrine, although his emphasis on "Ready Reserves" and increased M-Day forces arises from his belief that large-scale employment of nuclear weapons would compress the entire scope of a general war.

26. As regards a second phase he does not emphasise, as MC.48 does, that "our forces must be prepared to conduct operations of a much longer duration", but remarks that the character and duration of the second and final phase cannot be predicted with any assurance of accuracy.

27. Lastly SACEUR's requirement for forces for the additional mission of acting as a highly mobile reserve which can be moved rapidly in peace as well as war to any threatened area is one which has not been previously specified. It is no doubt linked to the idea of new Soviet tactics and contributes towards deterring "war by proxy" rather than all-out global war.

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