

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.

It is issued for the personal use of C.H.

**TOP SECRET**

Copy No. 56

This document was considered at COS(57)8612 Meeting Min. 1

CIRCULATED FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE CHIEFS OF STAFF

1. On 10/11/57

2. Decided

3. By

4. JP(57)129(Final)

5. On

6. 6th November, 1957.

UK EYES ONLY

7. The problem of  
8. official  
9. studies  
10. information

**CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE**

**JOINT PLANNING STAFF**

11. 3. On  
12. 1. 10/11/57  
13. regarding  
14. to do  
15. products

ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE  
MINIMUM FORCES STUDY, 1958-1962

Report by the Joint Planning Staff

16. In accordance with Standing Group instructions & SACEUR'S study "Allied Command Europe Minimum Force Study 1958-1962" has been forwarded to all NATO countries for information and examination by national authorities.

17. 2. Our representative in Washington has requested\* preliminary guidance from the Chiefs of Staff on how SACEUR'S paper should be handled during the process of writing MC 70.

18. 3. In accordance with instructions<sup>2</sup> we have examined SACEUR'S study and our report is at Annex. We have consulted the Foreign Office and the Joint Intelligence Committee.

Recommendation

19. 4. We recommend that if the Chiefs of Staff approve our report it should be forwarded to the United Kingdom representative in Washington as guidance during the processing of SACEUR'S study.

(Signed) E.D.G. LEWIN  
D.H. FITZGERALD  
J.G. DAVIS.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

- & STAND 2088
- § SHAPE/154-1/57
- + COS(57)72nd Mtg., Min.2.
- % COS(57)77th Mtg., Min.3.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**UK EYES ONLYAnnex to JP(57)129(Final)ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE  
MINIMUM FORCE STUDY, 1958-1962INTRODUCTION

1. Arising from the adoption of the new "Overall Strategic Concept"<sup>†</sup> and "Measures to Implement the Overall Strategic Concept,"<sup>@</sup> major NATO commanders were each instructed<sup>£</sup> to prepare a Minimum Essential Force Study for the period 1958-62. The next stage is the combining of the three studies by the Standing Group into one document "Minimum Essential Force Requirements,"<sup>§</sup>
2. In order to give nations the opportunity to examine the problems involved before they are invited to comment on MC 70 officially, the Standing Group decided<sup>£</sup> that Supreme Commanders' studies should be forwarded to all Ministries of Defence for information and examination.
3. Our representative in Washington has stated<sup>\*†</sup> that he requires preliminary guidance from the Chiefs of Staff concerning each of the three studies, in order that he may endeavour to inject their views into MC 70 during its initial production.

AIM

4. The aim of this report is to examine SACEUR's study for the purpose of providing guidance to the United Kingdom representative in Washington on the handling of the study by the Standing Group during the preparation of MC 70.

SCOPE OF OUR REPORT

5. In this report we examine SACEUR's study to determine whether:-

- (a) It departs from the NATO Strategic Concept,<sup>†</sup>
- (b) It is in accord with United Kingdom defence policy and current thought.

NATO Strategic Concept

6. The Overall Strategic Concept for the Defence of the NATO Area<sup>†</sup> states that:-

- † MC 14/2
- @ MC 48/2
- £ SGM-105-57
- § MC 70
- ‡ STAND 2088
- \* COS(57)72nd Mtg., Min.2.

- 2 -

UK EYES ONLY**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**UK EYES ONLYAnnex (Continued)

"... the objective is to prevent war by maintaining adequate military strength in being, consistent with economy of effort, resources and manpower, which will demonstrate to a potential aggressor that fatal risks would be involved if he launched or supported an armed attack against NATO and, should war be forced upon us, to have the capability to bring it to a successful conclusion."

7. It defines the strategic objectives in Western Europe

"... the concept for the defence of Western Europe in general war is to carry out a nuclear counter-offensive and to sustain operations to maintain the territorial integrity of Western Europe until the ability and will of the enemy to pursue general war has been destroyed. Under conditions other than general war, the concept is to deal instantly and in appropriate strength with any form of incident such as infiltration, incursion or hostile action ..... Operations to fulfil this strategy should be based on the provision of a fully effective nuclear retaliatory force provided with all the necessary facilities, adequate land, sea and air shield forces, having an integrated nuclear capability, and the development of the maximum practicable air defence of the area ..... Operations should aim at destroying the enemy's nuclear capability, his forces and his resources and communications. Operations of the shield forces should be developed along defensive-offensive principles, generating appropriate targets for allied nuclear weapons, exploiting terrain to create situations which will inflict maximum attrition on the enemy and halting his attack, while retaining the maximum combat effectiveness."

SACEUR'S AIM

8. SACEUR states that the aim of his study is "to determine the minimum force with which Allied Command Europe could carry out its mission through 1963 and to plan the necessary transition beginning in 1958."

9. In the preface to his study, SACEUR states his mission as that in the preamble to the treaty which founded NATO "to safeguard the freedom, the common heritage and the civilization of the free nations ..... allied in collective defence." He later states, in relation to his mission, "if war should occur..... Allied Command Europe is charged with defending and holding Europe. A minimum force able to fulfil this task must have the strength and flexibility to cope with aggression however it materialises, and must be so deployed that the general NATO community will be preserved intact."

Our Views

10. SACEUR's use of the phrase "preserved intact" goes beyond the wording of the Strategic Concept,<sup>+</sup> which refers to

<sup>+</sup> MC 14/2

UK EYES ONLY**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**  
UK EYES ONLY

Annex (Continued)

the maintenance of the territorial integrity of Western Europe. SACEUR's statement on this sensitive subject is no doubt meant for political consumption and, taken in this context, SACEUR's aim is in accordance with the Strategic Concept and with the United Kingdom White Paper on Defence.<sup>7</sup>

THE THREAT

11. SACEUR considers that the growth in nuclear capabilities on both sides, Allied and Soviet, is the most important single factor in planning for the period under review. He states that the period seems certain to witness a climax in the evolution of military forces, Soviet as well as our own, toward a nuclear footing. In this he considers that NATO forces will continue to have the advantage in weapons, delivery systems and geography, and that Allied requirements for manned aircraft and certain types of artillery will be sharply reduced during the next five years.

12. SACEUR's appreciation of the Soviet threat is based on the latest NATO intelligence<sup>8</sup>. He believes that the chances of general war will remain remote unless the Soviet leaders become convinced that our capacity for decisive retaliation can be overwhelmed by a surprise attack, or be neutralised by a technological break-through in air defence, or that our fear of a nuclear exchange has made us hesitant. However, he expects none of this. He states that a general war deliberately undertaken would probably start with a nuclear offensive mounted, without warning, against Allied nuclear delivery systems as primary targets.

13. In his study SACEUR emphasises, in accordance with the Political Directive<sup>9</sup>, other possible paths of Soviet action where Allied Command Europe must exercise special vigilance, i.e. local attacks, incursions and infiltrations, and attacks against peripheral non-NATO countries. In his interpretation of these situations he implies the possibility of limited war involving Allied Command Europe and he has since further advanced this thesis in his Minimum Forces Presentation.<sup>11</sup>

Our Views

14. NATO intelligence only forecasts as far as 1961 and we do not accept all SACEUR's estimated figures for 1963. For example we do not agree with SACEUR's estimate of the D-day deployment of Soviet submarines. We consider that the threat should be reconciled between major NATO Commanders to avoid duplication.

15. The possibility of limited war involving Allied Command Europe is not recognised by the NATO Strategic Concept<sup>12</sup> or by the United Kingdom.<sup>7</sup>

7 Ccmd 124

8 SG 161/10

9 C-M(56)138

10 KC 14/2

11 COS(57)213

12 UKDEL Paris to FO, Tel. No.712

- 4 -

UK EYES ONLY

**TOP SECRET**