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b. Forces Available:

(1) Soviet ground forces located in the East European Satellites comprise 26 line divisions together with support units and control elements.

(a) The Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG) consists of ten tank divisions, ten motorized rifle divisions, and support units organized into six armies. GSFG with its twenty divisions is a highly mobile, balanced striking force capable of immediate deployment for combat operations. The level of training in GSFG is high and is geared to the conditions of both atomic and nonatomic warfare. Its weapons and weapons systems are modern. This force, stationed in East Germany, constitutes the most immediate threat in USAREUR/CENTAG's area of responsibility.

(b) In addition to GSFG the Soviets have four divisions (three motorized rifle divisions and one tank division) stationed in Hungary. They comprise the Southern Group of Forces (SGF). There are also two divisions (one tank division and one motorized rifle division), comprising the Northern Group of Forces (NGF), stationed in Poland.

(2) Satellite ground forces as a group possess limited capabilities. These range from the capability of the Bulgarian Army to conduct a limited offensive against either Greece or Turkey, to the negligible capability of the Albanian Army to withstand any significant attack. Almost all are logistically dependent on the USSR to some extent. The armies of the other East European Satellites have capabilities which lie between those of the Bulgarian and Albanian Armies. At best they will be able to operate as fronts or armies under Soviet control in limited offensive operations and at worst could become liabilities such as the Hungarian Army in 1956. On balance, it is believed that the Satellite forces will be a military asset to the Soviets in case of war, up to the time Soviet control over the military situation in their areas appears to be lost.

An estimated 108 Soviet Army line divisions are located in the 13 military districts of the USSR west of the Urals. They would be available to reinforce a Soviet offensive against Western Europe. Prior to interdiction and with the present highway and rail capability, the Soviets possess a throughput delivery from the USSR to the forward Satellite areas in Central Europe rated at approximately 7.5 divisions daily (5.5 divisions by rail and 2.0 divisions by highway). However,

only the rail delivery capability is considered as a feasible initial reinforcement capability. Highway movement across Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary would be slow and would reduce combat capabilities of the units executing such an extended road march.

c. Enumeration of Soviet Military Capabilities:

(1) Withdraw all or a portion of Soviet forces stationed in the East European Satellites.

(2) Maintain forces in the East European Satellites at present strength levels.

(3) Allow or take varying degrees of military action against West Berlin to include liquidation of the Western military position in Berlin.

(4) Attack Western Europe without prior build-up or warning.

(5) Attack Western Europe following a limited reinforcement in the forward areas.

(6) Attack Western Europe following a large scale reinforcement in the forward areas.

(7) Support capabilities number 3, 4, 5 or 6 with any or all of the following:

(a) 5,250 Soviet combat aircraft and 2,500 Satellite aircraft in support of forward ground and air units during the initial hours of hostilities.

(b) 20,000 airborne troops in a single airlift assault.

(c) A wide range of guided missiles and nuclear weapons.

d. Discussion of Soviet Military Capabilities:

(1) Withdraw all or a portion of Soviet Forces stationed in the East European Satellites: A continuation of the present policy of stationing troops in Eastern Europe provides the USSR the best assurance

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of consolidating its power there. The presence of military forces in the most restless Satellites, Poland and Hungary, is important to the security of the USSR. The presence of GSG in East Germany supports the perpetuation of the partition of Germany, an important security requirement of the USSR. The geographic position of East Germany affords the Soviets a valuable forward position from which operations could be mounted against Western Europe. Further, the attraction exerted by West Germany's prosperity, the avowed aims of West German leaders to bring about a termination of the partition of Germany, and the primacy of the problem imposed by West Berlin compel the Soviets to maintain a strong force in East Germany if they are to preserve a strong bargaining position and maintain the stability of the East German government. Therefore, it is believed that a complete withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe is unlikely.

However, some reduction in forces appears probable, in support of the current Soviet disarmament propaganda offensive and in consonance with the announced shift in emphasis from reliance on masses of men to reliance on missiles and other modern weapons. In deciding on the appropriate strength levels the Soviets will be governed by their estimate of minimum security requirements.

Minimum Soviet forces required to maintain the Soviet position in East Germany are estimated to be 14 divisions. This figure is based upon a study of the minimum Soviet forces required to counter a large scale uprising in East Germany. These forces would probably consist of:

(a) Eleven divisions distributed along the Western border and throughout the political districts to seal off the border, put down civilian unrest, and guard critical communication points and supply installations.

(b) Three divisions as a reserve and to prevent East German units from joining or rendering support to the uprising. In addition, ground support units and air support would be required.

Accordingly, it is believed that a Soviet troop reduction could take place in East Germany but that it would not exceed six line divisions and their support units.

Soviet forces in Poland (NGF) render the double service of securing general Soviet interests in that country and of providing

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line of communications security for GSFG. In view of the requirement for line of communications security forces, it is deemed unlikely that any cut in the ground forces of NGF will be made.

Soviet forces in Hungary (SGF) are believed to be in excess of the security requirements of the Soviet position in that country. Present security requirements probably are no greater than in 1956 before the revolt. At that time an estimated two Soviet divisions were in Hungary. Forces stationed in the USSR near Hungary could move rapidly into the country should a requirement for additional forces recur. Accordingly, a reduction of up to two Soviet divisions in SGF is deemed possible.

A total reduction of eight Soviet divisions in the East European Satellites is therefore considered possible. The withdrawal of six is probable if the reduction in force is actually made. The decision as to withdrawal and the extent of the reduction will probably hinge on the outcome of negotiations at the Summit Conference and afterward.

(2) Maintain forces in the East European Satellites at current strength levels: The adoption of this capability is almost certain until the first Summit Conference to be held in May and probably until the end of the President's visit to the USSR in June. Continuation of the capability beyond that time presumes that no progress has been achieved on disarmament agreements.

The Soviets will retain the option of undertaking or sponsoring harassing actions against Western powers. The abnormal position of West Berlin furnishes the Soviets a useful lever with which to coerce the United States. If they decide to do this they will probably maintain GSFG at its current strength unless actions requiring larger forces are contemplated.

The foregoing discussion has been based on the estimate that Soviet leaders do not intend to initiate a limited or general war in Europe during 1960. The possibility remains that, for reasons not apparent at this time, the Soviet leaders might decide to initiate hostilities during this period or that Soviet miscalculation might lead to war. For that reason attack capabilities are analyzed below to include their relative probability of adoption. While the course of action against Berlin is in part a Cold War capability, it is enumerated here in view of its potentially explosive nature.

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(3) Allow or take varying degrees of military action against West Berlin to include the liquidation of the Western military position in Berlin: The range of Soviet capabilities against West Berlin and/or its communications with West Germany is extremely broad, ranging from minor harassments of traffic to outright military attack and seizure of West Berlin. The Soviets could allow the East Germans to take these actions, with or without Soviet support, or the Soviets could perform them unilaterally. They could be exercised selectively only against German civilian traffic to and from Berlin, or against the Western Allies military rights of access, or both; against only certain types of traffic or communications, or against all types of traffic and communications with West Berlin. They could take the form of new procedures, taxes, regulations or the transfer of Allied access controls to the East German government. These actions could be executed by individual Soviet soldiers, East German guards, "goon squads", groups of so-called workers or by Soviet and/or East German military forces.

Individual acts by Soviet or East German personnel necessitating protests by Western military commanders may occur at any time. However, until the Summit Conference no major harassment of West Berlin and its lines of communication is likely. Should no progress be made at the Summit on the Berlin issue, the USSR is likely to renew its pressures on West Berlin.

A Communist military assault on West Berlin is unlikely during 1960, unless the Soviets accept as a risk the possible necessity of employing one of the following capabilities.

(4) Attack Western Europe without prior build-up or warning: If they should select this capability, the Soviets would be confronted with the necessity of defending against attacks all along their extensive frontier, of neutralizing the widely dispersed Allied retaliatory forces and of engaging in large scale air, ground and naval warfare. Such an ambitious commitment undertaken before adequate air, ground, and naval forces had been deployed to exploit the initial attack would require the ability to deliver a decisive initial attack. To do this, the Soviets would need an exceptionally large nuclear stockpile and extensive, diversified and accurate means of delivery.

The Soviet Armed Forces in the forward area possess the capability of attaining an offensive posture rapidly and could be committed in their present strength. The Soviet submarine force

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could probably be infiltrated into or near attack areas over a period of time without giving a clear indication of an intent to attack. However, a Soviet attack against retaliatory bases in the United States during 1960 would have to be made primarily by manned aircraft,

A coordinated initial strike involving ground, air and naval forces would require different start times for each of the various components and delivery means to assure all significant targets being neutralized at about the same time. In accomplishing such a plan, it is considered that the launching of manned aircraft would provide as much as 5 hours' warning. This warning would negate at least tactical surprise and would reduce the possibility of a really decisive initial attack to the point of unacceptability. Therefore, we estimate that during 1960, the Soviets will not attack without some prior build-up.

(5) Attack Western Europe following a reinforcement in the forward areas: If carried out covertly, this capability would not compromise the Soviet intention to attain surprise to any greater extent than would certain minimal defensive measures, since limited air and ground reinforcement could be rapidly accomplished in locations adjacent to the major avenues of approach into Western Europe. A reinforcement of forces in the forward areas before attacking would be in consonance with Soviet tactical doctrine.

It is estimated that the Soviets would favor a limited reinforcement to an initial balanced force of 45-60 line divisions in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, with planned additional reinforcements to a total strength of 100 divisions by D+30 days. The initial reinforcement to 45 line divisions could be accomplished in approximately 72 hours. Reinforcement of the forward area would probably not involve movement of forces into East Germany for security reasons.

Soviet objectives under a limited reinforcement would be achievement of surprise together with the provision of a preponderance of balanced forces having the capability to overrun Western Europe within a short time.

It is also possible that the Soviets might take advantage of a rapidly deteriorating international climate in order to conduct a large scale reinforcement of the forward area. This would probably be done on the pretext of defending the Warsaw Pact area, or of strengthening the internal security of Satellite countries at the request of their governments.

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Such a large scale reinforcement would sacrifice strategic surprise but would still permit obtaining tactical surprise. However, the loss of strategic surprise, permitting Western defensive preparations and the possibility of a pre-emptive attack by the West probably outweighs the advantages of the greater preponderance of force provided by the large scale reinforcement.

In view of the foregoing, it is believed that should the Soviets decide to initiate hostilities during 1960 they would favor a rapid, covert reinforcement to provide a balanced striking force of 45-60 divisions in the forward areas.

(6) Support Capabilities: Soviet ground forces possess a wide range of rockets, guided missiles and other nuclear weapon delivery systems. These vary from a 200mm four round rocket launcher having a 20,000 yard range to a ballistic missile having a 1,100 nm range. Quantities of these weapons and yields of the warheads would be adequate to accomplish the required support missions. In addition the Soviets are believed to possess a small number of ICBM's of 5,500-6,500 nm radius.

The Soviets also have chemical and biological agents available to use against Western Europe. Their training procedures and public statements on the use of such weapons indicate that when the situation requires, the Soviets intend to exploit those capabilities.

Soviet air forces available in the forward area are capable of mounting in excess of 1,800 jet fighter sorties and approximately 225 light bomber sorties during the first day of combat against Western Europe.

Using the aircraft organic to the Aviation of Airborne Troops, the Soviets could employ an estimated 20,000 airborne troops within a radius of 500 nm in a single airlift. In a five day operation approximately 50,000 troops could be committed against Western Europe.

The Soviets have an estimated 400 light helicopters of modern design available for reconnaissance, observation, and fire support missions; an estimated 250 medium and heavy helicopters are available for troop movements and cargo transportation.

In the event of a Soviet decision to adopt capabilities 4, 5 or 6 it is highly probable that they would commit some or all of the above forces and weapons to support their operations.

e. Warning of Soviet Attack: Soviet ground forces are characterized by a large number of tank and motorized rifle divisions ready for commitment at any time. These units in East Germany could attack NATO forces with no warning. The following estimate of warning times is based solely on detection of the movement of ground units to attack positions.

(1) During the fall maneuver period (usually September and October): 0-12 hours.

(2) During the remainder of the year: 0-24 hours.

In the event the Soviets plan to attack after a deliberate large scale build-up, it is likely that up to 10 days warning of an increasing readiness to attack could be obtained.

Hostilities would probably be preceded by an increase in international tensions, which could provide some degree of strategic warning. Such a warning might be on the order of several days or weeks, but it would not rule out the possibility of tactical surprise.

Finally, it is probable that any Soviet course of action initiating hostilities would be prefaced by certain extraordinary security and air defensive measures in both the USSR and Satellite countries. Early detection of such activities could alert NATO forces to the possibility of attack.

In summary, based on the premise of a limited Soviet build-up prior to attack, we estimate that 0-24 hours warning of an impending attack can be obtained through detection of forward movement of ground forces. This time would be increased in proportion to interpretable information obtained on imminence factors other than the forward movement of ground forces.

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5. (S) Conclusions

a. The USSR still adheres to its goal of eventual world domination. Historically the USSR has moved into every area adjacent to it when not opposed by military force. However, Soviet officials realize the destructive potentialities of unrestricted nuclear warfare. The USSR, for the present, intends to achieve world domination by peaceful means, although it will not hesitate to use force if necessary to insure the final destruction of Capitalism.

b. For the next several years the USSR will:

(1) Cultivate the impression of peaceful coexistence.

(2) Emphasize scientific progress.

(3) Strengthen its armed forces qualitatively.

(4) Strengthen its internal economic base.

(5) Continue its political consolidation and economic integration of the East European Satellites.

(6) Continue the modernization and strengthening of the armed forces of the East European Satellites on a selective basis.

(7) Carry on the world wide struggle for Communist domination by overt economic penetration and both overt and covert political infiltration. The principal efforts will be in the uncommitted or neutral areas of Asia and Africa.

c. The strength of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe will be retained at substantially current levels until after the first Summit Conference.

d. The USSR may withdraw some of its forces from the East European Satellites as a result of the first or subsequent Summit meetings provided adequate compensation can be obtained. Such a partial withdrawal might include all or part of the following, in order of probability:

(1) Two divisions and supporting troops from Hungary.

(2) Six divisions and supporting troops from East Germany.

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e. The Soviets will not permit any major provocative incidents in East Germany and Berlin until after the first Summit meeting. The USSR, however, may at any time permit or sponsor some tensions in the Berlin area in order to emphasize the Soviet position that a settlement of the Berlin question on its terms is essential to the maintenance of peace. They will continue to press for acceptance at least of the de facto recognition of the East German regime, the political isolation of West Berlin from West Germany and the economic integration of West Berlin with East Berlin and thus with East Germany.

f. The Soviets will continue to improve the capabilities of their forces in the European Satellites by the selective introduction of modern weapons and equipment.

g. A large scale Satellite revolt is not probable during 1960.

h. The USSR will not deliberately initiate a general or limited war in Europe during 1960.

i. A war resulting from Soviet or Satellite actions to harass or annoy the Western powers, accompanied by a miscalculation of Western capabilities and determination to resist, is the most likely circumstance leading to hostilities in Europe in 1960.

j. In the event hostilities do occur it is estimated that the most probable course of action will be a rapid limited reinforcement in European Satellite areas prior to attack. The USSR will probably refrain from moving reinforcements into East Germany before D-Day for security reasons. It is estimated that the initial force would consist of 45-60 line divisions supported by 20,000 airborne troops and approximately 5,200 combat aircraft.

k. Should the USSR initiate a war without prior reinforcement in the forward areas or after only a limited build-up the period of warning would probably vary from 0 to 24 hours.

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