

DRAFT SPEECH

For Comrade Puja's address to the meeting of deputy foreign ministers of the
Warsaw Treaty countries held on 19 June 1970

Dear Comrades!

This meeting between the deputy foreign ministers has been called for a very important purpose: to exchange information regarding the experiences and results we have come across in our work preparing the convocation of the conference on security in Europe and to reach an agreement on the fundamental direction of our future activities.

1) The latest lessons of the preparations for the conference on security in Europe

Since the meeting of deputy foreign ministers held in Sophia in January of this year, several important developments have taken place in connection with the security conference. On the one hand, the bilateral consultations between the European states on questions related to European security and the preparations for the conference on security have become broader and more regular; and on the other hand several inter-state organizations of the West have addressed these issues quite specifically.

Comrades, first of all please allow me to speak about the experiences we have gathered during the bilateral consultations and the conclusions we have drawn on that basis.

During the five months that have passed since the meeting of deputy foreign ministers in Sophia we have conducted several bilateral talks and consultations on questions related to the preparations of the conference on security in Europe.

In addition to the continuous and mutual exchange of information and harmonization of views, we have conducted bilateral talks at ministerial and deputy-ministerial level with the friendly socialist countries, with our Bulgarian, East German, Polish and Romanian comrades. We have submitted for discussion our working papers on the preparations for the conference on economic cooperation in Europe to a multilateral conference of experts delegated by the socialist countries.

We have also had meetings with the representatives of the capitalist countries of the West.

Our foreign minister, János Péter, held bilateral talks with the foreign ministers of Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Norway and Austria.

Just a few days ago Mr. Enckel, Finland's traveling ambassador and the Finnish government's special envoy in matters related to the European security conference, visited our capital. Also, we have conducted consultations at various levels with the foreign ministries of other European states.

We have drawn several conclusions from our bilateral talks and consultations:

- It has now become generally accepted that the socialist countries' diplomatic campaign for European security and the associated conference genuinely reflects their dedication to peace and security in Europe, rather than serving some propagandistic purposes.
- The preparations for the conference, together with the questions related to determining its agenda and the circumstances of its convocation, have become a major topic of international politics in Europe, one that the western countries have to address concretely in bilateral and multilateral talks conducted both with the socialist countries and among themselves.
- An agreement has been reached on the list of participants invited to the conference: the capitalist states of Europe have come to accept that the German Democratic Republic take part at the conference on security in Europe on an equal footing with the Federal Republic of Germany, while the socialist countries announced their agreement to the participation of the United States and Canada.
- No objection to the suggested location of the conference has been raised. It appears that Helsinki has essentially been accepted as the location of the conference.
- The smaller western countries, such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and Finland, for example, seem to be rather keen on holding the conference. Of the larger capitalist countries, France and Italy have displayed considerable interest.
- The government of the United States set itself against the convocation of the conference on security in Europe, trying to sabotage, postpone and sidetrack the event accordingly; also, it exerts a negative influence on its allies and hinders the activities of the neutral countries. In this endeavor, it relies primarily on Great Britain, and partly on the Federal Republic of Germany.
- In the course of the consultations held with the capitalist countries the positions came closer in several topics, for example the items for the agenda, the institutionalization, the preparatory body of the conference, etc.
- Several governments feel that the negotiations conducted by the Soviet Union, Poland and the German Democratic Republic with the Federal Republic of Germany would improve the general atmosphere in Europe and help establishing the confidence in the security conference.

On the other hand, the NATO and the Federal Republic of Germany have been trying to use this to postpone or put off the conference by setting the success of these talks as precondition to the conference, in other words, by exerting political pressure.

Of the various international bodies of the capitalist countries, the Foreign Ministerial Council of the Northern European Countries looked at the questions of European security and the associated conference in a very positive light at their meeting held on 21-22 April 1970.

Also, the issues related to the topic were given marked attention in the document issued by the Council of Europe on 22 April 1970. Although its conclusions contain some positive elements, the value of these is greatly reduced by the fact that they are combined with offensive and slanderous statements concerning the socialist states.

In any case, the facts that the international bodies of the western states mentioned above concretely address the initiative of the socialist countries, and even discuss the practical issues of its realization, goes to show that we have made substantial progress in the political preparations of the conference, creating a situation whereby even those countries must give consideration to our proposals, which do not welcome the conference at all; also, it seems that the preparations of the conference have moved from the stage of issuing general statements of principles from that of the practical realization.

2) The assessment of the statements made by the NATO's Council of Ministers in May

Although they addressed several topics at their meeting in Rome, the NATO ministers considered the formulation of NATO's reply to the Warsaw Treaty countries' initiative on European security and the convocation of the conference on security in Europe as their main task.

In the question of European security the various NATO members held different positions – both at the session and earlier. Some of the members would have liked to see rapid progress, while others – most notably the United States – had a fundamentally negative approach, trying to block any rapid progress. In accordance with these differences, there were different proposals submitted to the meeting. Without opposing in principle the idea of improving the relations between the Eastern and Western European countries, the United States wanted to make the summoning of the security conference condition to the results of the bilateral talks. A similar position was adopted by the Federal Republic of Germany and Canada. Great Britain and Belgium proposed to set up a standing committee of mixed composition, as a coordinating body or platform to prepare the conference. The Netherlands urged to set up a working committee for the same purpose. Italy recommended calling an open conference attended by ambassadors or

experts, without an agenda, in the hope that it could lead to a conference of a higher level later on. Without actually submitting a separate proposal, France took up a more positive position, willing to consider the summoning of a security conference.

In the end the meeting of the NATO ministers adopted a closing statement based on a compromise. On the one hand the United States was forced to climb down from its strict position of complete rejection and on the other hand some of the members with a more positive approach reduced their demands. No basic changes have been made in the essential questions; nevertheless, new and more or less positive elements have emerged in the approach to European security and the associated conference on security in Europe.

The aim of the United States at the meeting of the NATO ministers was to hold on to its fundamental negative position and to disarm its allies with concessions that missed the core of the matter; also, by blowing the significance of the new elements in the adopted documents out of proportion, it wanted to ensure that NATO seize the initiative in the area of European security.

There is no fundamental change in the NATO position; this is evidenced in the following:

- NATO wants to keep the preparations of the conference in the state of tentative inquiries; if adopted, the method of procedure NATO had recommended could put off the conference indefinitely;
- NATO continues to link progress, in the form of some multi-lateral consultations, with the known preconditions (i.e. results in the negotiations between the Soviet Union and the FRG, between Poland and the FRG, the GDR and the FRG, at the four -power talks about Berlin, and at the SALT negotiations in Vienna). On handing over the NATO documents to our Ambassador, the under-secretary of state at the United States Foreign Office, Mr. Hillenbrand, announced that progress in the matter of European security could hardly be envisaged without having some results at least at one of these negotiations;
- Although the NATO statement did make mention of the proposal adopted by the Warsaw Treaty countries' foreign ministers on 31 October 1970 in connection with the agenda, elements of subterfuge and intervention in the socialist countries' internal affairs were mixed into it in order to dilute the proposal;
- They continue to regard the progress in the question of the troops' mutual and balanced reduction as a testing ground; nevertheless, they leave us completely in the dark about their ideas in this regard; it is not apparent from their joint declaration whether they have agreed to the actual reduction of armed personnel or whether they only have in mind the replacement of an American army of a certain strength with West German troops. Our information is that they want a so-called

“proportional” reduction; in other words, they want to see a reduction in the Warsaw Treaty countries’ armies that is twice or thrice as large as the one the NATO countries would be willing to undertake.

- Also, their declaration does not say anything about the fate of the tactical nuclear weapons.

NATO’s position also contains certain new elements, or slight shifts in comparison to their earlier point of view:

- In the closing document they concretely mention the conference on security in Europe, something they had not done in any previous NATO document;

- Admittedly only on certain conditions, they nevertheless seem willing to move from the tentative bilateral talks to multilateral negotiations, viewing the establishment of a permanent organization to prepare the European security conference as feasible;

- Although admittedly they dilute the proposal submitted by the Prague meeting of the socialist countries’ foreign ministers for the agenda, they are at least paying attention to it;

- They have issued a separate statement on the point of the mutual and balanced reduction of armed personnel, nevertheless, they have not linked it with their comments on the security conference in Europe.

In connection with this I mention that the British foreign minister Stewart thinks it possible to conduct parallel negotiations on the European security conference and the mutual and balanced reduction of armed personnel; in his view the reduction of armed personnel could be extended to the military units armed with tactical nuclear weapons; acting on behalf the NATO countries, Italy has sent the authentic text of the documents to all the non-NATO countries of Europe; several other NATO countries have done the same on their own accord; we, for example, have received the documents from representatives of Great Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United States, all expressing their willingness to conduct bilateral consultations.

3) Our plans and proposals for the work to be done

As it must be apparent from our assessment of the developments regarding the preparation of the conference on security in Europe, we are firmly convinced that the Warsaw Treaty countries’ harmonized plans, along with their initiatives and work made on that basis, have greatly contributed to the progress and the accomplished results.

It has primarily been due to their concerted and harmonized efforts that the socialist countries have so far been able to sustain the initiative in the matter of the conference on security in Europe, keeping the entire topic, one of the most important questions of European politics, on the agenda for over a year, both with a broadening scope and in a concrete form.

With regard to the future, we continue to assign utmost importance to the point that the socialist countries harmonize their policies in the interest of establishing peace and security in Europe in general, and in order to facilitate the convocation of the conference on security in Europe in specific. They should come forward with newer and newer initiatives, maintaining the diplomatic pressure.

The significance of concerted political actions on our part will continue to grow, especially once we get around to holding multilateral talks with the representatives of the western capitalist countries, or when some kind of a preparatory organization will be formed with representatives from both the socialist and the capitalist countries. In our opinion the latest meeting of the deputy foreign ministers and the proposed conference of the foreign ministers constitute important stages in the socialist countries' harmonized political campaign in connection with the preparation of the conference on the security in Europe.

Our future work must have two characteristic traits. On the one hand, we must intensify our joint efforts, initiatives and proposals in the interest of the convocation of the conference on security in Europe at the earliest opportunity, through the publication of joint statements and documents, if necessary; on the other hand, we must carry on conducting bilateral consultations and talks with the non-socialist countries on the basis of our harmonized policies. On our part, we have scheduled several bilateral talks at both ministerial and lower level on questions regarding the conference on security in Europe for the second half of the year.

As to the concrete tasks, our positions is as follows:

We think it necessary that the meeting of foreign ministers publish a statement with their assessment of the situation regarding the establishment of European security and the preparation of the associated conference. It reacts to the documents issued at the Rome conference of the NATO ministers, criticizing the negative aspects but using their positive elements in a constructive spirit in the interest of making the conference on security in Europe a success.

The Statement must also include our proposals. These are as follows:

a) The Ambassadors and special envoys of European countries who are resident in Helsinki – in the capacity of a quasi-steering committee – must start working on the concrete preparations for the first conference on security in Europe (agenda, timeframe, location, level of

representation, etc.). Those countries that have no representatives in Helsinki (for example, the GDR and the FRG) could appoint a special envoy for this purpose.

b) We must reiterate our willingness to participate in the European conference at any time, suggesting early 1971 as a possible new date.

c) Our recommendation to the European governments is that they accept the proposed series of conferences on security in Europe and immediately instruct their ambassadors and special envoys residing in Helsinki to start working on the preparations for the next conference as soon as they have agreed on the questions related to the first conference.

d) In view of the results of the bilateral consultations, we wish to change the title of our proposed items for the agenda.

The title of the first item should be changed to:

The renouncement of the use of force and the threat to use force in the relations between European states; the principles of the relations between countries of different social system.

The title of the second item should be changed to:

The broadening of trade, economic and scientific-technological as well as cultural relations, based on an equal status, in order to develop political cooperation between European states.

The changes made in the proposed titles in the light of current events necessitate certain changes to be made in the documents produced earlier in these topics. These changes could either be discussed through diplomatic channels or be submitted to the ministerial conference outlined earlier.

e) We must show readiness in starting exploratory negotiations with representatives of the North Atlantic Alliance in the matter of mutual and balanced reduction of armed personnel as well as in any other questions related to disarmament (for example, on the reduction of nuclear weapons, the creation of nuclear-free zones, etc.). It should be pointed out that NATO's relevant proposals are ambiguous and incomplete.

f) We must declare that we are willing to conduct bilateral or multilateral talks with any European or North American states in the interest of bringing security to Europe, discussing proposals and ideas that are likely to aid and speed up the preparations for the conference on security in Europe.

We are confident that our harmonized political direction and joint efforts will yield further results in the establishment of security in Europe, as well as in the preparation and convocation of the

conference on security in Europe. We are also confident that our efforts will generate sympathy in European public opinion. Thank you for your attention.

[Translated by Ervin Dunay, Central European University, Budapest]

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