

(11) Security Forces - The three most important security forces are the Border Guard (PS), Interior Guard (VS) and the Militia (LM). The Militia is a quasi-military organization, composed of armed and fanatic Communists and is the first force employed to repress public disorders. The Interior Guard is a militarized security force with a mission of supporting the Militia and guarding critical industries, railpoints and government buildings. The Border Guard, as the title indicates, has the mission of sealing the Czechoslovak borders and is a militarized force with some defensive capability.

These forces are generally composed of the most reliable elements of the population and are believed to be capable of accomplishing their assigned mission. In time of war they would probably all be employed in an internal security role.

f. Military Capabilities of the Hungarian Army

(1) Ground Establishment - The channel of direct military command is through the General Headquarters of the Hungarian Peoples Army, within the Defense Ministry, which currently directly controls six line divisions, three of which are at 50 percent strength and three at 25 percent strength.

Strength estimate as follows:

Ground Forces (6 divisions)	67,000
Air Forces (80 combat aircraft)	4,000
Security Forces	30,000

TOTAL 101,000

(2) Personnel Levels - Three motorized rifle divisions and one engineer brigade are estimated at 50 percent strength and three motorized rifle divisions and one artillery division at 25 percent of wartime TOE strength.

(3) "In-being" Combat Ready Divisions - No Hungarian ground line division possesses an "in-being" combat-ready capability due to their reduced personnel strength, inadequate training program (probably not above battalion level as of the fall of 1958), and a general posture of ineffectiveness reflecting the depredations of the October 1956 rebellion. Currently no Hungarian line division could be employed in a tactical role; moreover, no Hungarian

ground unit could effectively perform its mission against an organized military force. In the event of another popular uprising during the period of this estimate, the HPA would not constitute a reliable, nor an effective military force.

(4) Lead-time That Line Organizations Would Require to Attain an Effective Combat Posture - The present HPA force of six line divisions will not attain an effective training or organizational status until the end of the 1959 training year and then it will be marginal at best. It is believed that this force could not achieve an effective combat posture during the period of this estimate.

(5) Military Self-sufficiency - Potential for Independent Military Action -

Munitions and Armament: The Hungarian munitions industry has recovered from the 1956 revolution and the 1954 annual production level has been reattained:

	<u>1954 Actual Production</u>	<u>Estimated War- time Capacity</u>
Soviet-type submachine guns, PPSh-41	100,000	300,000
Machine Guns, light and heavy, Soviet types	8,000	24,000
Mortars, 82mm and 120mm	600	4,000
Artillery and mortar shells	260,000	575,000
Small arms ammunition	60,000,000	200,000,000

Prior to October 1956, Hungary produced more than its own requirement of the above listed munitions and was able to export small arms ammunition to the Soviet Union and, probably, to Bulgaria and Albania; munitions production, when mobilized, could reach a level exceeding the needs of Hungary's own forces.

Ammunition on hand and available to the Hungarian Army is estimated to comprise approximately one basic load of small caliber stocks. The sizeable stockpile of ammunition in Hungary is controlled by the Soviets and its release to the Hungarians would be contingent upon existing circumstances.

It is believed that a sufficient supply of balanced ammunition stocks for a Soviet force of four divisions, exists in Hungary for approximately 90 days of sustained combat.

Petroleum: Hungary is expected to reach a total domestic crude oil production this year of 900,000 metric tons, this constitutes 62 percent of the total annual through-put of crude oil charge-stock in Hungarian POL refineries. Since the bulk of the indigenous crude is a heavy product, not well suited for the production of strategic fuels, and since only a few refineries are equipped to manufacture these fuels, it is estimated that only 20 percent of the domestic production is used for the production of strategic POL i. e., 180,000 metric tons. Approximately 90 percent of this production is dependent on imports of crude and 10 percent is derived from domestic crude. Under present conditions Hungary is able to sustain its military forces with petroleum; however, if imports of crude were cut off, Hungary would be able to produce only about 30 percent of her military requirements.

Hungary's military stocks of petroleum are estimated at 125,000 metric tons. This quantity could sustain the present SFH (4 divisions) for approximately 120 days of combat operations.

Transportation Facilities: Approximately 75 percent of the total traffic moved in Hungary is by the railroads. The rail net is fairly well distributed throughout the country and the east-west lines, in the north, are used as alternative routes between the USSR and Czechoslovakia.

The rail and highway facilities in Hungary are capable of supporting the movement across Hungary of approximately one division per day, on a sustained basis.

(6) Reserve System - The Hungarian reserve system follows a general pattern in effect throughout the other Satellite countries. Reserve service is compulsory until age 60. Legally, such training, which is normally confined to those individuals under 42, can be undertaken as many as six times by each individual and may last from two to four months in any particular year. The number of trained reservists in Hungary is estimated at 400,000. This force, as well as the application of the system in effect, is not believed to be effective.

(7) Mobilization Capability - The six existing line divisions could be brought to full wartime strength in approximately 15 days time, however, they would not represent effective units. Basically, the HPA is restricted from a significant expansion of units by virtue

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of an inadequate training program, an ineffective reserve force, limited equipment and nonavailability of military supplies. The following chart is presented to indicate a manpower capability and does not represent an anticipated HPA course of action in the event of hostilities occurring during the period of this estimate:

M-Day	100,000 (6 divisions)
M + 15	150,000 (6 divisions)
M + 30	200,000 (8 divisions)
M + 90	250,000 (8 divisions)

(8) Military Trends - Notwithstanding the disintegration of the HPA during the October 1956 rebellion, Soviet efforts have been to reconstitute a military force which will, overtly at least, imply a contribution to Soviet power and position. That this activity contains much more than a psychological ploy, is indicated by continuing Soviet efforts to train selected Hungarian officers, NCO's and technicians in the Soviet Union and to reorganize the ground forces under latest Soviet/Satellite TOE's. Current indications portend the reactivation of an HPA that will be more closely monitored and directly controlled by the Soviets, a force that will parallel the other Satellite armies in equipment, organization and training and one that will be the subject of more stringent political indoctrination and control.

During the period 1959 - 60, the Hungarian Army probably will attain a strength of 8 line divisions and a much improved training posture, as well as a higher in-being personnel level. On balance this activity will not contribute materially to Soviet power and position.

(9) Combat Effectiveness/Reliability - Currently the HPA does not possess a combat capability and is not considered to be politically reliable. While Soviet efforts to reconstitute the Hungarian Armed Forces will achieve success from an equipment, organization and training standpoint, the problem of questionable loyalty and dis-allegiance to the Soviets will continue to mitigate against a combat effective posture. During the period of this estimate it is improbable that the HPA will attain an effective combat status or increase their political reliability to the extent that the Soviets would risk utilizing them in offensive employment, to include employment to quell internal disturbance.

(10) Probable Wartime Role as Directed by Soviet Plans - During the period of this estimate it is improbable that Soviet war plans will include the utilization of Hungarian forces in other than

internal security missions. Even then the Soviets probably will be circumspect in their commitment to ensure close Soviet control.

(11) Security Forces - The Hungarian Security Forces are organized into two main branches: the Border Guard (HO) and the Security Guard (SG). The mission of the HO, as the title implies, is to guard the borders and that of the SG, to maintain internal security of fixed installations of a sensitive nature. Neither of these forces possess a significant combat capability; however, their political reliability is considerably higher than the HPA (of the two security forces, the SG is the more reliable element and probably represents the only Hungarian force amenable to Soviet direction).

g. Military Capabilities of the Rumanian Army

(1) Ground Establishment - Control of the army is exercised by the Minister of the Armed Forces. A high command exercises administrative and technical control functions over the three military regions but has no tactical command. The operational chain of command passes directly from the Minister of the Armed Forces to the tactical commands. Neither field army nor corps headquarters exist at the present time but the tactical units (divisions) that do exist are patterned along Soviet lines.

The Rumanian Army, the second largest Satellite ground force in Eastern Europe, is basically an infantry force and is closely supervised by the Soviet Military Mission.

Estimated armed forces strength:

Ground Forces (14 line divisions)	215,000
Air Forces (325 combat aircraft)	13,000
Naval Forces	9,200
Security Forces	78,000
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TOTAL	315,200

(2) Personnel Levels - Eleven infantry divisions and one mechanized division are maintained at approximately 70 percent TOE strength; one mountain and one tank divisions are at approximately 80 percent TOE.

(3) "In-being" Combat Ready Divisions - No Rumanian line division is considered to be capable of effective, immediate combat employment, for the following reasons: 1) inexperienced leadership at the higher levels of command (i. e., division and above) and an inability to coordinate, effectively, large combined arms forces; 2) lack of technically trained support elements; 3) questionable loyalty of troops to Communist direction; 4) inadequate training posture, and 5) nonstandardization of weapons and equipment (most of the modern equipment is stored in permanent depots and only part of it used in training).

(4) Lead-time That Current Line Divisions Would Require to Attain a Combat Posture - Rumanian line divisions probably could attain full wartime personnel and equipment strength within a 10 day period. Under optimum circumstances, the ground forces could achieve a marginal combat posture in 30 days time, however, for the reasons indicated in the preceding paragraph, this would not reflect an effective combat status for offensive employment.

(5) Military Self-sufficiency Potential for Independent Military Action -

Munitions and Armament: Industrialization is still in its early stages. Nevertheless, a munitions industry has been developed with an annual production and wartime capacity estimated as follows:

	<u>Current Production</u>	<u>Wartime Capacity</u>
Soviet type 7.62mm pistols TT-33	3,000	Sufficient to fill needs of own army
Soviet type 7.62mm submachine gun PPSH-41	8,000	50,000
Czech type 7.62mm light machine gun BZ-26	500	Sufficient to fill needs of own army
Mortars, 82-120mm	180	Sufficient to fill needs of own army
Small arms production - rounds	25,000,000	75,000,000
Artillery shells 37-152mm - rounds	150,000	350,000

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Rumania is dependent on the USSR (and Czechoslovakia) for heavy artillery, tanks and other armored vehicles. It is estimated that a 60-day level (at combat rates) of ammunition is available for the present armed forces.

Petroleum: Rumania ranks 11th among world producers of petroleum; it has extensive crude oil sources and has sufficient refining facilities to produce six million tons of strategic petroleum products annually.

Rumania is estimated to have 90,000 metric tons of POL in military supply installations which is sufficient to maintain current indigenous military forces, for approximately 40 days of sustained combat (pursuit).

Transportation: The logistics posture of the Rumanian transportation system to support a Soviet campaign in Western Europe is considered to be generally poor. Railroads are the principal means of transportation in the country and consist of approximately 5,900 route miles of standard gauge lines, for the most part single track.

The inland waterway system is an important supplement to rail and highway and could be used primarily for transporting bulk supplies and/or POL. The Danube and tributaries constitute the principal portion of the waterway system.

(6) Reserve System - All citizens, ages 20 to 50, are subject to military service, which is divided into three categories: active, reserve and militia. (Active service of five years duration includes service in the ready reserve.) Reserve service of fifteen years duration follows active service and includes refresher training and active duty during emergencies. Periodic active duty training of reservists lasts from one to three months, depending on the grade and classification of the individual, and is normally scheduled during the summer training periods. The Soviet trained reservists of the Rumanian Army are estimated at 750,000 personnel.

(7) Mobilization Capability - Despite the availability of trained reserves, training facilities, cadres, and administrative machinery, the Rumanian Army could not mobilize effective units beyond the present number, due to the limited supply of artillery, armor and other specialized equipment.

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With Soviet logistic support, the mobilization capability is estimated as follows:

M-Day	315,700 (14 divisions)
M + 15	400,000 (14 divisions)
M + 30	425,000 (15 divisions)
M + 90	450,000 (16 divisions)

(8) Military Trends - As in other Satellite forces, the Rumanian Army is engaged in a modernization and re-equipment program. While the implementation of this activity is progressing at a slower rate than in Bulgaria or Czechoslovakia, the end product will be an improved, Soviet-patterned organization. No significant increase in the reliability or combat effectiveness will result during the period of this estimate, however, training and equipment advancements will be made. The Rumanian Army will continue to be dependent on the USSR for logistic support.

It is anticipated that a reduction in strength of the Rumanian forces will be accomplished, probably to the extent of the 55,000 announced in May 1958. This reduction will entail a screening of marginal personnel and units, and result in a lowering of active strength in the line divisions, and probably placing some of the divisions on a cadre status.

(9) Combat Effectiveness/Reliability - Recent and gradually implemented measures to modernize the Rumanian Army will improve its combat potential; however, its effectiveness and reliability will continue to be inhibited by the political climate, i. e., general anti-pathy for Communism, anti-Russian attitude and disloyalty to the puppet regime.

The Rumanian Army probably would not be a reliable or an effective force in the event of a widespread popular uprising in their country. As presently constituted, and during the period of this estimate, the army would not be capable of performing effectively in an offensive role outside their national boundaries; it does have a capability for employment in limited objective attacks against Yugoslavia.

(10) Probable Wartime Role as Directed by Soviet Plans - Should hostilities occur during the subsequent two year period, it is estimated that the Soviets would not attempt to employ Rumanian ground

forces in a major offensive role against NATO forces. It is probable that the mission of the Rumanian Army would be to maintain internal security.

(11) Security Forces - Rumanian militarized security forces are composed of the Frontier Troops and the Security Troops. The Frontier Troops are responsible for the security of the frontier and have an estimated strength of 35,000. This force is divided into approximately 15 regimental sized units which control the activities of subordinate personnel through battalion, company, and platoon headquarters in a military type organization.

The Security Troops are responsible for suppressing all forms of internal opposition or resistance to the Communist regime. They now have a strength of 43,000, tactically organized into one regiment, located in Bucharest, and individual battalions scattered throughout the country with specific territorial responsibilities. The security units are equipped with a higher proportion of automatic small arms than are equivalent Army units. Conscripts are chosen for their known political reliability and serve for three years. Since the Security Troops are screened for loyalty to the regime before they are conscripted, their reliability is believed to be higher than that of the army forces.

h. Military Capabilities of the Bulgarian Army

(1) Ground Establishment - The Bulgarian Armed Forces are controlled by the Minister of People's Defense, who exercises operational control of all major army headquarters and tactical units. The country is divided into two army and two corps areas for administration, mobilization, and training of tactical units located within their geographical areas.

The Bulgarian Army is predominantly an infantry force with the division as the major unit. Its organization is almost identical with that of the Soviet Army and it is Soviet oriented and mainly Soviet equipped. At present it is primarily a training organization with the capability of rapid conversion into a full strength combat organization by the mobilization of trained reserves.

Strength Estimate as follows:

Ground forces (10 divisions)	110,000
Security Forces	30,000

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Air Forces (300 combat aircraft)	10, 000
Naval Forces	6, 200
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TOTAL	156, 200

(2) Personnel Levels - The nine infantry divisions are currently maintained at approximately 50 percent of wartime TOE strength, the recently organized tank division at 75 percent of TOE.

(3) "In-being" Combat Ready Divisions - No Bulgarian line division is considered to be combat ready due to their reduced strength status.

(4) Lead-time that Current Line Divisions Would Require to Attain a Combat Posture - The present military establishment probably could attain wartime strength within a ten day period. Under optimum conditions, i. e., during summer or fall training periods, recall of recently discharged reservists, etc., the Bulgarian Army could attain an effective combat status in about 30 days following M-Day.

(5) Military Self-sufficiency - Potential for Independent Military Action -

Munitions and Armament: The Bulgarian Army's capability for independent military action is restricted by the country's limited industrial base. While there is evidence that steps are being taken to improve the armaments capacity, during the period of this estimate and for the foreseeable future, the army will continue to be dependent upon the Soviets for logistic support. Present ammunition production is estimated as follows:

Small arms	22, 000, 000 rounds
82mm and 120mm mortar shells	175, 000 rounds
Artillery shells (37mm through 122mm)	90, 000 rounds

The armament industry is not capable of manufacturing large end items of military equipment; current production is confined almost entirely to component parts for infantry and light artillery weapons.

Military equipment and ammunition is stored throughout the country at GHQ Reserve, Army area, and tactical unit dumps. It

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is estimated that Bulgaria has sufficient ammunition on hand to sustain present forces for 60 days of combat operations.

Petroleum: The domestic crude oil production totals 285,000 metric tons. Only 25 percent of this output is processed in local refineries, i. e., approximately 70,000 metric tons. This production, however, is suited only for industrial consumption. Bulgaria, therefore, relies 100 percent on the import of strategic fuels coming from the USSR, Rumania and also Austria. In 1957, Bulgaria imported 550,000 metric tons of finished POL. Based on the present domestic POL production the country is unable to support its forces without outside aid.

Approximately 75,000 metric tons of strategic fuels are stored throughout Bulgaria; 80 percent of these stocks are underground. Bulgarian forces can be supported from these stocks for 40 days of combat (pursuit).

Transportation: The rail system constitutes the primary means of internal transportation; highway transport is generally undeveloped. The through-put movement/reinforcement capability across the country in either an east-west or north-south direction, is less than one rifle division per day.

(6) Reserve System - The Bulgarian reserve and mobilization systems are patterned after those of the Soviet Army and are characterized by the capability for rapid, large scale mobilization of well trained forces. Bulgarian citizens, ages 17 to 65 inclusive, are liable to military service. The reserve system is probably the best and most efficient in Eastern Europe, and it is estimated that as many as 100,000 men are given refresher training each year either by participation in field exercises or by taking tours of duty in schools or at various headquarters. Mobilization plans are highly detailed and are often tested by trial mobilization. The system provides for the organization of new units using regular army cadre and reserve fillers. There are approximately 550,000 trained reserves of military age.

(7) Mobilization Capability - Bulgaria could mobilize at least 10 percent of her total population without seriously damaging her capacity to support a war effort. However, Bulgaria probably has only sufficient materiel to raise existing units to full wartime