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Moscow Arrived: 85.3.6. Top Secret! Prepared by: gnee 85.3.6. Checked

# **Encoded Message**

Immediate delivery To Cormade István Roska, deputy foreign minister

# Comrade Kornyenko:

At the start of his speech he announced that we had no intention to issue a joint communiqué. The Soviet leaders had earlier informed the governments of the Warsaw Treaty countries about a meeting taking place on 7-8 January 1985 between Schulz and Gromyko, who had a very serious discussion on the need to have debate on nuclear arms, strategic and intermediate-range weapons. Since the issue of space weapons was a much more complex matter, this did not come up in the discussion.

The Soviet side firmly insists that these issues be treated in conjunction. Since the Americans concurred in this view – the joint communiqué confirmed this –, it was decided that the negotiations would commence in all three topics. This is not a mechanical merger of the problems. The negotiations will be conducted by united delegations, but parallel with the plenary sessions it seems prudent to set up special work teams, which would be headed by Comrades Karpov, Kvicinsky and Obuhov.

The topics selected for discussion are closely interconnected; there is an urgency to start these discussions as early as possible, since the preparations for space weapons program are already under way in the US.

The anti-ballistic missile systems have three components: the first destroys the enemy's missiles shortly after launch; the second intercepts them in space, and the third in descent. The American leaders (including Reagan) say that they aim at a 100% protection and therefore they focus on the protection against counterstrikes, rather than against a first-strike attack. This rationale is not new.

In an interview by NBC, Weinberger announced that they needed a system, which protected the US from a counterstrike; in other words, they wanted to be able to launch a first-strike attack without fear of any counterstrikes.

In October 1984 in San Francisco, he was even more straightforward: he announced that the United States had to have military superiority over the Russians.

Initially, the negotiations were about deciding how many missiles the two sides needed to maintain security; now the aim of the negotiations is to prevent the weaponization of outer space and to reduce strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons, or in any case to halt their increase. Now even the Americans must face up to these demands. Significantly, when Schultz read out the text after his meeting with Comrade Gromyko in front of the journalists, someone asked him whether it was the Soviet draft or the American agreement. The Soviet strive for constructive negotiations.

The essence of the Soviet proposals is as follows:

## Space Weapons

The Soviet side urges for a complete ban on experiments in this category, as well as for the destruction of the existing systems. From the viewpoint of military-technology, spy satellites also qualify as space weapons, but in this case it is only about first-strike weapons, which have the capability to paralyze various installations either in space, or in the atmosphere or on the ground. However, the laser and particle-beam weapons are also in this category; in other words, we strive for banning space-based military installations of any kind – regardless of the actual physical principle involved. The second category is

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weapon systems to be used against cosmic and ground-based objects. The third category is formed by the military installations designed to paralyze antiballistic weapon systems.

When Washington and the Western powers claim that there is no contradiction between the Star War plans and their determination to reach an agreement, their duplicity becomes apparent.

The deployment of moveable, sea-based and ground-based weapons is relatively easy to monitor; since it is not possible to prove that the technical experiments related to space weapons form no part of the process to create them, they should be banned and monitored. A group of American lawyers claim that this is possible.

Undoubtedly, monitoring is a very difficult issue. For example, we already have an agreement banning the proliferation of nuclear arms, but to check whether the US has already sold such weapons to other countries would be close to impossible.

To expose the indefensibility of the American views both in our propaganda and in our diplomatic work is very important.

#### Strategic Weapons

According to the Soviet position, the problem of strategic weapons is closely bound up with the problem of the cosmic first-strike weapons. The Soviet Union supports both a radical reduction of these arms and the ban on the deployment and development of new weapons of this kind.

The other interconnection is with intermediate-range weapons. Because of the short travel time, these weapons are more dangerous than the intercontinental missiles. This subject should not be treated globally; we only talk about the European missiles.

According to the Soviet proposal, a reduction in the number of American missiles would be followed by a reduction in the number of the Soviet missiles. The view on the need to include the French missiles in the count has not changed; however, the Soviet side is ready to consider complete disarmament in the area of intermediate-range missiles.

Comrade Kornyenko: We have constantly reiterated that a separate agreement in areas not closely interrelated with other areas is possible. For example, there is the question of arms reduction in the more distant future. The destruction of missiles at high altitude over certain territories poses smaller risks, than their explosion on impact, Western experts claim. However, the radioactive fragments scattered in space threaten the entire humanity. Therefore, this "humane/moral" version is not the least humane.

In connection with the accusations about the Soviet violations of earlier agreements, we must point out that these are merely meant to justify the launch of the Star War program. To expose this lie both in our diplomatic work and in our propaganda is extremely important.

Johanes (Czecholsovakia)

We are grateful for the preliminary information. We have found the interview with Comrade Gromyko extremely useful. We completely support the Soviet Union's decision to address the three questions jointly. The Western protests reveal that the allies of the US do not see eye to eye on every issue in connection with the Star Wars project. In our view, the US is behind the arms race in Western Europe, strongly supported by the militaristic circles of the FRG. In our propaganda we must demonstrate the dangers of "space war"; we must reveal the protests of the West and expose the conceit in the American propaganda tricks. It is important that in this year, when so many anniversaries will be held, we use every available opportunity to explain our views and reiterate our position.

# Kinast (Poland)

The negotiations between the US and the Soviet Union have utmost importance. This does not imply, of course, that the US has revised its position on socialism. Unfortunately, after the détente of the 1970s the international situation has changed for the worse. Reagan's reaction to the relative balance of power that had existed was to launch an armament program on an unprecedented scale. They basically assume that their new initiatives could not be monitored. Poland constantly feels the effects of the sanctions and the manipulations of public sentiment. All these provide evidence of the US's ruthless politics, as seen

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for example in the activities of the American attaché, who was found to have taken photographs of military installations.

As Jaruzelski has said in an interview for an Indian newspaper, we assign utmost importance to the Geneva negotiations. We hope that the US is going to take a more reasonable position during the negotiations. We can also rely on the support of the non-aligned countries.

#### L. Gocev (Bulgaria)

We know that the Soviet Union will do everything in its power to bring the Geneva negotiations to a successful conclusion. At the same time, the United States will go to great lengths to make the talks more difficult.

#### G. Krolikowski (GDR)

The flexible yet principled policies of the Soviet Union faithfully express the Soviet Union's determination to bring the complex negotiations to a successful conclusion. The leadership of the GDR has passed a resolution in support of this politics.

The GDR finds it especially important that the three topics be discussed jointly and in their full complexity at Geneva. We cannot tolerate the United States' determination to attain one-sided advantages over the Soviet Union. Gromyko's TV interview has provided excellent arguments for our work in political propaganda. During his debate with Schmidt and Rau (prime minister of North Rhine-Westphalia), Honecker explained the GDR's views about the peace-loving policies of the socialist countries. Improving the relations between East and West is very important in Europe. The representatives of the FRG announced that they intended to take part in the research and development of space weapons; similar tendencies can be observed in Great Britain and Japan. In addition to the spirit of cooperation, the capitalist countries also show a certain amount of concern on seeing that the escalatory politics of the US might end in a catastrophe. The research and development work of the US could undermine the negotiations. The nations all over the world look upon these talks as the result of the Soviet Union's peace-loving policies. We must try to win the pessimistic and indifferent masses over to our policies. The tendency is perceptible that not every developing country understands the significance of the Geneva negotiations. Mozambique, for example, assigns higher priority to the resolution of the regional problems.

### A. Duma (Romania)

The year 1985 marks an important turning point in our campaign to eliminate the arms race. Our party and government welcomed the talks between Schultz and Gromyko. In view of the importance attached to this event, Romania proposed that a meeting be convened at the level of Central Committee secretaries, foreign ministers or perhaps heads of governments still before the start of the Soviet-American talks, so as to make up for the January Political Consultative Committee session that was cancelled.

Our countries are equal partners in the European fold of nations: they justly expect that their right to peace and security should be taken into consideration at the negotiations. We are of the opinion that since the Soviet Union is ready to go a long way at the negotiations, we should modify a few details, such as the joint treatment of the three questions, for example. We believe that, whenever possible, partial agreements should also be signed instead of waiting for a global solution for all the problems. In any case, the negotiations should be continued later. The decision to continue with the deployment of missiles in Europe may have an unfavorable effect on the negotiations. Freezing the deployment at the current level would demonstrate the two sides' sincere determination to come to an agreement. The expansion of the arms race to outer space would undoubtedly carry further dangers. However, the peoples of Europe see the deployment of intermediate-range missiles as the most important issue. The Romanian leaders expect the two sides to address this problem in accordance with its gravity at the Geneva talks. Comrade Ceausescu believes that these dangerous weapons must completely be removed from Europe. Romania proposes the establishment of a committee within the community of Warsaw Treaty countries for the purpose of working out the specific topics in cooperation with the Soviet delegation.

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It is also important that the socialist countries send observers to Geneva, who should continuously receive updated information from the head of the Soviet delegation. Romania has already proposed a meeting between the Warsaw Treaty countries and the NATO members to discuss the problems of arms limitation. During the Soviet-American talks the efforts should also be stepped up in other international forums, in order to exert a favorable impact on the Geneva talks. At the same time, Romania would like to reactivate these negotiations in order to break the deadlock in international negotiations. The Stockholm conference could sanction concrete steps in connection with giving advance warning of military exercises, etc. In Geneva an agreement could be reached on the freezing the level of arms and monitoring. Romania offers to hold regular consultations in connection with the negotiations in Geneva, Stockholm and Vienna, and also to play a more active role in the campaign for preserving peace and security. In the future, Romania will continue to work hard to promote the success of the negotiations.

## Kornyenko, G.M. (the Soviet Union)

Earlier on, the Soviet Union has opened every negotiation with the demand to put an end to the arms race; naturally, the situation will be no different in Geneva.

Now we have to take into account that the various questions are <u>organically</u> linked. We can reach <u>separate</u> agreements only about issues that are not linked to other issues in this manner.

Naturally, the Soviet Union will continue paying attention to the work of other forums (Stockholm, Vienna), where we have been making collective efforts to achieve progress. The proposed idea for a meeting of secretaries or heads of governments is not a timely one. The problem of observers requires a separate consideration. But it must be said that in certain questions any form of cooperation is ruled out.

Finally, Comrade Kornyenko asked the participants of the meeting whether the press statement distributed earlier had been met with their approval. All the delegations found the text acceptable, and they also approved of an embargo until 7:00 pm, Moscow time.

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[Translated by Ervin Dunay, Central European University, Budapest]

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