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delineation of responsibilities for nuclear strike action and at paragraph 29 regarding air defence priorities.

Naval Forces

39. SACEUR's broad concept of naval operations is:-

- (a) In conjunction with external strike forces and components of the Allied Command Europe strike forces to conduct nuclear counter-offensives.
- (b) To conduct a forward defence against the entry of enemy forces into Allied Command Europe waters by exercising positive control over the Black Sea Straits, the Straits of Gibraltar, the Baltic exits and, in conjunction with SACLANT, the waters between Norway and Spitzbergen.
- (c) To conduct limited operations forward of the defence lines in the Baltic and Black Seas and to contain forces threatening Allied Command Europe; and behind these lines to conduct anti-submarine operations.
- (d) To conduct mine counter-measure operations.

40. In addition to the foregoing SACEUR requires naval forces in support of ground operations for the defence of land frontiers. Their tasks are:-

- (a) The seaward protection of Allied Command Europe land forces.
- (b) Protection of coastal convoys.
- (c) Mining coastal and inshore waters.
- (d) Seaward defence.

41. The types of naval forces SACEUR requires are:-

- (a) A Strike Fleet - composed of a carrier task group and missile submarines.
- (b) A Shield Force - composed of anti-submarine vessels and aircraft, submarines and fast patrol boats, mine-laying and minesweeping units, and strike, mining and maritime aircraft. In addition SACEUR requires shore-based detection systems and organizations, which he states are national responsibilities.
- (c) Amphibious Forces - to be part of the strategic reserve and to be available after D-day.
- (d) A Strategic Naval Task Force - SACEUR suggests that the makings of such a force already exist in the Royal Navy and French Navy. He envisages its use on occasions short of general war when its mobility

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and power would be valuable. SACEUR admits that he has no initial wartime task for this force and has not included it in his force requirements.

42. The naval force totals, with the exception of the strike fleet carrier task group, allow for one third of the ships being in harbour or logistic supply area at any one time.

Our Views

43. We consider that SACEUR's concept of naval operations and the types of forces he requires are generally in line with his overall task, subject to our comment in paragraph 22 regarding the conduct of the nuclear counter offensive. We have the following additional comments:-

- (a) We are not happy about the employment of escorts in the Mediterranean on Hunter/Killer operations; some of these forces might well be better employed in the Gibraltar Area. We consider the requirements for all A/S operations in the Mediterranean, including Greek and Turkish waters, must be carefully scrutinised, any surplus being re-deployed to the Iberian area.
- (b) SACEUR states that all his forces must be ready on D-day. As far as United Kingdom forces are concerned, some D-day forces will not be on station unless there is a warning period as they will be deployed on a world wide basis to meet peacetime commitments.
- (c) We feel it would be premature to remark on SACEUR's idea of a strategic naval task force in conditions short of global war until he has had an opportunity to make his intentions clear.
- (d) We consider that the need for amphibious forces should be examined further in conjunction with a similar requirement put forward by SACLANF.

LOGISTIC IMPLICATIONS

44. SACEUR states that logistic support must be available for his forces until they can be effectively re-supplied. NATO policy in the past<sup>+</sup> has laid down that sufficient stocks must be available to last 90 days but SACEUR appreciates that, because of such factors as force attrition, intensity of operations, damage, etc., these stocks can be reduced.

Positioning of Nuclear Warheads

45. SACEUR considers that planning for the distribution of nuclear warheads must proceed at once within the framework of present laws and international agreements.

<sup>+</sup> MC 55 (now in process of revision)

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46. The United Kingdom's views are that the war, except possibly residual operations at sea, will be decided in the first thirty days. If it continues beyond this period it will be fought with forces and supplies remaining. The United Kingdom does not intend to provide reserves in excess of thirty days at United Kingdom rates with the exception of those required for naval and maritime operations.

47. We consider that the important problem of positioning nuclear warheads requires separate study in due course.

CONCLUSIONS

48. We conclude that:-

- (a) SACEUR's Study is generally in line with the NATO Strategic Concept and the United Kingdom White Paper on Defence, paragraph 20.
- (b) Except in minor details, SACEUR's appreciation of the Soviet threat is correct (paragraph 14).
- (c) SACEUR implies the possibility of limited war involving Allied Command Europe. This is not in accordance with the NATO Strategic Concept or United Kingdom thought (paragraphs 15 and 25).
- (d) SACEUR correctly states his tasks in general war provided that, in stating a requirement to join in the nuclear counter-offensive, he only intends to support his own shield forces (paragraph 22). *learn - copy*
- (e) Priority for "ready forces" can only be considered against all other force requirements for the free world (paragraph 24).
- (f) The principle of balanced collective forces in NATO is agreed, but the United Kingdom's participation must be limited by her world-wide interests and other Treaty obligations (paragraph 30).
- (g) If part of the Strategic Reserve is stationed in Germany, the likelihood of its removal at short notice must be made clear (paragraph 31).
- (h) No detailed comments can be made on SACEUR's force requirements until the operational concept and the threat have been reconciled between the three Supreme Commands (paragraph 32).
- (j) Should a comparison between force availabilities and Minimum Force Requirements show a substantial deficiency, it will then be for the Council to direct a reappraisal designed to make the best use of the forces likely to be available (paragraph 32). *delete*

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(k) It would be premature to comment on S/CEUR's idea of a strategic naval task force in conditions short of global war until he has had an opportunity of making his intentions clear (paragraph 43(e)).

(l) The distribution of nuclear warheads requires separate study in due course (paragraph 47).

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