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strength and to equip no more than five additional line divisions. To mobilize beyond this point Bulgaria would be dependent upon Soviet logistical support. The mobilization capability with outside logistic support is estimated to be:

M-Day	156,200 (10 divisions)
M + 15	250,000 (10 divisions)
M + 30	300,000 (12 divisions)
M + 90	375,000 (15 divisions)

(8) Military Trends - The efficiency of the army and its combat potential is being increased by improved training procedures, acquisition of modern Soviet equipment and the application of modern tactical concepts. In line with these activities we anticipate a major reorganization of the Bulgarian armed forces in consonance with latest Soviet procedures and TOE's.

(9) Combat Effectiveness/Reliability - The Bulgarian Army is considered to be the most effective and reliable Satellite ground force. The high command is experienced and capable; the leadership is believed to be loyal, competent and effective, and the morale, discipline and "esprit" of the troops is believed to be good.

Bulgaria is believed to be the most politically reliable Soviet Satellite and in the event of war, its army would effectively contribute to Soviet offensive operations. The Bulgarian Army could give considerable support to any combined Soviet operation in south-eastern Europe. Bulgarian forces could invade the Turkish Thrace, Yugoslavia or northeastern Greece, but could not successfully invade Asiatic Turkey.

(10) Probable Wartime Role as Directed by Soviet Plans - In the event of general war the Bulgarian Army would probably be committed against the Turkish Thrace and northeastern Greece. The objectives in such attacks would probably be limited and serve to augment the Soviet ground campaign. The Bulgarian Army is not now, and will not be during the period of this estimate, capable of sustained offensive operations over extensive distances.

(11) Security Forces - The Bulgarian Security Forces, estimated at 30,000, are subordinate to the Minister of Interior. They consist of the Frontier Troops and the Interior Troops and are

organized along military lines. They constitute auxiliary ground forces which, during wartime, may be used for special purposes or as line troops.

The Frontier Troops are responsible for the security of the borders and have an estimated strength of 15,000. The organization is basically infantry and follows the Soviet pattern.

The mission of the Interior Troops is to protect the Communist regime and maintain internal security. The strength is estimated at 15,000 organized into 16 battalions. Members are selected from among the conscripts whose political reliability has been tested.

The Security Forces are reliable, effective, and capable of suppressing any localized civil unrest.

i. Military Capabilities of the Albanian Army

(1) Ground Establishment - The Minister of Defense exercises direct control over the armed forces and is assisted by the high command, dominated by ground officers. The supervision of mobilization and conscription matters, as well as the provision for numerous logistical and administrative services are accomplished at Army GHQ. The Army is predominantly an infantry force with relatively little artillery and armor. It is organized along Soviet lines and the infantry brigade is the major combat unit. The highest echelon of tactical command is in its two corps, each of which normally controls two infantry brigades.

Strength estimate as follows:

Ground Forces (5 brigades)	30,000
Security Forces	10,000
Air Forces (50 combat aircraft)	2,000
Naval Forces	900
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TOTALS	42,900

(2) Personnel Levels - The five infantry brigades are at an estimated 40 percent of wartime TOE; the remainder of the military establishment is maintained at approximately 45 percent of full strength.

SECRET

(3) Number of "In-being" Combat Ready Units - None of the Albanian ground force units are combat ready due to their reduced strength status, inadequate training, equipment and organizational posture.

(4) Lead-time That Current Line Units Would Require to Attain an Effective Combat Posture - The present military establishment probably could attain full wartime strength in 30 days time; under optimum circumstances this force could achieve a combat posture in 60 days time, however, it would have limited effectiveness, and then only in a defensive role.

(5) Military Self-sufficiency - Potential for Independent Military Action -

Munitions and Armaments: Due to the lack of an industrial base in Albania, the army depends completely on the Soviet Bloc for the supply of military equipment. The majority of equipment furnished has been old Soviet equipment of poor quality, although certain anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, trucks and radar recently received from Russia and Czechoslovakia may be classified as modern. Albania's poor economy and low degree of technical education, training, and experience of her manpower prevent them from independently building or supporting an army of military significance.

It is estimated that a sufficient stockpile of ammunition is available to the Albanian Army to support defensive operations for at least 30 days.

Petroleum: Domestic crude oil production totals 490,000 metric tons annually. Since the bulk of this output is not suited for the manufacture of strategic fuels, i. e., gasoline and other light products, about 60 percent of Albania's crude output is being exported to East and West Bloc countries.

About 190,000 metric tons of indigenous crude oil is processed at domestic refineries. The annual production of strategic fuels (including gasoline, diesel and jet fuel) is approximately 130,000 metric tons. Fifty percent of this production, i. e., 65,000 metric tons, is based on domestic resources and 50 percent on imports coming from the USSR and Rumania.

SECRET

Approximately 35,000 metric tons of strategic fuels are stored throughout Albania, of which 50 percent is underground. Albanian forces could be supported from these stocks for 130 days of defensive action.

Transportation: The Albanian transportation system is poorly developed and inadequate for sustained military use. Highways are the principal means of land transport; the rail network is primitive and development is limited to the west-central part of the country, where two short standard gauge lines connect the port of Durres with the capital, Tirane and the Elbasom area. Both road and rail construction are hampered by rugged terrain, lack of equipment, and shortage of technically trained personnel.

(6) Reserve System - All physically fit males have a reserve service obligation until the age of 55. After an individual completes his tour of active duty he enters the First Reserve and remains in it until he becomes 45 years of age. From the age of 45 to 50, he serves in the Second Reserve. After that, until the age of 55, he is subject to call only in case of total mobilization. There are approximately 65,000 trained reserves now available.

(7) Mobilization Capability - Due to the lack of basic implements for waging war, Albania cannot mobilize effective units beyond the present number; however, with outside logistic support the army's mobilization capability is estimated to be:

M-Day	42,300 (5 brigades)
M + 15	55,000 (5 brigades)
M + 30	70,000 (3 divisions)
M + 90	80,000 (4 divisions)

(8) Military Trends - The Albanian Army will continue to be dependent on the Soviet Bloc for logistic support and technical and organizational improvements. Recent activities indicate a gradual but not significant improvement in capabilities; the objective being to maintain the relative status of the Albanian Army vis-a-vis other Warsaw Pact forces. Albania will continue to represent a strategic geographic area in the Soviet periphery and serve as a submarine and guided missile base.

(9) Combat Effectiveness/Reliability - The Albanian Army is the least effective of all the Satellite armies. It is incapable of

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launching a successful attack against neighboring countries or of withstanding large scale attacks; however, Albania does possess a potential for guerrilla warfare. Principal weaknesses stem from the fact that there is no training above brigade level; a lack of experienced leadership; poor morale among enlisted personnel; questionable loyalty to the regime and a shortage of modern weapons and motor vehicles. The army would be effective only in defensive operations.

(10) Probable Wartime Role as Directed by Soviet Plans - In the event of hostilities, the mission of the Albanian armed forces probably would be to maintain the internal security of the country, protecting the Soviet submarine and missile bases located in this country.

(11) Security Forces - The Albanian Security Forces, estimated at 10,000, are directly subordinate to the Minister of Interior. Since 1951, the Security Forces have been composed of two separate organizations -- the Frontier Troops and the Interior Troops. Personnel for the Security Forces are specially selected; in general, they receive better treatment and are better trained and more efficient than army troops.

The Frontier Troops, estimated at 6,000, are organized into 4 brigades. Their mission is to guard the borders and maintain frontier security. The units are distributed along the perimeter of the country and have demonstrated a capability for effectively sealing off the borders.

The Interior Troops, estimated at 4,000, are organized as a brigade. They are selected from the most reliable personnel and are charged with the maintenance of internal security. Their principal function is the elimination of resistance to the regime.

j. Hostilities in Europe Resulting Through Soviet Miscalculation - Since a primary Soviet objective is to either capture Western Europe or to neutralize it as a power factor, Soviet policy must seek to rupture the alliance between North America and Western Europe, to weaken the European component of the alliance, or to reduce the number of European states committed to the alliance. To this end vulnerabilities inherent in this alliance will be exploited by the Soviets by measures intended to exacerbate conflicts of national interest and in doing so will run the risk of miscalculating Western reaction to

their probing actions. In this regard the status of Berlin, the European economic competition, and regional political conflicts provide fertile ground for Soviet exploitation. In implementing these divisive measures, predicated on achievement of success in the face of Western vacillation and disharmony, the Soviets could arrive at an untenable position in which their vital national interests were threatened. Were this situation to obtain, and hostilities result, we believe the Soviets would attempt to limit and localize the conflict and would refrain from the use of nuclear weapons in an attempt to fight a "limited" war in which they possess a marked numerical superiority in conventional forces. We also believe that if general war comes about through such miscalculation, misconstruction of Western intentions by the Soviets, or as a result of military operations of limited nature which the Soviet did not expect to result in general war, they would not resort, initially, to the use of nuclear weapons. Upon the extension of the conflict, i. e., Allied response with nuclear weapons, the Soviets would direct priority nuclear attacks against strategic targets in North America and the Allied nuclear strike capabilities in the British Isles, North Africa and Western Europe.

Soviet courses of action following the outbreak of an "unintentional" conflict and a limited conflict, would be to augment their forces in the forward area through the introduction of advanced weapons systems and additional air and ground reinforcement. This augmentation and relocation of forces would probably be accompanied by mobilization measures in both the Soviet Union and the Satellite Bloc. Such preparatory efforts would jeopardize the "limited" status of hostilities and portend the extension of the conflict into general war. The possibility exists however, that all participants in the conflict, in recognition of mutual nuclear capabilities, would select to arbitrate the dispute and in the face of the nuclear alternative, return to the status quo which preceded the armed conflict.

During the period under review, (through 1960), should hostilities result, the eventuality of an unintentional initiation of hostilities in Europe is considered to be the most likely to occur.

k. Limited War in Europe - As suggested in the previous paragraphs, various predictable conditions exist in Europe which could lead to the unintentional initiation of East-West hostilities on a limited scale.

The following discussion is concerned with the military implications of a limited war in Europe, contrived by the Soviets in furtherance of

SECRET

their expansionist policies and objectives. Within this frame of reference is considered the possibility of a political climate conducive to Soviet blandishments of accommodation with the Socialist Bloc, coupled with incitement of the fears and terrors of a nuclear war and the vulnerability of the European battleground. To this end would be directed the Soviet alternative to nuclear devastation--capitulation to Soviet terms. These machinations could set the stage for a conflict in which the Soviets employed their predominant conventional superiority and which would preclude Western employment of nuclear weapons in defense. While it could be argued that the end result might be the same, i. e., Soviet domination of Europe, in terms of survival of European populations and cultures, of most immediate and vital concern to the European component of the Western Alliance, the opportunity to determine the nature of hostilities will engender strong pressures for the most feasible alternative to nuclear warfare. Thus, Soviet objectives would be served by specious overtures, to members of the Western Alliance, outlawing the use of atomic weapons.

Limited war might also occur in, and be confined to, such localized areas as Berlin and the Iron Curtain/Free World borders. Such localized conflicts might occur as a result of Satellite revolt, or of a direct clash of Soviet-Western interests.

During the period of this estimate, it is improbable that the Soviets will achieve success in dividing the North American-European alliance on such a vital military issue as reliance on the nuclear deterrent; in the face of Allied unanimity and firmness, the Soviets will be dissuaded from extreme risks and adventurism in areas vital to Western national interest.

1. Deliberate Soviet Initiation of General War in Europe - There is considerable reason to believe that the Soviet hierarchy views the East-West impasse in long range terms; that even a gradual evolutionary victory is no longer excluded as an acceptable path toward "socialism". Concurrent with their concentrated military efforts in the field of advanced weaponry, has been a series of sweeping, long range projects which have been instituted to bring about fundamental changes in the pattern of Soviet institutions. Each of these projects has as its goal an increase in Soviet power, but, taken as a whole, they necessarily reflect a long term, even gradualist philosophy devoted to fundamental changes which require time. It appears probable that the outward signs of confidence displayed by the Soviet leadership reflect a genuinely held belief that time is working in the Soviet favor and that the outcome of the

"socialist-capitalist" struggle is in fact viewed with substantial optimism. We believe that the Soviets will continue to concentrate upon progressive strengthening of the Soviet Bloc and upon opportunistic exploitation of Western weaknesses in order gradually to alter the balance of power in their favor. We believe that the Soviets are convinced of the feasibility and eventual success of such a doctrine and that courses of action adopted by them will be consistent with it.

Discernible indications within the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany, which we relate to Soviet intentions, also suggest a gradual, progressive improvement and strengthening of their military posture with the objective of maintaining a massive Soviet "deterrent" capability - - rather than preparations for deliberate hostilities in the near future.

On the basis of the foregoing we believe that during the period of this estimate the Soviet Union will strengthen its conventional forces for use in an expected condition of a balance of massive destruction capabilities, and will not undertake deliberate hostile military action against United States forces in Europe or against NATO members.

m. Most Probable Soviet Ground Campaign Against Western Europe -

(1) Perspective:

(a) During the period of this estimate, the deliberate Soviet initiation of a general war, or of a limited war in Europe, is improbable. Hostilities could result through Soviet miscalculation, misconstruction of Western intentions, or through the extension of military operations of a limited nature which the Soviets did not expect to result in general war.

(b) In a war resulting from Soviet miscalculation, following a period of increasing tension (which we believe to be the most likely eventuality leading to hostilities), we estimate the following to be the most probable Soviet courses of offensive action:

1. To conduct a rapid, limited reinforcement in the forward area to attain a preponderance of balanced forces.

2. Initially, to refrain from the employment of nuclear weapons in an effort to limit the conflict, compromise the defensive capability of the West, and provide for the optimum utilization of their numerically superior conventional forces.

3. To make a rapid, deep penetration to the west, with the objective of securing the west bank of the Rhine. To this end, a major offensive effort in the Wetterau and Fulda Corridors, to reach the Rhine near Mainz, offers maximum advantages to the Soviets.

(c) Soviet logistic and force capabilities complement this course of action. The dispositions, large numbers, and combat-ready status of major Soviet units in the Western USSR, coupled with the transportation capacity to move substantial forces rapidly over interior lines of communication, combine to provide the most advantageous set of Soviet offensive capabilities against Western Europe. This capability does not compromise the Soviet intention to attain surprise to any greater extent than would certain minimal defensive measures since limited air and ground reinforcement could be rapidly achieved in locations adjacent to the major avenues of approach into Western Europe.

Selection of this course of action would be in consonance with Soviet tactical doctrine which emphasizes substantial reinforcement in forward areas prior to an offensive and would more adequately face the realities of future warfare. That is, the Soviets undoubtedly appreciate the risk that any armed conflict in Europe would constitute the initiation of global war, and hence, a carefully executed, adequate reinforcement prior to hostilities would offer greater assurance, with minimum risks, of quick and decisive Soviet victory on the continent.

It is estimated that the Soviets would favor a limited reinforcement to an initial balanced force of 45-60 line divisions in the forward areas, with planned additional reinforcements to a total strength of 100 divisions by D plus 30 days. The initial reinforcement to 45 line divisions could be accomplished in approximately 72 hours. Reinforcement of the forward area would not necessarily involve movement of forces into East Germany; concentration of additional troop units in Western Poland prior to D-Day would provide for the rapid augmentation of Soviet forces into East Germany and their entry into Czechoslovakia (introduction of Soviet forces into Czechoslovakia to provide for immediate commitment against Western Europe is believed to be a Soviet tactical necessity).

Soviet objectives, under this course of action, would be to attempt to achieve surprise, yet provide for a preponderance of balanced forces and the capability to overrun Western Europe within the shortest possible time. In this regard, the advantage of deploying additional forces

SECRET

in the immediate area of contact also extends the Soviet capability to retain a combat posture for a period sufficient to insure the physical acquisition of the European continent.

(2) Terrain Considerations:

For a Soviet force attacking Western Europe, the outstanding critical terrain feature in Europe is the ground dominating the west bank of the Rhine River -- the Rhine itself being the most formidable, natural obstacle in the entire area. This feature must be secured in order to ensure further Soviet westward advance along the axis towards Paris and the Channel. If not seized, a potential threat to the flank of any Soviet advance across the North German Plain would exist.

(3) Axes of Advance:

(a) In general there are three major favorable axes of movement for a force attacking toward and across the Rhine from the east. The first follows the dry southern edge of the North German Plain and crosses the Rhine between Ruhr and Arnhem-Nymgen. The polder regions of the Netherlands, and the similar but less extensive areas in extreme northwestern Germany, limit movement north of this axis.

(b) The second axis follows the Wetterau and Fulda Corridors to reach the Rhine near Mainz.

(c) The third utilizes the Bavarian Plateau and the Kraichgau Corridor to reach the Rhine at Karlsruhe. South of this third axis, movement is greatly restricted and channelized by the Black Forest and Jura Mountains and even more directly by the Alps.

(4) Logistic Approach Routes:

(a) Three major concentrations of transportation routes lead westward from the Satellite boundary. These, on the whole, coincide with the best tactical routes of advance.

1. Routes in the North German Plain: This concentration of routes is the densest and the highest capacity network of transportation lines on the European continent. These lines, following the southern edge of the North German Plain near the base of the highlands, cross the Rhine between Koln and Wesel.