

SECRET

hostilities in Western Europe. It is probable, however, that these airborne units will not exceed regiments in strength. This will permit a sufficient dispersion of forces, the ability to concentrate necessary air cover, and the deployment of an optimum airborne force upon the target area.

(3) Reinforcement Capabilities - The location of Soviet forces in the Western USSR and the ability to move large numbers of ground units by rail over extended distances provide for the rapid concentration and convergence of major formations of Soviet forces in the forward areas of Central Europe. The rail and highway through-put delivery capability from the USSR to the forward Satellite areas in Central Europe is rated at approximately 7.5 armored-type Soviet divisions per day; 5.5 divisions by rail and 2.0 divisions by road. Only the rail delivery capability is considered as a feasible initial reinforcement capability, since highway movement across Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary would be slow and would have deleterious effect on the combat capabilities of the units executing such an extended road march. Following a prior build-up in the forward area (west of a north-south line through Poznan-Budapest), utilization of the highway nets to augment the rail movement would increase the reinforcement capability within the forward area to approximately 11 divisions per day; 5.5 by rail and 5.5 by highway.

Thus the Soviets could (moving troops from the Western USSR) simultaneously reinforce their forces in East Germany at the rate of approximately four divisions per day; introduce Soviet units into Czechoslovakia at the rate of approximately one division per day, and reinforce Soviet units in Hungary at the rate of approximately one division per day.

Following a prior build-up west of the Poznan-Budapest line, Soviet forces in East Germany could be reinforced at the rate of approximately 7.5 divisions per day, in western Czechoslovakia at approximately two divisions per day, and to the Austrian border at approximately 1.5 divisions per day.

(4) Satellite Forces Capabilities: There are two general criteria involved in the Soviet assessment of Satellite forces capabilities and wartime roles; 1) their military value and effectiveness judged within the context of their capabilities vis-a-vis NATO forces and 2) the political/propaganda implications such utilization

would generate. The decision to employ the various Satellite forces probably will result from a compromise between these two considerations, applied to each Satellite on an individual basis, but on balance will favor the military criteria. For example: in East Germany, where there exists a large number of military age males with a heritage of discipline, a tradition of military service, and an armed force organized and trained in modern Soviet concepts and tactics, there are the tempering considerations of questionable reliability, disaffection and unavailability to Soviet direction which negates offensive employment; in Bulgaria, however, where the military, political and historical traditions favor the Soviets, in view of the strengthened and revitalized military posture of the Bulgarian Armed Forces, employment would measurably add to Soviet offensive capabilities. Consequently, while we anticipate continued improvement of the military posture of Satellite forces during the period of this estimate, the Soviets probably would employ only Bulgarian and Czech forces in offensive operations. The remaining Warsaw Pact forces would probably be used in various internal defensive roles.

c. Military Capabilities of the East German Army:

(1) Ground Establishment - The East German Army is organized into two military districts with a total of four motorized rifle, two tank, and one antiaircraft divisions, plus various support units. At the present time, the two military districts are comprised of one tank and two motorized rifle divisions each. In time of war, military districts will become armies reportedly consisting of two motorized rifle divisions, one tank division, army artillery, an engineer battalion, and a signal battalion. Each of these armies would have an estimated strength of 32,000 personnel.

Current strength estimate is as follows:

Ground Forces (6 line divisions)	67,500
Air Forces (175 combat aircraft)	7,000
Navy Forces	11,000
Security Forces	67,000
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TOTAL	152,500

(2) Organization Personnel Levels - The East German Army line divisions are currently at approximately 70 percent of peacetime TOE strength.

SECRET

(3) "In-being", Combat Ready Divisions - None of the EGA line divisions are currently considered to be combat-ready due to: 1) personnel shortages (units are 70 percent of TOE), 2) equipment shortages (units at 80 percent TOE), and 3) a command structure incapable of effective control under conditions of nuclear warfare. Although 40 percent of the weapons on hand are of World War II vintage, they are still effective. The East German Army has received and is still receiving modern items from the Soviets such as T54 tanks, JS3 tanks, BM13 rocket launchers, amphibian and armored carriers.

A contributing factor in assessing the divisional combat capabilities is the less than adequate overall EGA logistics posture (i. e. , Soviets not only control the logistics facilities and apparatus but the EGA is dependent upon the Soviets for resupply of all major items of equipment). Moreover, the factors of questionable political reliability and low morale negate an "in-being" combat status.

(4) Lead Time That Current Line Organizations Would Require to Reach a Combat Posture - This factor is dependent upon the season of the year (training cycle) and the efficiency of the mobilization apparatus. The combat capability of the EGA, as in other Satellite forces, is analogous to the training cycle, in that starting from early in the calendar year and advancing through the fall, the training (combat) capability gradually increases, reaching peak performance in September-October.

EGA divisions probably could be brought to full personnel and equipment strength within 15 days. Utilization of recently discharged reservists and/or the transfer of personnel and equipment from existing units, to achieve a smaller organizational structure, (i. e. , one, three division sized army) would reduce the time period required to reach combat status, (i. e. , if personnel and equipment from the presently constituted divisions were transferred to establish a smaller organizational level at the completion of, or during division level maneuvers in the fall, this would contribute to a more rapid attainment of an operational status).

As a general guide, under optimum circumstances, dependent on season of year and training status of reservists, (utilization of previous year discharged personnel during fall maneuver period), the EGA could field six full strength, effectively trained line divisions within 15 days after the decision to do so was made.

However, as indicated in the preceding section, these line divisions while attaining "effectiveness" from an equipment, personnel strength, and training status, would be of limited combat effectiveness due to their marginal reliability.

(5) Military Self Sufficiency -

Stockpiles: The EGA ammunition stockpile is estimated (based on an 80 percent capacity of known EGA ammunition dumps), to be 60,000 metric tons. This quantity would be sufficient to sustain an EGA force of six divisions (the two EGA type armies) for 45 days of offensive combat operations.

East German POL stocks amount to approximately 7,850 metric tons stored in EGA military depots and 85,000 metric tons in the State Reserve, all or part of which could be utilized by the military (to include GSFG). These stocks would represent approximately 120 days combat supply for two EGA type armies supported by 125 jet aircraft.

EGA military POL stocks (exclusive of State Reserve), represent approximately 10 days combat supply for the two EGA-type armies. Spare parts for armored vehicles, located primarily in the EGA Neubrandenburg and Finow ordnance depots, are estimated to be sufficient to effect 90 major overhauls of T-34/54's and five JS-2's.

Logistic Posture: Two major factors are considered in evaluating the EGA logistics posture; the rail transportation facilities and the industrial capability. Past experience has shown the Deutsche Reichsbahn, with its centralized control, completely adequate in the GSFG logistic support role. Therefore, it is concluded that the Deutsche Reichsbahn is capable of adequately supporting the EGA logistically in any foreseeable independent action.

Industrial Capability: Synthetic production of basic fuel from indigenous sources is approximately 113,000 metric tons per month, or about seven times that necessary for normal combat operations involving current EGA forces.

Munitions output in East Germany is limited to the production of small arms and small arms ammunition. The current output is approximately 135,000,000 rounds annually, 15 percent of

SECRET

which is military rifle, carbine and pistol ammunition. The remainder is sporting and 22 caliber ammunition. Reports of planned ammunition production for 85mm artillery and up to 120mm mortars for 1959 have been received; however, while this would be within their capabilities, no evidence of actual production of this ammunition has been observed. Soviet policy of centralization of essential war material production, by type, within the geographical boundaries of separate Satellites tends to contradict any plans for the production of larger caliber ammunition.

Production of heavy ordnance, i. e., armor and artillery, is non-existent. Total soft-skinned vehicle production, suitable for military use is less than 1,000 units of 1-5 ton capacity per month. East German industry does produce some armor plating and tank turrets; however, there is no evidence of a current production of such critical machined and die cast parts as transmissions, motor blocks, gears, and bearings for armored fighting vehicles. This production is considered insufficient to support independent EGA military operations.

In the final analysis, EGA levels of supply are dependent on the quantity of material the GSFG would make available to them. While EGA troops currently guard ammunition storage dumps with a total capacity of 75,000 metric tons, it cannot be assumed that this quantity of ammunition would be available to the EGA in the event of hostilities. Such a level of supply would approach that which is presently estimated for GSFG. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the Soviets would permit such a formidable capability in any Satellite force.

An upper limit to the EGA's logistic capability is suggested by the amount of POL immediately available and controlled by EGA, presently 7,850 metric tons. This stockpile is estimated to be sufficient for approximately ten days of combat operations. It is estimated that the quantity of larger caliber ammunition, combat rations and certain other types of critical supplies are probably as low as three days on hand and immediately available. (Indications are that EGA units carry only small quantities of ammunition, primarily for training purposes.)

The EGA's "in-being" logistical capability, therefore, probably does not exceed three days of ammunition and ten days POL. It is further limited by the lack of spare parts, replacement items of

equipment and communications apparatus. The EGA capability, therefore, is almost entirely dependent upon Soviet release of supplies and the receipt of other logistical support.

(6) Reserve System - The reserve system in East Germany is not considered to be effective due to poor organization, partly because of frequent changes in organization and mission, and also due to the demonstrated lack of enthusiasm on the part of personnel. In August 1957, reservists were integrated into the Kampfgruppen to bolster that organization; however, in time of war it is estimated that many of these trained reservists would be drafted into the army to fill up understrength units.

The East German Army reserve is composed of approximately 150,000 men under 45 years of age with prior service in the East German Army since 1951. In addition to these trained personnel, in the summer of 1958, all university students began an annual eight-week training program consisting of four weeks in the summer and four in the spring. Although this training is not mandatory, a student may be expelled from school if he does not volunteer. As a result, the enthusiasm and reliability of these reservists is quite low. Students of technical schools will subsequently be eligible for officer training.

(7) Mobilization Potential - Although the population of East Germany is approximately 17,000,000, it is estimated that a total of 400,000 men would be the dictated mobilization ceiling (any increase over 400,000 would tend to unbalance and disrupt the economy, rapidly reducing the effectiveness to the Soviets). Furthermore, to attain this mobilization ceiling would require an estimated six-month period of time.

The administrative machinery does exist and an adequate number of trained reservists, under 45 years of age, are available to fill the present military establishment to 100 percent of wartime strength within a period of 15 days.

The greatest obstacle to mobilization beyond the present seven line divisions would be the lack of additional equipment and other extensive logistic and administrative apparatus which would be required by expansion.

The following chart represents a phased mobilization, calculated to be within the manpower capability: Formation

SECRET

of additional line divisions would be completely dependent upon Soviet supply of weapons and equipment.

M Day	152, 500 (6 divisions)
M + 15	200, 000 (6 divisions)
M + 30	225, 000 (7 divisions)
M + 90	250, 000 (9 divisions)

(8) Military Trends - An appraisal of recent Soviet military activity illustrates an increased Soviet effort to establish an effective Warsaw Pact force amenable to Soviet direction and suggests the contemplated utilization of EGA units during hostilities.

Four activities are particularly noteworthy: 1) the receipt of modern material, 2) an increased emphasis on joint Soviet-EGA training, 3) concerted efforts to improve the reliability of armed force personnel, and 4) attempts to equate the armed force personnel status with an effective organizational level.

We anticipate continued improvements relative to the EGA equipment and training status, but insignificant improvement in raising the political reliability of personnel.

The personnel situation, relative to the reliability and numbers of individuals is, and will continue to be, the most serious limiting factor to any overall increase in combat capability. The recruiting programs have been unable to replace personnel losses. It is estimated that some additional forms of "conscription", such as the forced student participation in the eight-week training program, will be implemented during the period of this estimate.

(9) Combat Effectiveness/Reliability: Based on an appraisal of military factors alone, i. e., the equipment status, training program and organizational structure, the EGA and the security forces possess a good, if not an appreciable, combat potential.

These organizations, while achieving effectiveness from an equipment and training status, would be of limited, "less than adequate", combat effectiveness due to their marginal reliability, low morale, indifference to Communist ideology and consequent lack of enthusiasm to fight for the Soviet cause. An additional limiting factor is the mediocre military capability of the

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present Commanders of higher level organizations, specifically of division and military districts.

While during hostilities there would exist a proportion of both enlisted and officer personnel who, because of ideological convictions or opportunism, would energetically support the Soviets, they would be in the minority and would not constitute effective military units.

If the Soviets elected to integrate EGA units within Soviet organizations, the absence of other alternatives would force these EGA units into a much more active combat participation and would contribute to the Soviet capabilities.

(10) Probable Wartime Role as Directed by Soviet Plans: Under conditions short of general war, such as a popular uprising or revolt, the EGA and security forces would react to Soviet direction and function effectively only to the extent of Soviet impetus and applied control measures over said forces. Consequently, we anticipate that in the event of an internal disturbance in the GDR, the Soviets initially would employ East German security troops and if this failed, then the EGA, closely monitored by the GSFG, and as a last resort, would commit the GSFG. The timing and sequence of the Soviet reaction under such circumstances would be dictated by the extent and magnitude of the internal disturbance and the Soviet estimate of the situation. A spontaneous, violent, general uprising would undoubtedly result in immediate Soviet intervention with minimum EGA and security forces participation.

In the event of general war it is estimated the EGA would be assigned a defensive mission, e.g., securing lines of communications and rear area security, thus relieving Soviet units for offensive action. EGA units thus employed would be integrated into Soviet organizations, principally for control, but also for coordinated utilization.

Such defensive employment does not imply an innocuous role for this Satellite force, since rear area security in Soviet doctrine also calls for maximum military efforts. It would equate the demonstrated Soviet effort to increase the combat capability of the EGA with the Soviet estimate of the military risks involved in relying on a less than adequate military unit for critical offensive action. The battlefields of the next war will demand rapid movement,

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shock actions, deep penetrations and precise coordination of aggressive units; -- cumulative capabilities possessed by Soviet forces, but those which cannot be jeopardized by the failure of a "less than adequate" part, which the EGA would represent.

We estimate therefore, the assignment of only secondary military tasks for the EGA, resulting in marginal, perfunctory performance.

(11) Security Forces: The garrisoned security forces of the East German Government number approximately 67,000 troops. They are essentially military forces, but with a limitation; they are intended to oppose anti-government action by civilians, such as sabotage, insurrection, assassination, riots and strikes, and illegal crossings of the regime's boundaries. In the event of war they could be integrated under EGA control and employed to secure rear areas and lines of communications.

Five separate organizations constitute the garrisoned security forces; Security Guard Police (SGP), Security Alert Police (SAP), Border Security Police (BSP), Railroad Security Police (RSP), and District Alert Police (DAP). A summary description of each follows:

The Security Guard Police is the smallest and probably the most politically reliable element of the Security Forces. Only one garrisoned unit exists; a regiment located in Berlin with an approximate strength of 3,000, with the mission of guarding important government buildings and installations in the Berlin area. This force is armed with rifles, pistols, SMG's and LMG's. A small riot control unit is equipped with SK-1's, SK-2's and heavy machine guns.

The Security Alert Police is the most recently formed of the Security Forces, having been activated on or about 1 May 1955. The mission of the unit originally was the support and protection of the East German regime during periods of internal disturbance. An added mission of providing ground security for the uranium mining area was imposed on this element in 1956. Strength of this force is estimated at approximately 15,000.

The Border Security Police is the largest of the Security Forces comprising an estimated 35,000 troops. These forces are disposed along all the outer East German boundaries,

including the zonal, Czechoslovak, and Polish borders, and the northern coast including off-shore islands. This force also mans authorized crossing points including road, rail, seaport, and inland waterway crossings. The BSP is one of the most heavily armed of the Security Forces. In addition to the usual light infantry weapons, equipment includes mortars, heavy machine guns, 45mm, 57mm and 76mm guns, recoilless weapons and BA-64 armored cars.

The Railroad Security Police comprises a force of approximately 8,500 troops. This unit's mission is that of guarding vulnerable portions of the rail net against sabotage, i. e., bridges, culverts, tunnels, overpasses, repair shops, yards and terminals. This force is closely associated with the East German National Railway (Reichsbahn), but is not subordinate to the Reichsbahn or to the Ministry of Railroads. The eight regional headquarters of the RSP correspond, generally, to the eight National Railways Directorates (RBD's), with Sector Pasewalk being the only exception. It is the most lightly armed of the Security Forces, having only rifles, pistols, light machine guns and possibly a very limited number of heavy machine guns.

The District Alert Police is actually a garrisoned element of the civil police and as such is subordinated to the Main Administration for Peoples Police (HVdVP) which is in turn subordinate to the Ministry of Interior (MdI). This force comprises approximately 10,000 troops and has the primary mission to suppress riots and civil disturbances and to train recruits for the civil police. These units are stationed in each of the Bezirke (Districts) of East Germany and in the Berlin area and are armed with rifles, pistols and light and heavy machine guns.

(12) Paramilitary Forces - Two paramilitary organizations are in existence in the GDR:

Gesellschaft fuer Sport und Technik (Society for Sport and Technical Crafts -- GST), and the Kampfgruppen (Combat Groups). The GST is in fact a pre-military organization which attempts to arouse the interest of young men in military-technical training under the guise of sports and thereby to give them sufficient training to shorten basic training in the armed services. The training is not sufficiently extensive, nor is the organization designed to give the members as such any military capabilities.

SECRET

The Kampfgruppen are organized in factory, Party and government installations for the purpose of quelling any anti-regime violence. They were first organized after the 17 June 1953 uprising to defend individual factories and installations from mutinous workers within and attack from without. Since the Hungarian uprising training has been extended to include tactics in street and house-to-house fighting by concentrating units from several locations in the same area, in conjunction with police and EGA units. It has been reported that the responsibility for Kampfgruppen training has been transferred from the Ministry of Interior to the EGA, and officers are receiving training for conducting operations in conjunction with EGA armored units.

The Kampfgruppen have shown every evidence of being unreliable in the event of an emergency. Membership is obtained by pressure, which results in poor attendance and disinterested performance at drill.

The units are organized into companies of 100, called "Hundertschaften". Where more than one company is organized in the same installation, they are under single direction; otherwise the company commander is responsible only to the county (Kreis) staff. Consequently the organization is not capable of participating in large-scale military operations. In the event of war, members could be used as guards and watchmen of rear area installations, but it is unlikely that they could be relied upon to take hostile action against fellow-Germans.

Total strength of the Kampfgruppen is estimated at 200,000. Current recruiting is on a basis of a target strength of 250,000.

d. Military Capabilities of the Polish Army:

(1) Ground Establishment: The Polish Army is organized into three Military Districts, which probably have a dual role as Field Armies in time of war, and currently comprise 13 line divisions. The two western Military Districts contain all but one of the armored (tank) divisions in the Polish Army and, with the exception of the 1st Mechanized Division located at Warsaw, all of the Type A (or "ready") divisions.