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e. (S) Resistance Potential and Internal Stability: Discontent and disaffection on the part of Soviet Bloc populations constitute, as in the past, a major Soviet vulnerability. The degree of disaffection differs greatly between the Russian populations of the Soviet Union, the minority peoples within the USSR, and the peoples of Eastern Europe on whom Communism has been imposed as a result of Soviet policy since World War II. The Soviet peoples' resentments are based largely on economic grounds and on their relative isolation from the rest of the world. However, they apparently have no quarrel with Moscow's foreign policies, or with the strength and influence in world affairs which their leaders have secured for the USSR. Although there may be "rockets-instead-of-butter" grumbling over the cost of Soviet scientific and technical achievements, particularly in outer space, there is no reason to believe that the Soviet citizen is not proud of these achievements. Expressions of nationalist feeling and local patriotism by the minority peoples within the Soviet Union apparently were the cause of some concern to Moscow during 1959. However, its forceful reaction to the situation indicated there was not the least intention of ameliorating any grievances that the minorities might have. Rather, through such measures as replacing minority functionaries in several security posts in various republics with nonminority personnel, Moscow was demonstrating the inevitability of the ultimate, total integration of the minority peoples into the greater Soviet community.

Within the Eastern European Satellites, Moscow's problem, and that of the local Communist regimes, is more acute and less predictable, as the dynamic events of June 1953 in East Germany and of the Fall of 1956 in Hungary and Poland made plain. The Soviets have sought to impress on the Satellite populations their willingness to resort to forceful repressions to preserve Communist hegemony within the Bloc, and this realization has been duly registered on Satellite minds. However, this still does not preclude completely the chance that the impossible or unlikely could happen again. This consideration probably has considerable bearing on all Soviet planning for the area. This is probably particularly true in matters which involve promotion of crises, or in which the risk of armed clashes may exist, such as East German interference with Allied ground communications with Berlin. Khrushchev apparently believes that his chief weapon to combat discontent and disaffection is improvement of Soviet Bloc living standards. As far as the Eastern European Satellites are concerned,

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the Soviets continue to press for Western official and public recognition of the Communist status quo in Eastern Europe, beginning with acceptance of the concept that Germany remain divided and its Eastern portions a part of the Communist sphere. Moscow probably believes that such Western acceptance would do much to hasten Eastern European acquiescence and long term accommodation to Communism and its permanence as a way of life in Eastern Europe.

Reduction of discontent and disaffection as a major Soviet vulnerability is to a large extent dependent on the degree to which Moscow is able and willing to raise Bloc living standards. However, should Khrushchev score notable political successes in his projected Summit meetings with the West, his position and that of the USSR will be correspondingly strengthened in the eyes of the subject populations of Eastern Europe.

Within the Soviet hierarchy itself, Khrushchev's position appears more secure than it has ever been. Although the Soviet leadership undoubtedly is not as monolithic as Soviet propaganda depicts it, possibilities of effective opposition to Khrushchev during 1960 seem to be slimmer than in previous years. Khrushchev's consolidation of personal power appears to have been complete and thoroughgoing. Barring a reversal of Soviet fortunes at the forthcoming Summit Conference, his position should be secure for at least the next year.

The inherent tensions and weaknesses in the Bloc structure would be accentuated in time of war. It must be remembered that there are many East Europeans who believe their only chance of eventual liberation lies in an East-West war. This being true, the Soviets undoubtedly would be faced with problems of control, but it is unlikely that East Europeans would collectively act so as to hinder seriously the Soviet war effort until such time as the Soviet forces suffered major reverses. (See Annex 7,)

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3. (S) Enemy Situation

The Soviet and Satellite Armed Forces discussed in this estimate are those considered to be available for a Communist offensive against Central and Southern Europe. These forces include the Soviet Armed Forces in East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Western USSR and the national forces of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Rumania.

Recent and Significant Activities

(1) Soviet Forces

(a) Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG) (East Germany)

1 The most significant development with respect to the GSFG during the past year was the acceptance of a third rifle company in the motorized rifle battalions of line divisions in the GSFG. Acceptance of these rifle companies resulted in an increase of 120 in the estimated total number of rifle companies in GSFG and an over-all increase of about 12,000 troops in estimated strength. The total estimated increase in strength very closely approximates that of a motorized rifle division. This not only represents a considerable increase in strength but also in the capability for successful operations on a nuclear battlefield. Trends in training indicate continued emphasis placed on the capability of independent operation of motorized rifle regiments within the GSFG.

2 Information presently available, although not confirmed, indicates that the antiaircraft artillery divisions within GSFG have been reorganized into brigades. Each brigade probably includes five or six battalions with three batteries of six guns per battalion. The resulting slight decrease in the over-all estimated number of antiaircraft guns within GSFG would be more than compensated for by the introduction of additional surface-to-air missiles of the Guideline type. Of additional significance is the replacement of towed antiaircraft guns by self propelled twin 57mm antiaircraft guns in the regimental artillery of tank and motorized rifle regiments. In addition to the increase in the number of tubes the greatest advantage achieved by such a program of re-equipment is the marked increase in the mobility of the antiaircraft batteries.

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3 The annual troop rotation started about mid-September 1959 and terminated about mid-December. There was no significant departure from the pattern established in previous years.

4 The 1959 fall maneuver period began on 18 September and ended on 19 October. Six maneuvers were observed within GSFG with indications that all GSFG divisions or at least elements thereof participated.

5 During the training year, up through the pre-maneuver period, many instances of CBR training were noted. Instances of passive defense against atomics were reported, such as restricted areas with signs indicating residual radioactivity and troops wearing protective clothing.

6 The number of simulated atomic strikes during the 1959 fall maneuvers indicates the concern of the Soviet command over the possible employment of these weapons against GSFG forces. However, in the conduct of actual maneuvers, participating GSFG forces disregarded the effects of atomic explosions. In spite of several simulated atomic strikes noted in one maneuver, for example, there was no indication of casualties, avoidance of contaminated areas, or loss of forces or equipment resulting from detonations apparently in the heart of troop concentrations. However, this lack of realism in atomic play may well be attributed to a requirement for fast movement in this particular maneuver rather than to deficiencies in training. It is also possible the apparent disregard of contaminated areas is evidence of a doctrine which dictates speedy capture of objectives regardless of casualties.

7 Soviet training doctrine establishes as a principal objective the requirement for a high degree of unit control to be exercised by army and division commanders. This objective was attained during the 1959 GSFG training year. No major modifications of previous Soviet doctrine or tactics can be detected from observations during 1959.

(b) Northern Group of Forces (Poland)(NGF)

The high level Soviet-Polish command post exercise conducted during August was probab'y the sole combined training exercise conducted this year. As in the past, the NGF conducted the majority of its training within the Borne and Swietoszow training areas. The NGF is estimated to have trained at all levels through division.

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(c) Southern Group of Forces (Hungary) (SGF)

1 During the last half of the year there were widespread rumors of a possible Soviet troop withdrawal. A 30 November announcement by Hungarian Party Secretary Janos Kadar that Soviet troops would remain effectively ended the rumors. During a conference in late August, however, several high ranking Hungarian Army officers reportedly indicated to an unidentified Hungarian government minister that the Hungarian Army was incapable of maintaining internal order in the event of an emergency and that a Soviet withdrawal was impractical at this time. If any Soviet withdrawal is to be made a Soviet force of one to two divisions will probably remain in Hungary since the success of the Kadar regime apparently depends upon the continued presence of a reliable military force. The Hungarian Army is not yet considered to be completely reliable by the regime. It is believed that the USSR would risk complete withdrawal only as part of a political arrangement involving a weakening of NATO by neutralization of Germany or by withdrawal of US forces.

2 All SGF divisions participated in division level exercises this year. The summer-fall training phase reached its peak in early October in a large scale exercise involving elements of at least three of the four SGF divisions. Tempo and scope of training in the SGF in 1959 paralleled 1958 levels.

(d) USSR

The most significant Soviet military activity noted within European USSR during 1959 was the construction of new surface-to-air missile sites. Location of the missile sites indicates that the Soviet missile program now includes key industrial and communications centers as well as defense of Moscow and the peripheral areas. Although it can be assumed that the accepted Glau type sites within the USSR have a limited operational capability, only the Moscow complex has been confirmed as operational. (See Annex 19,)

(2) Satellite Forces

(a) Albanian Army

1 The continued strengthening of air defense in the Vlone area by increasing the number of antiaircraft artillery positions

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appeared to be the most significant military development in Albania during the last year. An antiaircraft artillery regiment is now held on the Karaburun Peninsula, the western edge of Vlone Bay. In addition to this regiment, both antiaircraft artillery and coastal defense battalions are held in Vlone and on Sazan Island. These defenses reflect the increasing importance of and attention given to the security of the Vlone Bay area where four Soviet submarines have been reportedly based since August 1958.

2 A possible increase in training emphasis may result from the appointment of the Chief, Military Training, Albanian General Staff, to a position as Deputy Minister of National Defense.

(b) Bulgarian Army

1 Bulgarian Army training and activities followed the normal pattern until the fall of the year except in the recall of reservists. A limited recall of reservists, probably specialists, occurred in March. Call-ups of other reservists were observed during the spring and summer. However, there have been no indications that reservists have been called up for periods of several months as in past years. Unit field training started in early March and is believed to have progressed to regimental level exercises by late summer. The normal pattern varied, however, in that the Bulgarian Army did not conduct large scale field exercises this year. These exercises usually take place during August and September and climax the yearly training cycle. Absence of fall maneuvers in Bulgaria is most unusual since Bulgaria is considered to have one of the better trained Satellite armies and has conducted at least divisional level training since 1953. This apparent curtailment of the yearly training cycle may be related to the Bulgarian attempt to fulfill its economic goals as set forth in the "great leap forward" since military personnel appear to be more than normally active in civil work projects.

2 A reorganization within the Bulgarian Army has resulted in the inactivation of two infantry divisions without a change in the over-all strength of 110,000. Bulgaria now has seven rifle divisions and one tank division. Bulgarian air defense also has been reorganized to provide more effective control and better protection for both strategic and critical industrial areas.

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3 An increased number of JS-2 and JS-3 heavy tanks were reported in Bulgaria during the past year. This is a further indication that Bulgarian tank brigades possibly are being reorganized into divisions of the Soviet type. Although to date the 9th Tank Division at Knyazhevo is the only armor unit accepted as reorganized, recent sightings of more personnel and equipment (including JS-2 heavy tanks) in the vicinity of Kazanluk indicate the possible reorganization of the 5th Tank Brigade as a tank division.

4 Existing Bulgarian military schools for officers are to be transformed into "Higher Educational Institutes." New courses of instruction will be of at least four and one-half years' duration and are expected to provide increased technical training which will aid the Bulgarian Army in meeting the requirements of modern warfare.

(c) Czechoslovak Army

1 The training pattern during 1959 was similar to that of past years except that no large scale fall maneuver was held. The training progressed from small unit squad and platoon training up to division level exercises and included some command post exercises. The over-all effectiveness of the training program was maintained. The Czechoslovak Army is considered one of the better trained in the east European Satellites.

2 During 1959 greater emphasis was placed on reserve training. Considerable numbers of reserve personnel were called to active duty for periods ranging from one week to six months. In most cases reserve training consisted of a weapons familiarization program and small unit infantry and tank tactics at installations close to reservists' homes.

3 The Official Gazette published by the Czech Ministry of Defense, dated 21 July 1959, announced that normal induction of conscripts was to take place 16-17 August, 1 September and 29-30 October. This early draft program provided for a better balance between induction of recruits and discharge of veterans by having draft calls in three increments instead of on a one-time basis as was the case in previous years.

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(d) East German Armed Forces

1 Training of the East German Army in 1959 generally followed the pattern of 1958 but with increased emphasis placed on higher level command post exercises and field maneuvers. A higher degree of proficiency was noted in 1959, particularly in the engineer units. The establishment of three training regiments to train reservists, relieving combat units of this responsibility, materially assisted the over-all training effort.

2 The principal limitation on the use of the East German Army for offensive operations continues to be the political unreliability of the individual soldier. The East German regime recognizes the situation and attempts to alleviate it by sending many officers to school in the USSR and by giving political indoctrination. In order to further improve the reliability of commanders it is expected that in the future commanders will have had to serve as political officers prior to receiving a command assignment.

3 A significant development in the East German Army during 1959 was the confirmation of the inactivation of the 6th Motorized Rifle Division in late 1958. Current estimated strength of the East German Army is 70,000, which is 2,250 more than the last estimate. This small increase in over-all strength was accompanied by a much greater increase in the line units since the personnel of the inactivated division were reapportioned to the other line units. Combat units are now considered to be at approximately 80 percent of authorized peacetime strength. EGA equipment holdings are considered to be nearly 100 percent of authorized peacetime strength except that armored personnel carriers are at 40 percent of authorized peacetime strength. Over-all strength of the Garrisoned Security Forces is estimated at 56,200 which is 8,800 less than the previous estimate. This is primarily because of the dropping of the Railway Security Police from garrisoned status.

4 Increased emphasis on training and equipping the Garrisoned Security Forces was noted throughout the year. Each of the Security Alert Police regiments is slated to receive one company of ten T-34 tanks. Exercises up to battalion level were held by Border Security Police units for the first time in several years. Persistent rumors indicate that the Security Guard Police regiment in Berlin is to be increased to a brigade or division size unit. Its current training indicates probable tactical as well as security missions. This regiment is considered the most politically reliable of all East German units.

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(e) Hungarian Army

1 The rebuilding of the Hungarian Army continues steadily but slowly. The army now consists of five motorized rifle divisions (strength estimated at 7,000 each), two antiaircraft artillery divisions, one artillery division and one engineer brigade. The strength of this force is approximately 75,000 men.

2 An appreciable increase in the scope and tempo of training has been noted this year. Water crossing training was emphasized throughout the summer-fall training phase. The Hungarian Army participated in a Soviet training exercise in October on a minor scale. Training probably reached battalion level in most divisions and some regimental level training was conducted. The level of training is expected to increase at a gradual pace during the next few years, possibly reaching division level in most divisions by 1962.

3 The existence of the Civil Defense element of the Ministry of the Interior was confirmed early in 1959. The mission of this group includes bomb disposal, damage control, decontamination, emergency medical treatment and rescue operations. The members of the organization wear the standard Hungarian Army uniform with maroon colored collar tabs. The metallic device consists of a bomb superimposed on a crossed hammer and wrench. The strength and organization of the group are unknown.

4 As noted during the discussion of the Soviet forces in Hungary, the Hungarian Army is not yet considered sufficiently well trained or politically reliable to permit withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary. However, the build-up, training and political indoctrination continues. (By the time of the prospective Summit Conference in May of 1960, the USSR may feel the status of the Hungarian Army to be such that it can risk at least partial withdrawal of its troops.)

(f) Polish Army

1 The modernization and mechanization of the Polish Army continues at a slower pace than has been observed in the past few years. T-54 tank strength continues to increase as does the number of PT-76 amphibian tanks, wheeled and tracked amphibian vehicles and 57mm and 100mm antitank and antiaircraft guns. The

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only new item of equipment reported was the ZSU 57/2 SP anti-aircraft gun. It is probable that a primary limiting factor in the progress of army reorganization is the smaller amounts of modern equipment becoming available.

2 The conversion of the 12th Motorized Division into a mechanized division indicates that the Polish Army prefers the tank heavier organization of the mechanized division, and suggests that armored and mechanized divisions are the reorganization goal of the Polish Army rather than armored and motorized infantry divisions. All divisions are now either armored or mechanized except four: the two cadre training type 3d and 9th Infantry Divisions, the 6th Airborne Division and the experimental 4th Motorized Division.

3 The possibility that military districts have two separate staffs, one of which would become the nucleus of an army headquarters in the event of hostilities, was strengthened this year by the observation of field type headquarters in the Drawsko training area. Army support troops have been apparent for some time but there has been no evidence of any field type command organization between line divisions and the Ministry of Defense.

4 Rumors of several high level personnel changes in the Polish Army have not as yet been confirmed. The tenor of the reports indicates that former Stalinist officers are to be brought in to strengthen the communist attitudes of the army in consonance with other governmental changes resulting from Poland's economic crisis.

(g) Rumanian Army

1 The Rumanian Army appears to have been primarily concerned with farming and public works during 1959. For the second consecutive year there was no evidence of large scale maneuvers which usually take place in the fall. The Army conducted only limited military training outside of garrison areas. None above battalion level was noted.

2 Throughout the country more Security Troop activity was evident than in past years. Security troop strength is estimated at 40,000, but could be considerably larger. The increase in Security Troop activity is probably due to the aggressive internal security campaign being conducted against dissident elements in Rumania.

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3 Soviet Bloc officers not officially accredited to the country have recently been observed at official Rumanian Army functions on two different occasions. These observations tend to support numerous rumors that a Warsaw Pact headquarters or agency is located at Bucharest. However, the establishment of such an agency does not appear reasonable from both geographical and political standpoints and will not be accepted without further confirmation.

4 Rumanian Army strength was reduced from 215,000 to 200,000 and from 12 infantry divisions to ten. The army is currently organized into 12 divisions: ten infantry, one tank and one mechanized. The reduction in strength probably resulted from modernization and mechanization of units and from the economic pressure of maintaining a large army. Rumania has dropped one of its military regions, the First, with headquarters in Iasi. The Second Military Region has its headquarters in Bucharest and the Third Military Region Headquarters is located in Cluj. The actual boundaries between the two regions are unknown.

5 The military portion of the annual Liberation Day Parade held in Bucharest on 23 August was similar to that of the 1958 parade except that certain types of modern equipment were present in greater quantities. Also, T-54 tanks were publicly displayed for the first time. The number of vehicles displayed indicates the continued motorization of the Rumanian Armed Forces under the Soviet modernization program for the Satellites. The only new item of equipment observed in Rumania this year was the 130mm antiaircraft artillery gun noted in the Ploesti oil fields area. Presence of this particular item of equipment is indicative of increased air defense emphasis during this past year.

4. Soviet Military Capabilities:

a. General Considerations:

Soviet national policies, domestic, foreign and defense, are designed to maximize the power of the Soviet government both at home and abroad. The Soviet government regards a powerful military establishment as essential.

Soviet leaders recognize that general war might lead to a catastrophic nuclear exchange from which neither side would emerge with power. Accordingly, they have chosen for the present to follow policies which run little risk of general war. They have shifted their "Cold War" emphasis from the military to the political and economic fields.

Current policies of the USSR are directed at the consolidation of power within the Soviet Bloc and the extension of Communism among nations susceptible to infiltration and subversion. Other fundamental aims at the present time are the dissolution or weakening of NATO, the promotion of divisive tendencies among nations of the free world and the perpetuation of the division of Germany, unless it can be reunited on Soviet terms.

Soviet actions and official statements bearing on the Summit Conference indicate two major objectives which have an influence on the probability of adoption by the USSR of any of its military capabilities during the period January-May. These objectives are:

(1) To foster an atmosphere of detente in the West, supported by an impression of Soviet willingness to settle issues through negotiation.

(2) To negotiate at the Summit Conference from a position of greatest strength.

Accordingly, it is believed that the USSR will make every effort to approach the Summit Conference with the appearance of a respectable peace loving country, while preserving the status quo in Eastern Europe.