

2. The Central German Routes: These routes converge on the northern crossing of the Upper Rhine Plain (Mainz to Karlsruhe) from Thuringia and Czechoslovakia, passing through Hesse and Frankonia. These routes are somewhat less concentrated and of somewhat lower capacity than those in the North German Plain; nevertheless, they have a very high capacity. The routes leading to the key crossing of Mainz, through Frankfurt, have a capacity equal to or exceeding that of the routes leading to any other individual Rhine bridge area.

3. The South German Routes: These routes lead northward out of Austria across Bavaria and the Kraichgau to the same crossings as the central German routes. In this case, however, the heaviest concentration of routes leads to Karlsruhe, whereas the heaviest route concentration in the central group focuses on the Frankfurt-Mainz area.

(5) Exit Routes:

(a) The concentrations of logistic exit routes in general correspond to the concentrations in the approaches. However, these factors should be noted:

1. In the north, the exit routes have generally lower capacities than the routes in the approaches.

2. Those in the Mainz-Karlsruhe sector are likewise of lower capacity than the approach routes, but the disparity is not so great.

3. Exit routes from the southern part of the Upper Rhine Plain via Strasbourg and Mulhouse have a higher capacity than the approach routes. These exit routes might be exploited by the Soviets through diversion of traffic from the northern part of the Plain via the excellent lateral communications of the Rhine Valley itself.

(b) Thus from the logistic point of view, crossings from Wesel to Koln and from Mainz to Karlsruhe would have the greatest value to the Soviets.

(6) Soviet Tactics:

We believe the major Soviet offensive effort would be made in the Hessian Corridor, and its continuations, the Wetterau

Corridor and the Fulda Gap (the Eisenach-Giessen-Frankfurt axis)-- and thence to the Rhine corridor. This approach contains no major barriers, with the exception of the Main River, and is the most favorable and shortest route of approach to the Rhine River. This approach includes the critical city of Frankfurt, which is a center for land communications in Germany and, once across the Rhine, leads directly to critical exits into the relatively open country of the Lorraine Plateau. Moreover, the Hessian Corridor would give the Soviets the shortest, most direct supply routes from bases in East Germany. In addition, a maximum Soviet effort along the Eisenach-Giessen-Frankfurt axis would split the CENTAG-NORTHAG Army Groups. A Soviet offensive that would divide the NATO forces, affect the crossing of the Rhine, and move against our logistic installations in the Kaiserslautern complex would also be posed for rapid lateral exploitation, enveloping the NATO forces to the north and south. This offensive would also engage the preponderance of NATO military forces in Europe and considers what must be one of the major Soviet objectives -- complete destruction of this force in order to ensure the rapid conquest of the continent. One of the tactical criteria of the Soviets under this course of action would be to prevent the disengagement of NATO forces and their subsequent withdrawal to previously selected defensive positions. Therefore, we believe the Soviet requirement for rapid advance across the Rhine River barrier will dictate priority air/ground employment against the one objective that will insure the highest degree of initial and continuing successful exploitation, i. e., the shortest, most direct Rhine River crossing. Following doctrinal concepts, this Soviet offensive would be predicated upon the advantages to be gained by the dispersion of multi-armored combat command thrusts into the battle area, utilizing every available road net to the west, employing "hugging" tactics to limit atomic counter blows, and committing airborne forces against "Army" and intermediate objectives.

Furthermore, we believe that a concurrent major Soviet offensive would be made across the North German Plain. In view of the tactical advantages that would accrue to the Soviets in striking across the northern area to the Channel, we estimate the most likely offensive action would entail two main thrusts -- 1) across the North German Plain; and 2) direct to Mainz from the Eisenach area, with a subordinate offensive effort across the Bavarian Plateau into Southern France.

We believe that prior to the initiation of hostilities the NGF will be rapidly reinforced (to a point consistent with achieving

a balanced force and maintaining surprise) and will be employed in conjunction with divisions from the Western USSR against Western Europe. A suggested employment of this force is through the Hessian Corridor in a coordinated assault with the GSFG. Similarly, we believe that the Soviet Forces in Hungary will be substantially reinforced and employed against Western and Southern Europe. (See Annex 2)

Finally, the Kremlin must appreciate the risk that any Soviet armed aggression in Europe could constitute the outbreak of global war, hence a carefully executed, adequate reinforcement prior to hostilities would offer greatest assurance--with minimum risks--of quick and decisive victory on the European continent. Thus it is believed that the GSFG, NGF, and the SFH must be reinforced as a minimum measure by a substantial number of line divisions for an undertaking of the scope necessary for the conquest of Europe. In addition, the Soviets probably would require additional support units, especially artillery, engineer and transport units, to be deployed to the forward areas. Furthermore, additional combat aircraft from the western military districts of the USSR would be required to stage forward to provide the Soviets with sufficient numerical superiority to support an offensive action against Western Europe which would insure a reasonable degree of success.

(7) Satellite Employment:

While we believe that Satellite forces in general will improve their military posture (through direct and calculated Soviet efforts), the Soviets would employ only Bulgarian and Czech forces in offensive operations, utilizing the remaining "Warsaw Pact" forces in various internal, defensive capacities. The Soviets could employ an estimated nine Bulgarian divisions in combined operations in southeastern Europe, and an estimated six Czechoslovak divisions in combined operations against Austria and/or West Germany. Such integrated employment, in consonance with the limited offensive capabilities of these forces, would be confined in scope, mission and objectives.

(8) Austrian Status in the Event of Hostilities in Europe:

Geographically, Austria stands astride two avenues of approach into western and southern Europe; the Danube corridor into West Germany, and the Klagenfurt Gap into northern Italy. In addition, Austria extends as a salient into the Satellite periphery and has a

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common border with two Communist countries (Czechoslovakia and Hungary), as well as with Yugoslavia. Consequently, during hostilities, its geographic position would represent both a remunerative territorial acquisition and an untenable threat to the Soviets and would dictate Soviet physical control and occupation.

During general war, Soviet military considerations relative to Austria would outweigh the political implications of "respectable" land acquisitions, or the necessity to establish favorable world opinion, and focus Soviet courses of action on the tactical advantages to be gained by utilizing the approaches to western Europe and Italy through this country. The principle tactical advantages are:

- (a) Additional communications facilities increasing the Soviet reinforcement/resupply capacity in the land battle area.
- (b) Provides for greater lateral dispersion of major Soviet forces.
- (c) Strength augmentation for offensive effort across the Bavarian Plateau, (with the objective of a southern crossing of the Rhine and a rapid entry into southern France).
- (d) Would create additional offensive pressure vs defending forces in the central sector and threaten envelopment from the south.
- (e) Provide an additional avenue of approach into northern Italy from Hungary.

Under circumstances short of general war, political/propaganda considerations could outweigh the tactical criteria and the Soviets might elect to respect a neutral status of Austria under the guise of "restricting" the conflict. This situation could obtain under conditions of a "limited war" in Europe wherein the Soviets, as an initial step in the conquest of the European continent, profess to have only limited objectives, e. g., the reunification of the two Germans. However, the resultant military action probably would compromise the neutral status.

Therefore we estimate that in the event of general war the Soviets would violate Austrian neutrality concurrently with the initiation of hostilities and that in the early stages of a "limited" war

comparable to that specified above, the Soviets would acquiesce to a neutral status in furtherance of their ulterior motive to restrict the conflict.

ESTIMATE OF SOVIET/SATELLITE STRENGTHS

1. (S) Number of line ground divisions and estimated personnel strengths of Soviet Armed Forces outside the USSR:

	<u>Line Divisions</u>	<u>Ground Forces</u>	<u>Air Forces</u>	<u>Security Forces</u>	<u>Total</u>
GSFG (Germany)	20	326,000	28,500	5,500	360,000
NGF (Poland)	2 (1)	42,500	7,500	2,000	52,000
SFH (Hungary)	4	68,000	10,000	5,000	83,000
SFR (Rumania) (2)					
TOTALS	26	436,500	46,000	12,500	495,000

Soviet Mission in Albania	300
Soviet Mission in Bulgaria	2,500
Soviet Mission in Czechoslovakia	100
Soviet Mission in Rumania	2,000

TOTAL 4,900

2. (S) Number of line ground divisions and estimated personnel strengths of Satellite Armed Forces:

	<u>Line Divisions</u>	<u>Ground Forces</u>	<u>Air Forces</u>	<u>Security Forces</u>	<u>Total</u>
East German	6	67,500	7,000	67,000 (3)	141,500
Polish	13	226,000 (4)	23,500	50,000 (5)	299,500 (6)
Czechoslovakian	14	143,500 (7)	20,000	44,000	207,500
Hungarian	6 (8)	67,000	4,000	30,000 (9)	101,000
Rumanian	14	215,000	13,000	78,000	306,000 (10)
Bulgarian	10	110,000	10,000	30,000	150,000 (11)
Albanian (5 Brigades)	0	30,000	2,000	10,000	42,000 (12)
TOTALS	63	859,000	79,500	309,000	1,247,500

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3. (S) Number of line divisions and estimated personnel strengths of Soviet Armed Forces within the USSR located in the 13 military districts west of the Ural-Caspian line:

	<u>Line Divisions</u>	<u>Ground Forces</u>	<u>Air Forces</u>	<u>Security Forces</u>	<u>Total</u>
USSR	108 (13)	1,700,000	600,000	250,000	2,550,000

4. (S) Total Soviet Order of Battle - Line Division estimate based on latest reorganization trends.

Total Number Soviet Line Divisions 175 divisions

Motorized Rifle (14)	110
Tank	45
Airborne	10
Mountain Rifle	10
TOTAL	175

5. (S) Soviet Line Divisions in Satellites 26 divisions

a. East Germany	20 (10 tank, 10 motorized rifle)
b. Poland	2 (1 tank, 1 mechanized or motorized rifle)
c. Hungary	4 (motorized rifle)
TOTAL	26 (11 tank, 15 motorized rifle)

6. (S) Satellite Ground Forces 63 divisions

a. East Germany	6 (2 tank, 4 motorized rifle)
b. Poland	13 (4 tank, 5 mechanized, 4 infantry-mechanized and rifle divisions are probably motorized rifle divisions)
c. Czechoslovakia	14 (2 tank, 12 motorized rifle)
d. Hungarian	6 (motorized rifle)

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e. Rumanian	14 (1 tank, 1 mechanized, 1 mountain, 11 rifle)
f. Bulgarian	10 (9 rifle, 1 tank)
g. Albania	0 (5 infantry brigades)
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TOTAL	63 (10 tank, 31 motorized, 1 mechanized, 20 rifle, 1 mountain rifle, plus 5 infantry brigades)

(1) Does not include three unidentified separate regiments, two of which are mechanized.

(2) All Soviet Forces withdrawn (44, 100) during July - August 1958.

(3) BSP 37, 000; SGP 3, 000; SAP 15, 000; DAP 9, 800; RSP 8, 500.

(4) Includes 25, 000 Rear Services.

(5) Includes 30, 000 Internal Security Forces (KBW) and 20, 000 Border Security Forces (WOP)

(6) Does not include 12, 450 Naval Forces.

(7) Includes 7, 500 Labor Troops.

(8) Three divisions at 50 percent strength, three at 25 percent.

(9) Includes 20, 000 Border Guard and 10, 000 Security Guard troops.

(10) Does not include 9, 200 Naval Forces.

(11) Does not include 6, 200 Naval Forces.

(12) Does not include 800 Naval Forces, 200 of which are infantry.

(13) This includes unlocated divisions.

(14) Motorized rifle terminology reflects reorganization conversion of former rifle and mechanized divisions to light mechanized divisions.

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