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Current overall strength estimate as follows:

Ground Forces (13 divisions)	226, 000
Air Forces (870 combat aircraft)	23, 500
Navy Forces	12, 500
Security Forces	50, 000
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TOTAL	312, 000

(2) Personnel Levels - Ten Polish line divisions are at approximately 70 percent TOE strength (Type A), two are at approximately 50 percent (Type B), and one is a cadre division (less than 30 percent TOE strength).

(3) "In-being", Combat Ready Divisions - None of the Polish line divisions are considered to be combat-ready, (capable of effective combat action as presently existing), for the following reasons: 1) personnel shortages - no line organization is greater than 70 percent of wartime TOE; 2) equipment shortages - active organizations are generally maintained at 80 percent of authorized equipment under wartime TOE's; and 3) non-standardization of equipment throughout the forces.

Much of the material available to the Polish Army is of World War II vintage, however, the Soviets have initiated a military assistance program which, along with Poland's limited armaments production capability, is both modernizing the Polish forces along Soviet lines and reducing Poland's reliance on Soviet logistic support. The Polish Army, however, continues to be dependent upon the USSR for heavier items of military equipment, technical advancement and for such critical items of logistics support as POL.

(4) Lead-time that Line Organizations Would Require to Attain an Effective Combat Posture - Polish line divisions probably could be brought to full wartime personnel and equipment strength in 15 days time. The attainment of an effective combat posture would, as in other Satellite forces, be influenced by the period of the training year. Under optimum circumstances (i. e., mobilization taking place prior to fall maneuvers, use of previous years discharged reservists, etc.), the Polish Army could attain an effective combat status in about 45 days following M-day.

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The ten type "A" divisions, disposed principally in the western Military Districts, could not attain an effective status in measurably less time than the 50 percent reduced strength, type "B" divisions. However, the type "A" units, could acquit themselves better in an emergency mission, such as riot control.

### (5) Military Self-sufficiency - Potential for Independent Military Action -

Munitions and Armament: As the result of war damages and Soviet dismantling, virtually no Polish munitions industry existed during the early postwar years. During the following period of intensive industrialization, munitions production was at first neglected. Since 1949, however, Poland has developed and/or rebuilt a munitions industry which has produced annually, since the end of 1955, the following estimated quantities of munitions:

TT 33 pistols, 7.62mm cal.	10,000
PPS-1943 submachine guns	60,000
M-1944 carbines	90,000
DP light machine guns	5,000
Small arms ammunition	50,000,000 rounds
Artillery and mortar ammunition	600,000 rounds

Polish small arms and ammunition production satisfies the needs of the Polish armed forces. It is estimated that ammunition production capacities are not fully utilized and that the wartime potential for ammunition is a multiple of the above listed figure.

This ammunition production capacity suggests that a balanced supply of ammunition is on hand. Based on an appraisal of storage facilities, it is estimated that about 300,000 metric tons of ammunition, or a 40-day supply for present Polish forces is available.

In early 1957, Poland ceased producing the Soviet type T-34 medium tank and began retooling for the production of the newer T-54. Retooling has been completed and a small quantity of T-54's have been produced. Total capacity is estimated at 300 tanks a year.

Petroleum: Poland currently produces approximately 1,300,000 metric tons of strategic petroleum products. Approximately 60 percent of this production is dependent on imports of crude and 40 percent is derived from internal sources. The production of 520,000 metric tons of strategic fuel based on indigenous sources, is sufficient to fulfill the Polish Army's peacetime military requirements.

Poland's military stocks of petroleum are estimated at 165,000 metric tons, of which 50 percent is stored underground. This quantity could sustain present Polish forces for approximately 40 days.

Transportation Facilities: From the Soviet point of view, the most important transportation medium to Western Europe, are the five main east-west, standard gauge, rail lines crossing Poland. These lines currently service most of the international traffic between Poland and the USSR and the USSR and East Germany. Prior to interdiction, these six main lines are capable of delivering to the Oder/Neisse/Prague line 150 military trains daily, on a sustained basis. Based on a Soviet tank division TOE, approximately 4 divisions could be moved (daily), forward from the frontier of the USSR to the Oder/Neisse line.

(6) Reserve System - Reserve training in Poland during a single year can last as long as four months for an officer and two months for NCO's and privates. Under law, the total reserve refresher training time, to be taken piecemeal at two or three-year intervals, is limited to 28 months for officers and 18 months for NCO's and privates. This total requirement, however, is not fulfilled in all cases. The Polish reserve system is believed to be inefficient and generally ineffective. An operational ineffectiveness would be particularly apparent in the functioning of personnel who have been out of active service for more than five years. While there are an estimated 800,000 personnel in the reserve system (representing those individuals who have received military training and released from service during the past eight years), less than 500,000 are considered to be effective. However, recent indications point to an increasing awareness of the importance of this mechanism in a reduced strength military establishment - and a consequent emphasis on reserve training. This point is illustrated by the call-up and integration of reserves

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into active Polish units for participation in the first large-scale, joint Polish/Soviet maneuvers which took place in northwestern Poland during 6-16 September 1957.

(7) Mobilization Potential: There are an adequate number of trained reservists to fill the present military establishment to 100 percent of wartime strength within a period of 15 days.

Mobilization beyond the current 13 line divisions would be restrained by the additional administrative and logistic requirements such an expansion would demand. Furthermore, there exists a shortage of adequately trained key personnel, thus providing another handicap in the formation of additional units. In addition, the current equipment status and logistic capability, influenced in part by the modernization and re-equipment trend, is characterized by obsolescence, retooling, shortage of spare parts and dependence upon Soviet largesse.

The following chart represents a phased mobilization, calculated to represent a realistic, effective Polish manpower capability:

M Day	331, 500 (13 divisions)
M + 15	430, 000 (13 divisions)
M + 30	450, 000 (14 divisions)
M + 90	500, 000 (15 divisions)

(8) Military Trends: The Polish armed forces have entered another major development phase, the latest in a series that has witnessed the transformation since World War II, of a predominately infantry, poorly trained and equipped force, into a relatively modern establishment where the emphasis is on mobility and mechanization. This trend is most pronounced in the reorganization of line divisions along Soviet guide lines, specifically the establishment of armored (tank) divisions and motorized rifle (or light mechanized) divisions. During the past year Poland continued to receive post-World War II Soviet equipment and to develop an indigenous capability to produce modern military weapons, e. g., T-54 tanks and MIG-15 aircraft. While this activity portends achieving a self-sufficient logistic capability, it is negated by a reliance upon the Soviets for the basic raw materials and to a lesser degree, plant facilities.

Modernization and reorganization activities are increasing the operational capabilities of the armed forces and developing a military establishment that, while smaller than in the past, should achieve greater proficiency. Current evidence suggests a continued reduction in force level, through the elimination of marginal units, with a subsequent increase in modern weapons support and emphasis on reserve activities.

(9) Combat Effectiveness/Reliability: Recent reorganization and modernization measures within the ground forces have increased the combat potential of line units. However, it is improbable that the higher command structure is capable of proficient combined arms operations at this time, or will attain an effective capability during the period of this estimate.

Events transpiring in Poland since the fall of 1956, have tended to establish a nationalistic military force, one that reflects the traditional pride in the Polish nation, amenable to the direction of Polish officers and inhibited only by the existing political climate. Should an open break with the USSR occur, and as long as Gomulka represents the aspirations and optimum representative of the Polish people as he does now, the military forces would align with and support his (Gomulka) government. In the event of Polish/Soviet hostilities, the Polish Army would have only a limited capability for organized resistance. Poland's geographic vulnerability, between two major concentrations of Soviet forces, would present the Polish Army with an insupportable tactical mission. Furthermore, any conflict which might arise with the Soviets would be spontaneous, precluding Polish mobilization, and forcing the Poles to fight against a preponderance of Soviet forces, in their present reduced strength, less than optimum military posture.

(10) Probable Wartime Role as Directed by Soviet Plans: In the event of Soviet military action against the Western Powers, we believe that, although the Polish Army has a limited offensive capability, the Soviets would not attempt to employ Polish forces in offensive action. We believe this lack of offensive utilization would also maintain, were the Soviets to have the time to condition the Polish people to a German "threat" against their "recovered" territories. The probable wartime role would be confined to internal security, LOC defenses, closely monitored by Soviet forces.

(11) Security Forces: The Polish Security Forces are organized into two main branches; the Border Guard (WOP) with a

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strength of 20,000, and the Internal Security Forces (KBW) with a strength of 30,000. The missions of these forces are indicated by their titles, i. e., border guard and internal security. Although the KBW is equipped with tanks and light artillery and is an elite organization, neither of the security forces possess an offensive capability. Both of these forces have some defensive capabilities and are considered to be reliable to the present Polish government.

(12) Paramilitary Forces: Paramilitary forces worthy of note in Poland are limited to the Peoples Militia (MO), which are the regular police forces, and to the Factory Militia, a force made up of specially selected workers in large and important factories and whose primary function is to preserve order in the factory area. Under present and expected future conditions these forces are believed to be reliable to the Gomulka government and, in terms of their respective missions, effective. In a situation involving widespread violence, however, these forces would not be capable alone of restoring order.

e. Military Capabilities of the Czechoslovak Peoples Army

(1) Ground Establishment - Ground forces are organized within two Military Districts (MD's), which have dual roles as Field Army Headquarters, and each contain six motorized rifle (light mechanized) divisions. In addition, two tank divisions, one artillery division and five antiaircraft artillery divisions are directly subordinate to GHQ. Four motorized rifle and two tank divisions (Type A at 70 percent strength) are disposed in a defensive pattern in the western part of the country, as are three Air Force fighter divisions.

Strength estimate as follows:

Ground Forces (14 line divisions)	143,500
Security Forces	44,000
Air Forces (830 combat aircraft)	20,000
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TOTAL	207,500

(2) Personnel Levels: Four motorized rifle and two tank divisions, plus antiaircraft and air force divisions are estimated at 70 percent strength, (Type A), the remaining eight line divisions are cadre, Type B (35 percent).

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(3) "In-being" Combat Ready Divisions - No Czechoslovak ground line division is considered to possess an "in-being" combat ready capability due to existing reduced personnel levels and inadequate high level combined arms training. However, all ground units, regardless of personnel strength are believed to have 100 percent of authorized wartime TOE equipment available. The six (Type A) divisions could be employed with minimum preparation in emergency missions, such as riot control and anti-regime disturbances.

(4) Lead-time that Line Organizations Would Require to Attain an Effective Combat Posture - Czech line divisions probably could attain full wartime personnel strength in 15 days time. The period of the training year would dictate the time required to reach an effective combat posture. Under optimum circumstances the Czech Army could attain an effective status in about 45 days following M-Day.

The six Type A divisions, located in the Western area of the country, could attain an effective status (with priority efforts) in about 30 days time.

(5) Military Self-sufficiency - Potential for Independent Military Action:

Munitions and Armament: It is estimated that in 1953, the CSR had re-attained its high level of annual military production capacity which it had attained prior to 1945, namely:

- 5,000 light tanks and/or self-propelled guns
- 4,300 guns of 75mm caliber or above
- 43,000 heavy machine guns
- 61,000 light machine guns
- 730,000 rifles and/or carbines
- 600,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition

The CSR is producing considerably under the level of its capacity and it is believed that only approximately 300 tanks (T-54) are being produced in one year at present. Nevertheless, the above mentioned capacity remains, and may have been increased.

Analysis of ammunition dumps indicates a probable storage of approximately 350,000 metric tons. This quantity of

ammunition would sustain present CSR forces for approximately 45 days of heavy combat. It is believed that CSR has a sufficient manufacturing potential to make the country self-sustaining, munitions-wise, during war.

Petroleum: Czechoslovakia produces approximately 820,000 metric tons of strategic POL annually. However 90 percent of this production is dependent on imports of crude sources. Under present conditions CSR would be able to produce approximately two thirds of her wartime military POL requirements. It is doubtful that her present manufacturing facilities could be expanded to furnish the other one third. Without imports of crude oil, CSR would be able to provide only about 1/15 of her wartime military requirements.

The CSR is estimated to have a military stockpile of 135,000 metric tons of POL, 60 percent of which is stored underground. This quantity is estimated as sufficient to sustain present military forces for approximately 30 days of combat operations (pursuit).

Transportation: Czechoslovakia is completely land locked, and its most important transportation medium is the railroad system; however, lack of equipment, sparseness of high capacity east-west lines, and the difference between Soviet and Czech rail gauges limit the strategic potential of the system. The highways of the country serve mainly to supplement the rail network in short haul operations. Only one main east-west rail line across Czechoslovakia would serve effectively as an LOC in support of Soviet forces in a campaign in Western Europe. This line is capable of moving 30 military trains daily, or approximately .7 tank divisions. The highway net provides an additional movement capability of approximately .3 tank divisions for a total through-put capacity of 1 tank division per day, on a sustained basis.

(6) Reserve System - Reserve service in Czechoslovakia is compulsory until age 60. The Czechs have three different categories of reserve groups. Each category represents those liable to service in successive stages of mobilization. Men up to 40 years of age are considered in the first category; men between 40 and 50 in the second; and from 50 to 60 in the third. In addition, there is a "supplementary reserve" for men who have limited physical capacity or who have reached middle age without ever having performed military service. This group is given some training, but would serve in a limited duty status in time of war.

(7) Mobilization Capability - Existing units could attain a full wartime strength in 15 days time, utilizing recently discharged reservists to achieve optimum capabilities in the shortest period of time.

Although an effective reserve pool of 500,000 personnel is available, such a large manpower utilization by the military is not considered probable, nor would it be economically feasible.

The principal obstacle to mobilization beyond the current 14 line divisions would be the lack of additional equipment and logistic back-up, such an expansion would necessitate. The following chart represents a phased mobilization within Czech manpower and equipment capabilities; formation of additional divisions would be subject to Soviet supply of weapons and subsequent logistic support.

M-Day	205,000 (14 divisions)
M + 15	300,000 (14 divisions)
M + 30	325,000 (15 divisions)
M + 90	375,000 (16 divisions)

(8) Military Trends - Czechoslovakia is faced with a heretofore unresolved manpower problem as the nation attempts to increase her industrial plant and at the same time maintain an effective, standing military establishment. Measures to resolve this dilemma have followed two general trends: 1) in the economic area, there have been increasing efforts to maximize plant and personnel efficiency, and 2) within the armed forces, a modernization and reduction in force program predicated on a more efficient organization and modern weapons.

During the period of this estimate, the Czechoslovak Army is expected to improve its offensive capability and provide a positive contribution within the Warsaw Pact organization.

(9) Combat Effectiveness/Reliability - Continuing modernization and political screening efforts within the Czech forces are increasing the combat potential; however, the effectiveness of the army is considered to be limited by lack of enthusiasm for Communist ideology, an inadequate in-being posture and a relatively poor reserve training program. In general, the officer corps, which has been recruited from the working class element and carefully checked reference their political beliefs, is considered to be reliable

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and amenable to Soviet direction. While the enlisted ranks do not possess or exhibit this evidence of reliability, when integrated as units into Soviet organizations, they probably would acquit themselves satisfactorily. Although it is believed that the current political climate tends to associate Czech national aspirations with Communist objectives, the Czech Army would fight effectively, only when closely monitored and logistically supported by the Soviets, and then would have only a limited offensive capability.

The Czech forces are believed to be capable of maintaining internal security in the face of a popular uprising, the critical factor being the knowledge, and certainty, of direct Soviet intervention.

(10) Probable Wartime Role as Directed by Soviet Plans: While the employment of Satellite forces is not a Soviet military necessity, there are various military and political factors which could react in favor of such utilization. Foremost amongst the military considerations is the geographic advantage presented by the forward location of Czech forces, located astride favorable axes of advance into Austria and Western Europe. From the political/psychological aspect, prior to the initiation of hostilities, the Soviets might find it expedient to associate Soviet expansion with Socialist "survival" and in doing so elect to present to the world a common bloc issue, or communist cause celebre, and in furtherance of such a ploy, utilize Satellite forces to achieve their "united" objectives.

Within the context of the most likely course of action leading to hostilities in Europe, i. e., following a period of increasing tension, it is probable that the Czech forces would be brought up to a war-time posture and consequently would possess their optimum combat capabilities.

It is estimated that the Soviets could employ six Czech divisions initially, in combined operations against Austria and/or Western Europe, closely monitored and integrated within Soviet corps or armies. (Within a 30 day period the Czechs could have three additional divisions available as reinforcements/replacements).

Were the Soviets to elect to initiate hostilities in which strategic surprise was the paramount factor, we do not believe Czech, or any other Satellite, forces would be employed in the initial offensive effort.

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