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*POL DIR DUBOZ*

Limited War

24. NATO strategy as laid down in the Political Directive gives the land, sea and air forces the task (amongst others) of dealing "with incidents such as infiltrations, incursions or hostile local action by the Soviets, or by Satellites with or without overt or covert Soviet support." The strategic concept also states that if such incidents were broadened or prolonged the situation would call for the use of all weapons (including nuclear) and forces, since in no case is there a NATO concept of limited war with the Soviet.

25. Both SACEUR and SACLANT envisage the possibility of a limited war. SACLANT states that "..... the danger of preparing for all-out nuclear war may lie in the failure or refusal of the Allies to provide forces adequate to counter limited aggression without resort to nuclear weapons." SACEUR in his oral explanation of his study to the Council, makes the assumption that the possession of the ultimate weapon by both sides (presumably H-bomb parity and means of strategic delivery) imposes on NATO the need to possess the means to deal with situations short of general war by measures short of massive retaliation.

Our view

26. We do not believe that MC 14/2 or MC 48/2 can be reasonably interpreted to give SACEUR, as he claims, the means to deal with situations short of general war by measures short of massive retaliation, or even SACLANT the means to counter limited aggression without resort to nuclear weapons.

27. The United Kingdom believes that war involving a country or countries of the Soviet bloc would almost certainly not be limited and, as neither the U.S.S.R. nor the West want global war, both sides would probably take care not to get into a situation which might lead to local fighting between Soviet bloc forces and those of the Western powers. SACEUR's concept, in addition to being contrary to the United Kingdom views on limited war, is also tantamount to accepting the theory of "graduated deterrence." The Chiefs of Staff have previously stated<sup>2</sup> that they do not accept either of these theories and we see no reason to suggest any change of viewpoint.

28. Any attempt to write into MC 70 a requirement to plan for limited war must, therefore, be resisted, as it might lead to inflated force requirements.

THE LACK OF PRECISION IN THE NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT

29. It is clear that the major NATO Commanders in writing their studies have worked to the broad wording of MC 14/2 and MC 48/2, rather than to the original wording of the Political Directive, in which it is apparent that the major deterrent is a fully effective nuclear retaliatory force. The result has been a partial return by SACLANT to the concepts in force before the NATO re-appraisal and to undue emphasis being placed by him on the scope and importance of

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Phase II operations, which has prevented the expected reductions in force requirements.

(30) The issue is made more difficult for Major NATO Commanders because no document dealing either with the strategic concept or intelligence clearly lays down their individual objectives and strategic tasks. Instead, in MC 14/2, the strategic objectives are listed by geographical areas.

RELATION OF THE STUDIES TO THE UNITED KINGDOM  
INTERPRETATION OF THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT

31. The two aspects in which the studies conflict with the United Kingdom view are as follows:-

- (a) The roles of the major deterrent and shield forces.
- (b) The possibility of limited war in the NATO area. (See paragraphs 24-28).

Deterrent and Shield Forces

32. In using the terms "the broad deterrent" (SACEUR) and "the overall deterrent" (SACLANT) the two studies are consistent with "The Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept" which states:-

MC 48/2  
"This concept requires two kinds of NATO forces which together form the deterrent to general war and, should war be forced upon us, ensure attainment of NATO objectives. There are powerful nuclear retaliatory forces, composed chiefly of long-range strategic air striking forces mainly under national command. There are also the land, sea and air shield forces which by their deployment and by their defensive capabilities demonstrate that aggression, no matter what the form, will be effectively opposed."

33. This wording follows closely the version recommended by the United Kingdom when MC 48/2 was drafted. It is the United Kingdom view that the primary deterrent is the strategic nuclear retaliatory force, although "the possession of nuclear air power is not by itself a complete deterrent."

(34) Therefore, while we must accept the claim by SACEUR and SACLANT that their forces constitute a part of the deterrent as defined in MC 14/2 and 48/2, we consider that, owing to the looseness of the definition, there is a danger that the requirement for shield forces will tend to increase out of proportion to their role.

35. Both SACEUR and SACLANT plan to use their atomic strike forces for use primarily against targets in support of purely theatre objectives. We consider that any tendency to supplement unnecessarily the major deterrent, at present provided by Strategic Air Command and Bomber Command, would not represent the best and most economical use of the overall NATO forces.

£ MC 48/2  
δ C.O.S.(W)4  
/ Cmd. 124, paragraph 20

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INCONSISTENCIES IN THE THREAT ASSESSMENT

36. We believe that SG 161/10 contains, generally, sufficient intelligence detail for Major NATO Commanders to assess correctly the Soviet threat. SG 161/10 must, however, be read as a complete document. It is possible to use extracts which, taken in isolation, can give a twist to or exaggerate the threat to a particular NATO front.

37. In each study the submarine threat is ostensibly based on SG 161/10. Each Commander, however, takes certain aspects of the threat and magnifies them to some degree. While no Commander makes any numerical reference to the submarines expected to be met in his theatre, it is clear that the overall submarine threat, at least at the outbreak of war, exceeds that appreciated in SG 161/10.

38. There are certain force strength inconsistencies of a minor nature between SG 161/10 and individual Studies, e.g. SACLANC's over-assessment of the weapon range and capability of the G/W submarines and SACENR's gross over-assessment of the medium bomber strength of the naval air arm.

39. It is difficult to criticise Commanders for these force strength inconsistencies because they are estimating the threat in 1962/63, whilst SG 161/10 gives the strength and capabilities of the Soviet Bloc from 1957 to 1961 only. Inaccurate assessment of the submarine threat may have led to the wrong concept of SACLANC's anti-submarine strategy. We cannot, otherwise, say that any exaggerations of the threat have led to inflated force requirements.

FORCE REQUIREMENTS COMPARED WITH  
FORCE AVAILABILITIES

40. The NATO minimum force requirements cannot be assessed until each Supreme Commander's study is co-ordinated against the strategic concept, the intelligence appreciation, and the strategic nuclear force capability.

41. MC 70 is a military document and we believe that it must give the Council clear military guidance regarding the minimum forces required to carry out the strategic concept. If a comparison between force availability and minimum force requirements shows a substantial deficiency, it will then be for the Council to direct a re-appraisal designed to make the best use of the forces likely to be available, bearing in mind economic realities.

United Kingdom Force Availabilities

42. At Annexure we show the forces required from the United Kingdom, compared with those we plan to provide. An approximate assessment of the shortfall in availability by 1962 is as follows:-

- (a) Navy - about 40% in destroyers and 80% in mine-sweepers on D-day. Most of the shortfall, except in GW cruisers and helicopters, is made good by D + 30.

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- (b) Army - there will be no shortfall in BAOR unless it is reduced to five brigade groups by 1962, when the deficiency would be 15%. This has not, of course, been disclosed to NATO.
- (c) Air Force - 100% in SAM, 63% in maritime aircraft plus 30% in tactical aircraft. NATO has been informed only of our planned reductions up to 1960. We have, however, declared a reduction of 41% in the V-bomber force in the United Kingdom Annual Review Submission.

## CONCLUSIONS

43. We conclude that:-

- (a) The Standing Group should be urged to come to grips with the problem of providing an agreed appreciation of the probable course of a general war applicable to the three Allied Commands. They should not confine themselves to a mere collation of the three Minimum Force Studies, but should resolve the inconsistencies of strategic concept between these studies, and lay down individual objectives and strategic tasks.
- (b) Inconsistencies between the force studies are:-
  - (i) Policy for preservation of shipping.
  - (ii) Maintenance, repair and replenishment factors in determining naval force requirements.
  - ✓ (iii) Economic considerations.
  - ✗ (iv) Re-inforcement of Europe.
- (c) All three studies generally conform to MC 14/2 and MC 48/2 and to United Kingdom defence policy, except with regard to limited war in the NATO area and a tendency to place undue emphasis on residual operations.
- (d) The two aspects in which the studies are at variance with the United Kingdom view are:-
  - (i) A possible over-emphasis of the role of the shield forces as part of the deterrent.
  - (ii) Possibility of limited war in the NATO area.
- (e) An inaccurate assessment of the submarine threat may have led to an incorrect concept in SACLANT's anti-submarine strategy.
- (f) Stockpiling requirements should be consistent and should take into account SACEUR's paper "The Impact of the 30 Day Concept on the Stockpiling Situation" and comparable papers that are required from the other theatre Commanders. This cannot be done until MC 70 is finalised.

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(g)

The question of Ready Forces should be reviewed and SACEUR should have an alternative plan if his requirements for ready forces and rapid reinforcement cannot be met.

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(h)

United Kingdom force availabilities up to 1962 show substantial deficiencies against the requirement of the three Supreme Commanders.

(i)

MC 70 should not attempt to tailor the force requirements to match force availabilities. It should, however, make clear that it is a calculation of requirements without prejudice to the provision of forces. If a comparison between force availabilities and minimum force requirements shows a substantial deficiency, it will then be for the Council to direct a re-appraisal designed to make the best use of the forces likely to be available bearing in mind economic realities.

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