

**FOREIGN MINISTRY
TOP SECRET!**

**00482/3/1970 Approved by Comrade Frigyes Puja
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GUIDING PRINCIPLES**

For the preparations of the conference on security in Europe in accordance with the Sophia meeting of the Warsaw Treaty countries' deputy foreign ministers

I.

On 26-27 January 1970, the deputy foreign ministers of the Warsaw Treaty countries met in Sophia to discuss the issues related to the preparations for the conference on security and cooperation in Europe. They

- exchanged views on the lessons of the consultations conducted with representatives of various western countries
- analyzed the proceedings and documents of the NATO's latest conference held in Brussels in December 1969
- presented the ideas and proposals of their respective governments regarding the all-European conference and the most effective way of preparing it.

II.

1) During the meeting of the deputy foreign ministers the following observations were made:

- the ground for socialist countries' initiative to convoke the European security conference was well-prepared; with the conditions for convening the conference being ripe, and despite the obvious difficulties, the chances to make it a success are good;
- by handing over the documents produced at the Prague meeting of their foreign ministers, and by conducting broad-scale consultations afterwards, the socialist countries reached the phase of the concrete preparations for the European conference and of the discussions of practical issues;
- the socialist countries have proved that they were not led by propagandistic motifs when they suggested the idea of the security conference.

2) With regard to the capitalist states of Europe, two main directions seem to emerge with increasing clarity:

a) Several countries have shown enduring and positive interest in the European security conference; some of them have actively been involved, submitting constructive proposals in the interest of the conference's preparation; these countries include the neutral states, the majority of the smaller NATO countries as well as France and Spain.

b) The opponents of the conference are also beginning to emerge clearly: the governments of the USA and Great Britain, but also of the FRG and Italy, have made official and unofficial steps either to postpone or to block the security conference; the USA leads the field in this regard: at the December 1969 session of the Atlantic Council it defeated the governments supporting the idea of the European security conference and achieved that the problem of European security be approached on a military bloc basis; by including in the NATO statement certain topics not ripe for a solution among the proposed items of the agenda and by setting preconditions, the NATO powers aimed at either postponing the conference or blocking it. For example, the following proposals are not yet ready for solution and therefore cannot be accepted:

- The question of balanced regional disarmament. There is disagreement in this question even among the NATO powers. France, for example, would not welcome this topic on the

agenda, which could easily dissuade the neutral countries from attending the security conference.

- Demands such as accordance of the FRG's (in other words the western powers')
"Ostpolitik" or "progress in the Berlin question" are tantamount to setting preconditions.

3) The analysis of the Atlantic Council's session also revealed that the United States, Great Britain and the other powers opposed to the idea of the conference had been unable to block the preparation of the conference and to stifle the voice of those NATO members who supported the conference. This is suggested by the deliberately vague phrasing of the NATO documents, as well as the following circumstances:

- The recognition of the usefulness of the idea of the European conference;

- The charging of the Atlantic Council with further tasks related to the European conference;

- The proposed additions to the unofficial agenda, which could be incorporated into the material of the security conference, e.g. the development of cultural and scientific cooperation, the problems regarding the improvement of the human environment;

- The omission of vehement attacks on the GDR in the NATO documents, suggesting that they had already agreed, in principle at least, to the participation of the GDR at the conference.

III.

In discussions with the representatives of the host country and the non-socialist diplomats posted to the city, especially on encountering noted interest in the Sophia meeting of the deputy foreign ministers and the theme of European security, our diplomatic personnel must rely on the guidelines set forth in the present publication.

1) To questions regarding the Sophia meeting of the deputy foreign ministers, they should supply the following information:

a) In the opinion of the socialist countries' governments the majority of the European states welcomed the Budapest Call of the Warsaw Treaty countries and seemed ready to take part in an all-European security conference; this circumstance encourages the countries issuing the Call to make further efforts in the interest of the conference and to lend support to all its advocates.

b) The United States government is main the opponent of the European conference, despite the fact that the socialist countries do not object to its participation. Hopefully, the governments of the European countries will be able to convince the government of the United States that Europe's fate, security and the cooperation between the European states is primarily a European affair. Taking into account Europe's position and role in shaping the international affairs, it appears, however, that a well-founded European peace agreement could exert a positive influence on world peace.

2) They must point out that the items proposed for the European security conference's agenda by the Prague meeting of the socialist countries' foreign ministers found favorable responses from many European governments. Admittedly only in an unofficial form, a number of commentators urged for additional items. Naturally, we must be cautious not to overload the every first conference with insoluble or extremely complex issues; nevertheless, the socialist countries will consider with utmost attention every new proposal regarding the agenda. The same applies to proposals regarding the scheduling of the conference. We are ready to sit down at the European negotiating table within days. Other proposals can also be discussed, however, and if there are any such proposals, then these should be made public. In semi-official consultations between foreign ministries there was a suggestion that it might be useful to organize a preparatory committee and also consider the possibility of institutionalizing the European security system. The diplomatic personnel must point out that all these questions are open to negotiation. We do not reject any proposals that could further the reconciliation of European states and peoples and

the accomplishment of the European security conference. We welcome all suggestions, because the success of the European conference is the concern of every European state.

IV.

From the above it should be clear that we would like to see the idea of the European security conference stay in the focus of attention in the forthcoming months. This purpose will be served by Comrade János Péter's travels to several European countries as outlined above. We would like to ask Comrade Ambassador to provide continuous information about his discussions and experiences, as well as any possible proposal put forward by his partners, because (and this is strictly for the Ambassador's own information) it is possible that in early May another meeting will be held in Budapest between the foreign ministers of the Warsaw Treaty countries. His reports could play an essential part in preparing the ministerial conference.

Budapest, 16 February 1970.

[Translated by Ervin Dunay, Central European University]

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