

**Summary Nr. 10
of the Session of the Executive Committee [of the Central Committee of the
Romanian Communist Party] on the day of 16 March 1969**

Present at the meeting are Cdes. Nicolae Ceaușescu, Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Gheorghe Apostol, Emil Bondăraș, Chivu Stoica, Paul Niculescu-Mizil, Virgil Trofin, Ilie Verdeț, Constantin Drăgan, Janos Fazekas, Petre Lupu, Manea Mănescu, Leonte Răutu, Gheorghe Stoica, Vasile Vilcu, Stefan Voitec, Iosif Banc, Petre Blajovici, Dumitru Coliu, Emil Drăgănescu, Mihai Gere, Dumitru Popescu.

Cde. Vasile Pantilinet was also invited to the meeting.

The meeting started at 11:00 am and ended at 11:55 am.

Chairing [the meeting] is Cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu.

After the presentation and discussions of the proposals made by Cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu, the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party (CC PCR) has decided the following:

[The Executive Committee] unanimously approves the position [adopted by] the Romanian delegation to Budapest to the meeting of the Consultative Political Committee of the member states of the Warsaw Pact.

[The Executive Committee decided that] the Romanian delegation will reject any attempt to raise the issue of the relationship between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China during the sessions of the Consultative Political Committee. [The

Romanian delegation] will not accept that the final communiqué of the meeting include any reference to this issue.

Nicolae Ceaușescu
Secretary General of the CC PCR

(ss) Nicolae Ceaușescu

**Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Committee of the CC PCR
16 March 1969**

Present at the meeting are Cdes. Nicolae Ceaușescu, Ion Gheorghe Mauer, Gheorghe Apostol, Emil Bondăraș, Chivu Stoica, Paul Niculescu-Mizil, Virgil Trofin, Ilie Verdeț, Constantin Drăgan, Janos Fazekas, Petre Lupu, Manea Mănescu, Leonte Răutu, Gheorghe Stoica, Vasile Vilcu, Stefan Voitec, Iosif Banc, Petre Blajovici, Dumitru Coliu, Emil Drăgănescu, Mihai Gere, Dumitru Popescu.

Cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu: Comrades, I wanted to talk to you a little bit about this meeting [of the Consultative Political Committee of the Warsaw Pact member states] in Budapest, since some problems surfaced there and I think we need to discuss what steps to take [in the future].

We had sent a delegation of our comrades to Budapest to discuss with them the communiqué [of the meeting of the Consultative Political Committee], and [in discussing] it, there was the proposal of including a paragraph about the Chinese.

Before this however, could someone read for everybody here these [two] Soviet and Chinese notes of protest[?]

Cde. Paul Niculescu-Mizil: "The declaration of the Government of the Soviet Union addressed to the government of the People's Republic of China in regards with new incidents taking place in the region of the Damanskii [Zhaenbao] Island.

On 15 March, a new attack led by Chinese soldiers took place, [attack] which resulted in dead and wounded.

The following declaration addressed by of the Soviet Government to the government of the People's Republic of China was published in Moscow, addressing the shameless armed provocation of the Chinese authorities during the days of 14 and 15 March in the region of the Damaskii Island.

On 14 March, at 11:15 Moscow time, a group of armed Chinese soldiers tried once more to enter on Soviet territory—Damanskii Island on the Ussuri River. The following day, 15 March, a group of Chinese soldiers, with artillery and mortar support from the shore, attacked the Soviet border guards on duty on the island. [This] attack resulted in dead and wounded. Due to the measures taken [by the Soviet military] the attackers were pushed back from the island. This new shameless provocation of the Chinese authorities will have grave consequences.

At the same time, the Chinese government is intensifying its campaign of anti-Soviet hysteria, based on groundless and aggressive territorial demands, seeking to find a new reason for the further escalation of tensions in the inter-governmental relationship between the Chinese and Soviet states. Willfully presenting the facts in a false light, they [the Chinese Government] are trying to decline responsibility for the acts previously planned and organized at the Sino-Soviet border.

The facts show that the Chinese government has not drawn the necessary conclusions from the advertisement given by the Soviet government after the armed provocations on 2 March of this year on the Damnskii Island and is continues creating new incidents.

At the meeting of the representatives of the Chinese and Soviet border guards [which took place] on 12 March of this year, following Mao Zedong instructions, a

Chinese border officer of the Hotou [border post] threaten to use force against the Soviet border guards on duty on the island.

The Soviet government is strongly rejecting the groundless territorial demands of the Chinese government. The Damanskii Island is an integral part of Soviet territory. The false statements made by the Chinese authorities in this regard are only attempts to create confusion in the Chinese public opinion and [the public opinion] of other countries. The Soviet government is once again making clear its [desire not to have] military conflict on the Sino-Soviet border. All statements made in Peking [Beijing] regarding the [so called] enmity of the Soviet Union and the CPUS towards the Chinese people and the People's Republic of China are entirely without grounds. The Soviet Union does not seek conflict, on the contrary, it taking all measures [necessary] to prevent [conflict].

At the same time, the government of the USSR makes known that if the legitimate rights of the USSRT are to be infringed upon, if new attempts to violate the integrity of Soviet territory, in such a case, the USSR, all its people [nations], will firmly defend it, [they] will offer a crippling blow to any such attempts.

The government of the Soviet Union is [thus] sending a vigorous protest to the government of the People's Republic of China in regards with the new provocation in the region of the Damanskii Island. [T]his provocation was planned to bring about a cooling of the relations between the people of the Soviet Union and the people of the People's Republic of China. [T]he Soviet government is [furthermore] is placing the government of the People's Republic of China on notice that it alone holds responsibility for the serious consequences that are possible as a result of such adventurous [attempts] on the part of the Chinese authorities."

“Protest note addressed by the [People’s Republic of] China to the USSR.

The Soviet government is the only one responsible for all the consequences of the [Damanskii Island] incident.

Beginning with the morning of 15 March [1969] the Soviet government has sent a great number of armored vehicles, tanks and armed soldiers in a new incursion in Chinese territory, the Zhaenbao [Damanskii] Island and the Chinese territorial waters on the island west coast. The [military] forces which were entering [Chinese territory] were the first to open fire on the Chinese border guards who were patrolling the island. The Chinese border-guards were forced to fire in self-defense. The Soviet [counter]-part sent several armored vehicles, tanks and armed soldiers [to the island] and fired artillery rounds deep into Chinese territory. [Thus] the incident is becoming bigger.

After the vicious provocation on 2 March, which was a serious incident, the Soviet government, without taking into consideration the warnings given by the Chinese government, had continuously sent troops to enter Chinese territory—the Zhaenbao Island—and to organize new provocations. [N]ow they have [once again] provoked a vicious incident. The Soviet government holds all responsibility for the consequences of this [incident].

The Chinese government is hereby sending an urgent and firm protest to the Soviet Government. The Soviet government must immediately stop all military provocations against the [People’s Republic of] China. The Chinese government is reserving the right to make any other demands [at the later time].

There was a discussion among the deputy foreign ministers regarding the issue they were there to discuss, the communiqué [in regards with the Budapest Summit of the Warsaw Treaty Organization member nation]. [After that] Firiubin took the floor and started to read a [information] note in regards to [the situation with] China.

Our delegate, Cde. [Mircea] Malița, stood up and said: Comrades, we have gathered here with a very definite goal, on the basis on the instructions we have received from our governments. We cannot hold discussions on issues for which we have not received a mandate [from our governments]. After that it was declared that the session had ended and that there will be an informative [note] sent.

This happened yesterday morning.

At the end of the discussions regarding the communiqué, the Hungarian delegation came up, at 2 am with a new proposal:

“The participants at the [Budapest] Summit are convinced that fraternal solidarity and the unity of action of socialist countries is the most important guarantee of the success of their continuous fight against the policies of armed provocations and threats.

The participants at the [Budapest] Summit are unanimously condemning the emergence of such tendencies, the dangerous attempts to create, through border tensions, an artificial hostility among neighboring states, without regard to who is the perpetrator.

They [the participants] are ready to oppose all such antagonist provocations against their interests, all attacks on their security, through the high cohesion and high military readiness of the countries members of the Warsaw Treaty.”

When introducing [these] proposal, [Hungarian Delegate] Puja vaguely suggested that: "now, after we spoke about Vietnam and the Middle East, we should also discuss about 'this thing'."

Malița asked what is he [Puja] referring to since the issue of borders in Europe and the need to respect territorial integrity had been discussed and that we [the Romanian delegation] had brought some proposals [to the table, proposals] that had been accepted.

The Bulgarian [deputy foreign affairs] minister Popov said that he had studied the amendment and that he might speak of such cases on the borders of Bulgaria with Turkey and Greece.

Since Puja begun asking who is for and who is against [the amendment] all the others begun stating their agreement. We, Malița, said that we were against it.

[The Soviet deputy foreign affairs minister] Firiubin asked me if we are for or against the defense of the borders of all signatories of the [Warsaw] Treaty. It would be [a] very serious [situation] if a ally would [be opposed] to the defense of all the borders of another ally.

(Malița) said that we are respecting the letter of the treaty and quoted Article 4.

The word "China" was not mentioned.

[Deputy Soviet foreign affairs minister] Firiubin quoted Article 3 of the Warsaw Treaty which implies consultations on any issue if the security of one of the members is threatened.

It is my belief that the Soviet delegations will invoke this article so that they be able not only to inform but to request a consultation [with the other member nations of the Warsaw Pact] regarding the situation at the Sino-Soviet border.

Following, there were discussions on other issues.

Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu: It is becoming clear that it is their intension to introduce in the communiqué and, quite likely, in the discussions as well, something about the Chinese issue. After all, for the past 4-5 days [we received some information] that the discussions between [Soviet Foreign Affairs Minister] Gomulka, [Hungarian leader Joseph] Kádár and [Bulgarian leader Todor] Zhivcov were in regards with taking some action vis-à-vis China, and that [these actions] will be discussed in Budapest.

Generally speaking—since not all the comrades [present here] know the text of the communiqué they are proposing—the communiqué is in a form that is very hard for us to accept, first of all since it presumes that we are on the verge of war. After all, this is the issue they want to raise in Moscow as well.

Cde. Emil Bondăraș: On the verge of war, how, in general?...

Cde. N. Ceaușescu: That the danger of war is greater now.

Cde. P. Niculescu-Mizil: There are some paragraphs that we are on the verge or war.

Cde. E. Bondăraș: The Secretary General of the West German Social-Democratic party told me yesterday: when we spoke with [Secretary of State Henry] Kissinger he complained that [the US is too aggressive] and asked [Kissinger] to stop all trade with the People's Republic of China. Why should we [the Romanians] stop trade with them [the Chinese]? We want to have trade with you [West Germany] as well.

Cde. N. Ceaușescu: I would like you all to state, one by one, your opinions.

Cde. E. Bondāras: Regarding their proposal for the communiqué, did we agree, in principle, with them?

Cde. N. Ceaușescu: No, we will have more discussions in Budapest. We have brought here a copy of this treaty [the 1955 Warsaw Treaty] and it says that in case there will be created in Europe a collective security system, the present treaty will lose its validity.

Cde. E. Bondāras: The Executive Committee saw a copy of the minutes of the conversation in Beijing between the deputy foreign affairs ministers in regards with the two theories: limited sovereignty and the dictatorship of the proletariat?

Cde. N. Ceaușescu: These are the opinions of each [of the participants]. That is not important, what one or the other says.

Cde. E. Bondāras: There was [the Chinese] expression of solidarity with us.

Cde. N. Ceaușescu: Why would we want to discuss what was being said there about sovereignty? [We should] discuss the issue of Budapest.

[The issue] is that, as a result of the creation of the Western European Union, to which the Federal Republic of Germany has adhered, the danger of a new war is now more real.

The [treaty] speaks of the UN... and in conformity with the principles of [mutual] respect of sovereignty and of non-interference in the internal affairs [of a nation] they [the signatories] have agreed to sign the treaty. Then, [the treaty] says that in case of a military attack in Europe on one or more of the signatories, in conformity with the UN charter, all other signatories will offer whatever help it deems necessary and will inform

the UN Security Council. And, when there will be [a collective] security [system] in Europe, this treaty will dissolve on its own.

This was [said] in article 11.

Cde. E. Bondărăș: I believe that, starting from the clauses of the treaty, from its spirit [as it was written] in 1955, we cannot accept, under any circumstances, that we are dragged into any other actions than those mentioned in the treaty. This [is my conclusion] as far as the formal considerations of the letter of the treaty.

From a political point of view, it is absolutely clear that we cannot participate, under any form, in any anti-Chinese actions. We were opposed, some time ago, to their attempts to bring Mongolia into the treaty... We were opposed and they [the Soviets] gave up. We should oppose, once more, to any statement that clearly calls for solidarity of the Warsaw Pact nations against China, against the expansion of any military actions beyond the setting of the treaty.

Cde. Gheorghe Stoica: It is clear that the [Warsaw] Treaty was conceived, from the beginning, as a mechanism of defense of against the attack of the imperialist nations in Europe and this should be the way it remains.

We should avoid getting involved, under any circumstances, in this issue with China, although it would be worth discussing [the fact] that it is the consequence of the political line [which] begun in 1956.

I had a discussion with Cde. [Ion Gheorghe] Mauer and I asked him this question, which has been bothering me for some time now, this very issue. He suggested that I do not bring it up [at this time].

However, I have to come back again to this issue of the expansion [of the Warsaw Treaty] even though the treaty is clear in this aspect, but there are two new things which have developed and which, as much as one would like to ignore, one cannot.

The first [is] the invasion of Czechoslovakia. It was not said that this was an action of the Warsaw Treaty [per se], but it was seen as the action of five states allied within the treaty and this fact was always in the foreground [of the debate]. This is the first issue.

The second issue, the second facet: the birth of the political and philosophical basis of the theory of limited sovereignty. [T]his gives [the theory] political and theoretic power. [T]here were some declarations [made] in terms of the ability of one [state] or another to intervene [militarily into another state] when they believe that socialism is at stake—I think this was the way it was placed. Taking into consideration this fact, this thesis of limited sovereignty was expressed by the Secretary General of the CPSU during a congress, and, aside from us and the Yugoslavs who protested, all others seem to have recognized some validity [to the thesis].

I am thinking, given the situation, I understand our position, not at all an easy one, since we are maintaining the general line established at the 9th Congress of the [Romanian Communist] Party in regards with the principles of sovereignty, independence, etc. Since we sincerely desire to find common ground with the European socialist nations, we of course are trying to find ways not to deepen [the disagreement] among [us] since, as our own Secretary General said many times, [we must] not do anything that might have as a consequence the deepening [of disagreements], but, rather, [act to insure] just the opposite.

However, I am thinking, should not our delegation to this Summit [in Budapest] where this question of the Treaty is being raised, and since at this time it will be discussed whether we want to [discuss it] or not, [should not our delegation raise the issue] of what is this treaty, what are its limitations, how is this treaty viewed [by our allies], since this issue will be [in some way] raised whether we like it or not, by means of dragging us in this conflict with China. [S]ince this base violation of the Treaty through the invasion of Czechoslovakia, could we not, in a declaration somewhere, even if it was not just our declaration, make sure to stress that the Treaty's role is the defense of [socialist countries] against imperialist attack, to stress the European character of this treaty.

Cde. Ion Gheorghe Mauer: This is being raised in some form., but, I see that everybody here agree that the paragraph [our allies] want to introduce is not justified.

Cde. Gh. Stoica: But [I believe] that we should stress that the treaty is only an instrument [of defense against imperialist attack] and that it cannot be used for intervention in one or another socialist country.

Cde. P. Niculescu-Mizil: We have said that in the declaration of the Great National Assembly.

Cde. Gh. Stoica: Yes, but it should be said at the summit [of the member nations] of the treaty, where the issue of expanding its sphere [of action] is being raised.

Cde. I. Gh. Mauer: This would mean that we would have to raise again the issue of Czechoslovakia.

A few participants: Of course, this should not be brought up.

Cde. Gheorghe Apostol: I believe that this summit in Budapest will be a very tense one. They will try to bring pressure to bear on us in regards with the policy vis-à-vis China. We should continue to hold true to the line established at the 9th Party Congress, in the sense that we should not, under any circumstance, accept to back the desires of the Soviet Union.

I believe that this action which was undertaken on 2 March at the border with China, as well as this last one [on 15 March], which the Soviets want to use to put pressure on the Communist and Workers parties. This can also be seen from the discussions that have taken place [previously] in Budapest and Moscow. They [the soviets] are putting pressure in every possible way, and it is apparent that many parties are giving in [to them]. We however must stay true to our policy, which not only is in our national interest, but also in the interests of all other people.

Of course, our delegation in Budapest will have a tough job. I believe this is not the time to make declarations—I am referring here to what Cde. Stoica said. We should see how the discussions in Budapest will take place; our comrades will return [from Budapest] and then we will see what must be done. I do not believe this is the time to make a decision. We will have this possibility when the comrades will return from Budapest; they will inform us of how the discussions went and if there will be need to make a declaration, they we will do so. But at this time, [I don't think] that the comrades should go there with such a declaration over their head.

I believe that if the Soviets insist, we should tell them to contact the Chinese leadership and together find a solution to the crisis in the Far East [in particular] and to the global tension in general. This is what I believe.

Summing up, I believe that we should maintain our position, that we should recommend to the Soviets to talk with China regarding the problems between them and, that they should resolve them together.

Cde. Leonte Răutu: I believe that the delegation could face such a moment, that they [the Soviets] will try to introduce this amendment and, clearly, do that during the official meeting.

It is also possible, they have done this other times, seeing that they cannot act during the official meeting, bring up this issue during an un-official meeting. They can say: "we are not discussing this issue, but we request a meeting of the fraternal, socialist, countries; we would like to inform you [of the situation]. This can happen. In that case, our delegation should make clear our position regarding [the need] for unity within the socialist and worker's movement, with regards to the [need for] unity of the socialists countries, and refuse to make a common front with some socialist countries against other socialist countries, that the only [real] solution in direct contact among [countries].

I presume that they will try to do that [bring about discussion regarding this amendment]. Even if they will no be able to introduce this paragraph [in the text of the communiqué] they will try to make a separate declaration. In that case, we will need to make our position public, if they will have [a separate] declaration.

Cde. Ianoş Fazekas: I believe that we should no agree with any paragraph or proposal that was mention here, [that we should not agree] that they be introduced in the Treaty. We should continue to maintain our position in regards with the area in which the treaty applies.

We, our delegation should not accept any involvement in the relationship between the Soviet Union and China, regarding the incident, since the devil knows who started the whole thing... both of them are making declarations, both [sides] send protest notes.

Our position, we have made it known many times. It is known by the world public opinion, [it is known] by the international communist movement, and I don't think it is the time to raise the issue that Cde. Stoica brought up. That makes no sense now, more so since the situation in Czechoslovakia is not at all clear, as far as the five countries that went in and did what they did; even in Czechoslovakia there is a fight for power among different factions [of the Communist Party]. We have made our position clear. We should maintain his position, but not go into discussions at this time. This is my opinion in regards to this.

As far as the communiqué is concerned, I believe that this has a different tone... that we are on the verge of a new world war. Our delegation, which is there now, which will discuss the communiqué, will of course need to do everything to make sure they bring this communiqué closer to a realistic world situation.

Cde. Dumitru Coliu: I believe that the position expressed here up to this point is clear and [I believe] that all [our] comrades will unanimously agree with what we believe not to be appropriate and with what we believe the time is not right yet. [This] meeting [in Budapest] has a different character [that the one they are trying to impose on it]. Things should not get [too] mixed up and we must stand our ground and refuse to accept [any compromises].

For us, for me, it is clear that such meetings will be used in any way possible. This incident is being blown pout of proportion so that the situation seems much more

difficult, so that it seems that we are on the verge of a global conflict, on the verge of war. I believe that our delegates should not accept, under any circumstances, that this paragraph be added to the communiqué.

As far as the invasion of Czechoslovakia is concerned, we have mentioned this thing [our position] many times. [M]ore so, [our] Secretary General has recently made public the position of our party and government.

Of course, since we will be there, it is my opinion that during summits such as this there are meetings taking place outside the official discussions. I believe that our delegates should take this opportunity to suggest to the Soviets the idea that maybe they should look for a resolution to this conflict with China through other means, that this is not the way—to maintain a warlike atmosphere [at the border], to poison the relationship. [We should] counsel them, as we have done in the past.

We have spoken openly about our position in regards with Czechoslovakia. At this time it would be pointless to raise that issue again since we would risk to left alone. [A]t this point all the others are in line [behind the Soviets], including the Czechs—the proof [is in] that they did not go to the Yugoslavs, being under Soviet influence. [I believe] it would be pointless.

Cde. N. Ceaușescu: In Moscow, Bilac told me that some nations might feel insulted if they were to accept the Romanian formula in regards with the defeat of the Americans in Vietnam: that a people fighting for their freedom, for their independence, are impossible to defeat.

Cde. P. Niculescu-Mizil: In the committee, the Romanian amendment to the communiqué in regards with Vietnam was accepted, that a people that is defending its

freedom, its liberty, its invincible. Then, in the plenary discussion, Canapa raised the issue that this insults nations. Bilac said that this might be insulting to certain people which lost the fight, as for example the Greek people.

Cde. Chivu Stoica: I favor [the idea] to put into practice that which we have decided upon in [preparation] for this meeting, and to oppose any attempt to introduce in the communiqué or in another document any elements which are opposed to the letter of the Treaty and to the goals that we have set for ourselves in connection to this summit].

As for me personally... it gives me pause that these events are taking place right before the scheduled meeting in Budapest, and [I believe that] this [incident] is receiving so much publicity as to force a certain decision [to be made], [that] a specific direction be chosen, both here and in Moscow, as to create an atmosphere which will make people say: well sir, look at what is going on! And thus actions are being pushed in that direction instead of a [true] search for the way [to resolve this conflict], instead of making government-to-government contact as [it would be normal] among two socialist countries, so that the conflict is resolved. It is because of this that I believe so much publicity is being done around this issue, since there have been other border conflicts yet no one ever mentioned them. I saw in the news bulletins of the [News Agency] Agerpres that the five countries that met discussed [ways] to unify their efforts... Maybe they want to find a legal basis, a concrete form to what had been discussed at that meeting.

Cde. Petre Lupu: I think that it might be necessary for us [to be vigilant] not to allow any formula that is directly or indirectly against [the letter of] the Treaty to make its way into the communiqué.

[They] are invoking Article 3. Aside from the very important and powerful fact, the argument that [this article] makes reference to Europe, you must think also who made this treaty. What did others have in mind when they wrote this treaty, it is very tough to say that from the perspective of history.

As far as the conflict on the Sino-Soviet border is concerned, I do not even understand who owns this island, much less who started this thing.

Cde. Ilie Verdet: And there is a lot of territory there.

Cde. P. Lupu: This conflict did not appear all of a sudden. This is the result of the whole evolution [of the events] that lead to this situation. Of course, this is painful.

Cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu: Comrades, I believe we can end the discussions [at this time].

Cde. Ilie Verdet: We all agree with what was discussed.

Cde. N. Ceaușescu: I believe that we can draw the conclusion, of what has been said up to now, that we must reject any attempt to allow discussions within the Consultative Political Committee the problem of the relationship [of the Soviet Union] with [the People's Republic of] China and not to allow, under any circumstances, that this issue be addressed in the communiqué. Of course, we cannot prevent them from raising this issue. This is normal. We received the information [note] and we will see how things will evolve.

Cde. Emil Bădăraș: Discussions, but without any result in public statements.

Cde. N. Ceausescu:

We will see if it is beneficial or not to raise the issue of Czechoslovakia; we will take note of the mood. Thus, in this issue we are all in agreement. This is not the time to analyze this issue with the island, that it is [Soviet] or [Chinese].

The agenda states that there are four documents to be adopted [at the summit]: the Guideline of the Unified Armed Forces and Unified Command of the Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty, in time of peace. This is somewhat long; it makes reference to the Treaty and states once again that in case of an armed attack within Europe of a state or a group of states...—it is the formula used in the [Warsaw] Treaty.

After that, here, it states once again: to this purpose the Command [structure] was created and that measures are being taken to strengthen it, through the constant improvement of military readiness, for the defense of peace and security in Europe. Here standard sentences are being used. The military forces that are part of this [unified command] are, in time of peace, under the command of the country's own defense minister. Their activity is taking place under the rules in existence in their own country.

[Then the document] shows what makes up the [unified] command, that [its components] activate following the decisions of the participating governments in the Warsaw Treaty.

[It then shows that the Unified Command] is responsible for the coordination of the [defense] plans, and the efficient use of the forces designated to participate in the UN armies.

[The document further contains] directives for the improvement of military readiness of maritime forces, [a]nd sets the annual, mutual consultation.

[The Unified Command] is responsible for the elaboration of plans to outfit [forces] and prepare the theatre of operation.

There was a paragraph over there, [paragraph] 12, in regards with the operational plans approved by the governments of the member states of the Warsaw Treaty—[which made reference to the fact that] governments, following agreement, approve the movement of troops. This has been rescinded, subparagraph (a). Another formula was proposed. They did not agree with stating [that] “all governments” [should agree], and we took out this paragraph. We suggested that we either say “all governments” or we take out the paragraph.

There are still negotiations regarding subparagraph (b): for the implementation of the decisions of the governments of the member states [of the Warsaw Treaty] or of the Consultative Committee, [the Unified Command] offers suggestions (recommendations) in regards with placing the armed forces on full combat readiness.

It was stated there “upon agreement among the ministers” and here it states “for the implementation of the decisions of the governments”... “suggestions” and in parenthesis “recommendations.”

Cde. E. Bondāras: We asked that (b) also be [rescinded] and are thinking that if need be, to accept it.

Cde. I. Gh. Mauer: It only states that it gives suggestions (recommendations) for the placement of troops on high combat readiness.

Cde. E. Bondāras: Except the case that the movement to increased combat readiness does not imply movement of troops across the borders of another state.

Cde. I. Gh. Mauer: Suggestions and recommendations are things that you follow if you so desire. However, before, in the forth paragraph, there was a disposition that allowed the Unified Command to take [active] measures.

Cde. E. Bondăraș: Of course, what we need to see here is whether in this statement: moving to a higher threat readiness—is that including troops crossing the borders of a state[which might exist] in current planning. [If] this was to be the case, then this should only be possible with the approval beforehand of the government [of the member nations] and not just of “some” government but of “all” governments. In the Russian language [[for the Russians]], “some” is said as “pravitelstvo.”

Cde. N. Ceaușescu: This is not about a threat readiness, it is speaking about general combat readiness: i.e. [it is speaking] about having the equipment necessary.

Cde. E. Bondăraș: All I am saying is that you should make sure of that. The [Romanian] Chief of Staff should know that. This needs to be checked out, it is very interesting that they agreed that [subparagraph] (a) should be taken out. Maybe they discovered that (b) takes care of this. “Ucazanie” in Russian means “order” (*dispoziție*).

Cde. Gh. Stoica: Suggestion is one thing and recommendation is another. It gives me the ability to agree or not to [agree].

Cde. I. Gh. Mauer: Both words are included; suggestion and in parenthesis recommendation.

Cde. E. Bondăraș: This is one of their concessions.

Cde. Gh. Stoica: A very important concession.

Cde. E. Bondăras: Could mean staying in place, could also mean getting in formation.

Cde. N. Ceaușescu: I believe that we can accept the proposal in this way.

Cde. E. Bondăras: But please make sure to verify if it means troops entering on the territory of other states.

Cde. N. Ceaușescu: After that [comes adopting] the Statute of the Ministers of Defense, which is established now, in time of peace and which establishes that they will analyze and elaborate proposals, recommendations, etc.

This does not raise any questions, and we agreed with it.

[There] is also the statute of the military councils of the unified armed forces, which deals with the way the council of the unified command, established at this time, will function; this did not exist previously. This [council] is a consultative body, [operates] with the approval of the governments.

And there is the statute of the unified air defense system, which is in place even now, and on the foundation of which the general staff [of the unified command] will be organized. The defense command will also be expanded.

Cde. Leonte Răutu: And who will be the commanding officer?

Cde. N. Ceaușescu: There is the suggestion that this should be elected of the participating members, they accepted this at our requests, but they have asked that it be a Soviet [officer]. These are the documents that, after all, will be brought to a vote. Aside from that, an exchange of opinions will take place.

Cde. L. Răutu: Unofficially?

Cde. N. Ceausescu: Officially. This is an international situation and in this context they added the communiqué. I believe that we can sign the documents in this form, as well as no other problems surface.

This would be it.

Cde. Chivu Stoica: The communiqué?

Cde. P. Niculescu-Mizil: They are working on it and we shall see [what comes out].

Cde. N. Ceausescu: Comrades, are there any more issues [to be discussed]? Nu! Is everyone in agreement? (all members are in agreement) The session is now over.

[Source: A. N. I. C., fond CC PCR, Chancellery, Folder 16, pp. 2, 4-20. Translated for CWIHP by Mircea Munteanu]