

**Minutes of the Conversation of the Meeting
of the Executive Committee¹ (Politburo) of the Romanian Communist Party (PCR)**

12 July, 1966

At the meeting were present Cdes. Nicolae Ceaușescu, Chivu Stoica, Gheorghe Apostol, Alexandru Bîrlădeanu, Emil Bondăraș, Alexandru Drăghici, Paul Niculescu-Mizil, Ilie Verdet, Maxim Berghianu, Drăgan Constantin, Leonte Răutu, Gheorghe [Gogu] Rădulescu, Iosif Banc, Petre Blajovici, Dumitru Coliu, Florian Dănălache, Janoș Fazekas, Manea Manescu, Petre Lupu, Vasile Vilcu.

Cdes. Mihai Dălea, Mihai Florescu, Ion Cozmă, Nicolae Bădescu, Gustav Gusti, I[on] Locar, C[onstantin] Simon, Ion Iosefide, Traian Ispas, Simion Pop, Tiberiu Rici, Horea Maicu, Traian Stănescu, Ioan Ciubotaru.

The meeting started at 06:00 pm.

Cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu: Comrades, let us begin.

Do you have anything to add to the proposed agenda? No.

There is a suggestion that we postpone discussion on issue eight until tomorrow since the comrades did not finish preparing the material regarding the uses of the hotel space in tourist towns which were placed under the jurisdiction of ONT [*Oficiul National Turistic*—National Tourist Office].

Let us start with the first issue on the agenda:

Informing the Politburo about the consultative meeting of the Executive Political Committee of the Warsaw Treaty and the consultative meeting of the General Secretaries, the First Secretaries and the presidents of the Councils of Ministers of the COMECON member nations.

¹ Voting and non-voting members of the Permanent Presidium (Politburo) of the PCR

I will try to be brief, since, over the duration of the meeting—which took place here, in Bucharest—many of you understood some of the things that went on, and there also have been a number of short presentations.

As you well know, regarding the agenda of the Consultative Political Committee meeting, the decision was made that there should be three main issues [discussed] and that there should also be a consultative [meeting] regarding problems within the COMECON, and a high level summit and the 20th session of the COMECON. Over the course of discussions, things were clarified somewhat.

The Poles made suggested that the 20th session of the COMECON meeting not take place anymore. We, as well as other [parties] agreed, and, though some raised objections, the meeting did not take place.

In regards with the three issues [entered] on the agenda, the Germans withdrew their suggestions on the organization of the conference, though the situation evolved as follows: first the foreign minister told us that they are withdrawing their proposal. We then had a discussion with the Soviet comrades, who arrived earlier, [but] they told us they know nothing about this. When Ulbricht arrived, he said that they did not withdraw their proposal and that it should be discussed. I told him that we will see and that we will decide [on this] during the meeting of the First Secretaries [of the Parties].

Monday, when the meeting [of the First Secretaries] begun, [Todor] Zhivcov, after he assumed that chairmanship of the meeting—since we was the next in line alphabetically [in Romanian, Jivcov]—he said that he received a note from the secretariat [of the Consultative Political Committee] in which it said that in Moscow the decision was made to enter two points on the day's agenda: [the discussion of] issuing a declaration concerning European security, issues of a military nature and that there was a proposal made that the third issue be a declaration on [the war in] Vietnam.

I looked at Ulbricht, expecting him to object and ask that their proposal be entered on the agenda as well, but he did not say a word and on the agenda were entered only the three points.

In regards with the declaration regarding European security, you know what was decided in Moscow by the ministers of Foreign Affairs. Along the way we decided that we should withdraw all our objections and ask only for some improvements in the way

the text was written. We had discussed before the meeting with the with the Soviet delegation—which arrived [in Bucharest] earlier [than the rest] and, in general, the discussions followed the letter of the agreement reached between the Romanian and the Soviet foreign ministers.

This declaration was elaborated in a relatively relaxed atmosphere and was, indeed, quickly signed. We told them, as soon as they arrived that we had withdrew our objections; things evolved quickly from there and Tuesday the declaration was signed. There were no discussions regarding [the text of] the declaration.

We believe that this declaration corresponds, in general lines, with our point of view. Of course, there are things that could have been better, but being a declaration of seven different countries all positions had to be represented. But considering how [the declaration is generally viewed, even in countries like England, we believe that it represents a basis of discussion, a [general] platform, because people did not insist on certain formulations but rather concentrated on practical issues, where the question was what can we do to insure the security of Europe.

The second issue on the agenda was the signing of a declaration on Vietnam. Here there were three proposals: a Soviet one, a Romanian one and, later, a Polish one of a page an a half. Initially—before the other delegations arrived [in Bucharest]—there had been an agreement on a common Soviet-Romanian proposal. [This] was elaborated on the basis of the two proposals, and it was a good one. After the Poles made their own proposal, there were discussions regarding how to proceed. Ulbricht said that we should take, as a basis, only one proposal, the Soviet one. We said that we do not agree with this, and that all three proposals should be taken into account. The Foreign Affairs ministers were asked to elaborate a common proposal.

There were a lot of discussions until an agreement was reached in the Foreign Affairs ministers' subcommittee. This was then sent to all the delegations so they can make any objections [they might have].

On Wednesday morning, the Poles came with another project, which did not take into account what had been decided previously. They also proposed that the declaration be made a declaration of the states and not of the Parties, a diplomatic note, [because] there is no need to repeat what had been said and continue with the propaganda. This

were the main ideas of their proposal, though they did include some elements of previous projects. We told them how we see things and that we cannot agree with [the idea] of a diplomatic note. We presented the them, in detail, our position. This discussion, about what form should the declaration take, lasted about two hours.

Among other things, there were some things suggested in the Polish proposal that we could not accept. First of all they wanted [the declaration] to assert that Socialist countries must maintain relations among themselves and with all countries interested in a resolution to the Vietnamese issue. This was an attempt [on their part] to legalize in one way or another, a negotiated solution [to the conflict]. [Also] the attacks on the American were greatly reduced and so was the expression of solidarity with the fight of the Vietnamese people.

Emotions ran high during the discussions. First we presented our position, then others said they would [like to] come as co-authors while others said almost nothing. In the end Gomulka took the floor again and said that he is surprised that the comrades Foreign Affairs ministers could present such a proposal, a proposal which seems as if it was made at a [popular] demonstration, [it seems like made by a] popular organization [of the party], and that he is surprised that the comrades ministers presented such a proposal [to the First Secretaries]. We all were stunned.

We then said: We cannot understand why Comrade Gomulka is so surprised. We did not want to discuss the general proposals at this time. If we were to voice an opinion regarding the Polish proposal, if we were to look at the last three paragraphs [of the proposal], you could be accused of advocating capitulation instead of continuing the fight against American imperialism. Gomulka got very upset and said this an accusation directed at his party, a party with tradition [in anti-imperialist attitudes], and that he takes offense at this accusation. No one else protested, except for Brezhnev who said that indeed the Polish party is a party with traditions, and that we should finalize a project, etc.

The discussions continued concerning what to do. Ulbricht try to suggest a number of times that we should elaborate a project which should and the discussion. He also suggested that Brezhnev, Ceausescu and Gomulka should [meet and] come up with a proposal [for the declaration].

At one point, as they were insisting that we take the Polish proposal as the basis [for discussion of the draft declaration], Brezhnev said that, after all, we should approve this proposal and if the Romanian Comrades have anything to add let them say so now, but we should finish the discussions.

We then said in that we will not sign such a declaration. Gomulka took the floor again and suggested that, after all, the project was approved by six of the seven countries and that they can just sign it without [the Romanians]. Meanwhile—as I was sitting right next to Brezhnev—I heard an exchange between him and Gomulka, [Brezhnev] saying that Gomulka should suggested that they [the six] could just sign the declaration without the Romanians. The Brezhnev took the floor. He stood up—as he does when he wants to seem imposing—and said: truly, the Vietnamese people are suffering and we are unable to sign a declaration. We, who are, after all, six [of seven], we should just sign the six of us. We stay and discuss [this issue] while in the country there are earthquakes and floods.

After he spoke I said that we are not opposed to you six signing this declaration. We however will not sign this and will publish our own proposal and our position vis-à-vis this document. They did not expect that, [I think] they were expecting us to ask how could they think about signing this without us. I told them that I will not allow them to pressure us. I said that it should be entered in the record that we tell all [Communist] parties that we reject this pressure, [your] attempts at pressuring us, that we consider discussions, negotiations must always be held on the basis of mutual respect, independence and sovereignty. [I added that] only on this basis can we strengthen the unity [of our movement], not in any other way. I also said: Why do you continue to say that you want to help Vietnam? When we said that we should not participate at the Geneva conference you found all sorts of excuses and now you say that you want to help Vietnam. We will not sign any such declaration.

Gomulka said he will not accept to be recorded [in the minutes of the meeting] that pressures are being made [on some participants]. Brezhnev said that he was misunderstood, that the declaration will not be signed [only by the six]. I then said that the Foreign Affairs ministers should go and work [on the declaration]. [I said] they should finish the draft by 5:00 pm. [They] were done around 7:00 pm. This is they was the discussions regarding the Vietnam declaration went on.

In the evening, when we met again, everybody was in a good mood. There was a proposal where we still had different points of view [from the rest] on five or six issues. Some of them we were adamant about reintroducing them [in the negotiations] or reformulating them [in the final text]. They begun by saying that the text should be introduces as is. We said that we should discuss the proposal page by page. We had some concerns about page one, but we decided not to brig them up. There were some other parts [of the declaration] where we did not bring up objections since they were reformulated [to our liking] elsewhere. We then got to the Polish proposal, where, in a somewhat improved form, they were maintaining their previous idea regarding maintaining [negotiations] with other states [i.e. capitalist states involved in the Vietnam War], idea with which we could not, under any circumstance, agree. We came up with the following proposal: "that consultations be maintained among socialist states, with the endorsement of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), to discuss any new issues arising from our [position] of aiding Vietnam." They [the Poles] did not like this [formula]. We explained to the Soviets why we did not approve of this formula, that it could be interpreted this way and that. The Soviets understood and did not continue to insist [that the Polish proposal be accepted]. Gomulka continued to insist, though towards the end he said that if the Romanians will not sign the declaration [because of this] he accepts that their formula be taken out. [In the end] this formula was taken out and Gomulka told us that he was defeated. This was the way we elaborated this declaration.

There was another paragraph which was referring to the idea of making an appeal to the [other communist] parties. Here the Soviets had one formula and we had another. We did not agree with the formula proposed by the Soviets, since, after all, it was saying the exact same thing. We modified the text by taking out "united front" because, we argued, one can not make a united front between states and parties. Aside from that, the declaration came out as you well know.

Of course, it is a good declaration. I told you how the text was elaborated. This is the way things happen when you have seven nations, each with its own point of view. Some [of those present] were during negotiations to receive a restructuring of 60 million dollars of debt...

After that the declaration was signed and we ended [the session] in a friendly atmosphere, with a glass of champagne.

Regarding the other point on the agenda, the one concerning military issues. We had had a discussion Monday, alone with the Soviets, and we reached the conclusion that there are divergent points of view concerning this. [After] all, what was not achieved by organizational improvements in the Warsaw Treaty was trying to be introduced this way, through [discussions] on the military statute [of the Treaty Organization]. [There was] a proposal that suggested that the Consultative Political Committee will decide concerning any issues arising; there were also other problems.

The Soviets said that they are satisfied with the way things are now. We said that we are not satisfied, and that we would like to mention that in the future we would like to discuss on the basis of the positions expressed [by the participants]. They asked us not to raise this issue in front of the Consultative Political Committee, to agree not to discuss this [at this time] and we did not raise the issue.

After we reached an agreement concerning the declaration on Vietnam, we called a new meeting of the First Secretaries and the Presidents of the Council of Ministers, where the military representatives would also participate. Brezhnev came ahead and agreed with us not to discuss this problem, that this point should be postponed, and that discussions would be resumed at a later time. This is the way the discussions of the Consultative Political Committee ended.

After all, [our] two [main] concerns we discussed: the declaration on European Security and the declaration regarding American Aggression in Vietnam. The other issues were taken out from the agenda. Discussions regarding the other points we had in private with the Soviets. Everybody knew about military issues [concerning us] since we gave all delegations a copy of our proposal.

This session of the meeting of the Consultative Political Committee ended this way. The CPC, not taking into account the two problems, adopted two very good documents, of great importance. They show that, the Socialist nations signing these documents, are united behind this issues.

Regarding the meeting concerning the problems of the COMECON. Here there was a discussion lasting about an hour—this discussion was also between the First

Secretaries and the Presidents of the Council of Ministers—concerning the nature of this meeting. The Poles proposed that this meeting be unofficial in character. We, as well as other [participants] said, during this smaller meeting, that we do not see why we should ignore any [existing] disagreements, since in the end we would still have to discuss them. We would also have to hold the 20th session of the COMECON [at some time]. Brezhnev presented the way he sees [the function of] this meeting.

I said that we also see this as a consultative meeting, that everyone should express his point of view but that no decisions should be taken. Even though Brezhnev has said the night before that he does not understand how a meeting could be consultative and not take any decisions, then he clarified what he understands by a consultative meeting. Indeed, the meeting had a consultative character; we all expressed our positions. The German began by presenting some issues mentioned in the report, concerning the [creation of] multinational corporations [among Socialist countries], and everything else that was included in the report. Then spoke the Czech, who after all said the same thing. The Hungarian spoke less about those things.

Everybody said that [the COMECON] has a very capable secretariat, that has grown [in size] a lot and that [now] is underused. I was the forth to speak and I expressed our position, how we see things, what we disagree with, what is [our position regarding] a supranational organization. I left out the introductory part from the [prepared] speech, since it was not saying anything—our comrades had prepared it in a very diplomatic form—and I began directly from [the issues] concerning COMECON, clearly presenting our position.

After I spoke there was a short recess. Brezhnev came by and said that he does not understand one thing: he agrees with everything, but [considers] that we should find a way for whoever wants to build certain industries to do it within COMECON. I told him that nothing can be accomplished this way.

Everybody else spoke about [establishing] multinational corporations, including the Mongolian which was trying to lecture us on the theory of pragmatic laws of the existing Socialist international system; that we should not think only of our national laws since there are international laws, applicable to the whole system and that it is because of multinational corporations that they have developed to their current level.

Then spoke the Bulgarian. He said that [the Bulgarians] believe that we should cooperate within COMECON and raised the issue of prices. Kosygin spoke on behalf of the Soviet delegation. He said that a lot of issues were raised here, that he does not know who wants COMECON to become a supranational organization, that "Comrade Ceaușescu said that someone wants [the COMECON to become supranational]. "We, the Soviets—[Kosygin said]—do not want it to become supranational and [would like to] declare here that we agree with Ceaușescu, that we don't want it to be a supranational organization. I do not know who spoke about a unified [economic] plan, but we do not want a unified [economic] plan. So, here too, we agree with the Romanians. They do not want [to participate in] any multinational corporations. Does anyone here want common ownership of corporations?" This was about the way he was presenting it. He was saying that "COMECON cannot manage multinational corporations, COMECON can recommend policies, but cannot own corporations and cannot manage corporations, not within [its member states] nor without. [He said this] even though everybody before talked about common ownership of corporations.

No one else spoke after Kosygin finished. We all agreed that we must increase cooperation. This was the discussion concerning COMECON.

This exchange of opinions was a good thing, because people heard our position directly. Now everybody knows that it is not Gogu [Gheorghe] Rădulescu or others that go there [and negotiate] but that this is the position of the entire party leadership.

The meeting ended and all delegations departed. All praised us for the way the summit was organized. The Czech[oslovakians] also praised the tact we displayed [during negotiations, which was instrumental in] reaching an agreement.

In conclusion, if we were to draw a bottom line under the summits, we consider that both [of them] had some good accomplishments. First of all there were some good declarations adopted, both in what European Security is concerned and in connection with American aggression in Vietnam, which is of great importance to Vietnam. A success is also the fact that we postponed debates on those positions where differences existed, since they would only make the negotiations more difficult and would not have added anything [to the results of the summits].

It is apparent that everybody is in favor of finding some solutions to those problems. At least it seems that some are in favor of resolving those differences by abandoning those tendencies, which is our position as well. Of course, it is clear that those issues have not been abandoned, discussions have just been postponed. At least now, they are clear that those issues cannot be introduced by the back door and, if we are to discuss them, then we should discuss them openly. Everybody understood that those issues cannot be discussed under subterfuge, but rather openly. It is possible, of course, that this postponement be for a longer or for a shorter period of time.

I must say that the most zealous proponents of a different position [than our own], both in the issue of European security and in the Vietnam issue were the Poles. They were also adamant about COMECON. The others had a somewhat formal assignment [here], but at the end they all agreed that the declaration adopted was a good one.

The Soviet comrades have also thanked us for the organization of the summit, and have said that they are satisfied with the results of the consultations.

This is, in general, the way the consultations took place. Do you have any comments or questions?

Cde. Paul Niculescu-Mizil: Concerning the declaration on Vietnam..., there was also a Polish proposal. This Polish proposal was not [created by following] the two previous proposals [the Soviet and the Romanian]. During the meeting of the First Secretaries, there was a discussion concerning how the proposal should be written. When the deputy [foreign affairs] ministers could not agree, the night following the show, the Polish and the Soviet Foreign Affairs ministers worked on a forth proposal, which they sent to all delegations at 4 am. At 6 am, when the Foreign Affairs ministers were suppose to meet to continue discussions on the joint proposal, the Polish [foreign affairs minister] said that they do not agree [to continue discussing on the joint proposal] and that discussions should be held on the proposals made by them.

Cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu: This is not the essential part. During the meeting of the First Secretaries, everyone said that they have sent their suggestions to the Polish [delegation] and that the Polish [Foreign Affairs] minister incorporated them into the proposal. I then asked them to tell us if they have received the suggestions of the

Romanian [Foreign Affairs] minister. The German said why should we say whether or not we received any suggestions...

Cde. P. Niculescu-Mizil: [He said that] because they did not send any suggestions, in the morning they had their suggestions with them.

Cde. N. Ceaușescu: Then the Polish [First Secretary] said, let's be truthful, no one send us any suggestions, it is our proposal. When Brezhnev asked [Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei] Gromyko if he had discussed [the proposal] with the Romanian [Foreign Affairs] minister, he said no. They did not know all those things [raised in our declarations]. There is still this apparatus mentality, to face people with a *fait accompli*. Gromyko even said a few times, why discuss [all] three proposals when we were given the task of elaborating one proposal. Brezhnev and Kosygin intervened and said that they should consider all proposals. They still have their old mentality.

Cde. Emil Bondăraș: I would like to say something, so that the Executive Committee [of the PCR] is informed of some aspects [of the issue] which were not depicted in detail, but which [I consider] are important in understanding the core issue.

I believe we accomplish two good things. They could have been more [in tune to] our liking and our position could have been better expressed. Those two documents... I am speaking [first] of the declarations concerning European security, [if this document] was approved in the form that you have seen, that is after a long battle between different points of view, especially where the Soviets are concerned. Without a doubt, we had a positive influence on the final text of the declaration, which gives us the possibility of considering it a good declaration.

[In regards with the declaration on Vietnam,] if our delegation would not have acted with determination, it would not have had the content and the form it has today, [content and form] which makes it a valuable declaration. The Soviet proposal, and even more so the Polish proposal, were far away from reflecting that which, in the current international situation, must be reflected as far as the Vietnam situation is concerned. This is surprising considering that, just as ourselves, the Soviet side was aware of the Vietnamese position concerning this declaration.

If this Vietnamese position—to which we did not have any objections since it was concurrent with our own point of view concerning the Vietnam issue—has been so

faithfully represented in the draft of the declaration, this is due to the determination with which the Romanian delegation, and especially Cde. Ceaușescu, have insisted on and defended this point of view. This was, most likely, a signal to our allies concerning our unwillingness to accept that our point of view not be taken into account where military matters are concerned.

Now I would like to address the second objective of the Summit which took place in Bucharest. If we look at the way the conference was prepared, the main goal of this conference was not the declaration concerning European security. As the Executive Committee was informed previously, the main goal was that the statute of the Warsaw Treaty Organization be revised, that a new system of cooperation, political as well as military, be instituted in place [of the old way].

Since our point of view was not adequately defended in Moscow by the comrade officers which went there [to negotiate], the proposal for a new system of cooperation, [with] a unified command of the armies of the Warsaw Pact was not at all in accordance with our position, rather it was completely opposed. However, this was the proposal that they came here with, so that it be discussed and approved, and this proposal had, obviously, the unanimous approval of all the other [delegations] except for us. This is apparent from Ulbricht's surprised [statement]: "I did not abandoned anything." This shows that, until the eve of their arrival in Bucharest, they wanted to discuss this [proposal]. This could not have been done—[the discussion of this proposal]—and this is an extremely important point.

This is the way in which the Bucharest conference is valuable in what the Warsaw Treaty Organization is concerned, both in terms of what has been accomplished and in terms of what they [the other six delegations] could not [accomplish]. In terms of this, our delegation... I don't know if the Executive Committee knows this, but the Permanent Presidium [the Politburo] elaborated a new proposal for the military statute [of the Warsaw Treaty]. This proposal, completely re-written to express our point of view, was presented to the Soviet delegation, and then was sent to all the other delegations. This was a shock [to them] initially, but, seeing the determination with which we act [to defend our position] concerning the other documents on the agenda, they did not try to start negotiations on this problems.

Cde. N. Ceaușescu: They withdrew this issue from the agenda previously. Sunday morning, when we presented them with our proposal, they suggested that the point should be struck from the agenda.

Cde. E. Bondărăș: Of course, we also know the nature of the differences between the report of the Executive Committee [of the COMECON], [report] which includes all the proposals and objectives initiated by those desiring [establishing] a new relationship.

It is worth mentioning the fact that, as far as the history of international conferences among Socialist countries is concerned, this is the first time that, at such a high level Summit, divergent points of view were discussed and presented by the most authorized decision-makers, at least in those aspects that were accepted on the agenda. Until now, such conferences did not allow such openness. The way conferences of Warsaw Treaty [Organization] members was: the First Secretaries presented [their point of view] and then, as long as there was still time, the apparatus tried to negotiate settlements among [divergent] statements. This time however, the main statements were elaborated [negotiated] by the First Secretaries themselves. This is a way of saying it, since it is our own First Secretary that insisted, directed and establish the [topic] of the debate. Because of this, it was possible to adopt the documents in their present spirit and format. I say these things because [I think] this is a good thing. This eases the work load of the [diplomatic] apparatus and boosts the authority and prestige of the conference.

As a result of these international conferences [sic!—this international conference] all who had an open mind had the something to learn. We have seen—at our Bulgarian comrades—that they were not displeased with the way discussions [among participants] took place. It was thus possible to defeat those attitudes that do not conform with the way relations among [fraternal] parties should be. Brezhnev's attitude [is one example]: "what do you mean we cannot sign the declaration [regarding Vietnam] when the six of us approve and only you, the Romanians still oppose it!" To this he was given a firm, dignified answer, a reply that brought him quickly down to earth again. From here [we should] draw conclusions about how [such] discussions should be handled in the future.

I believe that this conference represents a turning point, as far as the our participation at such conferences, [a turning point] which must be appreciated, saluted

and which [should] represent the starting point for the way we should hold [such] discussions from now on.

Cde. N. Ceaușescu: Since Cde. Bondăraș spoke about those things, I want to stress that the problem with the Executive Political Committee [of the Warsaw Pact]—we have criticized its activity, including during the meeting with the Soviets in Moscow—[is] that the [participants] are not prepared in time concerning the meetings, that the [information] materials are not sent [to the participants] and that [the meetings] transform themselves into sessions of ratifying decisions already made. [We have made suggestions that] this is where there is a dire need for improvement.

A far as the military issues are concerned, neither the Soviets nor any others demanded that any modifications [to the statute] be made. We [however] asked ever since Moscow that [the statute] be changed, because we do not agree with its current form.

Cde. E. Bondăraș: I was referring to Khrushchiov. He wanted to modify the statute so that he can change the relationship between...

Cde. N. Ceaușescu: After all we did not carry out the requirements of the current statute. Based on it, they do not need anything more. But we believe that the statute is completely incompatible [with our interests]. In the draft proposal written in Moscow there were some things that were contrary to our interests. They took advantage of the fact that our comrades there were not paying attention and introduced [in the text] those issues discussed with Brezhnev in Moscow: that there no longer is supreme [military] command, that the army is a national army, that the responsibility [of taking decisions] lies with the Government and [the leadership of] the party, that there no longer is any control... So all our concerns were introduced, but under a different form. They especially insisted in regards with the leadership role of the Consultative Political Committee. This was the issue they fought the hardest about; regarding all others they agreed with [our] proposals.

They tried to transform the Consultative Political Committee an organization with majority vote decision-making ability also concerning military decisions. Then, the decision concerning the command [organization]—even though we called it by another name—the Consultative Political Committee could have taken decisions which would invalidate all other decisions [already taken]. This is the most important thing.

I want to stress that it is possible—they [the Soviets] said that from the very first day [of the conference]—they [the Soviets] might be willing to abandon [discussions] on those points of view where there are differences. This is what the Soviets suggested, to abandon discussions of differences in organizational problems from the agenda. It was not Ulbricht, he had no clue. They [the Soviets] said that they have received a mandate from the [CPSU] Politburo to reach a consensus, and [that they suggest] that positions where differences exist be dropped from the [conference's] agenda. When they saw that, from the very first day we gave them a new draft for the military [statute] proposal, they suggested that this be [also] dropped from the agenda. We asked that this [proposal] be put on the agenda, since we wanted to discuss it, but they said that they received a mandate from the [CPSU] Politburo to postpone discussions on divergent issues and they tried to take that out of the agenda, to postpone it.

As a matter of fact they wanted the same thing with COMECON... they did not want to discuss [anything]. They said: "why should we present our position, why exchange opinions?" They did not have a written statement, from the first day they said we do not want to take the floor. Generally, they did not have a written statement prepared concerning any of the issues since, in my opinion, they tried to avoid to take a position concerning these issues. If they [completely] gave up on this issues, or if they were to show support for them, they would have been placed in an awkward situation, so they simply avoided [to take a position]. When Kosygin spoke, he said that he represents the position of the Soviet government and the CPSU, that they do not want COMECON to transform itself into a supra-national organization.

Cde. Paul Niculescu-Mizil: It should be said that both Brezhnev in regards with military issues and Kosygin concerning economic issues said that, during the conference in Bucharest, different positions were presented, positions which should be carefully looked at. They did not want to discuss any [of these] positions, that much was clear.

Cde. N. Ceausescu: Concerning the issue of Vietnam, the Soviet proposal did not completely conform with our position, but it was, generally, an acceptable proposal.

Cde. P. Niculescu-Mizil: They were easily persuaded, until the Polish [delegation] showed up.

Cde. N. Ceausescu: What did² the Vietnamese [government] send us? Some things that they were interested in seeing [introduced in the declaration]. We added some other things in the declaration as well. All of the issues of concern to the Vietnamese [government] were included, in one form or another in the Soviet proposal. Since the Poles showed up, they put a lot of pressure on the Soviets³ to abandon their own proposal. It seems evident why. They came with their own proposal and were the most active throughout the discussions, they were the ones who fought for every single issue. Meanwhile, all the other delegations did not offer their support, at all, to the Poles. After all, as the others dealt with the issue, it was clear that they supported our position. They all said that we must respond to the American [aggression].

This is the way the discussions took place. The declarations are good. [The declaration on European security] mirrors positions [with which we can agree] and I believe we can ratify it. [More so,] the way it has been received by the public opinion of Europe and the world makes clear that they can constitute a platform [for future action].

The declaration on Vietnam is also a good one, but it must be followed by concrete actions in all fields. This [should be reflected] by the decision of our executive committee [politburo].

We have suggested, to the Soviets initially, and then to the other delegations [present at the Bucharest conference] that we should take a close look at whether it would still be useful for us to participate at the disarmament conference in Geneva. They said that this is an interesting issue, that we should think about what can be accomplished there, [of whether it would be useful to] discuss about peace with the Americans. All said that this needs to be discussed within their own parties, since this is an issue that they do not have a mandate to discuss [here]. Future consultations concerning this will follow, [and a decision might be made eventually] that we will not participate at this conference until the American aggression [in Vietnam] ends.

With this I think we can end our discussion of the first point on the agenda of discussions.

² in the document: "What didn't the Vietnamese send us?" I believe the verb should be affirmative. Possible typo by the person transcribing from the original document.

³ In the document "Poles"... ??? mistake, it should be the Soviets.

Cde. Leonte Răutu: I would like to suggest that we register our complete agreement with the activity of the delegation at the conference, and with the important role [the delegation had] in obtaining [and ratifying] these important and useful documents.

[Source: ANIC, fond CC PCR – Chancellery, folder 95/1966, pp 10-24. Translated by Mircea Munteanu]