

János Nagy
1593/N.J./1984.

Top Secret!
1) Comrade Várkonyi
2) Comrade Roska
3) Comrade Esztergályos
4) Comrade Kovács
5) Comrade Kőmives
6) Comrade Szűcsné
7) Comrade István Varga
8) own copy

Report
On the consultation of the Warsaw Treaty deputy foreign ministers in Warsaw
in connection with the Stockholm conference
(Warsaw, 3-4 May 1984)

The deputy foreign ministers of the Warsaw Treaty held a consultation in Warsaw on 3 and 4 May 1984, discussing questions related to the Stockholm conference.

Foreign Minister Stefan Olszowski, who is also a member of the Politburo of the Polish United Workers' Party, received the participants.

After giving their assessment of the first round of the Stockholm conference, the delegates discussed the questions related to the next session due to begin on 8 May.

In assessing the international and European situation, Comrade A.G. Kovaliev, the deputy foreign minister of the Soviet Union, started out from the statements and conclusions of the Budapest session of the Foreign Ministers' Committee. He underlined that we should expect the tensions existing in the European political situation to continue at the Stockholm conference. He took a positive view of both the position that the representatives of the socialist countries took at the conference and the overall activities of the delegations.

He concluded that the United States of America, along with the rest of the NATO members, still seemed unwilling to start the actual negotiations. This was borne out by the experience gained during discussions that took place in Moscow with the USA's principal Stockholm delegation. These revealed a "belated realism" in the matter of the renouncement of the use of force on the one hand, and the Americans' insistence on the NATO proposals on the other.

In connection with the renouncement of the use of force, the Western-European participants, including the FRG, France and Switzerland, showed a willingness to work out confidence and security building measures, so as to "crown" the principle, so to speak. According to the Italian, Belgian, Danish, Spanish and Dutch position, the issues of political nature should be discussed parallel with the military/technical measures. During his negotiations in Moscow, the Italian Foreign Minister Andreotti reiterated that substantial negotiations should be held in Stockholm, leading to results that should improve European security in regards to both the military and the political aspect.

Comrade Kovaliev pointed to the positive reaction our initiatives addressing comprehensive and essential political issues generated among the neutral and non-aligned countries of Europe. He appreciated the Yugoslav, Finnish, Austrian, Maltese and Cyprian position, which gave backing to the idea of having parallel discussions about the various proposals submitted. He pointed out that the neutral and non-aligned countries' proposal, regardless of the fact that in many ways it echoed the unrealistic western view in connection with the military/technical measures, did contain elements that could be utilized by us. Unofficially, the neutral countries supported the socialist proposals, giving us to

understand that they would be willing to endorse the principle of the renouncement of the use of force in an appropriate form.

Comrade Kovaliev emphasized that in the course of the hard negotiations that lied ahead of us we must keep the initiative. He mentioned the Budapest Call for the renouncement of the use of force, underlining the need to make good use of it at the Stockholm negotiations. He informed his audience about the Soviet Union's intention to submit a written proposal at the start of the second round of talks. (It has been done.) At a bilateral discussion taking place before the start of the consultation, the Soviet comrades asked us to agree to the idea that – in order to avoid the situation of 6+1 in consequence of the Romanian proposals – the Soviet Union alone submit the proposal, with others' giving their backing. I agreed to this, adding that later on, should the need arise, we might even agree to co-authorship.

The representatives of the other socialist delegations working in close collaboration spoke about the Stockholm conference, and the tasks ahead of us, in tune with the Soviet assessment. They approved of the step the Soviets were planning to take, assuring them of their support. On the subject of the Budapest Call addressed to the NATO countries, everyone apart from the Romanian delegate was of the opinion that it would be necessary to take advantage of this initiative at the Stockholm conference.

The speeches revealed that there was a fundamental unity in approaching the problem, with shades of difference in a few practical questions. For example, the Bulgarian representative laid stronger emphasis on the interconnections of the draft agreement about the renouncement of the use of force and the possibilities of the Stockholm conference.

On the one hand, the Romanian deputy foreign minister showed an interest in the step announced by the Soviets, and on the other hand he highlighted those elements in his own proposal, which coincided with the interests of the socialist-bloc countries. He supported the idea of starting concrete negotiations as soon as possible, while at the same time failing to take into account a number of essential tactical elements in the joint socialist position.

In my own speech, the text of which I enclose together with the NBO copy, I explained our position.

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The participants at the meeting were of the opinion that no concrete results were likely to emerge from the Stockholm conference in the immediate future. There was also a general agreement about the assessment that in the tense international situation the conference played a serious role in maintaining the east-west dialogue and in our attempts to bring about improvement in the current European situation.

The participants, who worked in close collaboration, appraised the significance of the communiqué and the Call issued by the Budapest session of the Foreign Ministers' Committee; even the Romanian deputy foreign minister made references to it in a positive tone. The atmosphere at the conference was calm and constructive; even the Romanian comrades avoided any issue that was likely to generate a debate. However, it was still not possible to follow up the speeches with a joint summary or a conclusion acceptable to all. In this way, once again, the consultation sent an important message to the outside world, but contributed nothing towards the establishment of cooperation, which would be so badly needed at Stockholm.

Budapest, 10 May 1984

[Translated by Ervin Dunay, Central European University, Budapest]

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