

István Roska  
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Recipients:  
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**Report**  
**On the consultation between the Warsaw Treaty deputy foreign ministers in**  
**connection with the Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva**  
**(Moscow, 1 March 1985)**

The meeting was initiated by the Soviets for the purpose of exchanging views in connection with the Soviet-American negotiations scheduled to start on March 12 in Geneva. A factual communiqué was published about the meeting.

Comrade Kronyenko, the first deputy foreign minister of the Soviet Union, held a speech that ran nearly an hour; in this speech he summed up the preliminary events leading to the Soviet-American talks set to start on 12 March in Geneva, listing the main elements of the preliminary agreement on the objectives, the subject and the nature of the negotiations. In the introduction he mentioned that the Soviet leadership had earlier informed the leaders of the “brotherly parties” of the principal agreement reached in November 1984, as well as of the proceedings and accomplishments of the Geneva meeting between the foreign ministers of the Soviet Union and the United States in January 1985. In reference to recent American press statements, he declared that if the United States chose to press ahead with the construction of a “strategic defense shield”, that decision would seriously undermine the negotiations and speed up the arms race in every area.

He reminded his audience that the aim of the Geneva conference was to prevent the militarization of outer space on the one hand and to curb the nuclear arms race on the other, just as it had been stated in the joint communiqué issued after the Soviet-American foreign ministerial meeting in Geneva on 7-8 January 1985. The American side was forced to accept the objective and the purpose of the negotiations as conceived by the Soviets. The American statements issued since the foreign ministerial meeting in Geneva gave no cause for optimism as to whether the US would faithfully execute what had been agreed to in Geneva. Regardless of that, the Soviet side prepares for a constructive negotiation. Comrade Korniyenko commented on the reason why it had been necessary to create three negotiating teams within the delegations. (The practical reason is that all three groups of questions have specific features that require a professional approach.) Comrade Kornyenko revealed that the Soviet delegation would submit the following three proposals in Geneva:

1) In connection with the space weapons:

- A complete ban on the development of strike-force capability space weapon systems, along with the abolition of the ones that are already in existence. The proposal applies to any

offensive space weapon based on any principles (traditional or nuclear explosives; laser, ray beam, particle beam).

- A complete ban on space weapons of any kind targeted on the atmosphere or the earth.
- A complete ban on anti-satellite weapons of any kind, without regard of their possible places of deployment.

2) In connection with strategic nuclear weapons:

- A radical reduction of the existing ones;
- A ban on the deployment on new weapon systems, or their maximum limitation.

A precondition of the agreements to be reached in this area is the point that an agreement on space weapons is forthcoming. At the same time, a definite connection exists with the intermediate-range nuclear missiles (the intermediate missiles deployed by the US in Europe can reach the territory of the Soviet Union, while the US falls outside the range of the Soviet rockets of the same type).

3) In connection with the intermediate-range nuclear missiles of Europe:

- A complete stop on the Western-European deployment of the new American intermediate-range missiles;
- In this case the Soviet counter-measures could also be scrapped;
- The next move would be to reduce the number of intermediate-range nuclear missiles to an agreed level. The Soviet Union continues to insist on taking the British and the French missiles into account
- In addition to the above, the Soviet Union is ready to sign an agreement on banishing nuclear weapons completely from Europe, both in the intermediate-range and the tactical category.

The Soviet demand to include all types of weapon systems capable of delivering nuclear charges (including intermediate-range airplanes) remains unchanged.

Comrade Kornyenko gave a notable clarification in explaining the mutual interconnection between the negotiation and the resolution of the topics. Although the principle of complexity continues to be important, it should not be considered absolutely sacrosanct: whenever a real chance emerges to find a solution that is not linked with space weapons – as for example in the case of intermediate nuclear weapons -, an opportunity for a separate agreement should be left open.

Finally, Comrade Kornyenko singled out those issues, on which the Soviet side placed great emphasis in diplomatic and propaganda work alike. He was hopeful that the friendly countries would be the Soviet Union's partners in this.

The principle of complexity means that the three topics of the negotiation are mutually interconnected. That is not open to bargaining. It must be emphasized that the Soviet side was not led by tactical considerations in linking these issues: in this case we are dealing with an objective, organic interconnection. This is the reality, and there is no alternative. To assume that it is possible to strike a deal on the limitation of nuclear arms race without outlawing the militarization of outer space is an illusion.

We have come to the problem of the status of scientific research related to space weapons. We must expose the logical absurdity in the American interpretation, which claims that SALT-I does not prohibit research. Similarly false is their other argument, whereby scientific research cannot be monitored and, therefore, it is not worth talking about its prohibition. Research - especially during its experimental, constructional phase – can be monitored and the Soviet Union is a partner in this.

The suggestion that anyone would launch a research program – especially one with an approved budget of \$26 billion – without ever wanting to find an application for it is absurd. The

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American leaders – most notably Weinberger – make it quite plain that their ultimate goal is application, not just research.

We must unveil the American lies about the “moral, humane and defensive” nature of the strategic defense initiative. The destroyed weapons may lead to the contamination of the entire world, whether they are hit immediately after the launch, or at the zenith, or in descent.

Ever since the announcement of the „star wars” program, the Americans intensified their smear campaign about the Soviet Union’s alleged treaty violations in connection with the agreements on disarmament/arms limitation. They want to make the impression that the Soviet Union is a difficult negotiating partner, one that it is not worth negotiating with it, because it would not honor its obligations anyway. These machinations poison the atmosphere of subsequent negotiations.

Finally, Comrade Korniyenko offered to inform the leaders of the friendly countries about any further developments at the Geneva talks.

The other speakers – with the exception of the Romanian delegate – supported the Soviet negotiating position, expressing their gratitude for the information and describing the exchange of views as useful.

The Hungarian speaker welcomed the Soviet initiative to hold this meeting; describing the consultation as both well timed and useful, he supported the Soviet negotiating position.

Assistant under-secretary Comrade Duma of Romania, who was accompanied by the Romanian deputy foreign minister Pop, proposed that we hold regular consultations in the future so as to forge a joint platform in relation to the Geneva talks and the other disarmament forums. “In this way it would be possible to avoid the repetition of past incidents, when instead of drawing the appropriate conclusions a faulty tactical approach was endorsed.”

On behalf of the Romanian party and government leadership, he announced that they stood by their earlier proposal, in which they urged to convene a meeting either at the level of the secretaries of the Central Committee and the foreign ministers or between the prime ministers still before the Geneva conference. Although he described the present meeting as useful, it could not be considered a substitute for the higher-level meeting they had suggested.

In response to the briefing about the Soviet negotiating position, Comrade Duma revealed that they would like to learn in greater detail about the concrete proposals and initiatives that the Soviet comrades intended to submit. Although they only had general picture of the Soviet ideas, a few amendments and clarifications would be useful.

Without questioning the principle of mutual interconnections, he urged the Soviet Union to reach an agreement in the various questions separately, rather than wait for a global solution of the entire complexity of the problems.

He reiterated their earlier proposal about the establishment of a consultative committee within the Warsaw Treaty, in the framework of which the member states had a chance to expound their positions and take part in the drafting of the proposals before they were submitted to the Geneva conference.

As a new proposal, he suggested that the Warsaw Treaty members appoint their own special envoys for the Geneva conference; they could be in permanent contact with the Soviet delegation and receive continuous information about the progress made at the negotiations.

They still think it necessary that the European states play an appropriate role in the Geneva conference. They stand by their proposal about a meeting between the Warsaw Treaty countries and the NATO members.

Romania urges the various international organizations and negotiating forums to step up their efforts in the area of disarmament. In his opinion, the Warsaw Treaty countries should display a more positively approach at the Geneva Disarmament Conference, the Stockholm

Conference and the Viennese negotiation, putting on the table a greater number of concrete initiatives. In order to achieve that, they suggest that the Warsaw Treaty countries hold meetings and consultations to discuss the best approaches to all those problems that are scheduled for discussion at Geneva, Stockholm and Vienna.

In the Romanians' opinion, the Warsaw Treaty countries should develop a new strategy in the area of disarmament.

Finally, he emphasized that Romania was determined to play a part in the successful conclusion of the Soviet-American talks at Geneva and in the activation of the other disarmament talks.

Comrade Korniyenko briefly reacted to the Romanian proposals. He described some of them as inappropriate for a consultation, meaning that no decision could be made at this level. Most of the proposals were not new to the other member states, who had already explained their doubts about their practicality.

Budapest, 8 March 1985

*[Translated by Ervin Dunay, Central European University, Budapest]*

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